

Japan's Perspective on Common Strategic Objectives

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1 A common threat to Japan and Taiwan and defense of Japan

It is clear what constitutes a common threat to Japan and Taiwan: It is China.

Followings are the reasons why China is perceived as a common threat to both countries. China's core interests are defined as 'matters that cannot be compromised due to China's national security'. As for territorial integrity, there are five core interests as follows:

- ① Taiwan's political status issue
- ② Tibet independence issue
- ③ East Turkestan independence issue
- ④ South China Sea issues
- ⑤ Senkaku Islands issue

Although it is one of the five core interests, the unification of Taiwan is China's long-held desire and I assume it is clearly distinguished from the others.

As you know, China's core interests have been changed as time passes, and China originally claimed its core interests as ①Taiwan issue, ②Tibet issue and ③East Turkestan issue. However, China included South China Sea issues in 2010 and Senkaku Islands issue were added to the list of core interests in 2013.

China has been forcefully promoting 'change to the current situation by force' with a rapid growth in its military power in background. This shows that as its military power develops, China's pursuit of its core interest has no limitation.

As described so far, China's core interests are targeted against Senkaku islands, island territory of Japan, and whole Taiwan islands. And I know there is a deference of opinion on Senkaku islands between Japan and Taiwan.

These highlight the fact that as long as China's economic growth continues accompanied by a continuous growth in its military power, China will be the most serious threat to Japan for a long time in the future. The same thing can be said about Taiwan, one of their core interests.

2 Japan - US security arrangements

The United States clearly identifies a sense of crisis with regard to the aforementioned Chinese movement. The Trump administration started in 2017 and clearly stated for its national security and defense strategy soon after that. It clearly identified China as a long-term rival that had to be deterred and - should the latter fail - would force the U.S. to drive China into a disadvantage with the assistance of allied nations. It also declared that it would maintain strong ties with Taiwan and meet its legitimate needs for defense. Further, considering the US-China trade war dominating recent media, it is clear that there is an intent to restrain China's economic and technical (as well as military) growth.

In the US-Japan Security Treaty, Article 6 (Far Eastern clause) states that "the United States army, air force, and navy is granted permission to use territory and facilities in Japan to contribute to the security of Japan and international peace and security in the Far East".

This indicates that in a "Taiwan crisis" the US military can use Japanese facilities and territory to provide military support to Taiwan.

In the "New Guidelines", along with peace and safety in Japan, there is also clear mention of "allowing Asia, the Pacific and beyond to grow stable, peaceful and prosperous" and the "Legislation for Peace and Security" includes concepts such as "situation that will have an important influence" and "survival-threatening situation", forming a more tightly knitted US-Japan joint response system.

Thus, it can be said that the Japan-US security arrangements have not systematically denied any involvement in the Taiwan emergency, and have improved the ability of Japan and the US to deal with the situation. In this sense, the Japan-US security system's existence itself serves as a great

deterrent to China's advance into Taiwan and indirectly gives Taiwan a great advantage.

3 China's A2 / AD strategy and the US MPS strategy

China's A2 / AD strategy is the idea of turning the South China Sea - the only territory with sufficient water depth near the Chinese coast - into a sacred cow to deploy strategic nuclear retaliation missile submarines, as well as to destroy enemy forces between the 1st Island chain and 2nd Island chain in order to secure the free use of sea within the 1st Island chain.

At present, all exits leading from the Chinese coast to the open ocean are constrained by what they call the 1st Island chain and there is no Chinese territory along this Island chain. This is a large handicap for China's military strategy. In order for China overcomes this situation and establishes regional sovereignty, it is essential for China establishing China-controlled islands territories along the 1st Island chain.

The Maritime Pressure Strategy (MPS) proposed in May this year by the US Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) reflects this situation clearly.

The MPS is thought to be a readjusted and re-edited version of the US military strategy against China, which started with the Air Sea Battle (ASB).

Based on this strategy, the US has already begun to make steady progress.

In February this year, the US notified Russia of the abolition of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (hereinafter referred to as the INF Treaty). It is clear that the US is aiming to deploy these intermediate-range weapons on the 1st and 2nd Island chain, of which the former, naturally, includes Japan.

The United States have also begun to strengthen Taiwan's defense. In June 2017, the US lifted the suspension of the \$ 1.42 billion military grant by the Obama administration as well as the seal on negotiations concerning the construction of submarines, pouring about \$ 2~8 billion in this year into military Aids.

As you know, both Japan and Taiwan are located on the 1st island chain. In particular, Taiwan, like other countries on the 1st island chain, not only controls routes to enter the Pacific Ocean from the Chinese continent but also occupies a strategically important position that connects East China Sea and South China Sea. And there are important sea lanes of communication (SLOC) that are lifeline for both Japan and Taiwan in these waters. The importance of these waters to China is the same.

From the Japanese point of view, if Taiwan with well-developed infrastructure becomes part of Chinese territory, it means not only allowing Chinese navy and air force free access to the Pacific Ocean but also facing continuous threats to the SLOC which are the country's lifeline. I believe that the strategic importance of Taiwan for both Japan and China is very clear in reference to this. In other words, a threat to Taiwan is no other than a threat to Japan.

As I mentioned earlier, the Chinese government's utmost desire is the unification of Taiwan.

At the moment, in order to achieve unification, the removal of US influence is absolutely necessary. In particular, in regard to a unification of Taiwan by military force, the largest threats are the Japan-US Security Treaty and US bases in Japan that come with the Treaty. Consequently, it is highly likely that China attacks US bases and important infrastructure in Japan if it embarks on unification of Taiwan by force. In this sense, it is simply the case that Japan and Taiwan are facing the same threat.

4 Strategic goals common to Japan and Taiwan

The strategic goals common to Japan and Taiwan are to prevent China from constructing a military sphere of influence on the first archipelago line and to establish an early support system to back up the US military upon initiation of military operations against China. The course to achieving this goal can be summarized in the following three points:

- ① Strengthening ties with the United States

- ② Strengthening national defenses
- ③ Strengthening ties with other nations belonging to the first archipelago line