

# **The Chinese Military Power: Its Real Situation & the Influence**

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Although China has a long history for more than three thousand years, The PRC is a newly built communism country on the basis of the traditional thought and strategy of the Chinese. The PRC is now attracting the eyes of the world because of her amazing economic growth. At the same time, the more countries have become pay more attention for the negative influences on the international society.

This paper tries to make the analysis on the reality of the Chinese military power and its influence on the surrounding countries from the viewpoint of Japan. Japan, as one of the surrounding countries of China, has not only imported many various cultures from China and also waged the wars with her. Japanese viewpoint would be beneficial for other countries because of the lessons learned through the long history of the communication with China.

## **1. Traditional Power of China**

### ***GDP & Population***

In the history of China, many dynasties got appeared, rising and experienced the height of its power for about fifty years, then became falling, and finally disappeared from the history. The Chinese history has experienced this type of cycles at the interval of several hundred years. In those cycles, the prosperity and the population on the continent of China changed dramatically. Over most of the past two thousand years China has accounted for between 22 and 33 percent of world GDP. But the economic power of China sharply fell down according to the collapse of the social order. For example, in 1950, the next year of the end of the Civil War, China's share of the global GDP fell, reaching 4-5 percent, where it stayed until 1973<sup>1</sup>.

The population has also been changing dramatically. In the Warring States period (403 -221 B. C.), the total population of China had already reached to about twenty millions. In Han Dynasty, the population reached about sixty millions in 2 A. D. After that, the population fell down dramatically to twenty millions in the one generation, because of the population collapse caused by the

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<sup>1</sup> Angus Maddison, *The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective* (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2001), Appendix B, p. 263.

civil war and the famine. The population of China increased in the stable and prosperous society in Han, Tang, Song, Qing Dynasties, reaching about sixty millions. In the 17<sup>th</sup> Century, the population of Qing Dynasty reached one hundred million, in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, reached about four hundred millions. And China also experienced dramatic decrease of the population, reaching less than twenty millions several times<sup>2</sup>.

### ***The most militarized civilization and formidable than the Soviets***

China has been very militarized from the ancient times, because of the frequently happening civil wars, the rebellions and the invasions by the surrounding tribes, which resulted in the population collapse. In China, there had been more than 6,000 battles in 4,000 plus years from the twenty-sixth century B. C. to the end of Qing Dynasty. This figure was more than one-third of the total numbers that had happened around the world during the same period<sup>3</sup>.

China has had a huge amount of force. For example, Shihuangdi (259-210 B.C.), Initial Emperor, in Qin Dynasty, commanded about one million personnel. The total force of China, including all of the warring states in those days, is estimated about 5,300,000. This huge amount of the force is far outnumbered the force commanded by Caesar, reaching twenty to thirty thousands. China also invented and developed the revolutionary armaments like the gunpowder, the advanced crossbows and the rockets propelled by the gunpowder; and besides, they deployed and used them in a huge amount in the battle fields. Although China was almost colonized by the lack of the military power coping with the modernized western countries after the eighteenth century, it would be better not to forget the fact that China has historically been seriously militarized civilization.

The U. S. confronted with the Soviet Union in the Cold War Era. Which nation does have the greater power, the PRC or the Soviet Union? The PRC has the almost similar amount of the territory to that of the U. S. The Soviet Union had the 2.3 times more of that of the U. S. But the most important factor deciding the national strength is GDP. Because it is not only the most useful indication of the economic power of the nation, but also decides the capability to invest the construction of the military power. In terms of GDP, the Soviet Union could not

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<sup>2</sup> Toru Kato, The History of the Population of China, <http://www.geocities.jp/cato1963/jinkou996.html>.

<sup>3</sup> Peng Guangqing and Yao Youzhi, *The Science of Military Strategy* (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2005), p. 3.

succeed to overwhelm the U. S. The best record of the Soviet Union's economy was nearly a half of the GDP of the U. S.

According to the IMF, in 1990 China's GDP share of global economy was at 5.61 percent, increasing to 11.02 percent in 2000, 14.39 percent in 2005, and an estimated 15.83 percent in 2007<sup>4</sup>. In 2020's, the China's GDP would become larger than that of the U. S., if the annual economic growth of China maintain more than 7 to 9 percent. The population of China is about five times larger than that of the U. S. The Soviet Union had almost the similar amount of the population to that of the U. S.

In total, the Soviet Union had almost the same power as the U. S., on the assumption of its vast territory has the same importance as GDP in the national power. Considering the importance of the GDP and the population, China would become about five times more powerful than the U. S., because China will have almost the same GDP in the 2020's, on the other side, she has the five times larger population and the same size of the territory. China should become more formidable than the Soviet Union for the U. S. in neat future, and especially for the adjacent countries of China like Japan, Korea and Taiwan.

### ***Until when will China be formidable and what should we do?***

The average duration of the most powerful and prosperous period of the dynasties is about fifty years according to the Chinese history. The pressure on the surrounding countries caused by the growing China would be kept for more than ten to twenty years, because the economic growth began in the late 1970's under Deng Xiaoping's leadership.

After 2030, China will become a society occupied by more than two hundred million aged people and the population of China will begin to decrease<sup>5</sup>. China will surely lose the momentum of the economic growth and the military expansion. According to the lessons from the Chinese history, the PRC will be suffering from the civil war or the rebellions after 2030. The most important issue on the national security of the neighboring countries should be how to endure the increasing pressure of the Chinese military challenge until 2030.

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<sup>4</sup> International Monetary Fund, *World Economic Outlook Database*, April 2007, [www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/data/weoiept.aspx?sy=1990&ey=...](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/data/weoiept.aspx?sy=1990&ey=...)

<sup>5</sup> Keiichirou Ooizumi, "the Possibilities of the Sustainable Economic Growth from the Viewpoint of the Demographic Dynamics," *The Possibilities of the Sustainable China's Economic Growth* edited by Zhu Yan, supervised by Toshio Watanabe & the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Public Policy Institute (Keisousyobou, 2011), pp.3-10.

## 2. Mao's Strategy

### ***Active Defense Strategy***

The rise and fall of the dynasties on the continent of China brought the Chinese philosophers some unique view on the history. They considered the human history as the cyclic change in the mixture of the positive aspect of all events within the universe, Yang, and the negative one, Yin. The Chinese people would never give up in the worst situation, because they believe Yang will surely come back again in some day. They would always be cautious not become arrogant about the height of the best situation, because Yin has certainly already stolen up behind them.

Such a view on the history based upon the dualism has prevailed among all factions of the Chinese philosophers, including the most famous ancient military strategist, Sunzi. Mao Zedong was also influenced by this view in his strategy. Mao viewed a war as the highest form of struggle for resolving contradictions, when they have developed to a certain stage<sup>6</sup>. He also said that "A war is the continuation of politics by other ... means. When politics develops to a certain stage beyond which it cannot proceed by the usual means, war breaks out to sweep the obstacles from the way<sup>7</sup>."

He asserted that the seizure of power by armed forces, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution<sup>8</sup>, and only with guns can the whole world be transformed<sup>9</sup>. Thus, Mao seemed the military force as the only decisive means to resolve the political contradictions between the imperialism states.

However, he also put the great importance on the politics and other non-military factors. This shows the dualism. The PRC leaders and the strategists emphasize the importance called Sanzhan, including psychological warfare, propaganda campaign to the masses and the legal warfare, those are very effective to collapse the adversary metal strength.

As the other side of the dualism, Mao formalized the Active Defense Strategy. This strategy contains three stages; the first stage is our strategic

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<sup>6</sup> "Problems of the Strategy in China's Revolutionary War" (December 1936), *Selected Works*, Vol. I , p. 180.

<sup>7</sup> "On Protracted War" (May 1938), *Selected Works*, Vol. II , pp. 152.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 219.

<sup>9</sup> "Problems of War and Strategy"(November 6, 1938), *Selected Works*, Vol. II , p. 225.

defensive; the second one is our preparation for the offensive confronting the enemy's defensive posture; and the final one is our strategic offensive and enemy strategic withdrawal<sup>10</sup>. On the defensive stage, Mao asserted; we sometimes have to retreat to avoid our casualties caused by waging war with the overwhelming enemy. If possible, we should disturb the enemy in order to wear down the enemy strength. The preparation stage is the hardest period for China during the long protracted war. During this stage, we should alter the balance of power, by wearing down the enemy enough to launch the offensive with the advantageous power. On the offensive stage, we should pursue the annihilation of the enemy<sup>11</sup>.

This Active Defense Strategy is in effective under the modernized local conflicts, such as those concerning the sovereignty of the disputed territories. This strategy adapting to the conflicts over the sovereignty of the territories puts more emphasis on the offensive than the Mao's Active Defense Strategy for the reunification of the mainland China. The People's Liberation Army would not give up their assertion to the sovereignty for the disputed territories, including Senkaku (Diaoyu in Chinese) Islands. Senkaku Islands were incorporated into Japan's territory according to the International Law with the legal procedures in 1895 by the Japanese government. At that time, Qing did not declare any protests to the incorporation. The PRC abruptly began to assert their sovereignty to Senkaku Islands in 1971, only after the discovery of the submarine oil field by ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) in 1968.

The similar situation has already observed in the South China Sea. The PRC is disputing the islands with Vietnam and the Philippines, both waged the battle, and other neighboring countries. The PRC would not give up their illegal request for the sovereignty to the islands, and if the balance of power is seemed to become overwhelming to the adversary, they will not hesitate to occupy the disputed area with their force by surprise. Once succeeding in the occupation, they would by no means bring back the territory. This shows the inherent endurance of the Chinese leaders to accomplish their aim in the long run, and their will to use force to do it without any hesitation if there is an opportunity.

### ***Nuclear Forces Combined with People's War***

Another principle of Mao's Strategy is "Liang-Dan Yi-Xing." This means the

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<sup>10</sup> "On Protracted War" (May 1938), Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 472.

<sup>11</sup> Niu Li, *Mao Zedong's Military Strategy* (Jiefangjun Chuban, 2004), pp. 98-103.

Ballistic Missiles with Nuclear Warheads and the Artificial Satellites. Peng Dehuai, Commander of the Chinese Volunteer Force dispatched to Korea during the Korean War, opposed to Mao's People's War Concept, because of the severe experience of waging war with the modernized U. S. Forces. Peng asserted the need to modernize the PLA conventional forces by learning from the Soviet Forces. On the other hand, Peng would accept the extended nuclear deterrence of the Soviet Union.

However, Mao rejected the Peng's request for the modernization. Mao, as the leader of newly built the PRC, would not accept the reliance of the nuclear deterrence on the Soviet forces. Mao decided to develop the nuclear bombs and the ballistic missiles under the support of the Soviets. All supports provided by the Soviet side were withdrawn, as the result of the confrontation between the PRC and the Soviet Union in 1960. In spite of it, the PRC independently succeeded to develop the nuclear bombs and various kinds of the ballistic missiles by the early 80's<sup>12</sup>. Mao established the foundation of the sovereignty and the independence of the PRC from the U. S. and Russia by attaining her own nuclear deterrence power.

On the other hand, Mao would defend China from the invasion especially by the Soviet Army along the long border with the Soviet Union by the People's War Strategy. On People's War Strategy, Mao said "What is a true bastion of iron? It is the masses, the millions upon millions of people who genuinely and sincerely support the revolution<sup>13</sup>." and he also said, "The operations of the people's guerrillas and those of the main forces of the Red Army complement each other like a man's right arm and left arm<sup>14</sup>." However, People's War Strategy should impose the burden of the guerrilla warfare and the casualties on the civilians; and besides the enemy should be allowed the invasion in the depth of the Chinese territory to wear down their strength<sup>15</sup>.

People's War Strategy has a great influence on the PLA military strategy today. For example, the Chinese strategists now consider the information warfare as a new type of People's War. And they put the emphasis on the mobilization of the cyber militias from the IT specialists in the civilian sectors.

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<sup>12</sup>Shi Xueyuan, *The Nuclear Force and the Policy of the World Nuclear Powers* (Junshi Chubanshe, Beijing, 1991), pp. 136-138.

<sup>13</sup> "Be Concerned with the Well-Being of the Masses, Pay Attention to Methods of Work" (January 27, 1934), *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p.150.

<sup>14</sup> "On Protracted War" (May 1938), *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 238.

<sup>15</sup> Niu Li, *Mao Zedong's Military Strategy*, pp.103-107.

They also assert that information warfare is not only a war using the computers but also a new special war mobilizing radio communication and Internet technology<sup>16</sup>. The PLA strategists put the emphasis on the creation and the development of People's War Theory under the current national defense circumstances. In order to match the request for war with the advanced technology, to accomplish the ideal and perfect mobilization system and the intimate corporation between the PLA and the civilian sectors is indispensable<sup>17</sup>. China is also emphasizing integration of defense and civilian sectors to leverage output from China's expanding science and technology base<sup>18</sup>. This reflects the traditional total mobilization system of People's War Strategy.

Another example of People's War Strategy is "Ciaoxian Zhan", which means war without any limitations. This strategy is based on the idea that every useful measure in the civilized society should be utilized as weapons<sup>19</sup>.

### **3. Deng Xiaoping's Modernization of the PLA**

#### ***The PLA modernization***

Deng Xiaoping got the supreme power after the catastrophic Great Cultural Revolution led by Mao. Under Deng's leadership, the "Four Modernizations," consisting of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense, were promulgated in 1973. Since 1978, China embarked on a fundamental process of reform and modernization that has resulted in an unprecedented rate of economic development. China has been successful in attracting vast amounts of foreign direct investment<sup>20</sup>.

Revamping the military was, however, seen as "a long-term strategic program, and put the fourth priority of the "Four Modernizations." No dramatic upsurge in the level of Chinese defense spending or effort occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Instead, attention centered on redesigning the armed forces so that they would be capable of absorbing and effectively using more

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<sup>16</sup> Study of War Theory & Strategy Department, Military Science Institute, *Study on War Strategy* (Jiefangjun Chuban, 2005), pp. 339-340.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, pp. 498-501.

<sup>18</sup> US Office of Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving People's Republic of China 2013*, p. 47.

<sup>19</sup> Qiao Liang & Wang Xiansui, *War without Any Limitations* (Junshi Wenyun Chubanshe, Beijing, 1999), Chapter 7.

<sup>20</sup> Zalmay M. Khalilzad, Abram N. Shulsky, Daniel L. Byman, Roger Cliff, David T. Orletsky, Davie Shlapak, Ashley J. Tellis, *The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), p. 1.

advanced weapons and equipment<sup>21</sup>.

In 1975 the CMC (Central Military Commission) concluded that a massive Soviet invasion was more of a myth than reality. With Mao's support and Deng's guidance, the CMC implemented a three-year plan of force reduction, cutting the overall forces level of the PLA from 6.1 to 4.5 million. The army was reduced by 32 per cent, strategic missile force by 27.2 per cent, and the air force by 13.4 per cent. Only the navy increased its number of sailors<sup>22</sup>.

In 1983, Deng proposed that the PLA's war strategy be altered from preparation for an early all-out war with the USSR to one of 'steady development' in a changed international environment. The Soviets were mainly focusing on the European theatre and preoccupied by the threat posed to it by hardline US policy. Thus the PLA enjoyed historic opportunity of development and reform: the PLA was no longer forced to keep a giant army<sup>23</sup>.

In July 1975, when Deng Xiaoping surveyed the PRC military, he summarized the problems of the PLA in five words: "bloating, laxity, conceit, extravagance and inertia."<sup>24</sup> The PLA did not perform well against the Vietnamese in 1979. Thereafter, first Deng and then his successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao continually sought to shrink the total number of PLA personnel; reestablish and then upgrade the military education system; build a noncommissioned officer corps; gradually create a more secure nuclear deterrent; reduce the dominance of ground units in the force structure and decision-making system; elevate the positions and capabilities of the strategic and missile forces (second artillery), navy, and air force; revolutionize the technological level of all services and functions such as logistics, intelligence, command, control, and communications; and increase mobility and joint operational capabilities<sup>25</sup>.

### ***The Rising of the Resources after the Tiananmen Incident***

The resources devoted to military modernization rose in the 1990s as China's economy gained strength, as communist regimes in Eastern Europe and

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>22</sup> You Ji, *The Armed Forces of China* (London & New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), pp. 32-33.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>24</sup> Deng Xiaoping, "The Task of Consolidating the Army," July 14, 1975, in *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), p. 27.

<sup>25</sup> David M. Lampton, *The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds* (Berkeley Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 2008), p. 39.

the Soviet Union collapsed, and as mutual strategic suspicion between Beijing and Washington increased following the June 4, 1989, violence in the PRC, the Tiananmen incident, in which the PLA had played a decisive role. Officially announced military budgets from 1990 largely rose by double digits<sup>26</sup>.

Beijing fears that the United States would intervene to protect Taiwan if the PRC used force against the island. However, a lack of response by the PRC would undermine the regime's legitimacy with its own people. Given this dilemma, Beijing's chosen course has been to increase its military strength in hopes of deterring a Taiwan declaration of its independence and, failing that, deterring a U.S intervention<sup>27</sup>.

Moreover, the 1991 display of U. S. military superiority in the gulf War, the 1996 dispatch of two U.S. carrier groups to the waters off Taiwan, a move that Beijing found it difficult to respond to, and the 1999 Kosovo War also created a rationale for increased military spending. Finally, a major contributor to rising military spending has been the need to keep military pay somewhat competitive with compensation in the civilian sector. Beijing's 2006 defense white paper acknowledged the protracted nature of the military modernization task by saying that the goal was "building informationized armed forces and being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21<sup>st</sup> century<sup>28</sup>.

US Office of the Secretary of Defense describes in *Annual Report to Congress* in March 2013 that, "Beijing announced a 10.7 percent increase in its annual military budget to \$114 billion, continuing more than two decades of sustained annual defense spending increases. Analysis of data from 2003 through 2012 indicates China's officially disclosed military budget grew at an average of 9.7 percent per year in inflation-adjusted terms over the period. China has the fiscal strength and political will to support defense spending growth at comparable levels, despite lowering its economic growth forecast in 2012 to 7.5 percent from 8 percent in 2011. Continued increases will support PLA modernization efforts and facilitate China's move toward a more professional force. Using 2012 prices and exchange rates, the U.S Department of Defense estimates that China's total actual military-related expenditure for 2012 falls between \$135 billion and \$215 billion."<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 40.

<sup>27</sup> John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), especially ch. 8.

<sup>28</sup> D. M. Lampton, *The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds*, pp. 39-40.

<sup>29</sup> US Office of Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security*

As long as the strong political power of the PLA will be kept, the trend of the military budget increase will be maintained, even if the economic growth becomes lower.

### ***The Maritime Strategy Development from the Coastal Navy to the Offshore Navy***

Deng Xiaoping made an on-the-spot inspection on the sea to a state-of-the-art destroyer equipped with missiles in 1979. He declared that we had the right to assert our interests in the issues in the Pacific Ocean. Then he wrote down a slogan appealing to construct a strong navy with the capabilities of conducting modern operations<sup>30</sup>. Deng appointed Liu Huaqing as Supreme Commander of the PLA Navy, and ordered him to construct such a modernized navy in 1982<sup>31</sup>.

Liu showed the strategic guidance which the reform of the PLA navy should base on. Active Defense and Offshore Operation (Jinhai Zuozhan) were the guidance shown by Liu<sup>32</sup>. There are several reasons in addition to the threat by the U. S. intervention, why the PLA has to construct a strong navy and why Liu showed such guidance.

The presence of a large and growing percentage of China's GDP in coastal areas vulnerable to air and sea threats is a concern Beijing is addressing<sup>33</sup>. From 1978 to 1980, 32.7 percent of China's GDP was located in coastal areas; by 1995-97, that percentage had risen to 41.7. Doctrinally, therefore, Beijing wants to push the space for potential conflict offshore. This requires enhanced naval and air capabilities, as well as the means to command, control, and coordinate fast-moving and far-flung forces<sup>34</sup>.

Another reason is the nation's increasing dependence on important imported strategic resources, notably oil, that are concentrated in volatile areas, especially the Middle East. It is an increasing concern in Beijing. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that by 2025 the PRC will be 73 percent dependent on oil

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*Developments Involving People's Republic of China 2013*, p. 45.

<sup>30</sup> Shi Changxue, *Navy Supreme Commander Liu Huaqing* (Changsha Chubanshe, Beijing, 2013), p. 125.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 33-35.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 86.

<sup>33</sup> Su Ruozhou, "A Great Military reform- Roundup of Strategic Changes in Our Army Building," *Jiefangjun Bao*, December 18, 1998, pp. 1-2.

<sup>34</sup> D. M. Lampton, *The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds*, p. 41.

imports<sup>35</sup>.

Liu indicated the six principles in the PLA navy strategy, as follows: The first principle is to match the multilayered system of the theoretical principles; The second one is to materialize the strategy given by the CMC; The third is to reflect the inherent requests of navy construction and future operations; The fourth is to base upon the objective needs brought by the development of the naval circumstances; The fifth is to respond to the requests from the circumstances of the strategic status and the posture of the maritime battle field in the Chinese defense districts on the sea; The final one is to meet with the increasing demand brought by the improvement of the China's status in the international society<sup>36</sup>.

Liu said: Comrade Deng Xiaoping clearly indicated the orientation on the two fundamental issues, the strategic characteristic and the basic area of the naval operations. The characteristic is defensive, and the area is the offshore sea. According to this orientation, we have to make sure that our naval strategy is to defend the offshore area, and it belongs to one type of the area defense strategies.<sup>37</sup>

Liu also said: It is needless for China to pursue the blue water navy to attain the hegemony. Our objective is to maintain the unification of our nation, and to defend our territory and sovereignty, to cope with the local conflicts on the sea, and to deter and defend the possible invasion from the sea by the imperialism and the hegemonism. The primary operational area for the PLA navy of the hour is the offshore sea which is encircled by the first island chain, including Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. All of this area is under the administration of China according to the international maritime laws, and including the inherent territories of China like the islands in South China Sea.

According to advancing the level of the economic power and the science and technology, the naval power should become much stronger. The operational area of the PLA navy should be gradually extended to the northern part of the Pacific Ocean and the second island chain. Our navy will conduct the operational phase in which both we and enemy launch the offensive, according to the doctrine of the Active Defense campaign<sup>38</sup>.

This Offshore Active Defense strategy is the basic theory leading the construction and the operational concept of the PLA navy today. The U. S.

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p.41.

<sup>36</sup> Shi Changxue, *Navy Supreme Commander Liu Huaqing*, pp. 118-119.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 125.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 126.

analysts fear the appearing strategy of the PLA, called the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Strategy. Although this strategy is the concept estimated by the U. S. side, it has clearly been resulted from the Offshore Active Defense declared by Deng and executed by Liu.

#### **4. The threat of the A2/AD in the western Pacific Ocean**

China's leadership has supported former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping's dictum from the early 1990s that China should, "observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capabilities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership." This guidance reflected Deng's belief that Chinese interests are best served by focusing on internal development and stability while steering clear of challenging or confronting major powers.

#### ***Rising of Power and Change of the Strategy***

However, some Chinese scholars question whether Deng's policy approach will continue to win support as China's interests increase abroad and its power expands. China's perceived security interests have changed considerably since Deng's era to include a heavy reliance on maritime commerce. China's improving naval capabilities enable roles and missions that would have been impossible for the PLA to pursue just a decade ago<sup>39</sup>.

Today the PRC became the country having the largest GDP except the U. S. Some analysts estimate that the GDP of China will surpass that of the U. S. by 2030. Analysis of 2000-2009 data indicates China's officially disclosed military budget grew at an average of 11.8 percent in inflation-adjusted terms over the period, while gross domestic product (GDP) grew at 9.6 percent<sup>40</sup>. If this trend is kept, the resources allotted to the military will become larger than that of the U. S. in ten years, because the U. S., now suffering from the huge amount of the budget deficits, is obliged to cut the defense budget for five hundred billion dollars in ten years.

In August 2011, President Obama and Congress struck a grand bargain to raise the U. S. debt limit known as the Budget Control Act of 2011 (Public Law 113-25). This law immediately placed ceilings on discretionary "security"

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<sup>39</sup> US Office of Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving People's Republic of China 2013*, p. 20.

<sup>40</sup> US Office of Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving People's Republic of China 2010*, p. 41.

spending. In implementing the Budget Control Act's spending ceilings, the White House's Office of Management and Budget is reportedly looking to trim as much as \$489 billion more from the Pentagon's budget over the next decade<sup>41</sup>.

Earlier this decade, China began a new phase of military development by articulating roles and missions for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) that go beyond China's immediate territorial interests. Some of these missions and associated capabilities have allowed the PLA to contribute to international peacekeeping efforts, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counter piracy operations. Other investments have allowed the PLA to pursue anti-access and area-denial strategies. Still others appear designed to improve the PLA's ability for extended-range power projection, although China's ability to sustain military power at a distance, today, remains limited<sup>42</sup>.

### ***The Background of the Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategy***

The PLA strategists conceive that the U. S. Forces are strengthening their envelopment around the PRC, especially in the north-eastern Asia-Pacific area, as Hilary Clinton declared in Guam on January 8, 2011. The PLA strategists assert: In order to accomplish their aim, the U. S. Forces are taking several measures as follows;

The first measure is to construct the so-called "three island chains," the chains for the military envelopment zones. The first island chain starts from Kyushu, Japan in the north, to Malaysia in the south, including Republic of Korea, Japan, one of the PRC provinces, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei and Singapore. The core of the second island chain is Guam where the largest U. S. Air and Navy bases in the western Asia-Pacific are stationed. The core of the third islands is Hawaii;

The second is to strengthen the military alignment in the Asia-Pacific. "Tianan Incident," the incident where the ROK navy vessel was sunk, and the sovereignty issue of the Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan are especially utilized for strengthening the Japan-U. S. military alignment and the ROK-U. S. one. By the exchange of the information, the corporation in the logistics, and the bilateral military exercises, the de facto military alignments among the U. S., Japan and ROK is constructed. Its aim is not only to threaten the North Korea

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<sup>41</sup> Foreign Policy Initiative, *Defending Defense* (November 17, 2011), <http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/defense-spending-super-committee-and-price-g....>

<sup>42</sup> US Office of Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving People's Republic of China 2010*, p. I .

but also to defend and deter our intention;

The third is by conducting the bilateral and multilateral exercises surrounding China, to threaten the safety of our country. The objectives of the offensives in those exercises were clearly China. And besides, during the U. S. exercise with the ROK and Japan in 2010, the U. S. Navy aircraft carrier group entered into the Yellow Sea area. They became the real threat against the safety of our country, although they did not commit the violation of the territorial waters of China<sup>43</sup>.

The PLA is preparing for the new types of war and operation in the current local wars; joint operation, non-contact and asymmetric operation, firepower war, information war, quick maneuver operation, command-and-control war, special operation, aerospace war, amphibious operation, air-raid, air defense, biological war, psychological war, ecological war, and chemical war<sup>44</sup>.

### ***The Threat of the Medium-Range Missile Forces***


On firepower war, as the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report notes, “China is developing and fielding large numbers of advanced medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, new attack submarines equipped with advanced weapons, increasingly capable long-range air defense systems, electronic warfare and computer network attack capabilities, advanced fighter aircraft, and counter-space systems.”<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> National Security Policy Committee, China Political Science Study Conference edited, *Review of China's Geo-Security Environment (2010-2011)*(Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, August 2011), pp. 118-119.

<sup>44</sup> Study of War Theory & Strategy Department, Military Science Institute, *Study on War Strategy* (Jiefangjun Chuban, 2005),pp. 186-206.

<sup>45</sup> US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 2010, p. 31.



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Among them, the missile forces have shown the most dramatic increase in the quantity and the quality. According to the US DOD report, the Chinese missile force in 2012 is as follows;

System	Missiles	Launchers	Estimated Range
ICBM	50-75	50-75	5,500+ km
IRBM	5-20	5-20	3,000-5,500 km
MRBM	75-100	75-100	1,000-3,000 km
SRBM	1,000-1,200	200-250	< 1,000 km
GLCM	200-500	40-55	1,500+ km <sup>47</sup>

The Second Artillery has deployed more than 1,100 SRBM s (Short Range Ballistic Missiles) to garrisons across from Taiwan and is fielding cruise missiles, including the ground-launched CJ-10 land-attack cruise missile<sup>48</sup>. Cross-Strait economic and cultural ties continued to make important progress in 2009. Despite these positive trends, China’s military build-up opposite the island continued unabated. The PLA is developing the capability to deter Taiwan independence or influence Taiwan to settle the dispute on Beijing’s terms while simultaneously attempting to deter, delay, or deny any possible U.S. support for the island in case of conflict. The balance of cross-Strait military forces continues to shift in the mainland’s favor<sup>49</sup>.

Concerning the number deployed China’s missiles in the range of within 3,000

<sup>46</sup> US Office of Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving People’s Republic of China 2012*, May 2012, p. 40, 42.

<sup>47</sup> US Office of Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving People’s Republic of China 2012*, May 2012, p. 29.

<sup>48</sup> US Office of Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving People’s Republic of China 2013*, p. 38.

<sup>49</sup> US Office of Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving People’s Republic of China 2010*, p. I

km, including the GLCM (Ground-Launched Cruise Missile), it reached about 280-620 based on the above assessment in 2012. On the other hand, the United States will retire the nuclear-equipped sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N). The reasons why the United States decided to do so is explained as follows:

This system serves a redundant purpose in the U. S. nuclear stockpile. It has been one of a number of means to forward-deploy nuclear weapons in time of crisis. Other means include forward-deployment of bombers with either bombs or cruise missiles, as well as forward-deployment of dual-capable fighters. U. S. ICBMs and SLBMs are capable of striking any potential adversary. The deterrence and assurance rolls of TLAM-N can be adequately substituted by these other means, and the United States remains committed to providing a credible extended deterrence posture and capabilities<sup>50</sup>.

The retirement of the U. S. TLAM-N will bring the limitation in the number of the U. S. Forces missiles ranging within 3,000km with the nuclear or conventional warheads deployed in the western Pacific. The deployed warheads will be limited to the ALCM (Air-Launched Cruise Missile) s, and bombs equipped with the bombers deployed in Guam and the fighter/bombers of the aircraft carriers. It will lead the inferiority in the numbers of the warheads deployed in the Asia-Pacific to those of the PLA.

On the aircraft carriers, the most serious concern for the U. S. Forces deployed in the region within 3,000km are the MRBM (Medium-Range Ballistic Missile) called DF-21D. China continues to field an ASBM (Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile) based on a variant of the DF-21 (CSS-5) MRBM that it began deploying in 2010. Known as the DF-21D, this missile provides the PLA the capability to attack large ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific. The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km and is armed with a maneuverable warhead<sup>51</sup>.

As the result from the retirement of the TLAM-N and the threat of the DF-21D, the credibility of the U. S. extended deterrence for Japan and the ROK, would be decreased in near future, in spite of the reassurance of the credibility by the U. S. side. In that situation, the order and stability in the Asia-Pacific might become unstable.

### ***The Threat of the Asymmetric Wars***

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<sup>50</sup> US Department of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review Report*, April 2010, p. 28.

<sup>51</sup> US Office of Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving People's Republic of China 2013*, p. 38.

The strategists of the PLA put the great emphasis on the asymmetric wars. They assert that: In such a war, the inferior side finally got the victory for about 30 percent of the wars. There are many aspects of the non-symmetries; power, operation domain, period, equipment and technologies, and methods of the operations. In the Post-Cold War era, the asymmetric warfare represents the new characteristics of information war. We should analyze and research the asymmetric wars. Today by using the missiles, the inferior side can defend directly against the superior side indirect attacks like the strategic bombings<sup>52</sup>.

According to this thinking, despite the decrease of the effective attacks caused by the deployment of the MD (Missile Defense) systems in the U. S. and its allies, for the PLA, the missiles should be kept as one of the most reliable asymmetric direct attack measures against the superior forces like the U. S. Forces.

The PLA has made a great effort to win the local conflicts under the circumstances of the military information operations, especially after the Iraq War in 2003. The PLA strategists recognize that information war is the most important aspect of the new types of wars, and the operation domain should include the aerospace and the cyber space<sup>53</sup>.

For attacks on U. S. C4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) Systems and to defend their C4ISR Systems, they have developed and conducted the clandestine cyber operations in the peacetime, as one of the operation domains and the methods supported by the advanced IT technologies in the new asymmetric war<sup>54</sup>. China is executing the vigorous activities to increase their space capabilities, especially for the military purposes like the anti-satellite attacks. They are also developing other soft-kill measures, including covert operative, jammer and EMP (electromagnetic pulse)<sup>55</sup>.

The hard-kill capabilities for the amphibious assault operation, the special operation and the submarine attacks, under the support of the modernized joint forces, are put a great emphasis, judging from the trend of their military force

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<sup>52</sup> Study of War Theory & Strategy Department, Military Science Institute, *Study on War Strategy* (Jiefangjun Chuban, 2005), pp. 229-234, 261-267.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 469-480.

<sup>54</sup> National Security Policy Committee of China Political Science Study Conference edited, *Review of China's Geo-Security Environment (2010-2011)*, pp. 58-79.

<sup>55</sup> Roger Cliff et al., "Entering the Dragon's Lair- Chinese Anti-access Strategies and Their Implications for the United States," *RAND Project Air Force*, RAND Corporation, 2007, p. 111.

construction<sup>56</sup>. Although the elements of the hard-kill methods and the soft-kill ones mentioned above should be effectively combined each other, the total effects brought by these war capabilities could increase the probability of the success of the A2/AD strategy in the western Pacific.

And besides, the U. S. forces rely on the vast transportation networks for the logistic support spread among the allied countries in the western Pacific. This reliance brings the serious vulnerability to the U. S. Forces. If the allied countries reject the use of the U. S. bases in their countries, the U. S. Forces will not support the forward deployed forces. Because Japan, South Korea and Taiwan located within 1,500 km from the coast of China are in the range of the Chinese MRBMs and cruise missiles, those countries might reject the use of the U. S. bases when threatened by China with their missile forces, additional to the special force attacks and the cyber-attacks, without any engagements of the military forces.

## **5. The U. S. Estimate of the Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategy & its Counter Measures**

### ***The U. S. Estimate of the Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategy***

The U. S. government estimates that states are developing anti-access and area-denial capabilities and strategies to constrain U. S. and international freedom of action. These states are rapidly acquiring technologies, such as missiles and autonomous and remotely-piloted platforms that challenge our ability to project power from the global commons and increase our operational risk<sup>57</sup>. China is clearly involved in those challenging states. This shows that the China's ability to defend the offshore sea of China encircled by the three island chains, has been estimated to be effective by the U. S. side.

A combination of ballistic, cruise missiles, aircraft, and covert operative attacks on runways, aircraft, shelters, and other critical facilities could render U. S. airfields in Okinawa, South Korea, and the main islands of Japan unusable, particularly in the days of a conflict. In addition, ballistic missile, cruise missile, aircraft, covert operative, jammer, antisatellite, EMP, and computer network attacks could degrade command-and-control or early warning capabilities for

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<sup>56</sup> US Office of Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving People's Republic of China 2013*, pp. 6-11.

<sup>57</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *the National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011-Redefining America's Military Leadership*, 08 February, 2011, p. 3.

forward-deployed forces, particularly air forces operating from bases within about 1,500 km of China, to the point that the theater commander would choose to move them farther away<sup>58</sup>.

Even if Chinese anti-access measures did not result in the outright defeat of the United States, they would likely make it significantly more costly for the United States to operate in the region. Moreover, it is possible that these costs could rise enough that, even if U. S. decision-makers were confident that the United States would eventually prevail in a conflict with China, they might be unwilling to pay those costs.

The United States, however, can take a number of actions to counter Chinese anti-access threats. Strengthening passive defenses at air bases, deploying air and missile defense systems, strengthening defenses against covert operatives, and bolstering allied air-defense capabilities will reduce the vulnerability of air bases to anti-access attacks. Diversifying basing options for aircraft will diminish the effects of such attacks. Air and missile defense systems, strengthened defenses against covert operatives, improved allied defensive capabilities, improved information-security practices, and efforts both to deter and to mitigate the potential effects of high-altitude nuclear detonations can reduce the vulnerability of C4ISR systems<sup>59</sup>.

### ***The U. S. Counter Measures against A2/AD***

The US Air Force and Navy together are developing a new joint air-sea battle concept for defeating adversaries across the range of military capabilities. The concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate capabilities across all operational domains to counter growing challenges to U. S. freedom of action. As it matures, the concept will also help guide the development of future capabilities needed for effective power projection operations<sup>60</sup>. This new concept known as “Joint Air-Sea Battle Concept,” is, however, the only a concept. It is not guaranteed by the budget. Offshore balancing is control.

The shortage of the budget influences most seriously on the R&D (research and development). As global R&D investment increases, it is proving increasingly difficult for the United States to maintain a competitive advantage across the entire spectrum of defense technologies. We cannot afford everything

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<sup>58</sup> Roger Cliff et al., "Entering the Dragon's Lair- Chinese Anti-access Strategies and Their Implications for the United States," *RAND Project Air Force*, p. 111.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 113-114.

<sup>60</sup> US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 2010, p. 32.

we might desire: therefore, in the future, the Department must balance capability portfolios to better align with budget constraints and operational needs, based on priorities assigned to warfighter capabilities<sup>61</sup>.

U. S. President Obama made remarks to the Australian Parliament on November 17, 2011. He said in the remarks that: Reduction in U. S. defense spending will not come at the expense of the Asia Pacific. We will keep our commitments, including our treaty obligations to allies. And we will constantly strengthen our capabilities to meet the needs of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Indeed, we are already modernizing America's defense posture across the Asia Pacific. It will be more broadly distributed – maintaining our strong presence in Japan and the Korean Peninsula, while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia. Our posture will be more flexible – with new capabilities to ensure that our forces can operate freely. And our posture will be more sustainable, by helping allies and partners build their capacity, with more training and exercises. The closer relationship between U. S. and Australia will be brought and it will allow us to respond faster to the full range of challenges. Meanwhile, the United States will continue our effort to build a cooperative relationship with China. And we will seek more opportunities for cooperation with Beijing, including greater communication between our militaries<sup>62</sup>.

In the remarks, the U. S. efforts to rebalance the military resources to cope with the new situation in the western Pacific, in other words, the rising threat of the A2/AD are appeared. The gravity of the U. S. Forces deployment will be getting back to the safer rear area like Australia and the Southeast Asia from Japan and South Korea. On the other hand, in order to save the resources, the more contributions by the allies are requested in the exchange for the transfer of the U. S. military experience through bilateral trainings.

Hilary Clinton published her opinion in November 2011. She said that: We are modernizing our basing arrangements with traditional allies in Northeast Asia - and our commitment on this is rock solid – while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia and into the Indian Ocean. For example, the United States will be deploying littoral combat ships to Singapore, and we are examining other ways to increase opportunities for our two militaries to train and operate together. And the United States and Australia agreed this year to explore a greater

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid., pp. 76, 94.

<sup>62</sup> Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, *Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament*, November 17, 2011.

American military presence in Australia to enhance opportunities for more joint training and exercises<sup>63</sup>.

Clinton's statement declared the strong will of the U. S. to keep its forces in Asia-Pacific. Responding to the political decision and Joint Air-Sea Battle Concept, the strategists in the U. S. are proposing the concept of Offshore Balancing and Offshore Control. Both concepts take the limitation of the resources and the new military situation in the western Pacific into consideration. The possibilities of how much and when these concepts are realized are uncertain. Representatives of the three military services indicated that they would be struggling in 2014 to restore readiness. For example, the Air Force for the first time in its history is implementing a "tiered" approach to unit preparedness. About one-third of the service's forces that are not deployed or preparing to deploy will be "standing down" and rated unready. The move will affect a number of nuclear-capable forces, with some B-2 bombers<sup>64</sup>.

Will these measures really not affect the credibility of the U. S. extended deterrence? If the U. S. extended deterrence becomes less credible, the U. S. allies will have to construct their own military forces to deter the threat of China and to defense against the invasion of the PLA.

## **Conclusion**

New Secretary-General Xi Jinping stated on November 15, 2012, that he would make every effort to realize a great revival of the China race. Socialism looks like one of the tools for realizing such a nationalistic aim. He declared that the objective for the modernization of the PLA is the construction of firm defense and strong military forces adapted to the national security and interest. He also said that we should fundamentally realize the mechanization and make a great advance in the construction of the information-oriented military by 2020. That the security of ocean, aerospace and cyber-space should be paid attention continuously is pointed out. The PLA will continue to pursue the construction of the capabilities enough to win the local wars under the information-oriented condition. The missile forces will be put the emphasis.

Consistency of the military strategy and the firm will among the leaders to make the enduring effort to realize it is the marvelous characteristic of the PLA.

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<sup>63</sup> Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," *Foreign Policy* (November 2011).

<sup>64</sup> Brian Everstine and Marcus Weisgerber, "Reduced Flying Hours Forces USAF To Ground 17 Combat Air Squadrons," *Defense News*, April 8, 2013.

The PLA is trying to seize the exclusive control in the South and East China Sea. The PLA will accomplish its objective to control the sea encircled by the three island chains in a long-term. U. S. Forces are suffering from the defense budget cut, and the forward deployed forces might gradually decrease, in spite of the statement to keep the American commitments to the allies in western Pacific.

If the U. S. does not accept the challenge by the PLA pursuing the control of the larger area, spread beyond the first or second islands chain, some conflicts, including use of military forces will happen in the future. At that time, the allies will be urged to defend by themselves for some period or eternally.