Defense White Paper
2008

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Message from the Minister of National Defense

The year 2008 was a remarkable year for Korea, during which it took an energetic step towards building a “Country that Stands Tall in the World through Advancement.”

This year also marked the historic 60th anniversary of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Armed Forces. The Korean military has successfully overcome many challenges and hardships over the past sixty years, including the Korean War. As a protector of the constitutional values of liberal democracy and market economy, the ROK Armed Forces have been the steadfast guardians of peace on the Korean Peninsula. Further, they have shared the proud history of the nation’s prosperity with its people every step of the way.

Going forward, the ROK Armed Forces will take advantage of past experiences and accomplishments to reshape themselves, ushering in another successful sixty years of history.

Today’s rapidly changing security environment presents new challenges and opportunities for the Korean military.

Around the globe, we are witnessing the emergence of new dynamics of international competition and cooperation based on the disparate interests of nations. At the same time, traditional military threats persist even as we see an increase in transnational and non-military threats. In Northeast Asia, an arms race continues as regional powers vie for their regional leadership amidst the ever-growing cooperation and interdependence.

On the Korean Peninsula, the government of the Republic of Korea has continued its efforts to steer its relationship with North Korea towards mutual benefits and common prosperity. Despite these efforts, North Korea’s military threats remain unchanged, and South-North relations have continually strained.

Domestically, the ROK is facing a tough economic situation in the wake of the global financial crisis. Our military is expected to efficiently manage Korea’s defense and flawlessly implement defense policy tasks such as defense reform and transfer of wartime operational control.
The difficulties in domestic and global security environment and defense situation pose unique defense challenges for our military and require more fortitude and focus than ever before.

To better support Korea’s national vision and fulfill its role in this era, the Ministry of National Defense has formulated a new vision for the coming years: an “Elite and Advanced Military.” We have drawn the Eight Tenets of Defense Policy from this vision and have consistently pushed forward these tenets.

Throughout 2008, the Ministry of National Defense has introduced bold measures to break away from the existing practices and implemented incessantly various reforms and transformations across the whole spectrum of national defense. The foremost goal of this reform effort was to promote a culture of “strong warriors” and “strong military” dedicated to combat, in order to build the foundation required to develop our armed forces into an advanced and strong military. Internationally, the ROK Armed Forces have successfully carried out various peacekeeping activities, contributing to world peace and enhancing Korea’s stature on the international stage.

We will continue to build an all-directional military readiness and defense capabilities that enable us to protect our nation against not only North Korea’s military threats but against all threats across the spectrum. The ROK-U.S. Alliance will evolve into a future-oriented strategic alliance. No less important, we will strive to reduce the burden of defense expenditures through low-cost, high-efficiency defense management. Furthermore, the Korean military will transform itself into an institution that further respects the comforts and needs of the citizens it protects.

Defense White Paper 2008 is the first such paper to be published under the Lee Myung-bak administration. It reflects our will and efforts in all aspects relevant to defense, including defense policy guidelines and key achievements, as we strive to realize the new administration’s national security strategy. In particular, we tried to provide detailed
information on topics of keen interest to both Korean and international readers, including the ROK’s defense posture, defense reform, and the future direction of the ROK-U.S. Alliance among others. In addition, the Appendix includes various defense data that may be useful for academic research in the fields of national security and defense.

It is my hope that *Defense White Paper 2008* will foster a better understanding of our efforts toward developing an advanced force capable of meeting the strategic challenges of the 21st century and strengthen the public’s trust and care for the military. The continued interest and support of the Korean public will help us in our endeavor as we move forward.

December 31, 2008

Lee, Sanghee

Minister of National Defense
Republic of Korea
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Chapter 1

Changes and Challenges in Security Environment

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Section 1. Global Security Environment

Coupled with conventional military threats, the global security today is characterized by increasing transnational and non-military threats, such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and natural disasters. Elements causing security threats including disputes over territorial, resource, religious, and racial issues are becoming multifarious and complicated.

In such an environment, all countries endeavor to maximize their own interests, strengthen their security capabilities, and at the same time exercise strategic cooperation and restraint in foreign affairs.

1. The Changing Security Threat

The most notable changes in the security environment today is the rise of complicated and multifarious transnational and non-military threats besides conventional military threats. Threats such as terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, cyber attack, etc., have become universal, encompassing wide areas. Other non-military threats such as contagious diseases, natural disasters, global warming, and environmental pollution have also come to the fore as major pending issues,
The proliferation of WMDs such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, as well as the means to deliver them through ballistic missiles is seen as one of the primary factors posing a major threat to global security today. It is particularly damaging to global security that some nations possess the technology to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. In addition, they can easily acquire related parts and materials on the international black markets. Furthermore, biochemical weapons such as anthrax and sarin gas feared to be easily manufactured at low cost, which allows non-state actors\(^1\) to secure such weapons without a great deal of difficulty.

Since the September 11 attacks in 2001, the activities of non-state actors have been regarded as one of the primary factors threatening global security. They are now able to acquire means of attack and yield destructive power that was not possible in the past, due to the globalization process and advancement of information technology. Moreover, it is usually the case that unlike a regular army, they are organized as diffuse networks of multinational members, rendering efficient management difficult.

Meanwhile, though the likelihood of a large scale war has diminished since the end of the Cold War, various types of local warfare continue all over the world. These result from the effect of complex factors such as territorial and resource disputes, religious and racial conflicts, and separatist and independence movements. In the Middle East, the Iraq War that began in 2003 is still ongoing. As for the war between Israel and Lebanon that began in July 2006, although it came to an end, the causes of the war are still remaining. In Europe, Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in February 2008. Immediate approvals were echoed by the United States and the major EU countries, but several countries including Russia, China, and India have yet to do so. In Africa, series of disputes are
waging on in Sudan, Somalia, and Chad. The areas in dispute are shown in Figure 1-1.

The recent competition between nations to secure energy resources has become a new variable in the global system, elevating the importance of energy security. Consequently, major powers vie with each other for new energy sources in Central Asia, South America, Africa, and the Caspian Sea as well as in the Middle East, thereby destabilizing the situation in the areas. In particular, some states continue to strengthen their stature and influence within the international community by flexing their energy resource power.

There are also new, previously unforeseen security threats that have come to the forefront of the international community. Such incidents as the spread of contagious diseases (Avian flu and SARS), and large scale natural disasters (Sichuan Province earthquake in China, cyclone in Myanmar, etc.) can have both an unpredictable and unprecedented effect on global security.

2. International Efforts for Peace and Stability

As potential global security threats have become increasingly diverse and complex, new countermeasures have been required accordingly.

Since a countermeasure employed by one single country against transnational and non-military threats has its limitations, cooperation with allies and friendly countries and the international community should be emphasized. Indeed, comprehensive countermeasures are most necessary, ranging from the existing military means to non-military ones including diplomacy, judicial review, information, and economy. Thus, when it became clear that al Qaeda was behind the 9/11 attacks, the notion that
mutual assistance on a global basis was essential to deal with the problem of preventing proliferation of terror and weapons of mass destruction was given great credence.

Accordingly, the international community has reinforced international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of WMDs and to counter terrorism. As part of such international cooperation, various regimes have been further strengthened to deal with information sharing, freezing of assets, criminal investigative cooperation, search and extradition of terrorists, etc. International activities to prevent the proliferation of WMDs are promoted through international conventions and an international organization. International conventions include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) and as an international organization it includes the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In addition, the United States expands the activities preventing the proliferation of WMDs that could be linked to international terrorism by utilizing the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),\(^3\) in which 93 countries are participating directly or indirectly as of October 2008.

The 9/11 attacks that took place in 2001 have become an event that made people realize the sheer scale of the present threat to international security. Thereafter, nations around the world including the United States began the “Global War on Terrorism.” Along with the Afghan troops, the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF),\(^4\) which is comprised of multi-national forces, currently continues operations to eradicate the remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The international community continues to make an effort to solve various types of local disputes. At the Middle East Peace Conference held in Annapolis, U.S., in November 2007, it was agreed that a peace agreement for

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3) Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
As an initiative to prevent proliferation of WMDs and its associated materials related to the means of delivery by concerned nations and terrorist groups, the United States took the lead and launched it in June 2003 with 11 European and Asian countries,

4) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
In line with the resolution by the United Nations Security Council, multi-national forces of 53,000 troops are comprised from about 40 countries as of June 2008 in order to support the maintenance of public order and reconstruction after the war in Afghanistan,
the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be concluded by the end of 2008 with quadrilateral talks led by the U.S., EU, UN and Russia. In addition, as of June 2008 about 12,000 UN peacekeeping forces from 26 countries are striving for peace and stability in Lebanon. The African Union (AU) and UN play a role as mediator for peace and stability in the Darfur region of Sudan in which a five-year long civil war rages on. However, despite the mediation efforts by the international community, social conflict and the bloodshed due to civil war abide.
Section 2. Security Situation in Northeast Asia

In Northeast Asia, cooperation and interdependence among nations are deepening in various fields such as security, economy, etc. In the meantime, factors for potential conflict such as North Korea’s nuclear issue, the cross-strait relations, historical disputes, and territorial disputes over islands still persist. Simultaneously, each Northeast Asian nation continues to make an effort to enhance its influence and modernize its military forces.

1. The Regional Security Structure

Northeast Asia is an area concentrated with major economic and military powers in which traditional confrontation and cooperation coexist. Within this security structure, the major powers in the area maintain mutual cooperation and balance of power at the same time.

While the United States, which is in a security alliance with both Japan and Australia, is solidifying the alliances with both nations, the three nations are strengthening tripartite security cooperation since the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in March 2007. Also, in October of the same year, a triangular security cooperative system of the United States, Japan and Australia was set into motion by a combined maritime training exercise.

China and Russia too are strengthening a strategic cooperative relationship. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), formed around China and Russia, held a combined training exercise among member nations under

5) Joint Declaration of Security Cooperation for Japan and Australia
Japan has made its first declaration for security cooperation with a country other than the United States,

6) The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
Its member states include six nations of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan, and Uzbekistan. It is an organization established on June 15, 2001 for the purpose of mutual cooperation and security enhancement in the region among the governments with a summit meeting held annually,
China’s initiative for the first time in 2005, and for the second time in July 2008 under the leadership of Russia. The SCO held a defense minister’s meeting of member countries in May 2008 and agreed to hold the third combined training exercise in 2010.

Meanwhile, neighboring countries run parallel ventures in an effort to resolve any security uncertainties. The Secretary of Defense of the United States visited China in November 2007 and agreed to set up a military hot line between the two countries, which went operational in April 2008. As for China, Minister of National Defense visited Japan in September 2007, and in November of the same year a Chinese naval vessel made a port call to Japan. On the other hand, a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force ship visited a port in China in June 2008 for the first time since World War II.

2. Security Issues in the Region

Northeast Asia, unlike the rest of the world, is an area that contains many varied and challenging issues such as North Korea’s nuclear issue, the cross-strait relations, the territorial disputes over islands, historical disputes, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) issues, and so forth.

North Korea’s nuclear issue forms a serious threat to global security as well as to the security of Northeast Asia. Since a nuclear test was conducted by North Korea in October 2006, tension has built up in the region. As the six-party talks continue to facilitate North Korea’s nuclear disarmament, there were two rounds of agreements concluded among the participants via talks in 2007. These included the “initial actions for the implementation of the September 19 joint statement” (February 13 agreement accorded in February 2007) and the “second-phase actions for the implementation of the September 19 joint statement” (October 3 agreement accorded in October 2007). In July 2008, an agreement was made for setting up a monitoring and verification system at the meeting of chief delegates of the talks in July 2008, and at the follow-up meeting of the respective foreign ministers they
reconfirmed a political mandate for North Korea’s denuclearization. The participating nations of the talks are making an effort to resolve the issue based upon agreed principles.

The cross-strait relations is one of the potential threats to the security of Northeast Asia. With the rise of the Ma Ying-jeou regime, whose core political line was referred to as improving cross-strait relations at the Taiwanese presidential election held in March 2008, a turning point occurred appearing to ease the tension between the two. Also, as was evidenced by the visit to China by Wu Bo-hsiung, the Chairman of the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party) in May 2008, various efforts by China and Taiwan to relax the tension continue. Nevertheless, the possibility of a dispute in the cross-strait relations remains.

The existence of disputes over territorial sovereignty between China and Japan, or between Japan and Russia is the cause of yet more unrest in the region. There are also historic issues: China’s so-called Northeastern Project; the distortion of the history textbook by Japan; and Japanese politicians’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine are all factors contributing to the regional instability.

Besides these, the establishment of an EEZ to utilize oceanic resources has become a potential factor for disputes as nations in the region adhere to the position that is advantageous to their own country.

3. Military Trends of the Major Countries in the Region

In Northeast Asia, a multinational security cooperation system like that of Europe or other regions has not yet been established. Military powers such as the United States, Japan, China, and Russia are competing for influence. These military powers are pushing forward with the modernization of forces in order to keep apace with the new security environment. Up-to-date military posture of the four major powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula is depicted in Figure 1-2.
As a consequence of the lessons learned from the 9/11 attacks, the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the United States is building up capabilities to respond to a diverse array of new threats as well as traditional threats.

Consequently, the U.S. Army has been reorganizing its combat units and support forces into light and maneuverable units. The U.S. Army redeployment plan confirmed in December 2007 makes it essential for a total of 48 brigades to be reorganized with 74,000 troops, including 65,000 active duty and reserve troops, reinforced by 2011. The Navy and Air Force have been promoting restructuring with the emphasis on enhancing efficiency.

Considering the strategic importance of the Asia Pacific area, the United States has increased its Navy and Air Force assets in the area. The Navy replaced the conventional aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk with
the nuclear powered aircraft carrier USS *George Washington* in August 2008. The Navy also plans to deploy 60 percent of its submarine forces to the Pacific by 2010. The Air Force plans a rotational deployment of one squadron of its most advanced fighter, the F-22 Raptor, in Guam for the first time.

The United States Forces Japan (USFJ) has relocated the U.S. Army I Corps (forward) based in the State of Washington to Camp Zama in Japan in December 2007 and is being reorganized to be a command which can execute an integrated mission of the U.S. Forces in Japan. The 8,000 Marine Corps troops stationed in Okinawa are scheduled to be relocated to Guam by 2014.

The U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) plans to maintain troop strength at 28,500 as agreed upon at the ROK-U.S. Summit in April 2008. At the same time there are preparations underway for the transfer of its wartime operational control to the ROK military in 2012. It is pushing ahead with restructuring in order to enhance the war-fighting capabilities of the units under its command.

**B. Japan**

Japan raised the Defense Agency to the status of a cabinet-level Ministry of Defense (MOD) in January 2007. Furthermore, with the emphasis placed on responding to the changing situation positively and on expanding the regional role of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), it plans to draft the new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) by the end of 2009.

While JSDF maintains about 240,000 military personnel, it has retired the outmoded weapon systems and replaced them with high-tech weapon systems. Major weapon systems that went operational most recently include two new *Atago*-class destroyers, which are additional to the four existing *Kongo*-class destroyers, and six Apache attack helicopters. In addition,
included in the ongoing modernization for armaments are newly developing
tanks, a 13,500 ton *Hyuga*-class helicopter-carrying destroyer (DDH), and air
refueling cargo aircraft.\(^9\)

In addition, to strengthen its joint operational capability, Japan has
expanded the frequency of joint training sessions and built a unified C4I2,\(^{10}\)
thereby constructing an information integration-delivery-sharing system and
boosting interoperability.

In the field of military satellites, Japan has built a four-satellite structure by
successfully launching its fourth reconnaissance satellite in February 2007.
Subsequently, Japan’s Diet has made an institutional foothold for the
subsequent development and operation of a high performance
reconnaissance satellite and early warning satellite by passing the Space
Basic Act in May 2008 that allows military use of outer space.

On the other hand, as North Korea test-launched a ballistic missile and conducted
a nuclear test in 2006, Japan has begun the early construction of the Missile Defense
(MD) system. To this effect, Japan has deployed ground-based interceptor missiles (PAC-3)\(^{11}\) at four bases of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) in the vicinity of Tokyo since March 2007. In De-
cember of the same year, Japan conducted a ballistic missile interception test for sea-
based interceptor missiles (SM-3)\(^{12}\) off the

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9) **Air Refueling Cargo Aircraft**
JASDF imported from the U.S. Boeing co. in February 2008, which was remodeled
from a civilian cargo plane into a multi-purpose airborne tanker. It can airlift troops
and cargo in addition to air refueling.

10) **C4I2**
This is a command and
test system for the JSDF,
and in consideration of the
weighted importance of
integrated operation by
JSDF following the creation
of the Joint Staff Office in
March 2006, interoperability
was added to the existing
C4I (Command, Control,
Communication, Computer
& Intelligence) thereby chang-
ing its designation to C4I2.

11) **Ground-based Inter-
captor Missiles**
(PAC-3: Patriot Advanced
Capability)
This missile is designed to
intercept a ballistic missile at
low-altitude below 15km

12) **Sea-based Interceptor
Missiles**
(SM-3: Standard Missile)
This missile is designed to
intercept a ballistic missile at
high-altitude above 100km
coast of Hawaii in a joint effort with the U.S. In January 2008, Japan operationally deployed a SM-3 loaded Aegis destroyer and further planned to build a ground and seaborne MD system by 2010 in a joint effort with the U.S.

C. China

China pushes ahead with military modernization through continuous increases in the national defense budget\textsuperscript{13} based on high economic growth. This is an effort to attain the military strategy\textsuperscript{14} “winning local wars in conditions of informationization.” In particular, the army concentrates on an enhancement of a rapid-reaction capability, the navy a deep-sea operations capability, and the air force a long-range operation capability.

While the Army expands the aviation corps with attack helicopter units as its main element, it is known to have created mobile tactical missile units for deployment in the southeast region.

The Navy has introduced four Sovremenny-class destroyers (7,900 ton) and 12 Kilo-class submarines (2,300 ton) from Russia, thereby enhancing coastal defense capability. The Navy deployed for active service in July 2008 a Jin-class strategic ballistic missile submarine (nuclear-powered) (SSBN) with Julang (巨浪)-II type ballistic missiles on board whose range reaches 8,000 km, and have another for test-runs. In the future, the Navy is scheduled to have 5 Jin-class SSBNs including the two aforementioned vessels.

The Air Force deployed its self-developed J-10 fighters operationally in 2007 and plans to produce additional J-10C bombers, the modified version of

\textbf{Jin-class SSBN (Type 094) }\hspace{1cm} \textbf{J-10 fighter}

\textbf{13) National Defense Expenditure of China}

China announced at the 11th National People’s Congress in March 2008 that their national defense expenditure for 2008 would be at $57.2 billion (¥417.8 billion), which is a 17.6% increase compared to that of last year. This should correspond to 7.2% of the total budget for the year 2007, which is equivalent to 1.4% of the GDP. In the meantime, U.S. Department of Defense estimates the real size of China’s national defense expenditure to be $97-139 billion (threefold of China’s proclaimed amount) in the Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, released in March 2008.

\textbf{14) Military Strategy of China}

China’s People’s Liberation Army established informationization as a constructive direction for national defense modernization in order to adapt to the international strategic environment and national security circumstances. It concentrates its efforts on building the Navy, the Air Force and the 2nd Artillery, thereby focusing mainly on winning local wars in conditions of informationization.
the former. And while introducing the most advanced fighters including Su-27/30 from Russia, the Air Force is concentrating its efforts on license production via technology transfer and indigenous aircraft production. As of June, 2008, it has four Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft *Kongjing* (空警)-2000 and two small-sized KJ-200 aircraft, with a third KJ-200 aircraft under production. At present, the Air Force has 10 airborne tankers and expands the radius of operations by making up for the weak points of the air-to-air refueling device for the existing fighters.

In the meantime, China conducted a successful anti-satellite test with a ballistic missile in January 2007 and launched a moon exploration satellite in October of the same year, further preparing a construction plan for a space station, thereby intensifying their efforts in space development.

D. Russia

Russia sees NATO’s expansion toward Eastern Europe\(^\text{15}\) and the American drive for a MD system in Eastern Europe\(^\text{16}\) as important changes in the security environment. As a response, Russia is enhancing its strategic deterrence capabilities, as well as the efficiency of its command system by reorganizing its force structure.

![Topol-M missile](image1)  ![MS Yuri Dolgoruki](image2)

As for the ground forces, Russia has abandoned conventional strategic missiles and initiated the deployment of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM: Topol-M) equipped with a new type of guidance device, thereby completing deployment of 48 fixed missiles and 6 mobile missiles as of December 2007. By 2015, it plans to enhance its nuclear deterrent by...
deploying Topol-M missiles to a total of 9 regiments (6 fixed type regiments, 3 mobile type regiments).

As for the maritime forces, reinforcement to submarines is a prominent agenda. In April of 2007, the first submarine of the Borei-class SSBN was rolled out at the North Sea Fleet. Two more SSBNs by 2011 are scheduled to be built for an assignment to the Pacific fleet. On the Borei-class SSBN, Russia plans to mount 12 Bulava\(^{17}\) submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) for which Topol-M missiles were modified for a surface launch.

As for the aviation forces, Russia fortified long range operation capability by improving the performance of the Tu-160/95/22 strategic bomber. It is also preparing for future warfare by concurrently promoting the development of the Sukhoi I-21 (tentatively named)\(^{18}\) fifth-generation fighter. In August 2007, Russia resumed long-range reconnaissance flights with strategic bombers that had been suspended since the 1990s, Russia has lately carried out vigorous reconnaissance activities mainly over areas of strategic interest such as the Arctic Ocean and the North Pacific. Also, in air defense, it continues to field deploy new type air defense missiles (S-400 Triumph) centering on the Metropolitan Area.

As for military structure, Russia plans to integrate the present system of six military districts\(^{19}\) into three regional headquarters: the West, the South, and the East. This is aimed at raising operational efficiency by simplifying the command system. Presently, the usefulness of this restructuring is being tested through command and staff training. In accordance with the integration plan for regional headquarters, each respective region is as shown in Figure 1-3.
Figure 1-3. The Integration Plan for Russia’s Regional Headquarters
Section 3.

North Korean Situation and Military Threat

In 2008 the New Year’s joint editorial, North Korea announced it would grow into “a strong and prosperous socialist nation” by the year 2012. To achieve this, the North urged a general mobilization in order to construct “a nation driven by a strong ideology, military, and economy.” North Korea also made it clear that it would concentrate its efforts on maintaining the regime with the National Defense Committee (NDC) Chairman Kim Jong Il at the center and as its leader through the “military-first politics.”

While North Korea is seeking to improve Pyongyang-Washington ties and promote friendship with China and Russia externally, North Korea is concentrating on improving its relationship with the Third World. In relation to South Korea, North Korea criticizes the government’s policy towards the North and takes hard-line measures against the South, thereby creating a tense political situation between the two countries.

In terms of military strength, North Korea maintains its huge conventional military power as before, and continues to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This creates a threat to the Korean Peninsula and to the general security of the region.

1. Domestic and Foreign Policy

A. Domestic Policy

North Korea is intensifying its military capability under the banner of “building a strong and prosperous socialist nation.” The North has consolidated the “military-first politics” that has been advocated since the establishment of the Kim Jong Il regime. It has since promoted the stability of the regime and transposed the NDC into a permanent organization. By
replacing some senior officials in the party, government and military, Pyongyang is continuing to stabilize the regime with the Chairman of the NDC, Kim Jong Il at the helm.

Economically, by adhering to a socialist economic system and promoting limited reform and opening policy, the North Korean economy is experiencing a limitation on its recovery.

Recently, North Korea has been concentrating on resolving the “food issue” with such rhetoric as “achieve one’s salvation through one’s own effort” and “the people’s livelihood-first principle” in order to overcome the food shortages brought on by the current economic crisis. Despite having exerted all its efforts to counter the economic crisis with such measures as the elevation of livelihood for residents through an increased output of comestibles, daily necessities, electric power and coal, the truth of the matter is that the North has not harvested substantial results.

Socially, North Korea has imposed more strict controls on freedom of thought in an effort to oust capitalist ideology and adopted strong control measures in the border areas against North Koreans who attempt to defect. Additionally, while increasing the punishment for deviations such as bribery, abuse of power, accumulation of wealth by illicit means and so forth, the North is conducting a form...
of propaganda education on the population to reconsolidate internal control.

In terms of the military, foremost, North Korea is concentrating efforts on strengthening asymmetric force. To this end, the North is focusing on strengthening its special warfare capability through augmenting the light infantry units and enhancing their night-time and mountaineering trainings. In addition, the North is developing diversified missiles such as new surface-to-surface and surface-to-ship missiles, and constructing submarines and midget submarines. Second, North Korea is reinforcing the capability to execute modern warfare. This is evidenced by the construction of a command automation system and by the cultivation of computer hackers for cyber warfare. Thirdly, the North is preparing ways to enhance the survivability during wartime such as the deployment of electronic jamming and deception devices and the construction of underground fighter bases. Furthermore, North Korean military is conducting planned military training as usual by securing the military supplies in spite of economic difficulties. In doing so, it continues to create military tension including infiltration of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) on the West Sea boundary while operating at top level combat readiness.

B. Foreign Policy

The North is focusing on navigating through the difficulties presented to them by the nuclear negotiations with the United States since conducting a nuclear test in October 2006. In 2007, North Korea agreed to the February 13 and October 3 Accords that outlined the declaration and disablement of its nuclear programs and economic compensations by the nations concerned through the six-party talks and bilateral contacts between North Korea and the U.S. Accordingly, the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon were frozen, closed,

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20) The Northern Limit Line (NLL) Established in August 1953 by the Commander of the United Nations Command in order to reduce and prevent the possible outbreak of various types of armed conflict, contingencies between the two Koreas, and limit the patrolling activities by the ROK Navy and Air Force in the West and East Seas.
and sealed in accordance with the disablement measure. In May of 2008, North Korea submitted a document entailing its nuclear weapons activities to the United States, and then submitted a formal statement to the People’s Republic of China, the chair of the six-party talks. However, due to certain verification issues regarding North Korea’s nuclear programs, the United States deferred the removal of North Korea from the U.S. state-sponsors of terrorism list. This has resulted in the North responding by stopping the disablement process and restoring its nuclear facilities. In early October, a tentative agreement over the verification scheme between the U.S. and the North was made, and as the U.S. announced the removal of North Korea from the terrorism list, the disablement process resumed later that month. However, the North still shows a negative attitude in adopting a documented verification protocol.

To Japan, North Korea urges the liquidation of past affairs and continues to criticize the strengthening of its military capabilities. This includes the construction of a missile defense system and the increase of reconnaissance satellites. Additionally, although both sides established informal working-level contacts to resume talks for normalizing diplomatic relations, no progress was made due to a sharp difference of opinion related to the reinvestigation of kidnapped Japanese citizens and the lift of economic sanctions.

In relation to China, Pyongyang is focusing on restoring the relationship that has been apathetic since the nuclear test through mutual exchanges between political parties, governments, and the militaries. As evidenced by the conclusion of the Rajin (羅津)-Khasan railway construction contract, the North maintains friendly cooperative relationship with Russian based on economic cooperation.

In regard to the Third World countries, North Korea maintains friendly relations with a total of 160 countries including seven countries that had established diplomatic relations or restored relations in 2007. Pyongyang is focusing its diplomatic efforts to strengthen political, economic, and military cooperation.
C. Policy toward South Korea

While North Korea is active in gaining economic profits through non-governmen-ental economic cooperation, the North avoids dialogue with the authorities of the South. North Korea further disrupts the public opinion of the South and continues to alienate the relationship between Korea and the United States, such as asserting withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Korea. Moreover, while threatening the peace on the Korean Peninsula and its region with the nuclear testing, North Korea still maintains a passive attitude in building substantial military confidence to reduce the tension and facilitating peace on the Peninsula.

Since the June 15 South-North Summit Talks, North Korea has been continuing discussions with the South and actively participating in the South-North exchanges and cooperation projects that are profit-oriented, such as the construction of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and Mt. Geumgang tour program. However, Pyongyang has been degrading South Korea’s new policy toward the North, and resuming reprobation activity against the South, which had been in abeyance. This attitude is causing some new frictions to arise.

In addition, North Korea unilaterally deported South Koreans in charge of the Office of Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation in Gaesong, and further cut off the hot line of Panmunjom. Since December 1, 2008, the North has been taking steadfast measures by limiting or blockading ground passage on the Military Demarcation Line.
Chapter 1  Changes and Challenges in Security Environment

2. Military Policy, Strategy and Organizations

A. Military Policy and Strategy

North Korea adheres to the strategy of “the communization of the entire Korean Peninsula” as manifested in the North Korean Worker’s Party (KWP) Regulations. To make this a reality, the North maintains large scale military power. The North Korean military policy is rooted in the Four-Point Military Guidelines adopted in 1962. Despite deepening economic difficulties, the North preferentially assigns national resources to the military sector under the banner of “military-first politics,” thereby continuously reinforcing its military forces.

North Korea’s military strategy toward the South is the “short-term blitzkrieg strategy” to win the war before the arrival of the U.S. augmentation forces. This strategy can be deduced from the consideration of the battlefield environment on the Korean Peninsula. To this end, the military will try to take the initiative in the war through “an early surprise attack” and mixed warfare with the regular and guerrilla army. At the same time, the military will exploit a success with its firepower and armored, mechanized units. Having learnt from the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq, the military has recently been enhancing the capability of Special Warfare; strengthening training for operations in urban areas, the mountains and at night; and reinforcing the capability of modern warfare execution.

North Korea has been allocating a large part of its national budget on defense. From the late 1960s to the early 1970s, Pyongyang detailed the military spending for those fiscal years, 30 percent of the total national budget. Since 1972, Pyongyang has announced the only ordinary expenditures as the national defense budget while undisclosing most of its defense budget. It is estimated that North Korea’s actual military expenditures exceed 30 percent of its gross national income (GNI). This is the estimated amount considering the characteristics of its regime and budget system. It is known that there is another source of income through the independent military accounts: the defense industry, the exports of arms,
and businesses set up within the military to bring in foreign currency.

**B. Military Command Organizations**

The National Defense Committee (NDC) is the highest-ranking military command organization in North Korea. It is clearly expressed in the North Korean constitution that the NDC decides on national defense-related issues and defense projects.

The General Political Bureau (GPB) manages the KWP’s apparatus within the military and relevant political indoctrination programs. The General Staff Department (GSD) has the command authority for all military operations. The Ministry of People’s Armed Forces (MPAF) represents the military externally. The MPAF also exercises the military administration authority by managing and implementing the military affairs such as military diplomacy, logistics, military finance, etc.

Since the inauguration of the Kim Jong Il regime, the relationship among the GPB, the GSD and the MPAF has changed horizontally. As for the MPAF, its stature and functions have weakened, but it still represents North Korea military. The military command organizations of North Korea under the NDC are shown in Figure 1-4.

**Figure 1–4, North Korea’s Military Command Organizations**

![Diagram of North Korea’s Military Command Organizations](image-url)
3. Organization, Weaponry and Deployment

A. Army

The North Korean Army is organized into nine forward and rear area corps, two mechanized corps, Pyongyang Defense Command, Border Guard Command, Missile Guidance Bureau, and Light Infantry Training & Guidance Bureau (LITGB) numbering a total of 15 corps-level units. In comparison to the end of the year 2006, it means that two mechanized corps became two mechanized divisions, one tank corps became one armored division and one artillery corps became one artillery division. But in the aspect of war potential, there is no significant change because they have maintained the corps level dimension.

North Korea deploys about 70 percent of its ground forces in the south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. Currently, 170mm self-propelled artillery and 240mm multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) deployed in the frontline are capable of carrying out a massive surprise bombardment on the Greater Seoul metropolitan area from their current location.

In addition, the North Korean Army has produced upgraded tanks (Cheonmaho) and deployed them in the armored and mechanized units. The current holdings of major weapons in the North Korean Army are shown in Figure 1-5.

**Figure 1-5, The North Korean Army’s Holdings of Major Weapons**

*Approximate figures*

- **Tanks** (3,900)
- **Armored vehicles** (2,100)
- **Field artillery** (8,500)
- **MRLs** (5,100)
- **River-crossing equipment** (K-605 type pontoon bridge) (3,000)
Recently, the Army reorganized unit structures by reinforcing the fire power of the first echelon in the frontline area, thereby attaining a surprise effect with overwhelming combat power in the initial engagement.

In addition, the troop strength for special warfare reaches approximately 180,000 by creating light infantry divisions in the forward area and augmenting the light infantry battalions to regiment-class. The Army is concentrating massively on enhancing their capabilities of special warfare as evidenced by the stepping up of night-time, mountaineering training and street warfare.

The strengthening of special warfare capabilities of North Korea reflects the lessons learned from the Iraq War. It can also be inferred that the North intends to execute multifarious types of attacks and mixed warfare simultaneously by infiltrating rear areas of the ROK in contingency through underground tunnels, etc. By utilizing special warfare forces, the North Korea military will support offensive operations of main forces, and try to harass our forces in the rear areas.

North Korea is stepping up measures to enhance the survivability in its rear areas. The North has greatly camouflaged military facilities and equipment while setting up a large number of fake armaments. They are taking steps to evade precision guided munitions (PGMs) by developing varied electronic jamming and deception devices. Also, as a result of having constructed hardened underground sites in a large number of widespread regions in the front-rear areas for a long period of time under the banner of “turning the whole nation into a fortress,” it is possible to shelter most of their equipment and facilities.

B. Navy

The North Korean Navy consists of two fleet commands in the East and West Seas, 13 squadrons, and two maritime sniper brigades under the Navy Command, The status of major naval vessels is shown in Figure 1-6.
Surface combatants mostly comprise small-sized, high-speed vessels including light frigates, fast patrol craft, missile attack boats, torpedo boats and fires support patrol craft (PCFS), of which about 60 percent are deployed in forward naval bases.

The North Korean Navy holds about 70 submarines (midget submarines included) including Romeo-class and Sang-o (Shark)-class submarines, and infiltration midget submarines, which are capable of emplacing mines, attacking the ROK’s surface vessels, or secretly infiltrating commandos into the South.

Also operated by the Navy are landing vessels such as air cushion personnel landing craft (LCPA), personnel landing craft, and mine sweeping boats.

The Navy retains two maritime sniper brigades and about 260 troop transport vessels including 130 LCPAs and 90 personnel landing craft.

The North Korean Navy is increasingly strengthening submarine forces, and developing surface-to-ship and ship-to-ship missiles as well as new types of torpedoes. Additionally, the Navy has built command automation systems,
connecting networks between appropriate equipment from fleet commands down to combat vessels.

C. Air Force

The North Korean Air Force comprises four air divisions, two tactical transportation brigades, two sniper brigades, and ground anti-aircraft units under the direct control of the Air Force Command. The North Korean inventory of aircraft is shown in Figure 1-7.

Combat aircraft are deployed into four divided districts of North Korea,

**Figure 1-7. North Korea’s Inventory of Air Force Aircraft**

*Approximate figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2-ISR* aircraft</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air mobility aircraft</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training aircraft</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*C2-ISR: Command & Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance

about 40 percent of which are deployed in forward bases located to the south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. They maintain their capabilities and posture to launch a surprise attack. In particular, the North has AN-2s and helicopters capable of low speed, low altitude flight. These aircraft can easily infiltrate the special warfare forces deep into the South’s rear areas.

The Air Force operates a large number of air bases including reserve bases and contingency runways. These bases are in addition to the 20 operational bases already in operation. Most of these operational bases have shelters
such as underground hangars to enhance their survivability.

The North’s surface-to-air missile units deploy long-range high altitude SA-5 missiles to the east and the west, SA-2/3 missiles are densely deployed in defense of the whole Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) area, east and west coasts, and Pyongyang area. Though most of the surface-to-air missiles are deployed in fixed launching bases, the trend shows that mobile launchers are additionally being deployed.

The radar units are capable of detecting aircraft flying in North and South Korea, and even some parts of China by dividing these areas into four sectors. The Air Force is building an automated air defense control system in order to execute air defense operations effectively.

D. Reserve Forces

As one gigantic “garrison society,” North Korea has succeeded in arming the entire population in accordance with the Four-Point Military Guidelines. In particular, having seen the Iraq War, North Korea is placing an emphasis upon the importance of the Reserve Military Training Unit (RMTU) in the rear area and enhancing its combat capabilities.

The RMTU retains armaments similar to those of active units and undergoes intensive training so as to replace the regular forces at wartime. All troops under the RMTU attend mobilization training at least twice for two months a year so that they can complete combat readiness within 24 hours once the mobilization order is given.

Civilians between the ages of 14 and 60, or approximately 30 percent of the entire population, are subject to wartime mobilization in North Korea. Currently, the reserve troops number some 7.7 million. The status of reserve
forces is shown in Table 1-1.

**Table 1-1, The Reserve Forces in North Korea**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RMTU</td>
<td>0.6 million</td>
<td>• Subject to combat mobilization – men between 17 and 50, single women between 17 and 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker and Peasant Red Guards</td>
<td>5.7 million</td>
<td>• Equivalent to the ROK’s Homeland Reserve Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Youth Guards</td>
<td>1 million</td>
<td>• Military organization of high/middle school students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramilitary Units</td>
<td>0.4 million</td>
<td>• Security Guard Command, Civilian Security and Protection Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Logistics Mobilization Guidance Bureau, Speed Battle Youth Shock Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7.7 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E. Development of Strategic Weapons

(1) Nuclear Development

In the 1960s, North Korea constructed the nuclear complex in Yongbyon, and in the 1970s, concentrated its nuclear research on nuclear fuel milling, conversion, and fabrication technologies.

Since the 1980s, based on the extraction of nuclear material through operating the 5-megawatt reactor and reprocessing the spent fuel rods, Pyongyang had completed the “nuclear fuel cycle”\(^{23}\) comprising a series of steps ranging from the acquisition of nuclear fuel to the reprocessing.

It is estimated that the North has secured about 40 kg of plutonium as a result of three reprocessing procedures, Pyongyang conducted the nuclear test in October 2006.

As for the promotion of the highly enriched uranium (HEU) program,
despite the North’s denial, various suspicions have been raised. In this regard, the ROK government is carefully pursuing relevant information in close cooperation with the countries concerned, including the United States.

(2) Ballistic Missiles

North Korea had embarked on a project to develop ballistic missiles in the 1970s, and in the mid-1980s, it domestically produced and deployed 300 km-range Scud-Bs and 500 km-range Scud-Cs. In the 1990s Pyongyang succeeded in test-firing a 1,300 km-range Rodong missile and deployed Rodong missiles for operational purposes.

By the end of the 1990s, the North began to develop new intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) which can reach beyond 3,000 km. The North recently has deployed them for operational purposes.

In August 1998, Pyongyang conducted an unsuccessful test-launch of a Taepodong-1 missile. Although the attempt failed, the North has tested the missile’s general functions including engine combustion, multi-stage body separation, etc. From the test, it can be inferred that North Korea has the capability to develop medium and long-range missiles.

Presently, Pyongyang is developing Taepodong-2, a long-range ballistic missile. After the test-launch failure on July 5, 2006, it is thought that the
North is rectifying the defects.

The range of the Taepodong-2 is estimated to reach beyond 6,700 km, which will be able to be extended if the weight of the delivery body is reduced or if three stage booster rockets are additionally loaded.

The scope of the threat by this type of missile is shown in Figure 1-8.

(3) Biochemical Weapons

North Korea launched its chemical weapons development program including the research and construction of production facilities in compliance with Kim Il Sung's "Declaration for Chemicalization" in December 1961.24 It is assessed that the North has been producing poison gas and germ weapons since the 1980s.

It is believed that approximately 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical agents
remain stored at the facilities scattered around the country. The North is also suspected of being able to independently cultivate and produce such biological weapons as the bacteria of anthrax, smallpox, and cholera.

F. War Sustainability

North Korea operates national-level logistics mobilization agencies to enhance capabilities for logistics mobilization and war sustainability.

The North retains about 300 logistics factories for the production of military supplies to prepare for wartime. Except for air and electronics area, the North is self-sufficient in weapons development, and can continue to advance the system of war supplies production.

Most of the produced war stocks are kept in the hardened underground storing facilities. The export of this materiel out of these storing facilities is thoroughly managed and controlled, and is only possible with the supreme commander’s approval.

The stockpile of core war supplies has been a top priority despite the economic difficulties since the mid 1990s. In particular, the quantities of major war stocks such as petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL), munitions, etcetera are estimated to last for two or three months.
Chapter 2

National Security Strategy and Defense Policy

- Section 1: National Security Strategy Guidelines
- Section 2: National Defense Policy
Section 1.
National Security Strategy Guidelines

The national security strategy is a comprehensive and systematic initiative for achieving our national security objectives by mobilizing the nation’s available means and resources.

The Lee administration set the catch phrase “To Develop a Country that Stands Tall in the World through Advancement” as the vision for the nation and is pointing to a “Global Korea.” To realize this vision in the field of security, the Lee administration presents the “National Security Strategy Guidelines.”

The ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) will focus all its defense resources on achieving national security objectives and supporting national policies.

1) Global Korea
Beyond current diplomacy and security strategies focusing on North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the Korean Peninsula, the ROK should cooperate with countries around the world on various issues including economy, culture, and the environment making a contribution to world peace and co-development. This is a vision that the ROK government is pursuing in the national security area, and is one of five national policies including lively market economy, active welfare, country rich in talent, and government serving the people.

1. The Vision for the Nation and National Security Objectives

The Lee administration set the catch phrase, “Develop a Country that Stands Tall in the World through Advancement” as the vision for the nation based on liberal democracy and market principles that drive Korea’s basic constitutional ideology. This is the long-term national vision that Korea should pursue to live up to the spirit of the times. The goal is to make a country that is respected globally through the
advancement of the economy and the enhancement of the quality of life as well as by meeting and helping to raise international standards.

The national security objectives are those that must be attained through an accurate assessment of the current security environment and available national resources. The government laid out the national security objectives as described herein: (1) maintaining stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula; (2) building firmly the foundation for the nation’s security and national prosperity; and (3) enhancing competence and status internationally.

First, maintaining stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula: the ROK should maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula based on our defense capabilities and the ROK-U.S. alliance; and the peace on the Korean Peninsula should be secured through inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation along with diverse cooperation with neighboring countries.

Second, building a firm foundation for the nation’s security and national prosperity: people’s lives should be protected from various security threats; and economic social safety that is the foundation of national prosperity must be secured.

Third, improving international competence and status: the ROK should contribute to world peace, liberal democracy, and co-prosperity; and the ROK must make a leap forward in order to become a soft power through enhancing cooperation with the international society.

2. Tenets of National Security Strategy

To achieve national security objectives, the government shaped the following three strategic tenets: (1) creating a new peace structure; (2) carrying out pragmatic diplomacy and active openness; and (3) seeking enhanced security for the world.

First, creating a new peace structure should be achieved by the following: advancing the inter-Korea relationship in a future-oriented way to achieve
mutual benefits; pursuing the 21st century strategic alliance with the United States to contribute to the peace on the Korean Peninsula, regional stability, and also world peace based on common values, benefits, and mutual trust; and constructing a close and cooperative relationship with neighboring countries.

Second, in order to carry out pragmatic diplomacy and active openness, the ROK should put more emphasis on diplomatic capabilities to revitalize the economy and build foundations for economic growth; the ROK must also pursue international cooperation and contribution corresponding to its economic size and diplomatic capability.

Third, in seeking an advanced security for the world, the ROK should put more efforts on the following: building military capabilities and advanced defense operating systems to respond to the changes in the security environment and future warfare; acquiring competence in the comprehensive security area to take action against various security threats; and participating in international peacekeeping operations and reconstruction projects.

In order to realize these tenets of the national security strategy, the government is implementing strategic tasks in each area. The main strategic task in the national defense area is to build a future-oriented security capability. To achieve this goal, MND set the development of an “Elite and Advanced Military” as its vision and is focusing all of its resources upon realizing it. At the same time, MND evaluates and develops the Defense Reform Basic Plan that was established in 2005.
MND has set national defense objectives to accomplish national security objectives in fast changing security environments. To this end, MND presents a national defense vision and the tenets of national defense policy to carry out relevant policies in a consistent manner.

1. National Defense Objectives

MND has set defense objectives as follows: defending the nation from external military threats and invasion, upholding the principle of peaceful unification, and contributing to regional stability and world peace. The specific meanings of those objectives are as follows:

First, “defending the nation from external military threats and invasion” signifies protecting the country not only from North Korea’s existing military
threats but also from all other potential threats. In particular, North Korea’s conventional military capabilities, development and enhancement of WMDs such as nuclear and missiles, and forward military deployment pose direct and serious threats to our national security.

Second, “upholding the principle of peaceful unification” means contributing to a peaceful unification of the two Koreas by deterring war, easing military tension, and bringing a permanent peace to the Korean Peninsula.

Third, “contributing to regional stability and world peace” demonstrates the ROK’s determination to contribute to stability and peace in Northeast Asia by promoting cordial and cooperative military relations with neighboring countries in accordance with the ROK’s national stature and security capabilities. The ROK also seeks to actively participate in the international community’s efforts to maintain world peace, including UN peacekeeping efforts.

2. Tenets of National Defense Policy

MND has set the development of an “Elite and Advanced Military” as its vision to realize the objectives of national security and national defense. Presented here are the key tenets of national defense policy that are geared towards achieving national defense objectives and vision.

“Our armed forces of 60 years history should be reborn as an elite and advanced military.”
The ROK Armed Forces should achieve a comprehensive security posture by being prepared to take action no matter when, where or what situations occur, and should establish an all-directional defense posture against not only North Korea’s military threats but against all other threats across the spectrum.

That is, the military should establish an all-directional defense posture to deter North Korea’s military provocation and win every battle when military provocations occur. To concentrate resources in a national crisis or emergency, MND should develop an integrated defense system where citizens, governments, and armed forces work together.

At the same time, enhanced spiritual education for service members is needed to raise strong soldiers armed with a clear vision of country and enemy.

B. Creative Advancement in the ROK-U.S. Military Alliance

The ROK and the U.S, not only fought together in the Korean War, but also recognize each other as a respective military partner. Further, both nations should creatively advance a future-oriented alliance based on shared values, trust, and legitimacy of the Alliance.

The ROK-U.S, alliance should be expanded to cover politics, economy,
society, and culture as well as military based on shared values and trust. The alliance must be developed to make a contribution to regional and global peace as well as prosperity.

“President Bush and I agreed that the scope of the Alliance needs to be expanded to encompass not only military and security affairs, but also politics, economy, society and culture.”

MND will provide quality stationing conditions for the United States Forces Korea (USFK) and promote mutual trust by expanding ROK-U.S. policy coordination. The ROK and the U.S. should build a new alliance military structure in accordance with the transfer of wartime operational control.

C. Enhancement in Advanced Defense Capabilities

MND should reshape the armed forces for post-unification as well as the current hostile relationship between the two Koreas and improve international capabilities in order to realize a “Global Korea.”

The Defense Reform Basic Plan should be adjusted taking into account changes in security situations and required budgets. “Integration” and “jointness” should be reinforced for military structure, which should in turn be developed to include information/knowledge-based technology-intensive structure suitable for future warfare. Force structure should be
advanced to be able to respond actively to various security threats. By improving mobilization systems and reserve forces training programs, the reserve forces should be advanced to meet the level of standing forces.

Also, based on the ROK-U.S. alliance, MND should develop cooperative military relationships with neighboring countries, expand military diplomacy to a global level, and enhance international peacekeeping operations.

D. Military Support for a New Peace Structure on the Korean Peninsula

MND should take timely military measures according to the inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation by developing and initiating creative agendas and strategies to alleviate military tensions and build trust.

The government is working hard to take the South-North relationship to the next level through exchanges and cooperation for mutual benefit and common prosperity. Therefore, while providing military assurance for the inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, MND should maintain a firm military readiness posture. The Ministry should build military trust and pursue arms control step by step to facilitate peace on the Korean Peninsula.

The matter of the ROK prisoners of war (POWs) must be carried out as a national responsibility. Accordingly, MND should prepare government-level plans and carry out negotiations with North Korea.

E. Professional Armed Forces Playing their Roles Faithfully

MND should build professional armed forces which can respond to both present and future threats by eliminating ostentatious and unnecessary bureaucratic elements and creating strong and powerful military spirits.

The manpower structure and personnel management system should be reformed to secure and manage superb human resources required for technology-intensive armed forces that can respond actively to future threats. In the field of education and training, troops should be trained and educated by using a scientific system so that they can become elite soldiers suitable to perform in future warfare.
F. Pragmatic and Advanced Defense Management System

MND should enhance centralized support capability of the noncombat management area, so that uniformed service members can concentrate only on their combat missions. The Ministry should not only attain a higher efficiency of national defense architecture and management, but also maximize the efucntions of the defense industry and defense budget upon the national economy.

The national defense resource management system should be developed to maximize the efficiency of logistics and management and to be suitable for future warfare. The noncombat management area should streamline its structure and manpower and improve its efficiency by benchmarking the private fields that are relatively more efficient. For the defense industry, relevant systems should be improved and the supporting foundation should be strengthened to develop the defense industry as a new growth engine for the national economy. Also, by leveraging world-class national information technology capabilities, MND should establish an advanced network-centric informatization environment.

G. Improvement of the Quality of Life

MND should gradually improve barrack environments to an advanced level by integrating and relocating military bases and building accordant infrastructures to provide better training and welfare befitting the professional soldiers.

The Ministry should advance military service environments and welfare systems to make soldiers satisfied with their military life and improve professional soldiers’ quality of life. The military medical service system should be upgraded to make soldiers healthier for stronger combat capability.

At the same time, MND should help veterans’ job-seeking efforts and manage the military pension system,
H. Armed Forces serving the People

MND should enable the armed forces to focus on their original missions and strengthen overall capabilities to garner trust from the nation, guarantee people’s convenience, and realize government policies actively to firmly establish an image of the “citizen in uniform.”

The Ministry should build an advanced barracks culture so that service members can undertake their duties with high morale and a spirit of pride. The disaster and catastrophe response system should be developed and relevant regulations should be eased to enhance public benefits and protect public rights. Especially, in the case of disaster and catastrophe, MND should provide active support for disaster-stricken civilians to secure their lives and eliminate discomfort. The military service system should be developed to utilize national human resources efficiently and promote equality in fulfilling military service duties.

At the same time, MND should increase compensations for those who sacrificed themselves for the country, in order to cherish and honor their noble sacrifice.
The ROK military should achieve a comprehensive security posture by being prepared to take action no matter when, where or what situations occur, and should establish an all-directional defense posture against not only North Korea’s military threats but against all other threats across the spectrum.
Section 1.
All-dimensional Military Readiness Posture

The ROK military is developing all-dimensional military readiness posture and capabilities to counter various threats including North Korea. The military is reorganizing its force structure to be technology-intensive and modern. The military is maintaining a high readiness posture based on the ROK-U.S. combined defense system to effectively respond to North Korean military provocations and other threats.

1. Military Organizations and Forces

A. Consolidation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) has four central directorates and two assistant chiefs of staff. Figure 3-1 shows its major organizations. JCS is responsible for conducting operational command and supervising the units under the command, and for performing combined and joint operations by
commanding joint units\(^1\) that are organized to carry out joint operations.

JCS is carrying out its reorganization process to have the ability of an independent defense planning and operations system under its command in connection with the proposed wartime operational control (OPCON) transition. In 2006, JCS began to enlarge its core organizations including intelligence and operations;\(^2\) JCS will continue to reshuffle its organization until 2012 with a specific plan prepared in 2008.

Following the reorganization of the structure, JCS is making various efforts to strengthen “jointness”\(^3\) to effectively respond to the change of future warfare and the strategic environment.

By publishing The Joint Concept in 2006, JCS has firmly established the Joint Operating Concept (JOC) in preparation for future warfare. JCS is also building a Joint Combat Development system based on the nexus of “joint concept,”\(^4\) experimentation, and combat development. JCS intends to develop a Joint Combat Development System that is suitable to Korea’s warfighting environment. For that purpose, JCS will develop methods of combat execution in stages based on the concept of network centric warfare (NCW),\(^5\) and develop required capabilities. Simultaneously, JCS will improve the joint military education system and develop a joint doctrine. JCS has a plan to operate a Jointness Committee and reorganize the Joint Staff College into an agency dedicated to reinforcing “jointness.”

B. Force Capability of Individual Services

(1) Army

The ROK Army is organized into Army Headquarters (HQ), two Armies, one Operations Command, Capital Defense Command, Special Warfare Command, Aviation Operations Command, and Guided Missile Command and their supporting units. Major organizations and forces are shown in Figure 3-2.

---

1) Joint Unit
A unit that consists of elements from two or more services and supports joint operations under a single commander with a unified command.

2) Reinforcement of Essential Organizations Focusing on Intelligence and Operations
JCS’s central directorates for intelligence and operations have been reinforced by adding 10 divisions. They are as follows: Naval Intelligence Div., Air Intelligence Div., Air Defense Div., Air Operations Div., Mobility support Div., etc.

3) Jointness
It refers to the joint operation concept corresponding to future warfare which effectively combines and exercises military power to that end, maximizes the synergies of warfighting capability, and thus ensures victory in war.

4) Joint Concept
It refers to a basic framework of thinking in which the commander of the joint forces manages essential capabilities to effectively respond to all military and non-military threats.

5) Network Centric Warfare (NCW)
Introduced in 1998, NCW is a new method of conducting warfare which utilizes information technology and network communication technologies to enhance the sharing of information for greater mission effectiveness.
The First ROK Army (FROKA) and Third ROK Army (TROKA) defend the frontline area of responsibility south of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), while the Second Operations Command is in charge of security in the rear area and war sustainability.

The Capital Defense Command is responsible for defending the capital area, such as assisting in maintaining the functions of Seoul and protecting its major facilities. The role of the Special Warfare Command is gathering enemy information, guiding the firepower of the friendly forces, and conducting other special missions. The Aviation Operations Command provides firepower to support ground troops and conducts transportation & surveillance missions. The Guided Missile Command carries out precision strikes on targets deep inside enemy territory.

In the future, the ROK Army will discard a manpower-intensive structure to achieve a scientific, integrity-driven, technology-intensive structure. While reducing the number of troops and units, the Army will pursue development
and acquisition of high-tech weapons systems. To this aim, the Army will secure advanced forces such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRSs), next tanks (XK-2) and next infantry fighting vehicles (K-21) in order to reinforce surveillance, strike and maneuver capabilities.

(2) Navy

The ROK Navy is organized into Navy HQ, Operations Command, Marine Corps HQ, and their supporting units. Its core organizations and forces are shown in Figure 3-3.

Figure 3–3. Major Organizations and Forces of the ROK Navy

* Approximate figures

The Naval Operations Command (NOC) controls overall maritime operations, and conducts surface warfare, submarine warfare, mine warfare, and amphibious operations. The Fleet Commands defend their respective areas of responsibility.

In the future, the Navy will create a structure suitable for the employment of three-dimensional forces, i.e., surface, underwater, and air operations. To that end, the Navy will steadily secure such advanced naval vessels as Gwanggaeto III-class destroyers (Aegis), next frigates and landing ships tank (LSTs), multi-purpose transport vessels, Jangbogo II/III-class submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft, etc.

7) Surface Warfare
It refers to battle operations in which a battle unit--comprising of surface ships--wages war at sea with the support of aircraft and/or helicopters,

8) Submarine Warfare
It refers to military operations involving submarines,

9) Mine Warfare
It refers to military operations in which mines are used to block or debilitate the enemy’s navy, or operations that are conducted to block the enemy’s use of mines,

10) Amphibious Operation
It refers to an operation designed to deploy landing troops boarding ships or aircraft in coastal areas,

11) Aegis
AEGIS is the shield of Zeus from the Greek myth. As its name implies, AEGIS is a ship with most distinguished defense capabilities among modern navy surface vessels. In particular, it can detect and track hundreds of enemy aircraft and vessels simultaneously in a broad area, and strike them at a long distance. This can play a decisive role in securing air supremacy and command of the sea by protecting friendly forces to conduct their operation without restraint.
The Marine Corps HQ is responsible for landing operations, defending the western part of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area (GSMA), and the northwestern islands on the Yellow sea. The Marine Corps will be equipped with a brigade-level landing operation capability by obtaining UAVs and next amphibious assault vehicles.

(3) Air Force

The ROK Air Force is organized into the Air Force HQ, Operations Command, and their supporting units. Figure 3-4 shows its core organizations and forces.

Figure 3-4. Major Organizations and Forces of the ROK Air Force

The Air Force Operations Command (AOC) controls the entire operations in the air war zones in a centralized structure and performs air operations for air control, strategic attacks, air interdiction, and close air support. The Southern Air Combat Command, a subordinate to the Operations Command, performs autonomous tactical actions and air operations for its territory in the southern part of Korea. The Air Defense Artillery Command performs multi-tiered air defense operations at low, medium, and high altitudes.
The Air Force will develop into a structure that is suitable for air superiority and precision strikes. To that end, the Air Force will steadily secure next-generation fighters, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), as well as surveillance and reconnaissance systems.

C. USFK and Augmentation Forces

(1) Status of the United States Forces Korea

The United States Forces Korea (USFK) consists of the Eighth U.S. Army, U.S. Naval Forces Korea, Marine Forces Korea, U.S. Air Forces Korea, and Special Operations Command Korea. The Commander of the USFK also serves as the Commander of the United Nations Command (UNC) and the Commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC). Figure 3-5 shows its core organization and forces.

Figure 3-5, Major Organization and Forces of the USFK

16) Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS)
Surface-to-surface missiles with a maximum range of 300 km operated by the U.S. Army
Its main forces are Abraham battle tanks, Bradley armored vehicles, 155mm self-propelled howitzers, MLRS, surface-to-air missiles, e.g., the Patriot, Apache helicopters, F-16 fighters, and anti-tank attack planes.

(2) Augmentation Forces

U.S. augmentation forces that will be committed to support the defense of the Republic of Korea in contingencies include approximately 690,000 Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps troops, 160 naval ships, and 2,000 aircraft.

Depending on how the crisis unfolds, the U.S. augmentation capabilities are categorized into three types: Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs), Force Module Packages (FMPs), and Time Phased Force Development Data (TPFDD).

FDOs are ready to be implemented when war is imminent. They can be classified into diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic (DIME) options. Approximately 130 deterrence options are ready to be employed.

FMPs are measures that augment combat or combat support units that need the most support in the early phase of the war should war deterrence efforts through FDOs fail. Included in the FMPs are elements such as rapid deployment aircraft and carrier battle groups.

Upon actual outbreak of war, U.S. augmentation forces are deployed according to the TPFDD, in which, FDO and FMP are included.
2. Military Readiness Posture

A. Early Warning and Crisis Management Systems

The ROK Armed Forces maintains 24-hour surveillance and operates an early warning system over the Korean Peninsula and its adjunct islands, including North Korea. For this purpose, the ROK military operates ROK-U.S. combined intelligence assets, including signal and image assets and satellites. Furthermore, the military also preemptively identifies indications of potential threats to Korea’s security and disseminates them in real time through the information distribution system.

The ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) is reinforcing its overall defense system to effectively counter the diverse types of crises. Primarily, MND has prepared 11 manuals relating to crisis management. It also integrated its crisis management organizations by function. In late 2008, the Ministry extensively amended its Defense Crisis Management Instructions.

The Republic of Korea and the United States jointly prepare for threats through close cooperation from an incipient stage by establishing a combined crisis management system. Thus, the two countries are equipped with a system that enables the leadership to make swift decisions and actions by integrating diverse information within a short period of time in contingencies. In addition, the two countries also periodically complement their consultation system by routinely carrying out ROK-U.S. combined crisis management exercises in times of peace. Meanwhile, the two countries are also preparing for a combined crisis management system through mutual consultation in order to be ready when the wartime OPCON is transferred to the ROK JCS.

B. Readiness Posture against Infiltration and Local Provocation

North Korea is continuing its provocative acts against South Korea, including invasion into the Northern Limit Line (NLL), trespassing the demilitarized zone (DMZ), and firing at the ROK guard posts (GP),
The ROK Armed Forces is tracking or monitoring North Korean army movements 24 hours a day and maintaining an operational termination posture on ground, sea and air. The ROK military will prevent escalation by executing operations in a swift manner by taking powerful action in any situation, at anytime, in anywhere based on the rules of engagement (ROE).

The ROK military has especially arranged for the capability to counter North Korean provocation in the northwestern waters at all times. The ROK military maintains an operation posture that can effectively counter North Korean provocation with joint combat capability pursuant to the Rules of Engagement. Meanwhile, the ROK Navy operates a communication system between South and North Korean navy ships pursuant to the 2004 South-North Korea General Officer-level Talks agreement to prevent contingent military collisions.

The military has developed its alert system by increasing scientific surveillance equipment rather than troops in order to strengthen its readiness in the DMZ and vulnerable areas. In addition, it provides military assurance on inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, but still maintains an immediate operational response posture against any contingencies expected in connection with such exchanges.

Furthermore, the ROK Armed Forces maintains complete readiness posture to firmly safeguard the five islands in the northwestern sea and national territory in the eastern, western, and southern seas including Marado, Ulleungdo, and Dokdo.
C. Readiness Posture against General War

The ROK-U.S. Combined Forces maintain a perfect readiness posture against general war in case of North Korean provocation to secure the safety of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area (GSMA) and to dominate the battlefield at an early stage.

The ROK-U.S. Combined Forces also maintain a combined crisis management system and early warning system that may enable a 24-hours-a-day surveillance of the entire Korean Peninsula in preparation against any possible military provocation by North Korea. The ROK-U.S. Combined Forces also continue their efforts to deter such provocations by maintaining combat readiness at all times.

Both the ROK and U.S. have established a firm combined defense system in connection with the transfer of wartime OPCON. To that end, they have
been developing preparatory plans reflecting the following: first, countermeasures and the availability of U.S. augmentation forces in relation to the changing North Korean threats including weapons of mass destruction (WMD); second, such combat execution concepts as effects-based operations (EBO),\(^{23}\) information operations (IO),\(^{24}\) and NCW; and third, new developments of military capabilities such as command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and precision guided munitions (PGMs).

Both the ROK and U.S. are also establishing doctrines that may maximize the joint and combined operational capabilities. In addition, the two nations are carrying out practical joint/combined training and exercises.

D. Readiness Posture against Terrorist Attack

The risk of a terrorist attack is on the increase at home and abroad as witnessed by the kidnappings of Christian evangelical missionaries in Afghanistan and the Mabuno in Somali waters in 2007. The ROK military has strengthened its capabilities and readiness posture for immediate response against various types of terrorist threats.

First, counter-terrorism planning function has been enhanced. In June 2008, the Implementation Manual on Responses to Terrorism on Military Installations was prepared to enable practical actions against terrorist attacks on military installations. Also, MND has revised the Working Manual on Actions against Terrorism based on the Standard Government Manual on the Management of Terrorism and Other Crises.

Second, the ROK military is becoming fully equipped with capabilities to carry out effective counter-terrorism operations, updating the equipment of counter-terrorism task forces, and pushing forward with the deployment of a comprehensive database of counter-terrorism equipments and materiel. Furthermore, the military has improved inter-governmental information sharing and cooperation among the related agencies, including the National Intelligence Service (NIS), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), the National Police Agency (NPA), and the National Emergency Management

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23) Effects-based Operations (EBO)
A concept of operations that accomplish pre-determined desired effects by applying all military and non-military capabilities in a consolidated manner while minimizing unnecessary mass destruction.

24) Information Operations (IO)
Operations for defending friendly information and intelligence systems by consolidating all available means in war and peace time, while attacking or affecting enemy information and intelligence systems in order to achieve information superiority.
Agency (NEMA).

Third, the military has developed counter-terrorism training systems by systematizing joint exercises between government agencies affiliated with counter-terrorism Special Forces, and crisis management training under the sponsorship of the JCS. The ROK military has also intensified on-site inspections while applying training models and techniques developed to suit changing operational conditions.

3. Readiness Posture for Rapid Mobilization

Modern warfare is a total war for which the government makes maximum use of all national personnel, materials, and resources. The ROK Armed Forces employs a rapid mobilization posture to efficiently mobilize the nation’s available resources in wartime.

A. Manpower Mobilization

Manpower mobilization constitutes essential troops required for units in action, secures needed personnel for military operations, and mobilizes additional human resources to convey missions of government agencies and companies designated for mobilization. It is broken down into personnel mobilization, wartime labor service mobilization, and technician mobilization.

Personnel mobilization refers to mobilizing human resources to be used as combat personnel of military units as required for expansion (augmentation or establishment) of military units or for replenishing their losses. MND has designated and manages elite resources to ensure efficiency in wartime.
personnel mobilization. The assembly areas have been grouped by region in order to enhance timeliness. Personnel mobilization has become more efficient by allowing each Regional Military Personnel Administration to supply manpower to frontline corps that has suffered large casualties. Furthermore, MND has improved its procedure for wartime emergency mobilization, systems for issuing notices of call for operational mobilization, promotion of homeland reserve force leaders, and the transportation and convoy of mobilized manpower.

Wartime labor service mobilization refers to mobilizing personnel that carry out wartime labor duties to support military operations, damage recovery, and transportation of supplies and ammunition. MND has improved efficiency in mission performance by switching the conscripts from second eligible conscription status\(^27\) to replacement status\(^28\) who can serve as an active duty personnel. MND will continue to review and complement the requirements for wartime labor service mobilization in the future.

Technician mobilization involves mobilizing personnel who hold government-issued technical qualification certificates. The personnel carry out operations or maintenance of equipment to support combat or combat service activities. MND has stepped up its cooperation with the Ministry of Public Administration and Safety (MOPAS) and Local Government Administration Offices to mobilize persons with technical qualification certificates in new technology or information service areas.

B. Materiel Mobilization

Materiel mobilization supports military operations and ensures war sustainability by mobilizing such resources as commodities, equipment, facilities, and entities held by the civilian sector and government at the appropriate time and place. It is broken down into mobilization of industry, transportation, construction, and communication.

Industrial mobilization refers to “mobilization” or “management of control”\(^29\) of materials (food, clothing, petrol, materials for construction, ammunition, medical supplies, parts for repair, etc.) and targets such as maintenance and
repair service providers (general equipment, aircraft, and ships, etc.), promotional media, and hospitals, MND has deployed a government-wide joint resources survey system in cooperation with government ministries responsible for managing resources. The Ministry has made companies designated for mobilization (CDM) familiarized with their wartime mission procedures by gradually extending the production drill of appointed companies for mobilization. Furthermore, MND reassigned the mobilization of materials service in the First and Third ROK Army (FROKA/TROKA) regions from the Logistics Command to the military units with assigned missions. MND plans to expand designation of resources for mobilization by continually identifying those consumer commodities that are interoperable with those of the military.

Transportation mobilization refers to "mobilization for use" or "management of control" of transportation equipment (automobiles, vessels, and aircraft, etc.) and companies for maintenance, transport, loading and unloading of such equipment. MND has enhanced the mobilization ratio by designating resources in other cities or provinces for regions where resources are insufficient. In case of helicopters, the scope of designation has been extended by adding business enterprises to the existing individual mobilization.

Construction mobilization refers to "mobilization for use" or "management of control" of the buildings, land, construction equipment, maintenance service providers and construction companies. The military has shortened the mobilization time by mobilizing the latest-model equipment, tire-mounted mobile equipment or equipment available in areas near the units that will use them. In the future, MND plans to utilize civilian repair and transport service providers by designating them for mobilization according to a plan for extending outsourcing to the private sector.

Communication mobilization refers to "mobilization for use" or
“management of control” of the general communication (domestic and international circuits), satellite communication circuits and information and telecommunication service providers. MND is extending the mobilization scope to civilian broadband service providers and information technology companies in order to maximize the capability to support smooth command, control, and communication capabilities during wartime.
Section 2. Integrated Civil-Governmental-Military Defense Posture

Threat from North Korea is still continuing while non-military threats such as terrorism, disaster, and catastrophes are also on the rise.

The ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) has developed an integrated civil, governmental, and military defense posture with the aim of utilizing all available capabilities in contingency in order to actively cope with diversified threats to national security.

Accordingly, MND has established the integrated civil, governmental, and military defense system to ensure effective military command, close cooperation and support, and is enforcing the relevant laws and regulations to that end. It is also preparing the necessary infrastructure and training conditions to enhance the integrated defense operational posture.

1. Integrated Defense System

Due to the increase in request for larger roles and functions for regional security by heads of local autonomous entities, succeeding the implementation of the local autonomy system in 1995, the government has been advancing the integrated defense system to firmly secure the local security posture.

The integrated defense system is comprised of the Integrated Defense Headquarters, the Central (Regional) Integrated Defense Committees, and the Integrated Defense Supporting Headquarters. Figure 3-6 shows the system of command and cooperation under the integrated defense system,
The Integrated Defense Headquarters is the office of primary responsibility for integrated defense missions, chaired by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Its main missions are to formulate and coordinate policies for integrated defense, to ascertain and supervise the integrated defense posture, to conduct general analyses of the situations of integrated defense operations and present counter-measures, to provide directions for operations and training for integrated defense, and to coordinate and control their execution.

The Central Integrated Defense Committee is the top decision-making organization in connection with integrated defense, which belongs to the Office of the Prime Minister. It deliberates and votes on the national integrated defense policy, directions for operations and training for integrated defense, and the announcement of an integrated defense situation.
The Local Integrated Defense Committees are controlled by mayors and governors of 16 metropolises and provinces, including the mayor of Seoul as well as mayors of smaller cities and heads of district (gu) offices. They deliberate and decide on integrated defense counter-measures, the announcement of integrated defense situations, and integrated defense operations and their supportive measures for its training.

The Integrated Defense Supporting Headquarters are controlled by mayors, governors, county administrators, and district (or eup, myeon, and dong) office heads. Their major functions and duties are as follows: establishing the plans for provision of support for integrated defense related operations and exercises; operating the situation rooms; providing support for national defense elements including military, police, reserve forces, local governments, and the civil defense corps; and establishing a reporting system of suspicious activities or persons to the authorities.

The government holds the Central (Regional) Integrated Defense Council once a year to appraise the status of measures taken concerning the integrated defense posture on a central and local level in an effort to maintain the integrated defense posture.

2. Integrated Defense Operations Posture

In the cases of enemy infiltration or provocation, the integrated defense operation procedure is as follows. First, the mayor or governor announces the integrated defense situation as the chairman of the Regional Integrated Defense Committee via authorization of the Regional Integrated Defense Council, Second, the mayor or governor appoints the local police agency’s commissioner or the local military commander as the local integrated defense
operations commander. Third, the operations commander carries out his duty, integrating all national defense elements and unifying all command systems into one. At the same time, the mayor or governor operates the Integrated Defense Supporting Headquarters and provides support for the integrated defense operations.

The government is making diverse efforts to maintain a wholly-integrated Civil-Governmental-Military Defense Posture at the local level, operating the Integrated Defense General Situation Room to cope with emergency situations in a timely manner. It is also developing a wide area network for video tele-conference (VTC) and interactive broadcast between local situation rooms.

To enhance the protection capability of national key facilities, self-defense plans by each facility have been refurbished along with surveillance assets, situation rooms, and monitoring facilities. The military and police are also developing an integrated defense plan for densely populated areas and further strengthening related drills. Especially in 2007, factors in integrated defense training such as control, evaluation, content, and time management were reinforced.


Homeland defense operations are carried out by mobilizing the Homeland Reserve Forces in cooperation with civilians, the government, and the military. They aim to protect important local facilities and military supply lines from enemy attack, which include those from armed infiltrators.

MND carries out rigorous training of the Homeland Reserve Forces using scientific equipments and devices in an effort to reinforce their capability of
carrying out operations to protect the homeland during both times of war and peace.

The organization of the Homeland Reserve Forces has been undergoing an overhaul on a continual basis to maintain a high level of efficiency in homeland defense operations. Up until 2008, with the number of reserve forces and local conditions under consideration, 95 local reserve companies were reorganized and integrated, and 74 local units\(^\text{32}\) of Homeland Reserve Forces were organized. Moreover, 21 mobile units were additionally organized in urban areas to secure a higher level of operational flexibility. In 2007 and 2008, there were changes in the status of 96 workplace reserve forces (i.e., nine were newly established; 14 were upgraded; 14 were downgraded; and 59 were disbanded).

Continual efforts are made to ensure support for homeland defense operations of the Homeland Reserve Forces. Such efforts include modernization of arms and establishment of objectives by units and items to secure combat gear in consideration of each unit’s duty and operational environment.

4. Laws and Regulations related to Integrated Defense

In December 1967, MND enacted the Presidential Directive on Counter-espionage Measures in response to the North’s continuing infiltration and provocation in the 1960’s. In January 1995, the name was revised to the Integrated Defense Guide. In January 1997, the Integrated Defense Act was enacted as the legal basis for the integrated defense stimulated by the North’s submarine infiltration incident at Gangneung in October 1996.
In 2002 and 2006, relevant laws and regulations were revised in consideration of changes in the national security environment. In 2007, the Integrated Defense Guide was amended to reinforce cooperation between elements engaged in national defense to better protect strategic military facilities and carry out smooth integrated defense operations,
Section 3. Strengthening Spiritual Power

Since soldiers must place their lives at risk in order to engage in combat duty upon contingencies, they should be equipped with sound views on the nation, right views on the enemy, and the esprit de corps.

As shown in recent surveys, young people’s national security awareness remains unsatisfactory. Action is required to impart a mentality of patriotism and sound consciousness about security to those who join the military. Thus, the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) has set spiritual education for soldiers as one of the top priorities for commanders and instructed them to carry out rigorous sessions of spiritual education on combat readiness posture.

1. Meaning of Spiritual Power and Contents of Spiritual Education

Spiritual power refers to the organized mental strength with which troops carry out their assignments diligently and follow commanders’ orders based on firm belief, strict discipline, high morale, and strong unity.

In connection with the aim to establish a “solid all-directional military readiness posture,” MND encourages military personnel to think of “what to protect” (sound views on the nation), “who to fight against” (right views on the enemy), and “how to carry out duties” (esprit de corps).

As Citizens in Uniform, troops are encouraged to take pride in the country’s history based on the love of the homeland, the firm belief in the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea, and the supremacy of a liberal, democratic system,
Troops should firmly recognize the need for national security measures keeping in mind that the duty of the military is to protect the country from those threatening its existence and interest. They are taught to look at the duality of the current national security situation on the Korean Peninsula (i.e., exchanges and cooperation amid military confrontation between the two Koreas). They are also taught to pay attention to the Korean War and other provocative acts perpetrated by the North, the current reality of the North and its military threats against the South, and the significance of the ROK-U.S. alliance for the country’s security.

MND does its best to instill six leading elements of soldiers’ virtues that form the basis of their mindset and can lead a country to victory in war. It reinforces the fact that they may be forced to sacrifice their lives for the country.

33) Six Leading Elements of Soldiers’ Virtues include honor, loyalty, genuine courage, confidence in victory, a “no retreat” mindset, and patriotism. These are the values which the ROK military should forever adhere to.

“Troops’ sound views on the nation is the first and foremost condition for an elite and advanced military.”

President Lee Myung-bak making a speech at the 64th graduation ceremony of the Korea Military Academy (March 11, 2008)
2. Spiritual Education System

Spiritual Education for officers is conducted in two ways: in-school education of spirit and unit’s education of spirit.

At schools, leaders are educated to imbue their minds with patriotism and general security consciousness as well as train their ability to provide spiritual education to their subordinates. To aid the adaptation process of the barrack life for newly enlisted personnel, the military is conducting new education and training with emphasis placed on “making a true soldier.” In order for them to have the correct sense of patriotism and national security consciousness, the military has balanced each value in order to consolidate their sense of value as soldiers.

All members are subject to unit’s spiritual education that is conducted in two sessions: regular-hour education and barrack-life education. Respective experts educate on the issue of the motherland and national security. Furthermore, the area of combative spirit is conducted as daily-life education by commanders. Also, civilian experts are invited to give spiritual lectures to the troops (a total of 4,116 sessions in 2007). The faculty members at the National Defense University visit individual units for spiritual education (a total of 4,553 sessions in 2007) in an effort to enhance the quality of overall education.

MND examines relevant guidelines periodically to maintain the consistency and unity of education and uses the modified Basic Texts for Spiritual Education. In particular, it has constructed a system for the constant production of educational materials using such mechanisms as the armed forces TV. Therefore, in case of a major security issue, it is believed that
simultaneous education can be conducted to all troops throughout the nation using the televised channel.

Diversified spiritual education programs are also being developed and used. In keeping with the changing times and the trends of a new generation, MND leads its troops to voluntarily participate under their own belief. Promptness and efficiency are certainly upgraded by virtue of having developed a cyber-infrastructure for spiritual education system in conformity with the age of information technology and science.
The ROK and the U.S. have shed blood together in war and will remain staunch allies for years to come. The two nations seek to develop a future-oriented relationship in a creative way based on their shared values, interests, and the legitimacy of the Alliance.

Chapter 4

Creative Development of ROK–U.S. Military Alliance

- **Section 1** Future-oriented ROK–U.S. Military Alliance
- **Section 2** New Alliance Military Structure
- **Section 3** Securing Quality Stationing Conditions and Promoting Mutual Trust
Section 1.
Future-oriented ROK-U.S. Military Alliance

Based on the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States signed in 1953, the ROK-U.S. military alliance has played a pivotal role in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The two nations will continue, based on shared values of liberal democracy and market economy, to expand cooperation and to develop a 21st Century strategic alliance that contributes to world peace.

1. Development of the ROK–U.S. Alliance

The ROK-U.S. Alliance has evolved in response to its changing security environments and U.S. global strategies.

Today, in addition to the conventional military threats, the world is facing various security threats that include terrorism, natural disasters, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In order to effectively cope with these various threats, the U.S. is changing its global posture and carrying out the military transformation that can maximize operational efficiency and guarantee the rapid deployment of the troops. The United States is transforming the once-stationary forces deployed overseas into a flexible force equipped with enhanced mobility. Simultaneously, the U.S. seeks to strengthen the effectiveness of its alliances with friendly states in order to address global and regional concerns.

Korea has significantly elevated its worldwide reputation through
sustaining economic growth and fortifying democracy. Such changes have prompted South Koreans to increasingly voice out for a healthier and more mature partnership with the U.S.

Reflecting such changes, the two nations are coordinating their Alliance issues, an agenda based on mutual consultation that includes the United States Forces Korea (USFK) mission transfer, re-sizing of forces, elevating the recipient status of the ROK’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of U.S. weapon systems, wartime operational control (OPCON) transition, and relocation of USFK installations.

In accordance with the Joint Communiqué announced at the 34th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM)\(^1\) in December 2002, Ten Military Missions\(^2\) previously assumed by the U.S. were handed over to the ROK military starting from 2004 and completed at the end of 2008.

The number of USFK troops stationed in Korea was gradually scaled-down from 37,500 in 2003 to 32,500 in 2004 and to 28,500 in 2007. An additional reduction to 25,000 was expected by 2008, but the two nations agreed to maintain the troop level at 28,500 at the ROK-U.S. Summit Talks in April 2008. The figure was reconfirmed during the subsequent Defense Ministerial-level Talks in June 2008 and at the 40th SCM.

Elevation of ROK’s FMS status was pursued actively following the ROK-U.S. Summit in April 2008. Consequently, the FMS status of Korea was elevated to that of NATO+3\(^3\) (Australia, Japan, New Zealand) in October of 2008.

1) The ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM): It is the highest level security consultation session attended by high-ranking defense and diplomatic officials, including the Defense Ministers.

2) Missions transferred to the ROK Military:
   - Security Mission of the JSA (October 2004)
   - Rear Area Decontamination Operations (August 2004)
   - Installation of Rapid Mines (August 2005)
   - Management of Air-to-Ground shooting ranges (August 2005)
   - Counterfire Fight Headquarters (October 2005)
   - Control of Main Supply Routes (October 2005)
   - Counter Special Operation Forces (C-SOF) Operations (January 2006)
   - Close Air Support (CAS) Control (August 2006)
   - Weather forecast (December 2006)
   - Day and nighttime combat search & rescue (September 2008)

3) In accordance with Arms Export Control Act and Foreign Assistance Act, the U.S. classifies the recipient countries of U.S. defense sales into four groups. The Congressional review period and conditions for sales approval are applied differently to each group.
These constructive adjustments in Alliance issues form the foundation for a future-oriented relationship that expands cooperation and defines new roles.

### 2. A Way Ahead for the ROK–U.S. Alliance

The Alliance, once focused primarily on military issues, now seeks to transform into a more comprehensive and future-oriented relationship by expanding cooperation.

The two nations have developed a close military collaboration system based on shared values of liberal democracy, human rights and market economy. The shared values and trust are utilized to further expand cooperation into the political, economic, social and cultural sectors. They are now developing the relationship into a 21st Century strategic alliance that contributes to regional, global peace and prosperity.

During the Summit in April 2008, the leaders of the two nations agreed to upgrade the relationship into a 21st Century Strategic Alliance. The Defense Ministers agreed to cooperate closely to materialize the future vision of the ROK-U.S. Alliance during the 40th SCM in October 2008.

Sharing such universal values, the two nations will further solidify mutual trust by forming a solid cooperative relationship. Furthermore, with robust ROK-U.S. Alliance as a model framework, the ROK government will strengthen its strategic cooperation with other nations in the region as well.
Section 2. New Alliance Military Structure

The ROK and the U.S. have agreed for the U.S. to transfer wartime OPCON to the ROK side by April 17, 2012. From there on, the two countries will maintain the new combined defense system, equivalent to the existing combined system, that can deter enemy aggression and ensure sheer victory in the event of war.


In July 1950, the President of the Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee handed over the Operational Command (OPCOM) authorities of the ROK military to the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, General Douglas MacArthur, It was an inevitable choice intended to extricate the country from crisis during the Korean War. When the war was over, the ROK and the U.S. agreed to place the ROK Armed Forces under the UN Commander’s Operational Control (OPCON) to ensure the UN Forces’ commitment for defending the nation. With the establishment of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) in November 1978, operational control was transferred from the UN Commander to the ROK-U.S. CFC Commander.

Discussions regarding the return of wartime OPCON began in August 1987, when the then Presidential candidate Roh Tae-woo proclaimed “OPCON Transition and Relocation of Yongsan Base” as his campaign pledge, The

4) New Combined Defense System
The defense system set up to achieve joint strategic and operational objectives of the ROK and the U.S., with the ROK JCS-supported and USFK-supporting roles. The two nations establish bilateral operational plans and carry out combined operations

5) Operational Command (OPCOM)
The authority of a commanding officer to a subsidiary to execute an operational mission

6) Operational Control (OPCON)
The authority delegated to a commanding officer to carry out a specified mission or task in an operational plan or operational order
matter was also discussed in the U.S. through the Nunn-Warner Amendment to the Brooks Act (1989)\(^7\) and the East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI, 1990-1992),\(^8\) which added momentum to the issue in ways of a series of working group studies and close bilateral coordination.

During the 13th session of the ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting (MCM)\(^9\) in November 1991, the two countries agreed on returning peacetime OPCON to the ROK government between 1993 and 1995, and to further discuss wartime OPCON transition after 1996. Thereafter, peacetime OPCON was transferred to the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) at the end of 1994. Currently, the CFC Commander exercises wartime OPCON as well as the Combined Delegated Authority (CODA)\(^10\).

2. Timeline of Transferring Wartime Operational Control (2005–Present)

As the Defense Ministers agreed during the 37th SCM in October 2005 to “appropriately accelerate discussions on wartime OPCON transition,” the discussions gained momentum.

During the ROK-U.S. Summit in September 2006, the two Presidents agreed in principle to transfer wartime OPCON. During the 38th SCM in October, the two Defense Ministers agreed on the Roadmap to the New Alliance Military Structure in the post-OPCON Transition Era. The agreement included a plan to “decommission the ROK-U.S. CFC and expeditiously complete the transition of OPCON to the ROK after October 15, 2009 but no later than March 15, 2012.”

In January 2007, the ROK-U.S. Military Committee signed Agreements on

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7) Nunn-Warner Amendment to the Brooks Act

8) East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI)

9) The ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting (MCM)
The MCM develops and disseminates missions to the CFC Commander in accordance with Strategic Guidance set forth by the two nations’ National Command and Military Authority or decisions made during the SCM.

10) Combined Delegated Authority (CODA)
The delegated authority during peacetime over ROK units, which are placed under wartime OPCON. It encompasses six areas: combined Crisis Management; establishing OPLAN; combined exercises; developing combined Joint Doctrine; managing ROK-U.S. combined intelligence; and establishing C4I interoperability.
Combined Implementation Working Group (CIWG) Management,\textsuperscript{11} which was followed by a February 2007 agreement between the Defense Ministers to finalize April 17, 2012 as the date for OPCON Transition. Thereafter, CIWG was formed to establish a Strategic Transition Plan (STP) to transfer OPCON from CFC to ROK JCS. In June 2007, the plan was signed by the Chairman of ROK JCS and the Senior U.S. Military Officer Assigned to Korea (SUSMOAK).

3. Main Contents of OPCON Transition

The Strategic Transition Plan will provide the combined forces with an improved operational capability and establish an engine for robust military coordination system. Further detailed implementation efforts of the STP include: commissioning a Theater Operation Command System; inaugurating the ROK-U.S. military coordination system; framing an operation plan; constructing a combined operations execution system; building a combined exercise structure; and facilitating the basis for wartime OPCON transition.

Starting in 2008, the ROK and the U.S. have conducted biannual combined exercises to skillfully master mission areas considered essential under the new defense system. These exercises are scheduled to continue until the end of 2011, a year immediately preceding wartime OPCON transition. The annual SCM and MC will be used as venues to review the progress of STP. In early 2012, a Combined Evaluation Group consisting of ROK-U.S. professional experts will be commissioned, in order to assess the status of OPCON Transition as well as verify the operational capability of the ROK JCS and U.S. Korea Command (US KORCOM).

OPCON transition signifies a new allied military structure in which the ROK military assumes the leading role and the U.S. provides overall support, hence the construct of the “Supported and Supporting Roles.” Korea and the United States are striving to establish a strong combined defense system commensurate to the current standing system.

A key to the new combined defense system is the ROK-U.S. military
coordination authority. It consists of the Alliance Military Coordination Center (AMCC), which assists the Chairman of ROK JCS/Theater Operations Commander, Chairman of U.S. JCS (Senior USFK Officer)/KORCOM Commander; functional military coordination elements between the ROK JCS and the U.S. KORCOM; and cooperative bodies between subsidiary echelons. The two countries will cooperate closely in essential areas required to deter war and maintain robust readiness. In terms of the operation of Air Force assets, the two nations will maintain an efficient cooperative system that reflects the unique battlefield environment of the Korean Peninsula.

OPCON transition is initiated by four guiding principles: first, maintaining the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty; second, continuing USFK stationing and guaranteeing rapid deployment of U.S. Forces in times of crisis; third, providing continuous U.S. support in areas where ROK falls short in capability, such as in ISR capabilities; fourth, maintaining combined readiness posture and deterrence capacity during the OPCON transition.

In recognition of the historical meaning and the significance of wartime OPCON transition, the two nations will monitor changes in the security environment and transition readiness through annual SCM and MCM, reflecting adjustments if deemed necessary. Once the transition has been completed, the ROK and the U.S. will exert all efforts towards early consolidation of the new combined defense system.
Section 3. Securing Quality Stationing Conditions and Promoting Mutual Trust

The ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) is doing its best to provide a stable stationing environment for USFK and to solidify mutual trust to maintain a robust Alliance. The two nations are in close consultation to ensure seamless implementation of USFK relocation plans and appropriate level of defense cost-sharing. By facilitating policy consultations and various activities to reinforce bilateral ties, the two nations are promoting mutual trust.

1. Securing Quality Stationing Conditions for USFK

A. USFK Base Relocation

The ROK and U.S. governments are relocating the U.S. military installations scattered nationwide including the Yongsan base and the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division in Northern Gyeonggi Province, in order to ensure a nationally balanced development and provide a stable stationing environment for U.S Forces stationed in Korea.

The two nations began negotiations on Yongsan relocation in March 1988 and reached an agreement at the ROK-U.S, Summit in May 2003. In 2004, the Yongsan Relocation Agreement (UA/IA) and the Amendment to the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) were signed. The plan to relocate the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division, which was initially a separate issue, was integrated into the LPP. In December 2004, the Special Act on the Assistance to

13) Yongsan Relocation Agreement (UA/IA)
   - Umbrella Agreement (UA): Consisting of a preamble and eight clauses, it contains the principles and methods for expenses concerning Yongsan base relocation,
   - Implementation Agreement (IA): Consisting of a preamble and seven clauses, it contains details concerning Yongsan base relocation

14) Land Partnership Plan (LPP)
   This is a program to integrate USFK facilities throughout the Peninsula and to return unnecessary facilities as well as land. The letter of intent was signed during the 33rd SCM (November 2001) and was ratified by the National Assembly (October 2002).
Pyeongtaek City, etc., for the Relocation of the USFK Bases was enacted to promote local economic development. In March 2007, the two nations agreed on the Master Plan and held a groundbreaking ceremony in November the same year. Presently, the project is being progressively carried out in accordance with the Master Plan.

In the process of relocation of the U.S. Forces in Korea, a total of 40 U.S. military bases and facilities were returned to the Korean authorities by the end of 2008. About 40 more U.S. bases (approximately 43 million square meters) are scheduled to be returned.

The consolidation of U.S. military bases is expected to mitigate local complaints toward the USFK and set conditions favorable to accomplish a balanced regional development. At the same time, the two nations are currently discussing ways to resolve environmental cleanup issues concerning those U.S. bases and facilities being returned.

B. Defense Cost-Sharing

Since the signing of the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) in 1991, the ROK government has shouldered a certain portion of the USFK stationing cost. The size of such payment is proportionately decided by factors considering the ROK government’s financial capacity as well as efforts to best improve the USFK stationing environment.
Until 2008, the shared defense cost was divided into four areas: labor cost of the Korean contractors hired by USFK; military construction costs for non-combat military facilities; Combined Defense Improvement Project (CDIP) for constructing facilities of combat and combat support service; and logistic areas for service and materiel support. After 2009, CDIP will be merged as a sub-category of Military Construction. Such integration is justified by the fact that CDIP, which began in 1974, has satisfied most of its needs during the past 30 years and that its distinction from military construction has become increasingly obscure.

MND was in charge of the negotiations for defense cost sharing until 2004, and subsequently the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) took over in 2005. Defense cost sharing has been paid partly in U.S. Dollars and in the Korean Won, but since 2005, the entire payment has been processed in the Korean Won.

In 2007 and 2008, the Korean government paid 725.5 billion and 741.5 billion won respectively, as part of its burden-sharing. The Korean government’s contribution of payment for 2009-2013 was settled in December 2008 after several high-level negotiations. The amount for 2009 was set at 760 billion won, which is 2.5 percent more than that of the previous year. It was agreed that the amount for 2010-2013 should reflect the rate of inflation of the year before the preceding year, by a margin not exceeding 4 percent. The recently signed SMA has the following features: (1) The agreement is made valid for the ensuing five years, enabling stability in government budget management; (2) The agreement will see a gradual shift from cash to “in-kind” contribution for Military Construction within three years.

The appropriate level of defense cost-sharing with the USFK achieves the following: (1) It fosters a positive stationing environment for USFK soldiers and contributes to peace on the Peninsula; (2) It helps the local economy by generating demand for local goods and services; and (3) It facilitates USFK hiring of Korean civil contractors, which stabilizes the labor market.
2. Building Mutual Trust

A. Stimulating Policy Consultations

The two countries operate a policy consultative body in order to build trust and settle Alliance issues. Continuous policy consultations including the annual defense ministerial level SCM since 1968 and Security Policy Initiative (SPI)\(^\text{16}\) have been contributing to such goals. Since 2005, contentions in Alliance issues have been closely consulted within the framework of the SPI based on the successful experience of conflict resolution obtained from co-hosting the Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA).

By leveraging the experience of running a policy consultative body, the two nations carried out the "Joint Study on the Vision of the ROK-U.S. Alliance"\(^\text{17}\) in 2006. Such efforts will be the basis for actualizing a future-oriented ROK-U.S. strategic alliance.

The two nations will maintain these existing consultation channels, while expanding further opportunities to stimulate multiple dimensions of strategic cooperation.

B. Friendship Building

The two nations have been making efforts to strengthen social ties in order to promote mutual trust. As part of such efforts, goodwill programs for connecting the ROK military, USFK, and local residents were designed and implemented.

Through the Friends Forever Program (FF Program), the ROK military is providing the U.S. counterparts with opportunities to experience Korean culture by inviting them to various events and spending traditional holidays together. The Experience Korean Culture Program (held every May and October) invites about 600 U.S. soldiers to traditional cultural events. On holidays such as Lunar New Year or Chuseok, the ROK military units

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\(^\text{16}\) Security Policy Initiative (SPI)
A consultative body to discuss defense and diplomatic issues, SPI is headed by the Deputy Minister for National Defense Policy Office for the Korean side and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the U.S. side.

\(^\text{17}\) Joint Study on the Vision of the ROK-U.S. Alliance
A study that focuses on alliance justification as well as its mid- to long-term vision. The study is based on the two nations’ understanding of common interests and security threats as well as their evaluation of the security environment in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula, while focusing on reconciliation efforts and peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas.
including the 3rd ROK Army (TROKA), have invited U.S. service members for a hands-on experience of the culture.

Meanwhile, USFK is promoting goodwill through exchange programs, lectures hosted by goodwill associations, and English camps through the Good Neighbor Program. In addition, the U.S. military bands hold goodwill concerts while the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division runs English conversation classes for local residents.

Other USFK goodwill activities include assisting farmers during busy seasons, assisting disaster relief and recovery efforts, and providing medical services.

Such activities provide opportunities for the Korean people and the USFK service members who have different cultural backgrounds to share a sense of cultural harmony. Thus, such efforts contribute to creating a stable environment for USFK members’ service in Korea.

The two nations will continue to ensure that the USFK remains an enduring friend and good neighbor to the Korean people.
The ROK military seeks to rid itself of the ad-hoc stopgap measure in countering existing threats for the past 60 years. Instead, the ROK military will strengthen its global capability that embodies the concept of Global Korea, by reshaping its future and visualizing the time beyond the South–North confrontation to the unification of the Korean Peninsula.

Chapter 5

Improvement of Defense Capabilities

- Section 1 Defense Reform for "Elite and Advanced Military"
- Section 2 Development of Military Structure
- Section 3 Force Structure in Preparation for Future Warfare
- Section 4 Fostering the Reserve Forces as Key Combat Units
- Section 5 Strengthening Defense Diplomacy
- Section 6 International Peacekeeping Operations
Section 1.
Defense Reform for “Elite and Advanced Military”

The ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) is proceeding with defense reform intended to redesign the military under the concept of an “elite and advanced military,” corresponding to the 21st century strategic environment and the trends of future warfare. MND has been carrying out the defense reform focusing on reforming the military structure to be knowledge-centric and transforming the defense management system to become a pragmatic and advanced one.

MND is supplementing the Defense Reform Basic Plan periodically by analyzing domestic/international security environment changes and achievements of the on-going reform process.

1. Background and Progress of the Defense Reform

In September 2005, MND established the Defense Reform Basic Plan in order to possess the defense capacity and posture corresponding to the protean security environment and concept of future warfare.

Taking past experiences into account, MND laid the foundation necessary to press forward with the reform coherently and consistently. First, MND has established legal ground by enacting the National Defense Reform Act (December 2006) and the Enforcement Decree of the National Defense Reform Act (March 2007). In July 2007, the Office of Defense Reform, an organization administering the defense reform, was established directly under the Office of the National Defense Minister, to solidify the basis from an organizational aspect.
With such policies and systems in place, MND is continuously pursuing the reform, and in accordance with the National Defense Reform Act, MND is reflecting the changes in the security environment coupled with assessments on progress to supplement the Defense Reform Basic Plan.

2. Overview of Defense Reform

Defense reform consists of two parts; military structure and defense management system.

A. Reforming Military Structure

Military structure reform focuses on achieving an information/knowledge based qualitative structure in actualizing the central concept of “jointness” in future warfare. It is divided into command structure, unit structure, personnel structure, and force structure.

Command structure focuses on developing a system that enables ROK-led defense planning and operations. The ROK-U.S. military coordination authority will stabilize the new combined defense system.

Unit structure focuses on simplifying the chain of command while downsizing the number of units. Such reduction will be channeled into combat units completely organized to enhance overall combat capability.

Personnel structure consists of forming an cadre-based elite military as well as acquiring advanced force, while gradually downsizing the troops. Reserve forces will be improved through revamping the training system, while prompt mobilization system will further guarantee its combat capability.

Force structure seeks to actively cope with the existing North Korean threat as well as various types of threats in the near future. MND will establish an advanced information/knowledge based force structure and secure the most effective weaponry and equipment.
B. Reforming Defense Management System

Defense management reform focuses on securing a successful reform of military structure by transitioning to a management system based on practicality, cost-efficiency, and high-performance. It focuses on developing advanced defense personnel management; improving non-combat management; developing a defense training and education system to build an elite force; improving quality of life and barracks culture that harmonizes with the community; implementing advanced defense resource management system; forming an informatization environment for future warfare; and improving defense science and technology.

Defense personnel management improves the recruitment system as well as personnel management in order to promote expertise of the MND service members including active-duty service members, public officials, and civilian employees.

Non-combat management consists of adjusting similar and redundant units, and promoting implementation of civil enterprises management technique by entrusting responsibilities to the civil sector or operating military executive agencies. Conserved troops will be utilized to guarantee full complete organization of combat units.

1) Guaranteeing full complete organization of combat units
It is possible to guarantee full tasking of combat units by tasking non-combat personnel into combat units. It will improve peacetime tasking rate into wartime level, thus fully tasking permanent combat units.

Defense training and education focuses on the development of an information-based scientific training system that fosters defense manpower best suited for future warfare and technology-intensive military structure.

Barracks culture and welfare focuses on providing ideal conditions for the service members to concentrate on their tasks. It also includes improving the medical support system to provide medical care beyond the level of the civilian medical service.

Defense resource management focuses on improving logistics, military installations, and environment in order to achieve low-cost, highly-efficient, and pragmatic defense management. For logistics, the goal is to guarantee wartime logistics support and to improve peacetime management. For military installations, emphasis is on efficient unit management and land use. It also seeks to guarantee harmonization of units with the local community.
The environmental sector will form an eco-friendly image by improving overall military environmental management.

Defense informatization seeks to establish an environment in which network centric warfare (NCW) can be waged through sophisticated defense information system. Efforts will also be made to advance defense information systems through enterprise architecture (EA); to upgrade information communication infrastructure; and to improve standardization as well as interoperability among information systems.

Defense science and technology focuses on improving weapons development technology in order to independently develop advanced weapons. It will require increased investment in defense R&D as well as an improved R&D system.
Section 2. Development of Military Structure

The ROK military seeks to develop a technology-intensive, information/knowledge-based structure that can cope well with changes in future warfare.

The military structure will be divided into command structure, unit structure, and personnel structure to improve “jointness” and combat capability, and each of the Services are developing these structures in accordance with the future battle space environment.

1. Overview of Developing the Military Structure

A. Command Structure

Development of command structure seeks to allow ROK-led defense planning and operations following wartime operational control (OPCON) transition.

Figure 5-1, Changes in ROK JCS Command Structures
(focusing on reinforcing the current joint system)

※ The Chairman of JCS exercises operational support on Logistics Command within the authority entrusted to him,
Under the new structure, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) will have two Vice-Chairmen; one will perform operational command duties, while another will perform military command duties. The Chairman of ROK JCS will function as theater operations commander in order to improve command efficiency. The structure is shown in Figure 5-1.

B. Unit Structure

Development of unit structure focuses on simplifying the chain of command, while decreasing the number of units in the middle of the chain to improve the effective performance of the combat mission. The curtailed troops will be channeled into reinforcing strength of the combat units to ensure completeness of combat power. Changes in unit structure are shown in Figure 5-2.

Figure 5–2, Changes in Unit Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>Target year</th>
<th>Increase/Decrease</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Army level</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>−1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps level</td>
<td>9*</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>−2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division level</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>−20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade level</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Command level</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flotilla / Defense Command</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>−3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Command</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter Wing</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Corps level (9): Regional corps (7), Mechanized corps (1), Capital Defense Command, Special Operations Command is excluded.

C. Personnel Structure

Development of personnel structure consists of forming a cadre-based elite military in order to efficiently operate and maintain advanced forces. The advancement in weapon systems will significantly improve individual unit
capacity in ways of combat efficiency and capability. Modifying personnel structure will be handled according to the downsizing of the number of units. The plan to downsize troops is shown in Figure 5-3.

**Figure 5–3. Plan to Downsize Troops**

Considering such limitations as changes in the conscription system and the decreasing birth rate, MND will also pursue policies aimed at increasing the number of cadres, expanding extended service system, and broadening civil entrustments as well as military execution agencies.

### 2. Development Plan of Individual Services

#### A. Army

Future ground combat will be a network-based, synchronized, and integrated warfare. The Army will reinforce command/control capability, maneuverability, and firepower to ensure real-time decision making as well as troop deployment. Changes in the structure will be as follows (See Figure 5-4).

In accordance with the Defense Reform Basic Plan, the 2nd ROK Army (SROKA) was revamped into the 2nd Operations Command (November 2007) while two subordinate corps were disbanded. The Army will gradually reorganize units in accordance with the fielding schedule of advanced
weapon systems and equipments.

By reinforcing information surveillance capability, command and control (C2), and maneuverability/fire power of individual units, the Army will either double or triple its operational coverage despite the decrease in number of Corps and Divisions.

B. Navy

The Navy will strengthen its triad (surface, underwater, and air) to protect national interests across the gamut. Such interests not only include coastal water defense, but also protecting sea line of communications and marine resources. The Navy will restructure the current three Fleet Commands and Submarine and Aviation Flotillas into three Fleet Commands, one Submarine Command, one Aviation Command, and a Maneuver Flotilla. Changes in the Navy unit structure are shown in Figure 5-5.
The Navy will secure three-dimensional combat assets including Gwanggaeto III-class destroyers (Aegis), next frigate, Jangbogo III-class submarines, assault helicopters, and minesweeping helicopters. Such capacity will enable the Navy to effectively accrue operational capability around the coastal waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula.

The Marine Corps’ main mission is amphibious operations. The Marine Corps will develop into an air land maneuver unit structure suitable for rapid response duties on land and island operations.

C. Air Force

The Air Force will evolve to best perform precision strikes and achieve air superiority. To that end, the capacity to monitor for indicators of enemies and conduct retaliatory attacks will assure operational coverage to include the entire Korean Peninsula.

The Air Force will activate Northern Air Combat Command under control of Air Force Operations Command. Units will consist of two Combat Commands, nine Fighter Wings, Air Defense Artillery Command, Tactical Air Control Unit, and Air Defense and Control Wing. In the long term, the Air Force will secure a space force system to gradually develop a space operations execution unit. Changes in the Air Force unit structure are shown in Figure 5-6.
The Air Force will retire its 30-year old F-4/F-5 aircraft and replace them with F-15Ks boasting superior precision strikes and long-range capabilities. It will continue to secure advanced fighter aircraft (F-X/KF-X) in order to secure strategic deterrence capability in the vicinities of the Korean Peninsula.
Section 3.
Force Structure in Preparation for Future Warfare

MND will construct an elite military capable of deterring war and ensuring victory in every battle to prepare for the North’s military threat and a variety of future threats. For that reason, MND is acquiring an early-warning and real-time surveillance capability as well as a system for network centric warfare (NCW), and investing in the qualitative improvement of mobility and precision-strike capabilities.

1. Trajectory of Developments in the Force Structure

MND is developing its force structure with the objective of acquiring sufficient capability to actively respond to national security threats that include North Korea and possible future threats. This will require establishing an advanced system based on information/knowledge and acquiring combat-efficient weapons and equipments. The trajectory of developments in force structure will be as follows:

First, improve early warning and surveillance/reconnaissance capabilities in the vicinities of the Korean Peninsula.

Second, establish a command, control, communication, computer & intelligence (C4I) system that allows for integrated combat capability and a reliable and integrated battlefield network with improved survivability in preparation for NCW.

Third, enhance long-range precision strike capability and multi-dimensional high-speed maneuverability in ground, sea, and air, and
reinforce defense capabilities to ensure survivability.

Science and technology are developing rapidly and advanced weapon systems are becoming costly, high-tech, and complex. In order to respond to such changes in the environment, MND is striving to develop a user-centric acquisition system that improves the acquisition cycle of weapon systems (i.e, requirement-acquisition-maintenance).

2. Securing Advanced Combat Capabilities

A. Force Improvement Programs for FY2008

The defense budget for FY2008 stood at 26,649 billion won, an increase of 8.8 percent from that of the preceding year. The expenditures for force improvement reached 7,681.3 billion won, a 15 percent annual increase. A total of 170 ongoing programs were carried out in 2008, with a budget of 7,610.8 billion won. Thirty new programs were launched in 2008 with a 70.5 billion won budget. Major ongoing and new programs are shown in Table 5-1.

Table 5-1, Major Ongoing and Newly-launched Programs for FY2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Ongoing Programs</th>
<th>Newly–launched Programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Surveillance Reconnaissance/Command and Control | · Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)  
· Army Tactical Command Information System (ATCIS) | · Weather Satellite Reception System                     |
| Maneuver/Fire                     | · K1A1 Tank  
· K–9 Self–propelled Artillery | · Next Infantry Fighting Vehicle  
· Improvement of Anti–artillery Detection Radar\(^9\)  
(AN/TPQ–36 · 37) |
| Maritime/Landing                  | · Gwanggaeto III–class Destroyer (Aegis)  
· Jangbogo II–class Submarine | · Next Landing Ship Tank                                  |
| Airborne/Guided Weapons           | · F–15K Fighter  
· Advanced Trainer (T–50) | · Joint Air to Surface Stand–off Missile (JASSM)           |
| R & D                             | · Next Tank (Black Leopard), Medium–altitude Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), Tactical Information Communication Network, Korean Utility Helicopter, etc, |                                                                 |

5) Anti-artillery Detection Radar
It detects incoming artillery rounds to track and identify the location of enemy artillery.
B. Objectives of Mid-term Force Improvement Program (2009–2013)

MND’s Force Improvement Program will focus on the following: first, establishing surveillance and reconnaissance system (sensors) for early warning and real-time battlefield surveillance; second, establishing a C4I system to carry out NCW and securing long-range precision strike capability (shooter); third, improving fundamental capacities and weapons developing capability. The schematics of such objectives for acquiring military capability are shown in Figure 5-7.

Figure 5–7. Objectives for Military Capability

Surveillance and reconnaissance assets aim to establish early-warning and real-time surveillance capability in the vicinities of the Korean Peninsula. It
promotes programs to acquire AWACS, tactical surveillance and reconnaissance system, and to develop medium-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle in order to facilitate strategic level surveillance and early-warning.

The C4I system seeks to establish a foundation for NCW by guaranteeing jointness and seamless flow of information. In order to achieve such objectives, MND seeks to improve an interconnecting capability between Korea Joint Command and Control System (KJCCS), which connects ROK JCS to operations commands of each Service, and tactical C4I systems for each Service. It also seeks to field rear area C4I systems, Military Information Management System (MIMS), which can comprehensively process each unit’s military information of three Services, will be fielded in connection with KJCCS. Furthermore, Joint Tactical Data Link System (JTDLS) will be developed to promote exchange of digitalized tactical information, Tactical Information Communication Network (TICN) which allows real-time broadband communication will be developed as well.

In order to secure long-range precision strike capability, MND pursues programs to acquire advanced forces as follows: K-9 self-propelled artillery, large-caliber MLRS (munitions), Gwanggaeto III-class destroyers (Aegis), Jangbogo II-class (1,800t-class) submarines, ship-to-ship guided missiles, joint air-to-surface stand-off missiles (JASSM), F-15K fighters (2nd round purchase), and aerial refuel aircraft.

Continued efforts will be made to improve outdated weapons and equipment, Army will modify one division into a mechanized unit, and improve K-200 armored vehicles, K-55 self-propelled artillery, and anti-
artillery detection radar, Air Force will extend the life of F-5E/F aircraft to reinforce those capabilities lacking, and improve the equipping of the weapon systems of F-16 fighters.

MND continues to secure next generation weapons in connection with the Defense Reform Basic Plan. First, the Army will continue to field K-9 self-propelled artillery and launch new programs to acquire next rifles, next tanks (Black Leopard), next infantry fighting vehicles, and anti-artillery detection radar; Second, the Navy will secure next frigate, next patrol boat killer medium, next landing ship tank (LST), and Korean amphibious assault vehicle (KAAV), while promoting programs to additionally acquire amphibious transport ship helicopter (LPH) and mine sweeper and hunter (MSH); Third, the Air Force will continuously pursue ongoing programs such as Korean helicopter program (KHP) and mass production program of T-50s, while launching new programs such as mass production program of large-sized cargo aircraft and light attack aircraft (FA-50). Efforts to improve air defense will continue by fielding short range anti-air missiles, next surface to air missiles (SAM-X), and newly deployed decontamination vehicles,
C. Direction of 2010–2014 Mid-term Defense Plan

Mid-term Defense Plan (2010-2014) will reflect the National Fiscal Management Plan and re-evaluation results from the Defense Reform Basic Plan as well as changes in the security environment. The plan will be established following close scrutiny of the Force Improvement Program. It will take available resources into account when determining dates to field weapons and apply a more specified “high-low mix concept.”

7) High-Low Mix Concept
The implementation and concept of combining high-performance weapon systems with that of low-performance systems,
Section 4.

Fostering the Reserve Forces as Key Combat Units

Modern warfare is conducted as a total war with all available national resources, which makes efficient employment of reserve forces one of the key elements for victory. MND is upgrading the reserve forces in relation to its buildup of regular forces. To this end, the Ministry is enhancing organization and management system of reserve forces, while improving its education and training infrastructure.

1. Organization and Management of Reserve Forces

A. Organization and Resources Management

The reserve forces conducts its homeland defense mission according to the designated reserve units’ area of responsibility. The reserve also conducts its combat mission as replacement for combat loss or for activation and augmentation of units in wartime.

In accordance with the Military Personnel Act, reserve officers, warrant officers, and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are expected to serve as Homeland Reserve Forces (HRF) until retirement age for active-duty
members. Those who have completed mandatory military service are expected to serve as HRF for eight years. Anyone aged 18 or more may volunteer to serve as a member of the HRF. Presently, there are about 10,000 volunteers including women operating under the HRF.

HRF currently consists of about three million troops, serving either as members of local reserve units (by eup, myeon, dong) or workplace reserve units. The status is shown in Table 5-2.

Table 5-2, Status of the Homeland Reserve Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Local reserve forces</th>
<th>Workplace reserve forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Those who have served as HRF troops for less than 5 years</td>
<td>3,040</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>2,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Those who have served for 5 years or more</td>
<td>1,550</td>
<td></td>
<td>710</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Until 2020, MND plans to refurbish organizations of the reserve and reduce the period of service to utilize only the effective resources. Specifically, it is planning to modify the reserve forces by taking into consideration administrative area integration, the discrepancies in resources of urban and rural areas, and changes in the operational environment.

B. Managing HRF Commanders

Every year, qualified reserve officers are selected to perform as HRF commanders.

HRF commanders’ duties include defending responsible areas, commanding HRF troops, and managing reserve resources. They are also expected to lead efforts to assist disaster relief and to support local communities. Current status of HRF commanders above company-level echelon is shown in Table 5-3.
In July 2006, MND enacted the Enforcement Rule on HRF Commander Selection to ensure fairness, transparency in selection, and secure competent leaders for each unit.

It also plans to enact a ministry directive concerning the personnel management of HRF unit commanders, which is currently implemented as a guideline.

**C. Ceremony to Commemorate the Activation of the HRF**

During the ceremony of the 40th Anniversary of the HRF on April 4, 2008, President Lee Myung-bak delivered a message appreciating HRF for their dedication which inspired three million reservists nationwide.

Earlier, MND invited and conferred awards to model reservists. Through visits to the National Museum, the National Cemetery, and the Blue House, the reservists had the opportunity to elevate their pride as model reservists, and pledged once again their dedication toward the nation.

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**Table 5-3, Current Status of HRF Commanders (As of July 2008)**

(Unit: person)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Local HRF Commanders</th>
<th>Workplace HRF Commanders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>Regiment Commanders or Higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,804</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>3,666</td>
<td>739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Reserve Force Training and Education

A. Outline of the Training

The purpose of reserve force training is to maintain a level of readiness for wartime mobilization and to foster homeland defense capability. The Military Service Act and the Establishment of Homeland Reserve Forces Act classify individuals into reservists as well as those professionally related to HRF as participants of reserve force training. The training sessions can be divided into mobilization reserve forces training, homeland defense reserve forces training, and officer training.

The length of training is stipulated in the aforementioned Acts. Details on training sessions are shown in Table 5-4.

Table 5-4, Length of Training for Reserve Forces (2008) (Unit: hours)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Mobilization training</th>
<th>Make-up session for mobilization training</th>
<th>Basic homeland defense training</th>
<th>Homeland defense OPLAN training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory Servicemen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointees for mobilization</td>
<td>3 days</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non–appointees for mobilization</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those who have served for 5 or 6 years</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointees for mobilization</td>
<td>3 days</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non–appointees for mobilization (NCOs)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3 days (24)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9) Mobilization Reserve Forces
Those who have served in the reserve forces for up to four years. In wartime, they will fill openings in active-duty units,

10) Homeland Defense Reserve Forces
Those who have served in the reserve forces for five years or more. Duties include homeland defense,
B. Improving HRF Training and Conditions

MND has made efforts to enhance overall convenience for reservists and improve the conditions and quality of HRF training.

A new method of training was adopted in 2007 to allow reservists to voluntarily participate in training sessions. In the past, mobilization training was managed in a unilateral way under the directive of an active-duty personnel. The new system enables reservists to take a more active role that reflects their respective tasks.

Also, survival game equipment familiar to the younger generations was adopted in training in order to provide a more realistic simulation of warfare. As of late 2008, a total of 15,477 sets of survival game equipment are being used in 215 reserve force training camps. Moreover, the improvements in training camps have facilitated a more realistic experience comparable to actual warfare, satisfying practical training needs for the participants’ individual tasks.

In the past, there have been complaints that the training often interfered with the participants’ occupational duties. To ameliorate such inconvenience, participants were allowed to choose training dates and camps via internet since 2005. In 2006, the policy of designating holidays for training was adopted for those that faced limitations in attending training during the workweek.

MND has made efforts to improve food, transportation, and facilities at training camps. Now, sanitation verification has been strengthened against local companies providing reservists’ meals, while further efforts are being made to improve the general quality of food. Public transportation as well as chartered buses now serves the routes to training camps and training center information is provided by automobile GPS to help reservists with
navigation. Efforts are continuously made to improve facilities such as restrooms and cafeterias.

C. Future Development of Reserve Training

The reserve force training strives to develop along the lines of pursuing a results-oriented training while promoting citizens’ convenience, as well as fostering a sense of achievement and satisfaction from the reservists through self-participatory training. To achieve such objectives, some training will be replaced by internet-sessions. Training camps will be integrated regionally, and will be developed into a professional, scientific, and citizen-friendly facility.

3. Establishing and Managing Defense Mobilization Information System

In June 2006, MND completed phase 1 of the Defense Mobilization Information System project to automate and computerize all mobilization processes. The effort laid the groundwork for a systematic mobilization of HRF troops based on data sharing among related agencies.

The system also brought about savings in budget and manpower. The use of electronic mail when sending reservist tasking orders helped save about 370 million won a year. Automated duties helped reduce the number of full-time reservists who assist HRF commanders by 10,600 between 2006 and 2007. Furthermore, an internet-based system, which allows individuals to choose their training dates and to voice their opinions, has gone a long way towards fostering civilian convenience.

Phase 2 of the project, concerning automated personnel mobilization and provision of integrated mobilization command information, is now under way. Phase 3, concerning materiel mobilization, is scheduled to be completed by 2012.
Section 5. Strengthening Defense Diplomacy

Founded on the ROK-U.S. Alliance, MND is strengthening cooperative military ties with Japan, China, and Russia to lay the groundwork for peace and stability. Also, MND is extending its military diplomacy from the Northeast Asian region to the global level, including Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and actively participating in multilateral security talks and international cooperative organizations. Through such efforts, the ROK military will perform a role befitting Korea’s position in the global community.

1. Defense Exchanges and Cooperation with Neighboring Countries

A. Exchange and Cooperation with Japan

As allies of the United States, the Republic of Korea and Japan share the basic values of liberal democracy and market economy. The two nations cooperate through bilateral and Six-Party Talks, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Asia Security Summit, to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and establish regional peace and stability.

The defense authorities of the two countries have held periodic Defense Ministerial Talks since 1994. In February 2007 the ROK Defense Minister visited Japan for the 13th session of the Defense Ministerial Talks with the Japanese Defense
Minister. In addition, MND has held multi-layered working-level meetings such as Defense Policy Talks (at the director-general level), Security Policy Consultation (at the director-general level of defense/foreign affairs ministries), and Defense Exchange Cooperation Working-level Meetings (at director level) with their Japanese counterparts. Through such channels, the two nations are enhancing mutual understanding and expanding the scope of cooperation to achieve peace and stability on the Peninsula as well as in Northeast Asia.

The exchange between the two countries consists not only of meetings between high-ranking officials such as those between the Chairmen of JCS and Service Chiefs, but also of regular working-level and intelligence exchange meetings. In addition, exchange among units, mutual visits to colleges of each Service and academies, exchange of students for oversea studies and other personnel exchanges are actively taking place. Current interactions include humanitarian search and rescue exercises, exchange of visits between transportation aircraft, and mutual cooperation in international peacekeeping operations, etc.

However, the difference in historical perspectives and Japan’s unjust claim to sovereignty over Dokdo, which is an inherent territory of the ROK, have been singled out as factors that should be settled in order to achieve satisfactory development in future military exchange and cooperation.

MND will continue to solidify military ties and mutual trust with Japan, and will strive to develop the relationship into a “future-oriented and mature partnership,” as agreed upon at the ROK-Japan Summit of April 2008.

B. Exchange and Cooperation with China

The relationship between the Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of China\(^{(1)}\) has made rapid progress in diverse sectors, including growth in volume of trade and the exchange of personnel. The scope of defense exchange and cooperation has also been expanded.

The year 2007 was designated as the Year of Korea-China Exchanges, commemorating the 15th anniversary of Korea-China normalization of
relations. Exchanges and cooperation between the two defense authorities were thus invigorated, ROK Defense Minister, the Chairman of JCS and the Chief of Naval Operations visited China, and the Chief and Deputy Chief of Staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) paid a visit to Korea. Working-level exchanges included Defense Policy Talks, an exchange between the 3rd ROK Army (TROKA) and the PLA Jinan Command, as well as a defense academic conference. For the first time, the two countries carried out a search and rescue exercise during the ROK Fleet’s visit to China. In addition, exchanges between military athletes, military research institutions, and colleges of each Service were active as well.

In 2008, the Chief of Staff of the ROK Army and Air Force visited China, and PLA’s Chief of Naval Operations visited Korea for the first time. In May 2008, the ROK military sent 26.6 tons of relief supplies to earthquake victims in Sichuan Province, China, using three Air Force cargo planes.

MND will continue to facilitate defense exchanges with China and explore new areas of mutual cooperation.

C. Exchange and Cooperation with Russia

The bilateral relationship between the ROK and Russia has continued to develop since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1990. At the ROK-Russia Summit held in September 2008, the Presidents of the two countries upgraded the bilateral relationship from a “mutually trustful and comprehensive partnership” to a “strategic cooperative partnership.” The two countries are reinforcing the level of bilateral cooperation in various sectors, including politics, economy, energy, space technology, etc.

The defense authorities of the two countries have signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) concerning military exchanges for the next two years and
have operated diverse regular consultation bodies. They have also systemized reciprocal visits by their respective defense ministers, Chairmen of JCS, Service Chiefs, the Commanding General of the 1st ROK Army (FROKA), and the Commander of the ROK Naval Operations Command and their Russian counterparts.

In 2007, the Commanding General of the 1st ROK Army and the Chief of Naval Operations paid a visit to Russia, and the Chief of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) paid a visit to Korea. Also, routine meetings held by the various levels of military institutions are as follows: Defense Policy Talks between the defense ministries; a meeting of the Joint Military Committee between ROK JCS and the Russian Military General Staff; conference between the Armies of the two countries; the consultative meeting for execution of the Agreement on Prevention of Sea Incidents; the Inter-Air Force Meeting; and sessions between military history institutes. In particular, a cruise fleet of the Russian Pacific Fleet called at Busan Port to take part in goodwill activities and a combined search and rescue exercise (SAREX) in September 2007.

In April 2008, the 3rd session of the ROK-Russia Joint Commission on Cooperation in Military Technical Field, Defense Industries and Countries Support was held in Seoul. On April 8th, Ms. Lee So-yun, the first Korean astronaut, successfully completed her space flight mission on a Russian spaceship. The ROK Air Force Chief of Staff paid a visit to the Bainur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan and the Khrunichev Space Center in Russia to discuss ways of encouraging mutual cooperation in various sectors, including space.

The armed forces of the two countries will continue to expand the scope of their exchanges and cooperation based on the strategic cooperative partnership to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

Welcoming ceremony for a Russian Cruise Fleet calling at Busan.
2. Defense Cooperation with Countries outside Northeast Asia

A. East Asia

With the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the core, the Southeast Asian region has maintained a system of dynamic regional cooperation in the political, economic, and security sectors. Rich in natural resources, the Southeast Asian region has gradually come to play an important role in the energy security sector for Korea. In particular, with about 30 percent of the entire traded cargo and more than 90 percent of the imported petroleum for Korea passing through the Strait of Malacca, the region is vital in terms of Korea’s national interests.

MND is pushing for brisk exchanges with the Southeast Asian countries, including reciprocal visits by high-level military officials, regular meetings, and the exchange of military officers’ entrusted education. In March 2007, the Malaysian Defense Minister paid a visit to Korea to discuss ways to promote defense exchanges and cooperation. In June 2008, the first Defense Policy Talks was held between the ROK and Indonesia. As for Korea’s relations with Singapore, the two countries held the first Defense Strategy Talks in August 2008 and Defense Ministerial Talks a month later in Seoul.

Defense diplomacy towards the Pan-Oceania states is carried out with Australia and New Zealand as the core countries of the region. Australia and New Zealand share common security interests with Korea in terms of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. The Defense Policy Talks are held...
every year to discuss issues of mutual security interests and ways to broaden exchanges among the states in the region, while the student officers at the National Defense University (NDU) and naval ships are also undertaking mutual exchange visits.

B. Southwest Asia and the Middle East

(1) Southwest Asia

MND is enhancing military exchange and cooperation with Southwest Asian countries, with a focus on India and Pakistan, including reciprocal visits between students at the NDU and Cruise Training Fleets as well as the dispatch of military officers for entrustment education.

Recently, India has been emerging as a country that can exercise significant influence in world affairs with its rapid economic growth. In 2006, the ROK started negotiations over the possibility of signing the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with India, MND has also been seeking to enhance military ties with India, holding Defense Ministerial Talks in New Delhi in May 2007.

As for the relationship with Pakistan, the volume of bilateral trade has been gradually increasing, and the ROK government is contributing to Pakistan’s economic development by providing development aid. The ROK Armed Forces is laying the foundations for defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries through reciprocal visits between students of the NDU and exchange educational sessions for the student officers of the Command and General Staffs College.

While strengthening exchange and cooperation with India and Pakistan in the future, MND plans to gradually expand such defense exchange and cooperation to other countries in Southwest Asia.

(2) The Middle East

The importance of the Middle East has been increasing with regards to energy security for Korea. The ROK government held the 5th Forum for
Korea-Middle East Cooperation in December 2007 in Seoul. In August 2008, the Korea-Arab Society (KAS) was launched to enhance mutual understanding and increase exchanges in the political and cultural sectors. MND established defense attache offices in Iraq, the UAE, Oman and Kuwait to enhance friendly cooperative relations and reinforce mutual cooperation in the defense industry.

At the Defense Ministerial Talks held in Riyadh in December 2007, Korea and Saudi Arabia exchanged opinions on the security situation of the Middle East and discussed ways to enhance exchange and cooperation. In May 2008, the Chairman of ROK JCS paid a visit to Qatar for the first time as a high-ranking Korean military officer.

MND plans to increase exchange and cooperation with countries in the Middle East through exchange visits by high-ranking military personnel and technological cooperation in the defense and logistics sectors.

C. Europe

The defense exchanges and cooperation with European countries are focused on security issues in Northeast Asia and those issues of a global nature, as well as the area of defense industry and logistics. Exchanges between high-level officials, Defense Policy Talks, sessions of the Defense Industry/Logistics Joint Committee, and meetings for intelligence exchange are taking place regularly, and the number of participating countries is also increasing.

The ROK-Germany Defense Ministerial Talks was held in Seoul in April 2007,

Korea and Turkey held Defense Ministerial Talks in 2008 and consolidated the friendly relationship rooted in Turkey’s participation in the Korean War. The ROK-Turkey Tank Development Technology Cooperation Agreement was signed in Istanbul in July 2008 with the attendance of distinguished members including the Turkish Prime Minister and Defense Ministers of both nations. This agreement is expected to go a long way towards furthering exchange and cooperation between the two countries.

Mutual exchanges in military education with European nations are active, with Korean officers and cadets being sent to various military educational institutions in European states including the United Kingdom, Germany, and Turkey, as well as receiving officers from Turkey, France, etc., at the military educational institutions in Korea.

MND plans to extend the opportunities for mutual exchange and cooperation to those under the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as well as various East European countries, MND will also continue to invite veterans who have participated in the Korean War and their families to pay visits to Korea and to provide support for building war memorial monuments in order to strengthen the ties with the participants of the Korean War under the UN flag.

D. Other Regions

In November 2007, the ROK government held the 1st session of the ROK-Central Asia Cooperation Forum in Seoul, with the Vice Foreign Ministers as the Chief Delegates of five Central Asian countries. It was part of the effort to expand the cooperative relationship with the countries of Central Asia beyond the current focus on the energy and resource sectors to include various sectors such as information/communication, construction, culture, education, and tourism, MND is also reinforcing its exchanges and cooperation with the Central Asian countries. In November 2007, the ROK

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14) CIS
It refers to the Commonwealth of Independent States that acquired independence following the disintegration of the USSR in 1991 (i.e., Russia, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). Turkmenistan is an associate member of the CIS. Georgia withdrew from the CIS following the war with Russia in 2008.

15) ROK-Central Asia Cooperation Forum
It is a consultative body in support of the economic development of the Central Asian countries, which shares Korea’s experience in economic development and discusses ways to reinforce cooperation in various sectors, including information/communication, construction, culture, education and tourism.

16) The five countries of Central Asia:
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.
Defense Vice Minister paid a visit to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to discuss ways of strengthening defense exchanges and cooperation. It marked the first such visit by a high-ranking defense official. In June 2008, the ROK and Uzbekistan signed an MOU on the ROK-Uzbekistan Defense Exchange Cooperation at the first Defense Ministerial Talks held in Seoul.

MND has also been maintaining friendly relations with Canada by periodical Defense Policy Talks, combined naval exercises, and reciprocal visits by naval ships.

The ROK government has enhanced its cooperation on energy and resources with Latin American countries rich in resources. MND is also expanding defense exchanges and cooperation with those countries. Subsequently, the ROK Vice Defense Minister paid a visit to Brazil and Columbia in June 2008 and laid the groundwork for mutual cooperation in areas such as the defense industry.

However, the ROK has yet to engage in active defense exchanges and cooperation with African countries. MND is actively promoting its defense policy to high-level military personnel and students visiting Korea in an effort to look for opportunities for exchanges and cooperation with African countries. MND communicated its defense policy to students of the Nigeria National Defense University who visited Korea in April 2007, and in late June of 2008, the ROK Defense Minister discussed ways to enhance defense exchanges and cooperation with the Ghana Defense Minister during his visit to Korea. Recently, MND has been actively discussing matters concerning defense exchanges and cooperation with North African
countries, including Libya, Algeria, and Morocco.

In the future, MND plans to expand its defense diplomacy to countries in Central Asia, Latin America, and Africa and will pursue defense diplomacy in a way befitting Korea’s national power.

3. Multilateral Security Cooperation and the International Disarmament and Non-proliferation Activities

A. Multilateral Security Cooperation

MND is reinforcing multilateral security cooperation in order to actively deal with transnational/non-military threats as well as conventional military threats.

Table 5-5. MND Participation in Multilateral Security Consultative Bodies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Character Region</th>
<th>Inter-governmental</th>
<th>Semi-/non-governmental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northeast Asia</td>
<td>· Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism Working Group (NEAPSM), within the framework of the Six Party Talks</td>
<td>· Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>· ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)</td>
<td>· Asia Security Summit (ASS, also called the Shangri-La Dialogue)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1st and 2nd sessions of the NEAPSM were held in China in March 2007 and in Russia in August 2007, respectively.

The NEACD is a semi-governmental (semi-official) body launched in 1993. It works to enhance peace and stability in Northeast Asia by coordinating efforts to foster mutual understanding and trust between regional countries.

MND has been partaking in the ARF\(^\text{18}\) and the TDF\(^\text{19}\) since 1996. It has also participated in the ASS\(^\text{20}\) since its inception in 2002 in an effort to enhance stability and cooperation among countries in the region.

In his keynote speech at the 7th session of the ASS in May 2008, the ROK
Defense Minister stressed the necessity for international cooperation to cope with the uncertain security environment of the 21st century.

MND will continue to take part in multilateral security cooperation held in the region with the aim of contributing to peace and prosperity in the world, including the Northeast Asian region.

B. International Disarmament and Non-proliferation Activities

The international community is strengthening its control through existing international organizations and regulations in order to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It is also pursuing a new international norm such as UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

In addition, global initiatives to strengthen controls over conventional weapons have also been maintained and expanded. Most notably, discussions are under way to prevent the illegal circulation of small arms & light weapons and to regulate the use of cluster munitions.

The Republic of Korea has used its renewed national strength since membership into the United Nations in 1991, to actively participate in the international community’s disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. The participation status is shown in Table 5-6.

In particular, the ROK is also taking part in the international community’s efforts to minimize civilian losses and damage caused by explosive remnants of war, having signed Protocol V (Protocol on explosive remnants of war) of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in January 2008.

21) Disarmament
Disarmament refers to any measures taken in relation to the reduction or abolition of weapons with the aim of eradicating the arms race.

22) Non-proliferation
Non-proliferation refers to diplomatic efforts to prevent the horizontal (quantitative) or vertical (qualitative) proliferation of weapons.
Table 5-6. ROK’s Participation in International Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nuclear Weapons</th>
<th>Biological/Chemical Weapons</th>
<th>Missiles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>· International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): August 1957</td>
<td>· Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC): April 1997</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT): September 1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conventional Weapons</th>
<th>Multilateral Export Control Regimes</th>
<th>UN Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>· UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNRCA): 1993</td>
<td>· Zangger Committee (ZC): October 1995</td>
<td>– General Assembly First Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· Australia Group (AG): October 1996</td>
<td>– UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· Wassenaar Arrangement (WA): July 1996</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MND, jointly with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), has held International Assistance and Protection Courses against chemical accidents or chemical terrors every year since 2005. The course invites participants from Asian member states of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), as part of protection support activities against chemical weapons in accordance with CWC.

MND will continue to take part in international disarmament/non-proliferation activities in an effort to foster a favorable international environment for peace on the Korean Peninsula and enhance the prestige of
the country, MND will also make joint efforts in cooperation with the relevant international organizations to control the threat posed by North Korea’s WMD and to persuade the North to take part in international disarmament/non-proliferation activities.

C. ROK–NATO Exchanges and Cooperation

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) announced the principle of expanding cooperative relations with non-member countries that share democratic values at the summit held in December 2006. Therefore, the ROK government is seeking to secure channels of communication and propel gradual exchange and cooperation.

MND plans to selectively take part in education/training sessions offered by NATO. Those sessions will be utilized as an opportunity to study and learn the doctrines and techniques applied by NATO.
Section 6.

International Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping operations (PKO) have been actively deployed as part of the international community’s efforts to secure world peace and stability. Recently, PKOs have been extending their efforts from monitoring areas of conflict to direct involvement in the settlement of conflicts and post-reconstruction. MND is actively participating in UN PKO and those of the multi-national forces (MNF) and laying the groundwork to expand such efforts.

International peacekeeping activity can be divided into UN peacekeeping operations and those of the multi-national forces. Table 5-7 compares the two.

Table 5-7. Comparison of PKOs Carried out by the UN and the MNF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>UN PKO</th>
<th>MNF PKO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Actor</strong></td>
<td>The UN</td>
<td>An organization or a country serving in a region with the UN Security Council’s approval</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Basis for Formation**         | The agreement of the relevant country is required,  
                                 | ※ Request for mission establishment from UN Security Council,  
                                 | The agreement of the relevant country is required,  
                                 | ※ Such agreement is not required for an aggressor nation (E.g. the Gulf War). |
| **Command and Control**         | UN Security Council / Secretary General → UN SRSG*  
                                 | → Peacekeeping Force (PKF) Commander → Relevant unit  
                                 | A regional organization or head nation of MNF → MNF Commander → Relevant unit |
| **Expenses for Logistics Support and PKO Forces** | Apportioned among the UN member states | Apportioned among the participating countries |

* SRSG: Special Representative Secretary General
MNF PKO can be considered to be under the broad concept of UN peacekeeping activity as their missions are assigned by UN Resolutions.

1. ROK Armed Forces’ Participation in the UN PKO

The UN-led peacekeeping activity first began with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) of Palestinian region in 1948. Over the past 60 years, a total of one million troops from 120 countries have taken part in UN PKO in 60 areas.

The ROK Armed Forces began participating in PKO in 1993, when an engineering battalion was dispatched to the UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM-Ⅱ). The military units dispatched by the ROK military as part of UN PKO in the subsequent period include a medical support group to West Sahara, military observers to India/Pakistan and the Georgia (1994), an engineering battalion to Angola (1995), and an infantry unit to East Timor for the first time (1999). Presently, as part of UN PKO efforts, the ROK military has dispatched forces to Lebanon and military observers in six areas, including India/Pakistan and Georgia. See Figure 5-8 for their current status.
The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 425 and 426 in March 1978, to establish the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country. Israel and Hezbollah engaged in a battle in July 2006. Through Security Council Resolution 1701, the UN demanded an immediate cease-fire as well as the reinforcement of troops and participation from the member states to UNIFIL.

Consequently, the ROK government decided to dispatch 350 troops to UNIFIL in November 2006. After obtaining approval of the National Assembly in December, it dispatched the Dongmyeong

A. PKO Participation in Lebanon

Refer to Appendix 9, Status of ROK Forces Dispatched.
Since August 2007, the Dongmyeong Unit has been engaged in civil-military operations called Operation Peace Wave, a program designed to attend to local issues for the Lebanese that have been suspended for a long time, and the unit was praised as being “a family, a brother” to the Lebanese people. As a result, the ROK troops were awarded the UN Medal in December 2007 and in August 2008 by the UNIFIL Commander as the exemplary unit involved in peacekeeping operations.

In early August 2008, the second and third units rotated, leaving the number of stationed soldiers at 359.

B. Activities as Military Observers

As of August 2008, a total of 16 ROK officers have been carrying out their duties as military observers, nine as members of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), and seven as members of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). In addition, 30 officers or so are currently serving in areas of conflict, including Sudan and Liberia, where they monitor cease-fire violations and take part in patrols, investigations/reports, and mediation efforts under the local command.

Five ROK officers had been dispatched in March 2007 to the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) at the request of the UN and authority of UN Security Council Resolution 1740, and returned home in July 2008 after having completed a tour that involved monitoring cease-fire violations and providing support for local elections.
2. ROK Armed Forces’ Participation in the MNF PKO

The role of the MNF PKO is to expand with international terrorism emerging as a serious threat to global security.

Korea has joined the international effort against terrorism in the name of world peace and the safety of humankind. It also dispatched troops to take part in the efforts to secure peace and stability in Afghanistan and Iraq with the approval of the National Assembly.

The Dongeui and Dasan Units in Afghanistan and the Zaytun Division in Iraq returned home after finishing their duties in December 2007 and December 2008, respectively. Presently, staff and liaison officers are stationed in four countries, including Bahrain and Djibouti. See Figure 5-9 for details.

A. Dispatch of ROK Troops to Afghanistan

The ROK government dispatched the following units to Afghanistan under UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373: a Navy/Air Force transport support group in December 2001, a ROK military medical support group (Dongeui Unit) in February 2002, and a construction engineering support group (Dasan Unit) in February 2003.

Figure 5–9, ROK Participation in MNF PKO
The Medical Support Group (*Dongeui* Unit) (780 troops in total) provided medical services to a total of 230,000 residents and members of the allied forces. The unit was highly acclaimed by the locals for its humanitarian service and health education sessions.

The Construction Engineering Support Group (*Dasan* Unit) (1,332 troops in total) successfully implemented various tasks such as building hospitals and bridges for the reconstruction of postwar Afghanistan, supporting local rehabilitation groups, and offering civilian support.

Meanwhile, even after the withdrawal of *Dongeui* and *Dasan* Units, some military medical staff have joined a civilian-led medical service and vocational training team.

**B. Dispatch of ROK Troops to Iraq**

In April 2003, the ROK dispatched the *Seohee* Unit (200 troops), a construction engineering support group, and the *Jema* Unit (90 troops), a medical support group, to Nassiriya, Iraq, as part of the Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I).

For a year or so until August 2004, the *Seohee* and *Jema* Units carried out activities such as supporting MNF base operations and humanitarian recovery while providing medical services to the locals as well. Such efforts helped establish peace and contributed to reconstruction efforts in Iraq and paved the way for the Peace and Reconstruction Division (the *Zaytun* Division).

25) **The Zaytun Division**

Zaytun means olive in Arabic. Olives are Iraqi people’s favorite food. Olive branch is a widely recognized symbol of peace. The name embodies the ROK forces’ respect for and goodwill towards the locals.

(1) **Deployment Progress of the Zaytun Division** in Iraq

The U.S. declared the end of the war in Iraq in May 2003. In October, the ROK government announced a plan to dispatch additional troops to Iraq in response to a request for support in postwar Iraq reconstruction. In December, the ROK finalized its plan to dispatch less than 3,000 soldiers to assume an area of operation...
and to support peace and recovery projects.

At the 245th special session of the National Assembly in February 2004, the Assembly approved the Government’s plan to dispatch additional troops to Iraq. Subsequently, MND selected Arbil, Iraq, as the area for dispatch and in July 2004, the first unit of 3,566 soldiers completed their deployment in Iraq. Thereafter, a total of eight shift units took their turns and a total of 18,700 were dispatched to the area to conduct its mission.

The dispatch of the Zaytun Division was submitted and approved by the National Assembly on four occasions. The number of troops involved decreased every year in consideration of the local situation in Iraq: to 2,200 in 2005; 1,200 in 2006; and 650 in 2007. The Zaytun withdrew in December 2008 after successful completion of its mission.

(2) Achievements of the Zaytun Division

The Zaytun Division has achieved great success in Iraq in ways such as supporting peace settlement and reconstruction efforts, and consolidating the alliance with the U.S.

Activities carried out by the Zaytun Division include: providing humanitarian support and building friendly relationships with the locals; supporting maintenance of public security; establishing the basis for social and economic development; and developing and educating the locals.
First of all, humanitarian support and friendly relationship building activities provide construction materials for building or renovating housings of the locals. The Zaytun Division helped the locals to lead construction efforts, imbuing a sense of improved standard of living on the locals. Also, the Zaytun Division operated hospitals which treated over 100 patients per day, so that a variety of medical services could be provided to those who had not received benefits. Zaytun also conducted multi-functional civil-military operations (Operation Green Angel)\(^\text{26}\) which took care of local people’s unsolved issues such as installing public waterworks. This in turn, earned the Zaytun Division respect from the local people, creating a mutually friendly relationship. Zaytun conducted other supporting activities or friendly activities such as opening schools for illiterates, donating medicines, operating a Taekwondo class, and inviting key officials from the regional government to Korea, as well as periodical exchange of people.

In terms of the supporting activity in public security, the division helped the local police to reinforce its ability by supplying equipment and materiel. In addition, building and repairing police facilities such as check points in outer blocks of airports improved local conditions to maintain order.

Providing support for socio-economic development and education for the local people inspired locals in backwater areas to gain a sense of self-sustenance, and laid the foundation to improve their standard of living. Notably, through Saemaeul Movement Projects, the Unit introduced the Korean experience during its modernization process and inspired the locals’ willingness for self-sustenance. The project achieved the following: distribution of Saemaeul Movement-related books; operation of the...
Saemaeul Center; improvement of surroundings such as a new construction of community centers and renovation of the public park; and establishment of sisterhood relationships at the village-level and promotion of self-support activities.

Many local residents attended the Zaytun Skills Training Center and more than 80% of them have landed jobs.

Despite difficult conditions, the members of the Zaytun Division successfully completed assigned missions with a clear sense of duty and impressive self-esteem in representing the Republic of Korea. The division’s humanitarian assistance is reputed to be the most exemplary of all allies, gaining the reputation of having presented an “ideal model for civil affairs operation.”

Foreign troop dispatch and befitting missions comparable to Korea’s national power, is significant, in that it not only contributes to world peace and stability, but also enhances national prestige for the Republic of Korea.

3. Establishing the Basis for the Expansion in PKO Activities

The Republic of Korea is one of the greatest beneficiaries from UN for its assistance during the Korean War to overcome such national crisis. Active PKO participation symbolizes Korea returning the favor to the international community, as well as securing international support when such a need
rises. The participation is in line with the government’s pledge to become a Global Korea, and helps improve the ROK military’s civil-military operations capability.

Thus, MND is making an effort to establish a legal and systemic basis in order to expand Korean participation in PKO and also enhance military capabilities.

Efforts made in this context are the following: first, in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), there are now plans to enact the PKO Participation Act (provisional name) to simplify the domestic procedure to dispatch troops; second, MND is reviewing the formation and size of standing forces for PKO missions for timely response upon request from the global society to join peacekeeping efforts and to ensure successful mission accomplishment; third, the function of the Military PKO Center is being strengthened in order to improve PKO training, cultivate instructors, and develop doctrines; finally, exchange and cooperative opportunities with foreign countries such as PKO-related multilateral exercises and conferences are being expanded.
While devising timely military measures in the wake of expanded inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, MND seeks to develop and implement a creative agenda and strategy to build confidence and alleviate tension.

Chapter 6

Military Support for Peace on the Korean Peninsula

- Section 1  Confidence Building and Arms Control
- Section 2  Repatriation and Settlements of ROK POWs
Section 1.
Confidence Building and Arms Control

With the aim of facilitating a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK government is advancing inter-Korean relations under the rubric of mutual benefits and common prosperity, while devising methods to build confidence and relieve military tensions. Against this background, the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) seeks to reach and implement agreements aimed at lowering tension and building confidence such as military assurance on exchange and cooperation as well as prevention of armed conflicts through the South-North military talks. In addition, through inter-Korean arms control measures, MND seeks to maintain military stability on the Korean Peninsula and continue its efforts to offer military support for the creation of a new peace structure.¹)

1) New Peace Structure
A new order based on mutual benefits and common prosperity, built through sincere talks and productive cooperation between South and North Korea

2) Military Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)
An effort to reduce distrust and tension by disclosing the activities, operation, and size of the respective state’s military, which is expected to increase transparency and predictability

1. Military Confidence Building Measures through the South–North Military Talks

A. A Need for Military Confidence Building Measures²

Despite the progress made in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation since the First South-North Summit Talks in 2000, a possibility for accidental skirmish amid armed confrontation still exists.

Massive military forces of South and North Korea are standing off against each other along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and actual armed conflicts occurred between the two navies in the West Sea, both in 1999 and 2002. Therefore, resolving distrust and establishing military confidence is a prerequisite for establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula,
Through the South-North military talks, MND seeks to adopt and implement agreements aimed at relieving tension and building confidence.

B. The South–North Military Talks Progress

In the early 1990s, the two Koreas held High-level Talks and Military Subcommittee Sessions. Major agreements adopted by military talks were as follows: Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Cooperation and Exchange (Inter-Korean Basic Agreement); Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (Joint Declaration of Denuclearization); Subsequent Agreement on Non-aggression to the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement; and Agreement on the Composition and Operation of the Joint Military Commission.

The Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and Subsequent Agreement on Non-aggression clauses contain agreements on military confidence building measures that include: exchange of military personnel and information; notification of military exercises; and installation of a hotline between the North and South military authorities. However, such agreements have failed to be implemented due to the North’s passive attitudes on the issues.

The military talks were suspended in 1993 amid suspicions toward the North’s nuclear program and were resumed following the First South-North Summit Talks in 2000.

Since 2000, South-North military talks were held a total of 46 times with Defense Ministerial Talks being the apex of the series of talks: General Officer-level Talks were held in order to relieve tension and build confidence; and Military Working-level Talks were held to ensure military assurance on exchange and cooperative projects, Table 6-1 shows the status of the South-North military talks.

3) South-North High-level Talks

- The two sides held the first Prime Ministerial-level Talks on September 4, 1990 at the suggestion of the South on December 28, 1988. Thereafter, a total of eight high-level sessions were held until September 18, 1992.
- At South-North High-level Talks, Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the Agreement on the Composition and Operation of Subcommittees were signed.
- Subcommittee sessions of the bilateral High-level Talks consist of Political Subcommittee, Military Subcommittee and Exchange / Cooperation Subcommittee.

4) Military Subcommittee

- As a committee to implement the non-aggression clause of the Basic Agreement, eight plenary sessions were held during the period of March 13 - September 5, 1992, Chairmen of the two sides met three times, and the committee members met three times.
- At the plenary sessions, the Agreement on Composition and Operation of the Joint Military Commission and the Subsequent Agreement on Non-aggression for the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement were signed.

5) Refer to p.148,
5) Joint Military Commission

- The purpose of the commission is to execute the non-aggression clause and discuss matters for establishment of military trust and realization of arms reduction.
- It was agreed to have a Chairman (vice-minister level or above), Vice Chairman and five members.
- The commission’s functions are: (1) to have discussions about the implementation and compliance of the non-aggression clause; (2) to draft relevant agreements; and (3) to implement, confirm, and supervise agreements to alleviate military confrontation.
- Sessions of the commission have not been held as of December 2008 due to the North’s incompliance.

Table 6-1. Status of the South–North Military Talks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>the 1990s (14 in all)</th>
<th>the 2000s (46 in all)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Subcommittee Session</td>
<td>Defense Ministerial Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Defense Ministerial Talks

The Defense Ministerial Talks were held twice. The first session was held in Jeju Island in September 2000. The two Koreas adopted a joint press release consisting of five items that included a joint effort to alleviate military tension and to hold a working-level meeting to support inter-Korean railroad/road projects.

After an interval of seven years, the second meeting took place in Pyongyang in November 2007. The two sides discussed measures on conducting joint efforts to relieve military tension and assure peace, preventing military clashes in the West Sea, undergoing joint excavation of war remains, and providing for military assurance on exchange and cooperation projects. The parties also adopted an agreement containing seven articles and 21 clauses. The agreements signed at the Defense Ministerial Talks are shown in Table 6-2.

Table 6-2. Agreements Signed at the Defense Ministerial Talks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Occasion</th>
<th>Agreements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 26, 2000</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Joint Press Release on the Meeting between the Ministers of MND, ROK and the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, DPRK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 29, 2007</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>Agreement by the Defense Ministers to Implement ‘a Declaration for the Development of the Inter-Korean Relationship, and for Peace and Prosperity’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) General Officer–level Talks

Inter-Korean General Officer–level Talks (head delegate: Major General level) had been held seven times between May 2004 and December 2007.
Issues discussed, were relieving military tension, preventing collisions in the West Sea coupled with launching joint fishery, and military assurance of inter-Korean economic cooperation. During the 2nd meeting in June 2004, the two sides signed an Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Naval Clashes in the West Sea, and the Cessation of Propaganda Activities and the Elimination of Propaganda Apparatus from the DMZ (The June 4th Agreement). The two sides eliminated all propaganda activities and apparatus in accordance with the agreement. However, measures to prevent collisions in the West Sea such as exchanging signals on the Global Maritime Distress Safety System and sharing information on illegal fishing activities by third nations have not been completely realized, due to the North’s passivity on the issue.

During the 5th meeting in May 2007, a Provisional Agreement was signed for militarily assurance of the railroad test-runs along Eastern and Western Transportation Corridors (ETC and WTC). During the 7th meeting in December 2007, the two sides discussed military assurance of transit, communication, and customs process in the Joint Administrative Area (JAA). They agreed on assuring free transit, allowing the use of the Internet and wired/wireless communications, and simplifying the customs process. Agreements signed at the General Officer-level Talks are shown in Table 6-3.

**Table 6–3. Agreements Signed at the General Officer–level Talks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Occasion</th>
<th>Agreements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 4, 2004</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Naval Clashes in the West Sea, and the Cessation of Propaganda Activities and the Elimination of Propaganda Apparatus from the DMZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 8, 2007</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>Joint Press Release of the 5th South–North General Officer–level Military Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provisional Agreement on Military Assurances for the Inter–Korean Railroad Project in the East and West Coast Districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 13, 2007</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>Agreement to Ensure Military Assurance of Transit, Communication, and Customs in the Joint Administrative Area in the East and West Coast Districts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(3) Military Working-level Talks

Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks (head delegate: Colonel level) had taken place a total of 37 times between November 2000 and October 2008. Meetings until 2003 mainly dealt with providing military support to inter-Korean transit and railroad/road projects. Meetings thereafter focused on implementing agreements made at the Defense Ministerial and General Officer-level Talks.

During the 8th meeting in September 2002, an Agreement on Military Assurances for Designation of the Joint Administrative Area in the East and West Coast Districts and the Construction of Railways and Roads Connecting the South and North was adopted. In accordance with this agreement, parts of the DMZ along the Eastern and Western Transportation Corridors were placed under the JAA. June 2003 marked the first ever instance when the two military authorities inspected each other’s mine sweeping efforts in such areas. During the 35th meeting in December 2007, a Military Assurance Agreement on Railway Freight Transport between Munsan and Bongdong was signed. The cargo trains had run 222 times between December 11, 2007 and November 28, 2008, until the North unilaterally announced its cessation on December 1, 2008. The agreements from Military Working-level Talks are shown in Table 6-4.

The two Koreas have signed a total of 12 agreements as a result of the military talks since 2000. Among them, the June 4th Agreement and the Subsequent Agreement to the June 4th Agreement are the only ones dealing with actual confidence building. This is due to the North’s reticence regarding purely military matters such as mutual confidence-building in contrast to the active attitude exhibited in providing military assurances to exchange and cooperation issues.
2. Military Assurance for Inter–Korean Exchange and Cooperation

A. The Need for Military Assurance

Since the 2000 Summit Talks, inter-Korean exchange and cooperation have expanded to include the ETC/WTC and Road Projects, the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, and the Gaeseong and Mt. Geumgang Tours. Between 1989 till the first half of 2008, 530,000 Koreans had crossed the South-North border with a total trade volume of $10.07 billion.

The government seeks to improve the quality of the relationship through exchanges and cooperation based on mutual benefits and common prosperity. In order to promote such projects, military assurance measures between the ROK military and the United Nations Command (UNC), or the North Korean Military should be premised. This is due to the fact that most
of the projects are carried out along areas under military jurisdiction via the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), DMZ, and the Northern Limit Line (NLL).

B. Proceedings

(1) Road and Railroad Projects in ETC and WTC

With the coordination and consent of the UNC and the North Korean military authorities, the ROK established a JAA in the DMZ where railway and road connection projects and transit for passengers would take place. Mine sweeping as well as construction support took place in the JAA and Civilian Control Line (CCL) areas during the period of September 2000 to December 2003. In addition, authorization procedures to allow access for South-North Koreans to cross the MDL as well as safety assurance measures were devised to assure transit and safety of personnel.

Through such military assurance, the ROK military laid the groundwork to expand Inter-Korean cooperative projects such as the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and the Gaeseong and Mt. Geumgang Tours.

(2) Inter-Korean Passage

The ROK military is maintaining military assurance measures and military readiness posture for contingencies to ensure safety of transit between the North and the South in land, air, and sea routes. The number of inter-Korean cross-border passages since 2003 is shown in Table 6-5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008 (up to September)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>65,680</td>
<td>2,801</td>
<td>5,392</td>
<td>9,564</td>
<td>15,175</td>
<td>20,449</td>
<td>12,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Via land</td>
<td>30,205</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>3,240</td>
<td>4,859</td>
<td>6,686</td>
<td>8,405</td>
<td>6,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Via sea</td>
<td>34,843</td>
<td>2,022</td>
<td>2,124</td>
<td>4,497</td>
<td>8,401</td>
<td>11,891</td>
<td>5,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Via air</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to assure safety of ground passages, the military receives transit
plans from the Ministry of Unification and obtains authorization from the UN and the North Korean military authorities prior to the visit. Guard posts are operated to assure the safety of passengers, and vehicle escorts are offered as well.

In order to assure safety of sea and air passages, the military reviews authorization of inter-Korean waterway and airway operating plans received from the Ministry of Unification, and maintains patrol/monitor support continuously during all ship/aircraft transports.

The military periodically evaluates security influence on the inter-Korean passages to interdict elements that may harm the security conditions, and continues to find areas for improvement regarding the South-North Korean transit.

3. Maintaining Readiness for Arms Control Implementation between the Two Koreas

Arms control is a strategic concept to reduce the threats of war by achieving military transparency and stability, thus improving overall security. A complete, peaceful solution of the North Korean nuclear issue is a precondition for arms control on the Korean Peninsula. The principle is to gradually achieve operational arms control and structural arms control based on military confidence. In addition, the two Koreas must lead all efforts, while adhering to the current Armistice Agreement until it is replaced by a peace treaty to build a new peace structure.

The two Koreas agreed in principle to build military confidence and to control arms in the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement (1992) and the Subsequent

6) Arms Control
A strategic concept to reduce the threats of war by achieving military transparency and stability, thus improving overall security. It is achieved through mutual agreements such as unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral consultations among related nations by limiting, banning, and down-sizing forces or by constructing, deploying, relocating, operating, or verifying the use of forces.

7) Operational Arms Control
A military measure to reduce and prevent the possibilities of surprise attacks and all-out wars through limitations on operation and deployment of forces. It does not include changes in force structure and size.

8) Structural Arms Control
A military measure to maintain military stability and balance through limitations and reduction of troops and weapon systems, which is a substantial element that forms military power, in a structural sense.
to the Agreement on Non-aggression. The Basic Agreement, however, has made little progress due to the North’s passive attitudes on the issue.

Notwithstanding this dire situation, MND continues to ready itself to implement arms control. It is exploring ways to achieve the desired goal, for example, by undergoing multilateral research and discussions on disarmament such as hosting arms control seminars and publishing issues of the Korean Peninsula Arms Control. Also, to enhance its capabilities in arms control verification, MND is holding workshops on improving inspection job performance, conducting simulated inspection training and nuclear inspection training, sending officials to attend verification education and training courses, etc.

4. The Way Ahead

Although the military talks are assessed to have played some role in supporting cooperation programs and thus alleviating tension, measures to build military confidence have remained extremely rudimentary.

For consolidating peace on the Korean Peninsula, the two Koreas must abide by the following agreements: notification of military exercises; military personnel exchange; military information exchange; peaceful use of the DMZ; and installation of a South-North military hotline.

Through the military talks, MND will continue to exert efforts to reduce tension and build confidence in accordance with the basic tenets of the Government’s North Korea policy of mutual benefits and common prosperity, which aims to resolve all inter-Korean issues through dialogue.

In accordance with the principle of “resolving easier issues first,” the talks will first discuss military support on inter-Korean cooperative projects. Meanwhile, the military will progressively discuss confidence building and arms control within the frameworks of the Basic Agreement and the Subsequent Agreement on Non-aggression.

Once the stage is set for further discussions, gauged by progress in the
North Korean nuclear issue or inter-Korean relationship, the military will run
a previously-agreed Joint Military Commission to devise peaceful measures to
relieve threats and to provide military support for a peaceful Peninsula.

When the North attempts to nullify the NLL during the course of
discussions, the ROK military will consistently espouse its initial position that
“the NLL has functioned as a de facto maritime demarcation line for the past
50 years, and that it should strictly abide by the line in the future.”
Section 2.

Repatriation and Settlements of ROK POWs

Repatriation of prisoners of war (POWs) took place in accordance with the Armistice Agreement in 1953. However, a considerable number of POWs excluded at the time are still forced to remain in the North.

The ROK government is seeking ways to: verify the status of POWs still alive in the North; allow reunion and ensure repatriation; safely repatriate POWs and their families who escaped from the North to a third country; and assist settlements of repatriated POWs in the South.

1. ROK POWs from the Korean War

During the Korean War, the United Nations (UN) Forces and the Communist Forces exchanged POWs on three occasions from April 1953 to January 1954. Despite the UN estimate of 82,000 ROK soldiers as missing in action (MIA), only 8,343 have been repatriated. Therefore, a considerable number of POWs are presumed to have been forced to remain in the North.

Since 1953, when the first POW exchange took place and to the 1960s, the UN Forces continued to request repatriation of remaining POWs via the United Nations Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC). However, the
North maintained their position that all POWs were transferred to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and there remain no further POWs detained. The issue had also failed to be dealt with during the sporadically held inter-Korean talks since the 1970s.

As of October 2008, the ROK government has formed a list of 560 ROK POWs presumed to be alive in the North based on statements from North Korean defectors and repatriated POWs. As they are now in their 70s and 80s, the issue requires an immediate solution.

2. The Government’s Efforts

A. Verification, Reunion, and Repatriation of the ROK POW

Since the return of the late Army Lieutenant Cho Chang-ho in 1994, the ROK government began to review POW issues. As part of humanitarian and reconciliatory measures, it prioritized POW status verification and repatriation during inter-Korean talks.

During the Ministerial-level Talks and Inter-Korea Red Cross Talks following the June 2000 Summit, the two sides agreed to resolve POW issues alongside that of dispersed families. They agreed during the 7th Red Cross Talks (February 2006) to tackle the issue by “including status verification of those missing during the war into the issue of
separated families.” Such principle was reconfirmed during the 20th Ministerial-level Talks (February 2007) and 8th Red Cross Talks (April 2007). As a result, the status of 25 POWs was verified, and among them 11 were able to reunite with their families in the South.

In the meantime, the government exerted efforts to safely repatriate POWs and their family members who escaped from the North to third countries. Once the status of an escaped POW is verified, the ROK government protects them as they do for Korean nationals living abroad, and leverages diplomatic ties to have them repatriated swiftly and safely. Due to such measures, 76 POWs and 161 family members were repatriated through a third country from 1994 to December 2008. The current status is shown in Table 6-6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>94</th>
<th>97</th>
<th>98</th>
<th>99</th>
<th>00</th>
<th>01</th>
<th>02</th>
<th>03</th>
<th>04</th>
<th>05</th>
<th>06</th>
<th>07</th>
<th>08</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROK POWs</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family members</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Supporting Settlements of Repatriated POWs

MND has established a legal foundation such as the Act on Repatriation and Treatment for Korean Prisoners of War, in order to support settlements for repatriated POWs and their family members.

Supporting Settlements for ROK POWs under the Act on Repatriation and Treatment for Korean Prisoners of War

- Settlement Subsidy: A junior enlisted to be promoted to staff sergeant and pay 50–years worth of salary, pension, and aid for residential settlement
- Free medical support: Free medical treatment of up to 10 million won a year
- Family support: Provision to the North Korean widow and children of a POW who died in the North

In 2008, discussions to explore solutions for POW repatriation and settlement were initiated via repatriated POW invitational talks and expert
workshops. In line with such initiatives, an incorporated Family Union of Korean POWs Detained in North Korea was established in August 2008 with approval from the MND to promote POWs’ self-help and self-sufficiency. In October 2008, a pilot program utilizing defector education and consulting agencies was launched to support POWs’ adjustment to the society.

3. The Way Ahead

MND will exert efforts to repatriate and settle POWs through government-led coordination and cooperation with the civil sector equipped with expertise. Foremost, it plans to continuously raise POW issues at inter-Korean talks to induce the North to admit to the existence of remaining POWs. Efforts to solve separated family issues will continuously be made, while practical and creative approaches reflecting changes in the inter-Korean relationship will be sought. In addition, MND will do its best to safely repatriate POWs and families defected to third countries. In particular, firm measures to guarantee the safety of those peoples will be devised. Diplomatic efforts to maintain cooperative ties with such governments will be made as well.

Taking into account the repatriated POWs’ challenges to settle in the ROK due to the long years spent in the North, policies that focus on their successful settlements will be implemented. POWs face the following challenges: difficulties in adapting to a new society and culture; treating illness sustained by forced-labor; concerns about family members left behind; and communication with current family members. The ROK government will devise a system in cooperation with the civil sector in order to best solve those personal problems which the nation may not be equipped to remedy.
MND seeks to cultivate a highly professional force by eliminating pretentious administrative elements and creating a culture of “strong warriors and strong military,” to contend with existing and prospective threats.
Section 1. Defense Manpower Management

In order to actively respond to changes in the security environment, the capabilities of defense manpower, which constitutes the foundation of national defense, need to be maximized.

The ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) is arranging the military personnel management system to cultivate active duty personnel into professional experts in their functional areas. MND is also increasing the proportion of civilian and female workforce in order to improve the structural diversity of national defense personnel.

1. Military Personnel Management Based on Expertise

In the process of reorganizing into a technology-intensive military structure, MND is overhauling its sizable mandatory servicemen-intensive manpower structure into a structure that centers on professional officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). In this regard, MND is planning to establish a military personnel management system to foster active duty service members into experts in their functional areas.

A. Establishing Military Personnel Management System Based on Professionalism

The legacy military personnel management system that formerly gave weight to equality and balanced distribution is now transforming into a system that places higher value on professionalism and capabilities. By
preparing new personnel management models; establishing limitless competition system; and building a position management system that assigns the right talents to the right post, it will further uphold professional development while creating a fair, transparent, and reliable culture where individuals yield to results.

To that end, MND has provided an institutional foundation by enacting the Directive on Personnel Management Based on Professionalism in August 2008. Key details are as follows:

First, it constructed a functional personnel management system that systematically administers the career path of each respective specialty area, reaching the highest level of Lieutenant Generals (Vice-Admiral) or Major Generals (Rear Admiral).

Second, it adopted a promotion management system where candidates from 2-3 graduation classes limitlessly compete with each other instead of having a single graduation class of separate commissioning institutions competing amongst themselves. As such, this will enable the selection of best available experts. Third, by improving the customary practice of giving command opportunities to all promoted individuals, the position management system now assigns command opportunities to candidates that prove suitable for commanding and assigns high specialty functional positions to candidates that prove to be functionally qualified.

In addition, MND will enhance the utility of manpower management by revising rules and regulations of the system: invigorating programs to benefit long-term service members, including a term-limited promotion system, and an increase in honorable discharge funds.

B. Complementing the Professional National Defense Manpower System

MND has categorized its professional national defense manpower1) consisting of active service members into five types, including those in international affairs and those in policy. Yet, it has been assessed to be more or less inadequate in terms of managing those who are on time-sensitive

1) Types of Professional National Defense Manpower

Defense expert personnel are categorized into five types, experts in international affairs, policy, technology and functions, special areas, and acquisition,
missions, due to shortages of professional manpower in various fields such as military personnel with languages skills and Foreign Area Officers (FAO).

That being said, MND is establishing an effective personnel management system that efficiently fosters and manages FAO who perform their duties in foreign missions and international negotiations, as well as professional policy manpower such as those in defense policy, military strategy, and military diplomacy. Through these efforts, MND will specify posts filled by expert personnel as well as standards that designate such posts, while smoothing the system that links assignment-education-personnel management-utilization in each area of expertise.

The enactment of the National Defense Reform Act has provided the legal foundation to foster and manage experts in jointness. However, because of the overly stringent criteria in defining experts in jointness, fostering a workforce specializing in jointness has been challenging. In response, MND is amending related laws and regulations that will appropriately expand the scope and human resource pool that defines jointness.

2) Joint Professional Military Manpower
Refer to those experts with qualifications in jointness, They are assigned to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC), and other joint units.

2. Diversifying Defense Manpower Structure

As modern weapon systems have become more precise and diverse, the process of acquiring and managing required force capabilities are also becoming increasingly more complex and specialized. Furthermore, the spectrum for national defense has widened to cover areas such as disaster relief and counter-terrorism, while the linkage with other social areas (politics, economy, society, and culture) has become more salient. In order to flexibly deal with such situational changes, MND is currently strengthening the diversification of the defense manpower structure.

A. Boosting Professional Expertise in MND Headquarters

Implemented from 2005, MND is reorganizing the Headquarters (HQ)’ personnel structure to maximize harmonization between civilian officials and
active duty personnel. This is to raise employee expertise, maintain continuity of policies, and improve objectivity in policy formulations.

MND’s restructuring efforts are geared towards annually increasing its civil servants ratio and further improving their respective field of expertise.

Increasing the number of the civilian officials in the Ministry’s HQ first requires consensus within and outside of the military community, while concurrently upgrading the professional capacities of each individual. Furthermore, all positions within the Ministry’s HQ will be carefully scrutinized in order to distinguish posts that are better suited for civilians and for active duty personnel.

MND is devising various policies to elevate the level of expertise of its civilian officials. Recent recruitments bring together civilian and military experts as well as grade 5 civilian officials, while defense MBA core programs and specialization courses are in operation. In addition, employing a career development program (CDP) enables a constructive personnel management system that closely connects assignments, expertise areas, and education.

B. Utilizing Civilian Personnel and Improving the Personnel Management System for the Military Civilian Workforce

Because defense affairs are carried out by complex entities combining military and civilian personnel, it is also important to attract and make the best of civilian talents in non-combat service areas.

In order to guarantee integrity of the ROK military’s combat organization (missions) and to enhance efficiency in force management, MND is consolidating the use of its civilian resources. Accordingly, adopting civilian employees by the military is being expanded in parallel with its increased outsourcing, private entrustment, and privatization efforts.

The military civilian workforce carries out specialized administration, technology, and support related functions in areas such as force build up and maintenance of military capacities, which plays significant roles in maintaining the expertise of defense affairs.
However, the classification system of the military civilian workforce is very complicated (61 job lines in 15 job groups), compared to that of the regular public service members (32 job lines in two job groups). MND is scheduled to simplify the overly-complex classification system by amending the Enforcement Decree of the Act on Personnel Affairs of Military Civilian Employees. At the same time, the Ministry will improve efficiency of personnel utilization by reviewing the requirements for each job groups.

Furthermore, an all-around personnel management system for the military civilian workforce that covers recruitment-assignments-education-promotion will be enforced. To this end, MND will devise until 2012 a comprehensive plan that includes: simplifying the hiring system; expanding the use of defense contractors; reorganizing position structures; and improving training and education systems.

C. Efficient Utilization of Defense Female Workforce

There has been an increasing number of female hiring which facilitated the conditions for MND to develop its female-related policies such as protecting maternal rights and promoting gender equality and so forth.

(1) Status and Utilization of Defense Female Personnel

Female public officials represent approximately 32 percent of the entire number of public officials in the Ministry. Female military civilians represent approximately 16.5 percent of the total military civilians, Table 7-1 shows the status of female public officials and military civilians,
The intent is to increase the number of female officers and NCOs from 5,400 in 2008 to 11,600 in 2020. In doing so, the percentage of female officers will increase from 3.1% to 7%, while the percentage of female NCOs will increase from 2.2% to 5%. Table 7-2 shows the annual employment plan.

Table 7–1. Status of Female Public Officials and Military Civilians (2007)  
(Unit: Person)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>4–5th grades</th>
<th>6–7th grades</th>
<th>8th grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,454</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>1,070</td>
<td>3,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Officials</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Civilians</td>
<td>4,151</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>3,055</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The basic principle behind utilizing the female workforce is that “all qualified service members, regardless of gender, will be assigned to any job and will carry out the same missions during peace and war.” Assignment of female service members is limited only in the following cases: regiment or lower units where missions are mostly close ground combat; units that carry out special warfare operations or long-range reconnaissance missions; and units and positions whose mission requires physical conditions unsuitable for most females.
Presently, female service members assume posts including command or staff positions in field units, fighter pilots, crewmembers on combat ships, and even positions in overseas dispatch units. In 2008, there were a total of 28 female service members dispatched overseas that conducted their missions in places such as Iraq, Lebanon, Nepal, etc.

(2) Promoting Policies for Defense Female Personnel

Since 2007, the implementation of the Defense Policy’s Gender Impact Assessment System,\(^5\) which was first introduced in 2005, has been expanded to each military service, and has been enforced in furtherance of protecting maternity related issues. Specifically, MND amended existing statutes that allow: proper remunerations to those who fill in the voids left by service members on maternity/childcare leave; flexible service systems for childcare;\(^6\) guaranteeing leave of absence for miscarriages or stillbirth; increasing eligibility for maternity leave and prolonging its length; and a system that acknowledges both service members on leave of absence and those who substitute them.

In September 2008, MND enacted the Directive on Operation of Consultants for Female Service Member’s Difficulties in order to facilitate female personnel--still a
minority in the military circles—in adjusting to their unit of service and to provide counseling services on the difficulties they confront. Supplementary education for consultants takes place more than once a year in order to improve the quality of counseling.

MND also works to create “a gender equal society,” which is in line with the government’s policy direction. Since 2003, the Korea Institute for Gender Equality Promotion and Education (KIGEPE), a subsidiary institution under the Ministry of Gender Equality (MOGE), conducted “gender awareness” sessions to faculty of education institutions and personnel on education-related posts in each Service. As of June 2008, over 1,300 completed the course and 18,000 service members posted in remote areas participated through private non-profit organizations.

3. Building a Defense Human Resources Management System

Starting in 2009, MND plans to utilize a Defense Human Resources Management System (DHRMS) in order to computerize and automate personnel services.

DHRMS consolidates the programs currently operated by each branch of Services and performs twelve HR-related services in three fields. It interfaces with six MND systems such as logistics and mobilization information systems, as well as three non-MND systems including those from the Military Manpower Administration (MMA) and the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs (MPVA). In the future, new functions such as payroll administration, e-Learning, and policy management will be additionally developed while allowing interfacing capabilities with the Battlefield.

7) Gender Awareness
An ability to perceive and consider the impact of sex and gender on males and females.
Management Information System,

DHRMS will be employed as base in order to realize a personnel management founded on professionalism. The operational concept for the system is shown in Figure 7-1.

Figure 7-1, Operational Concept Diagram for DHRMS
Section 2.

Strengthening Training and Education

Systematic and sustainable training and education are necessary in order for individual service members and units to exert their maximum combat capabilities during a crisis and achieve success in war.

MND is improving its defense training and education system and cultivating talents with specialized military knowledge. Furthermore, MND is promoting “strong warriors” and a “strong military” by executing realistic training simulations to guarantee impermeability against engagement with any enemy.

1. Developing the National Defense Training and Education System

MND conducts various training and education to foster “strong warriors” and a “strong military” that is impenetrable. Through such trainings the military fosters combatants with a warrior’s disposition; creative military experts equipped with appropriate technical skills and leadership; and an elite force with high standards of combat-readiness.

A. National Defense Training and Education System

In order to effectively carry out its training programs, MND amended the Directive on Defense Training and Education in November 2008, and is currently in the drafting process of such defense training and education policy outline.

As shown in Figure 7-2, the national defense training and education system is divided into military education, human resources development, and unit training.
Military education can further be divided into candidate training that transforms civilians into officers and NCOs, and refresher training that augments duty performing abilities. Experts required by the three Services are fostered and “jointness” is improved through systematic education that reflects specific missions.

Figure 7-2, National Defense Training and Education System

MND seeks to strengthen management training for higher-level managers, and extend education for public officials serving at the Ministry.

Human resources development seeks to foster defense expert personnel, and is divided into professional education and capability improvement
education. Professional education cultivates military experts capable of leading the establishment of a technology-intensive force structure. Capability improvement education includes increasing the values of officers in their respective expert area of interest and potentials, as well as upgrading service members’ capacities in connection with the national lifelong education policy. To that end, the Ministry provides domestic and international graduate level degree programs, conducts research education, and offers opportunities for self-development such as offering courses to obtain college credits during times of service.

Unit training is divided into individual training and collective training that fosters war-fighting capabilities. The Ministry develops IT-based scientific training systems to maximize integrated capabilities of battlefield functions. It also develops field maneuver training methods in association with War Games and the combat command training model.

B. Improving Conditions for Defense Training and Education

MND has upgraded its training facilities to minimize inconveniences caused by outdoor field training to the local community, while enhancing IT and scientific features of training that complies with recent accomplishments of information technology as well as prospects for future warfare.

In order to improve the conditions related to military education, the Ministry plans to design a distance learning system (shown in Figure 7-3) by introducing the defense broadband convergence network. The plan is to field the network by 2009 in order to provide timely education for the service members. In so doing, the Ministry will automate the education planning-execution-assessment process and provide a customized education opportunity for the users.
As part of a human resources development mechanism, the Ministry seeks to offer self-development opportunities to satisfy the desire for learning by service members. To this end, the Ministry has been improving related systems and also installing Cyber Knowledge Information Rooms down to company-level units.

To actively cope with the changes in future warfare, unit training will employ advanced technical training systems. MND plans to expand the current battalion-level Korea Combat Training Center (KCTC) combat exercises up to brigade-level units. Furthermore, it will increase the use of simulators for equipment (tanks, armored vehicles, combat ships or jet-fighters) whose actual maneuver (or live firing) can be limited during training.

Battle command training systems adopted from War Game models are being devised. In this regard, an LVC System\(^8\) that incorporates advanced live fire maneuver exercises (Live), simulator-based training (Virtual), and battle command training program (Constructive) is being fabricated.
The ROK military has seen difficulties in securing appropriate training areas due to rapid urbanization and regional developments. Therefore, MND plans to consolidate scarcely-used and small training facilities scattered across the country, and then re-organize them into large training facilities befitting the corps-level echelon, in the meantime consolidating smaller training facilities suitable at the division/brigade-level echelon. MND has also made efforts to assure safety and to minimize inconveniences to local residents residing in nearby training facilities. These efforts include installing a safety wall from ricochet rounds, erecting sound-proof walls, establishing car wash sites, and completing pavements in maneuver routes. It also includes distributing eco-friendly training equipment such as silencers for individual small arms and tank guns.

2. Developing Military Education

MND is developing a system for candidate training and refresher training that reinforces service members’ military expertise, leadership, duty performance, and potentials.

The military academies have moved away from the old simplistic education curriculums and introduced theme-oriented curriculums starting in 2008, along with sending an increasing number of cadets via exchange programs with foreign military academies. In addition, the service academies plan to recruit more talented civilian professors.

Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) is planning to assess the quality of its cadets and education system and reflect the outcomes to its selection and resource allocation process. Such efforts will improve overall ROTC education condition while recruiting well-qualified junior officers.

The Branch schools and colleges of each military service are improving their curriculums, education contents, and conditions in order to foster military experts. In particular, they have systemized the levels and realms of joint military education by each course to establish the concept of future joint

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9) Ricochet Rounds
Ammunition that is deflected to a different direction after hitting the initial target

10) Theme-oriented Curriculum
Courses on core knowledge, basic science, optional major subjects, and military science
battlefield operations, and synthesize them into the regular education program.

Meanwhile, in 2008, the Korea National Defense University (KNDU) launched a new Doctorate degree program for the first time to produce top experts in national security and military affairs. Table 7-3 shows the current status of the program.

Table 7-3, Status of the Doctorate Program at KNDU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree name</th>
<th>Years of study</th>
<th>Quota</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Areas where graduates will be utilized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doctorate in military science</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>15 person (3 per major)</td>
<td>• Active service member of captain or higher</td>
<td>• Policy department experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Public officials of 5th grade or higher</td>
<td>• Professors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Defense-related civilians</td>
<td>• National defense-related research posts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Specialization: military strategy, defense resource management, operational analysis, information technology, weapons systems

3. Developing Military Human Resources

Annually, the ROK military provides a pool of human resource numbering 270,000 active mandatory servicemen and 16,000 officers/NCOs to the society. Accordingly, MND is devising policies to develop military human resources that allow service members and the enlisted to achieve self-development while carrying out their missions.

A. Fostering Military Experts

The Ministry has established and implemented mid-term plans for yearly education outsourcing so as to systematically foster experts that can lead the transformation of the military into a technology-intensive structure.

Expert personnel selected between 2007 and 2008 included 611 master’s degree and 101 doctoral degree holders. In 2008, the Ministry increased the number of positions required to foster appropriate numbers of education,
defense policy, research, and acquisition experts from 1,964 to 2,600.

The Ministry has sent Masters and Doctorate candidates to world’s top 100 universities with competitive advantages. Table 7-4 shows the current status of students in degree courses at home and abroad.

Table 7-4, Status of Students under Degree Courses at Home and Abroad

(Unit: Person)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Sub-total</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Sub-total</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overseas</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, the Ministry has dispatched officers and cadets to defense universities, command and general staffs colleges, branch schools, and military academies abroad to acquire advanced military knowledge and foster regional experts by countries. The countries under exchange programs have increased from 28 in 2007 to 31 in 2008, and the trend will continue. Table 7-5 shows the current status.

Table 7-5, Number of Personnel Sent to Overseas Military Education or Training Courses

(Unit: Person)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Military Education</th>
<th>Training Overseas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007 (28 countries)</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 (31 countries)</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MND is setting educational objectives for different ranks in order to satisfy officers’ and NCOs’ desire to learn and upgrade their capabilities through lifelong education. The objective is to have more than 70 percent of the officers and more than 50 percent of the NCOs obtain master’s degrees by 2012.
B. Improving Service Members’ Capabilities

Approximately 82 percent or more of the enlisted joined the service while enrolled at colleges. Therefore, MND is offering opportunities to continue their education by providing chances to obtain credits for their college courses. In April 2007, it provided an institutional basis for service members to acquire up to six credits during military service by amending the Military Service Act, the Higher Education Act, the Act on Academic Credit Recognitions, et cetera. In addition, the Ministry encourages service members to continue their education in their units by running Cyber Knowledge Information Rooms. By August 2008, the Ministry installed 39,900 PCs, 80.2 percent of the total planned. The Ministry plans to install a total of 53,000 PCs by 2009.

A total of nine universities are accepting credits obtained through military education institutions as of the 1st semester of 2008. Table 7-6 shows the status of the credit recognition system.

Table 7–6. Online Courses and Recognizing Universities (1st Semester of 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Courses</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, some universities introduced a credit bank system to recognize credits from training courses during military service. Military courses recognized by universities have increased from 82 programs at 18 institutions in 2007, to 131 programs at 23 institutions in 2008.

MND is developing a system where certain military job skills can be recognized in the civilian sector as well. Such initiatives include...
exempting written tests in nationally-recognized certificate exams or converting military licenses into a civilian one. In 2003, the six national certificate exams in which written tests were exempted for military experts were coupled with 16 additional exams in 2007 that included automobile maintenance, etc. Table 7–7 shows the details.

Table 7–7, National Certificate Tests Exempted (a total of 22)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Written tests are Exempted for following Certificates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Environment, boiler handling, electricity, diving, Korean cooking, vehicle maintenance (Navy) – total of six certificates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Vehicle maintenance (Army), electronic appliances, electric welding, gas welding, special welding, caterpillar equipment maintenance construction equipment engine maintenance, construction equipment chassis maintenance, aircraft fuselage maintenance, aircraft engine maintenance, aircraft electronic maintenance, forklift operation, bulldozer operation, motor grader operation, loader operation, and excavator operation – total of 16 certificates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MND has authorized two military job skills to be recognized as national certificate-worthy, as indicated in Table 7–8.

Table 7–8, Military Job Skills to Be Recognized as National Certificates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Job Skills</th>
<th>Recognized Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caterpillar Equipment Maintenance</td>
<td>November 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optical Equipment Maintenance</td>
<td>December 2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since 1975, 276,000 out of 960,000 defense personnel passed National Technical Qualification Certificate Exams. The exams are offered biannually by MND delegated from the Ministry of Labor, and it fosters technical experts while allowing them to contribute to the society upon discharge. In the first half of 2008, a total of 1,345 passed Exams for an Industrial Engineering
Certificate and 4,162 passed Exams for a Technician Certificate.

Compared to 2007, total applicants increased by 12 percent, with passing rates at 34 percent, a rate higher than that of the civilians (27 percent).

In addition, by establishing special programs, MND is cultivating technical experts through a cooperate system between industries, academia, and the military. In 2008, for the first time, 500 students from ten schools were chosen as a test case. The Ministry plans to expand such efforts by assessing their performance.

In the future, the Ministry will upgrade quality management of military certificates and increase the spread of such skills to the society by enacting the Defense Technical Qualifications Act.

4. Realistic Training and Exercises

The ROK military conducts realistic training and exercises to allow its service members and units to maximize combat capabilities in contingencies. In particular, the exercises\(^1\) and training are focusing on post-operational control (OPCON) transition, while reinforcing joint combined exercises and training\(^2\) and training by each Service.

A. Combined/Joint Training and Exercises

(1) Ulchi–Freedom Guardian Exercise

Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) Exercise is a ROK-U.S. Combined Exercise in preparation of the OPCON Transition to improve operational capabilities of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (ROK JCS) and U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM). The exercise will be carried out from 2008 to 2012, and consists of military command post and government exercises.
The exercise was established when Focus Lens, a UNC-led military exercise which began in 1954, and Ulchi Exercise, the military support training by the ROK government, which was initiated by the January 21st incident in 1968, developed into a comprehensive military and government command post exercise (CPX) using computer war gaming. The exercise was renamed from Ulchi-Focus Lens (UFL) to Ulchi-Freedom Guardian in 2008.

The exercise is conducted between late August to early September, in the order of crisis management exercise, military and government exercise, and after action review board (AARB).

Administrative agencies of a city, county, district or above, major mobilizing industries, army units above the corps-level echelon, navy units above the fleet-level echelon, air force units above the wing-level echelon, the Marine Corps Command, the United States Forces-Korea (USFK), and pre-planned augmentation forces HQs participate in the exercise.

(2) Key Resolve (KR)/Foal Eagle (FE) Exercise

Key Resolve (KR) is a ROK-U.S., combined exercise to maintain combined defense posture during the OPCON Transition period (2008-2012). It is a simulated CPX to gain familiarity with the Operational Plan (OPLAN) execution procedure, to deploy U.S., augmentation units to the Korean Peninsula, and to maintain war sustainability of the ROK Armed Forces. The Korean participants include MND, JCS, Service HQs, Logistics Commands, Operations Commands, MND subsidiary units, joint units, and units above the corps/fleet/wing-level, The Combined Forces Command (CFC), USFK, U.S, Pacific Command (US PACOM),
Strategic Command (US STRATCOM), and augmentation units participate from the American side. The exercise is conducted in the order of crisis management exercise, computer simulation-based CPX, and AARB.

Foal-Eagle (FE) Exercise first began as a small-scale rear-area defense training in 1961, then added concepts of combined and joint operations, as well as combined special warfare operations in 1975. In 1982, the spectrum of the exercise was expanded to include rear-area defense, stabilization operations against enemy Special Operations Force (SOF) infiltration and assaults, RSOI\(^\text{13}\) special warfare operations, ground maneuver operations, amphibious maneuver operations, and combat air operations.

KR/FE Exercise further developed into a ROK-U.S. Combined Exercise that runs both CPX and field training exercise (FTX).

(3) Taegeuk Exercise

Taegeuk Exercise is an annual CPX conducted to reinforce operational capabilities of the ROK JCS and to derive requirements for joint forces and unit structure developments.

A working-level exercise was conducted in 1995 to reinforce self-reliant operational capabilities of the ROK JCS in the wake of the transfer of peacetime operational control in 1994. In 1996, it was named the Aprok River Exercise, and developed into a \textit{de facto} joint exercise in which the ROK JCS and Operations Command participated.

The exercise then was renamed Taegeuk Exercise in 2004. Starting in 2005, it utilized Taegeuk Joint Operations Simulation (JOS), a joint operation simulation model developed by the ROK JCS. From 2008, the exercise focused on improving operational capabilities and force enhancements in preparation of OPCON Transition.
(4) Hoguk Exercise

Hoguk Exercise is an annual ROK JCS-led live-maneuver joint training to reinforce joint operational capabilities among the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

In 1988, separate trainings by Services--Sangmu Training for the Army, Tonghae Training for the Navy and Philseung Training for the Air Force--were integrated into a single joint training and was named Tongil Training. In 1996, it was named Hoguk Exercise involving corps-level field live-maneuver training. In 2008, corps-level FTXs that were conducted on an annual basis were integrated into the exercise.

(5) Hwarang Exercise

Hwarang Exercise is an Integrated Defense Headquarters-led comprehensive rear-area training participated by all national defense elements including the civilians, the government, and the military.

This is a military-wide version of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area (GSMA) Counter-Infiltration Training that was led by the Third ROK Army (TROKA) from 1977 to 1981.

Hwarang Exercise focuses on familiarization of OPLAN execution in rear areas during war and peace, as well as on establishment of an integrated defense posture involving the civilians, the government, and the military while inspiring the local’s sense of national security.
B. Major Training of Individual Services

(1) Army

The Army reinforces “a realistic unit training focusing on combat missions” for each echelon in accordance with its philosophy of “train the way you fight and fight the way you train.” In particular, the Army is developing a scientific training system such as advanced combat training, a Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), and simulator training in order to allow the soldiers to vicariously experience the battlefield and to offer the most realistic training available.

Advanced combat training is a two-way training conducted in conditions similar to that of an actual battlefield, using advanced scientific technology such as MILES equipment, data communication, and satellites, and also by employing opposition forces (OPFOR). Presently, the training is conducted at the battalion level but will be extended to regiments while mechanized unit training will be involved as well.

BCTP is a computer simulation training to reinforce commanding abilities of commanders and staffs. Since 1999, the program applied the self-developed Changjo 21 Model and Hwarang 21 Model in order to familiarize the participants with operating integrated forces as well as corps/division/regiment/battalion-level commanding procedures under a realistic situation. Also, a designated controller and Opposition Force are employed for corps and division-level trainings, and Battle Command Training Group is tasked with hosting the after action review (AAR) session. In the future, training will be reinforced by involving field live-maneuver trainings.
Simulator training involves using simulators for key combat equipment to train firing, control, and tactical discussions in a virtual battlefield. The Army plans to set up simulation training centers in all corps and divisions in order to improve individual training and training system for battlefield functions.

(2) Navy

The Navy strengthens real warfare-oriented maritime training that reflects conditions of the East, West, and South Sea.

Key training programs include: component operations training, maritime maneuvers training, combined exercise, and Naval Academy midshipmen cruise training.

Component operations training is designed to enhance combat capabilities of component operations that include anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, amphibious operations, rescue and search operations, special warfare, submarine warfare, and aerial anti-submarine warfare training.

Maritime maneuver training is to ensure early command of the sea in contingencies. Three-dimensional forces such as newest combat ships, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and maritime operations helicopters are involved.

Combined exercise includes ROK-U.S. combined exercises to strengthen their combined defense system, and multinational combined exercises to reinforce humanitarian relief and military cooperation. The ROK and U.S. conduct counter-SOF operations, anti-submarine search exercises, submarine warfare, mine warfare, rescue
operations, amphibious operations, and special warfare training. Training for rescue and search operations are conducted between Korea and Japan, Korea and China, and Korea and Russia.

Furthermore, the Navy seeks to strengthen multinational combined operations and international ties by participating in RIMPAC.\(^\text{17}\) West Pacific Submarine Escape and Rescue Exercise (PAC-REACH)\(^\text{18}\) is also an effective exercise with the Navy at the helm. Such exercises are regularly conducted between ten countries including the U.S., UK, Japan, Canada, and Australia.

The ROK Navy will actively participate in peace-seeking multinational naval exercises designed to counter military, transnational, and non-military threats. They include the COBRA Gold\(^\text{19}\) and ASEAN Regional Forum exercise to foster maritime security cooperation.\(^\text{20}\)

Cruise training is for Naval Academy midshipmen, who sequentially cruise along four different designated sea routes\(^\text{21}\) for 100 to 150 days each year. In doing so, the Navy enhances its military diplomacy by making goodwill visits to allied and friendly nations while improving midshipmen’s professional skills and broadening international perspectives.

(3) Air Force

The Air Force reinforces realistic training focusing on combat missions in order to maintain readiness that can rapidly counter all situations and threats, and to establish an optimal operational posture.

Key Air Force trainings include: defensive counter-air, offensive counter-air, air interdiction, and close air support.

Defensive counter-air training seeks to block enemy air and space capacities crossing the ROK’s airspace. Available air defense assets are simultaneously operated in order to remotely detect, identify, intercept, and destroy simulated enemy
a aircraft employing enemy infiltration tactics.

Offensive counter-air training involves offensively operating air and space capacities in enemy Area of Operations (AO) to achieve air superiority. It can increase its effectiveness by operating alongside in-depth strike power including surface-to-surface missiles and special warfare units.

Air interdiction training is used to confuse, delay, and destroy potential enemy capacities before it is effectively used against friendly ground and naval forces. By limiting augmentation, re-supply, and mobility, friendly forces can disrupt or delay enemy’s operational tempo.

Close air support training is utilized to directly support ground and naval forces. Training includes offensive efforts using nighttime equipment such as night vision goggles, and involves live ordnance bombing as well as live firing of precision guided munitions (PGMs).

In addition, the Air Force trains for counter-fire operations against enemy long range artillery and counter-infiltration operations against enemy SOF. It also utilizes scientific training systems that include ground simulation training equipment and air combat maneuvering instrumentation in order to overcome limits involved with live-maneuver trainings.

(4) Marine Corps

As a multi-purpose rapid response force, the Marine Corps develops combat mission-based realistic training in order to reinforce operational capacity to complete missions under any circumstances in contingencies.

Key trainings include: amphibious (maneuver) operations, major training under the supervision of ROK JCS and CFC, overseas training with U.S. Marine Corps, division and brigade-level trainings, and battle command training.
Training for amphibious (maneuver) operations is to improve capabilities for Combined and Joint Amphibious Operations at the division-level echelon, while focusing on “jointness.”

The training led by the ROK JCS includes joint training in preparation for coastal infiltration, north-west islands defense training, and reinforcement training.

The Marine Corps conducts Combined Korea Interoperability Training Program (KITP) with U.S. Marine Corps, Combined Engineering Training, Combined Tactical Air Control Party Training, and Combined Air Assault Training, in order to improve combined operational capabilities. It achieves the same goal by participating in overseas exercises such as COBRA Gold, RIMPAC, and U.S. Marines’ Arms-in-all Cooperation Training.\(^{22}\)

Division and brigade-level training includes surprise amphibious assault training required in a given mission, ground training for deep maneuver after initial assault, special search training, and airborne training.

In addition, the Marine Corps conducts Battle Command Training using computer simulators in order to evaluate division/brigade/regiment commander and staffs’ commanding procedures, and to improve OPLAN execution. Operator Proficiency Training for Amphibious Assault Vehicles also utilizes simulators.

\(^{22}\) U.S. Marines’ Arms-in-all Cooperation Training

Combined Arms Exercise conducted by each U.S. Marine Corps Regiments at 29th Palms Unit (California) to enhance their operational capabilities of integrated fire power.
The objective is to develop a centralized support capacity in non-combat management areas and improve efficiency in organization and management in order to allow those in uniform to focus on combat missions, while maximizing contributions of defense industries and the defense expenditure to the national economy.

Chapter 8

Pragmatic Defense Management System

- Section 1 Advanced Defense Resource Management
- Section 2 Defense Management as a New Economic Growth Engine
- Section 3 Defense Informatization for the Future
Section 1.
Advanced Defense Resource Management

The cost of maintenance for weapons systems is rising with increasing precision and diversification of such weapons systems, thus, paving the way for emerging technologies regarding resource management. Such changes require constructive development in the field of defense resource management.

The ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) is improving efficiency and capacities for logistics support by establishing a Defense Logistics Integrated Information System (DELIIS) as well as a logistics support performance management system. In addition, by increasing private entrustments and military executive agencies, the Ministry seeks to improve efficiency in resource management.

1. Efficient Use of Defense Resources

MND is developing a logistics resource management system to reflect the changes in future warfare. It is also establishing an integrated information system for logistics by applying the latest information technology, and pursuing an objective evaluation of logistics support.

A. Establishing a Defense Logistics Integrated Information System (DELIIS)

In order to visualize logistics and improve logistics supporting capacities, MND is systematically establishing a DELIIS. Figure 8-1 shows its conceptual plans. The first stage involves developing an information system by function and

1) Visualization of Logistics
A comprehensive information system to consolidate data regarding the size, status, and location of logistics, as well as resources scheduled for acquisition and those under maintenance.
improving their performance. It also seeks to develop an equipment maintenance information system by 2008, and improve the efficiency of the aging munitions and materiel information system by June 2009. The second stage involves integrating information systems and reinforcing interface. By 2014, a single DELIIS will be established by integrating materiel, munitions, and equipment maintenance systems, while its capacities to interface with other information systems will be reinforced. The third stage involves establishing u-DELIIS. From 2015, the Ministry will continue to develop the system by utilizing newest technologies.

![Conceputal Diagram for DELIIS](image-url)

**Figure 8-1. Conceptual Diagram for DELIIS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core Concept</td>
<td>Fund’l System Development /Performance Improvement</td>
<td>Web-based DELIIS</td>
<td>u-DELIIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Const. Concept</td>
<td>DELIIS</td>
<td>DELIIS</td>
<td>DELIIS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Major Features | • Development of Equipment Maintenance Information System (EMIS)  
• Development of Transportation Information System (TIS)  
• Performance Improvement of Munitions/Materiel Information System | • Equipment Maintenance + Material + Munitions: One–Set System  
• Strengthening the Linkage with Other Systems | • Applying u–IT technology (RFID, tele–matics)  
• Establishing u–Logistics System |

2) Ubiquitous Sensor Network (USN)
A system to acquire information from various sensors through wireless networks.

3) Global Positioning System (GPS)
A system to precisely locate current positions using satellites.
Chapter 8  Pragmatic Defense Management System

MND plans to introduce advanced information technology into the field of logistics. First, radio frequency identification (RFID) technology has been introduced and applied experimentally in the field of munitions management. Through this technology, receipt/transfer and storage management of logistics supplies can be improved. In addition, it allows for real-time tracking and management of logistics supplies in transit.

In order to improve ROK-U.S. combined logistics support capacity such as visualizing logistics movements, MND has adopted a pilot program for G-ITV system, while closely coordinating to obtain ROK-U.S. interoperability.

### B. Establishing Logistics Support Performance Management System

The current logistics support performance management system is a supplier-based (logistics support units) system, leaving difficulties in measuring the satisfaction of final users (combat units, maintenance units). It is also insufficient to assess the system’s overall contribution to combat units’ readiness posture.

Thus, MND seeks to establish a user-based logistics support performance management system that evaluates the logistics process from the users’ perspective. In 2006, it developed a performance indexes which reflects the characteristics of each Service. In 2007 and 2008, it designated test units from each Service to evaluate results using the index. The process will be extended across the military by 2009. Table 8-1 shows the performance indexes.

#### Table 8–1. User–based Logistics Performance Indexes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Performance Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common</td>
<td>Customer Waiting Time (CWT) equipment operability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand</td>
<td>Accuracy in forecast of demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td>Required time for procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Waiting time, inventory, satisfaction in clothing &amp; food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>Repair Cycle Time (RCT)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

4) **Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)**

A technology that reads the information contained in a thin and flat serial-numbered tag through radio frequency.

5) **Global In Transit Visibility (G-ITV)**

An RFID technology-based infrastructure set up between military bases of U.S. and friendly nations to support exchange of information regarding status and inventory of materiel between friendly forces.

6) **Customer Waiting Time (CWT)**

The time it takes for the user to receive the requested goods after having applied for the goods.

7) **Repair Cycle Time (RCT)**

The time it takes for the user to receive the repaired goods.
Once a user-based performance management system is established, it will not only improve user satisfaction, but also logistics readiness posture. The efficient management of resources will contribute to cutting down the overall budget. Each Service’s efforts to develop and improve MND’s initiatives will have a synergistic effect on the development of logistics systems.

2. Reinforcing International Logistics Cooperation

A. Logistics Cooperation with the U.S.

In the field of logistics, MND is developing a future-oriented cooperation structure with the U.S., that reflects changes in the security environment such as wartime operational control (OPCON) transition.

By undergoing negotiations to bring in War Reserve Stock for Allies (WRSA), the two sides signed a memorandum of agreement during the ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October 2008. Following up on such agreements, ROK brought in 259,000 tons of quality-assured munitions, equipment, and materiel the military needs. The residual stocks are to be shipped out or become demilitarized by the U.S. by 2020. A win-win agreement was derived during the negotiation process, through which the alliance was solidified even further.

The two nations plan to further reinforce cooperation in munitions technology in order to maintain the best munitions support system. In addition, a database to improve interoperability of munitions among Pacific nations including the U.S. will be established.

MND is promoting a project invested jointly between the ROK and U.S. by implementing U.S. technologies in order to dispose of munitions in an eco-friendly way. As one part of the demilitarization facilities (DEFAC), construction of an incinerator was started in June 2006 in Yeongdong-gun, Chungcheongbuk-do, which was completed in December 2007. Remaining facilities are to be completed by 2009.

8) War Reserve Stock for Allies (WRSA)
U.S. war reserve materiel to support its allies in times of a military crisis. It has been consistently adopted in Korea since 1974 in contributing to deterrence of war on the Peninsula.

9) Receiving Reserves
155mm artillery rounds, 81mm mortar rounds, 105mm tank artillery, air-to-surface missiles, general munitions, and 2.75 inch rocket munitions.
B. Diversifying International Logistics Cooperation

By diversifying logistics cooperation with allied and friendly nations, MND is facilitating defense industry exports while supporting military diplomacy.

In order to secure stable sources of logistics supplies during wartime and peacetime, Korea has signed Mutual Logistics Support Agreements (MLSA) with four nations--Thailand (1991), Australia (1998), New Zealand (2007), and Turkey (2008)--and is pursuing similar deals with the Philippines, Indonesia, and Israel.

MND has transferred ships and aircraft to Thailand, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia. It is also promoting a transfer of war supplies to Indonesia, Peru, Mongolia, Cambodia, and Ghana. In order to strategically connect foreign transfer of war supplies with military cooperation and defense industry exports, the Ministry established and implemented a Directive on Transfer of Unused Logistics Supplies to Foreign Countries.

3. Increasing Private Entrustment to Improve Efficiency in Defense Management

A. Gradual Increase of Private Entrustment

In order to upgrade efficiency in non-combat management areas with little relation to combat operations, the Ministry plans to progressively expand private entrustments. Non-combat areas under consideration are facility management, automobile maintenance, laundry/alteration/repair services, and welfare. Areas subject to entrustments and yearly plans are as shown in Figure 8-2,
B. Selecting Private Companies for Entrustment and Management Methods

MND objectively assesses company performance, productivity growth, and cost-cuts to select companies for entrustment. Contracts are detailed and reflect work coverage, settlement of costs and payment conditions, contract period, and cancellation clauses.

The Ministry plans to consistently determine user unit’s satisfaction in order to select appropriate companies and to improve qualities of their services.

C. Wartime Duties and Operational Security

When signing contracts, MND specifies details on wartime and peacetime duties. Moreover, it plans to modify related statutes in preparation of potential service stoppage caused by labor strikes, etc.

To assure operational security, the Ministry specifies such responsibility in contracts and consistently inspects and trains related companies.
4. Designation and Management of Military Executive Agencies

MND designates and manages the organization in non-combat sectors capable of improving defense management efficiency through implementation of private management methods as the military executive agency. Such efforts will improve the organization’s efficiency while transforming it to provide high-quality services. The system does not merely mean that a business expert hired through public recruitment procedures will replace active duty personnel as agency chief. Its value lies in the fact it helps transform the organization into a more flexible and professional one by providing the agency chief with self-regulated rights in business management.

A. Plans Forward

Military executive agencies are selected via free competition and those whose performances can be precisely evaluated, such as maintenance depots, supply depots, computer offices, printing depots, rear-area hospitals, and welfare groups are targets. Plans forward and management outline are as shown in Figure 8-3.

B. Establishing Related Statutes and Guidance

Legal groundwork for operating military executive agencies was laid out when the Designation and Management of Military Executive Agency Act was enacted in March 2008 and its Enforcement Ordinance was established in June. Details specified in the Act are: Hiring of the agency chief following public recruitment procedures; the agency chief’s self-regulated rights; signing performance contracts and ways to evaluate performance; designation of the military executive agency and conditions set for management; and installation and management of the operation council and committee.
C. Designation and Management of Military Executive Agencies

Taking into account balance in different Services and fields, as well as individual agency readiness, MND identified the first five units for potential selection in November 2008. The plan is to regularize the process through such measures as public recruitment of agency chiefs and incrementally increase the number of military executive agencies every year.

The Ministry will gauge performance indexes in order to assure adequacy.
and validity of performance assessment, while running an evaluation committee of civil experts. Through such efforts, military executive agencies will flawlessly perform their wartime/peacetime duties and offer improved quality of services.
Section 2. Defense Management as a New Economic Growth Engine

MND is securing a budget that allows for the construction and maintenance of forces in accordance with its security threat analysis, thereby maximizing performance of defense management through reasonable allocation and execution of such budget. Defense expenditure contributes not only to its fundamental function of national security, but also to the development of the national economy. The Ministry is reinforcing its policymaking efforts to make the defense industry into the engine for new economic growth.

1. The Significance of Defense Budget and Its Social & Economic Contributions

A. Changes in Defense Budget Allocation

The proportion of defense budget in total government spending and gross domestic product (GDP) has shifted according to changes in security and social conditions.

Until the early 1980s, defense budget marked 5 percent of the GDP and 30 percent of the total government budget. This was due to the facilitation of stably implementing military initiatives of the mid-70s regarding self-reliant force improvements such as the Yulgok Project. In the meanwhile, due to the financial crisis as well as increasing demand for social welfare, the trend from the late 1980s until the early 2000s was to reduce the budget size. Budget allocation has somewhat improved since, due to a full-scale pursuit of military reform.

In 2008, the defense budget stood at 2.76 percent of the GDP and 15.2

12) *Yulgok Project*

It refers to an initiative from 1974 until 1992 to modernize the military with the objective of establishing a self-reliant defense posture. The ROK military could have capabilities to develop and mass-produce M16 rifles, Korea-type K-1 Tanks, etc, to contribute to overall force improvement through this project.
percent of the total government budget. Changes in proportions are shown in Figure 8-4.

**Figure 8-4, Proportion of Defense Budget to GDP and Government Budget**

![Graph showing the proportion of defense budget to GDP and government budget from 1980 to 2008.]

*Figures are based on general accounts.*

### B. Importance of Defense Budget Allocation that Reflects Security Conditions

It is desirable to allocate defense budget in a level that strikes a balance between force requirements based on security threats and national spending capacity.

However, countries facing direct military confrontations like ROK must allocate the defense budget in proportion to their “level of security threat.”

Despite the fact that the ROK’s security threat is among the highest, its defense allocation ratio is lower compared to that of countries facing disputes and confrontations. GDP-defense budget ratio for main countries facing disputes and confrontations is shown in Table 8-2.

**Table 8-2. GDP-Defense Budget Ratio for Countries Facing Disputes and Confrontations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures in FY2006, %*

*Source: The Military Balance 2008 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2008); CIA’s World Factbook (June 2008) reports China’s rate to be 4.3 percent. The ROK’s rate according to its government data is 2.7 percent.*
C. Social and Economic Contributions of Defense Expenditure

(1) Defense Expenditure’s Effect on Industries

Maintaining a robust security posture by securing an appropriate amount of defense budget bolsters economic growth and national development. Moreover, defense expenditure not only serves its initial purpose of defense but also generates a rippling effect through the economy by injecting funds to various industrial sectors.

Labor costs from defense budget including servicemen/military civilians’ salary, generates demand through household expenditures and stimulates industrial production. Project funds for weapons system acquisition supplying materiel, and facility construction is spent on industrial sectors such as manufacture and construction, etc., thereby increasing industrial production, employment, and domestic income.

According to research results from the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), the defense sector’s influence on industries is higher than the industry average. Every 1,000 Korean won (KRW) spent in the defense sector stimulates 1,709 KRW worth of production as well as an increase in domestic income of 764 KRW. Moreover, defense spending of every billion won stimulates the creation of 21 jobs, a positive contribution to employment.

Table 8-3. Defense Sector’s Effect on Industries (As of 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Defense</th>
<th>Public Admin.</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Manufacture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Production Stimulating Coefficient(^{13})</td>
<td>1,659</td>
<td>1,709</td>
<td>1,448</td>
<td>1,581</td>
<td>1,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Added–value Stimulating Coefficient(^{13})</td>
<td>0.714</td>
<td>0.764</td>
<td>0.943</td>
<td>0.886</td>
<td>0.627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Stimulating Coefficient(^{14})</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{13}\) Source: Analysis of the Defense Sector’s Social and Economic Contributions, KIDA, June 2004

\(^{14}\) Source: Analysis of the Defense Sector’s Social and Economic Contributions, KIDA, June 2004

13) Production (Value Added) Stimulating Coefficient
A level of production (value added) directly/indirectly stimulated in each industrial sector when 1 unit of demand increases in that sector.

14) Employment Stimulating Coefficient
A level of employment directly/indirectly stimulated in each industrial sector when demand increases by 1 billion won in that sector.
Advanced technology developed via defense R&D is spread across the private sector, offering opportunities for private companies to upgrade their productivity.

Since 1986, advanced technologies developed for defense purposes have been transferred to private corporations, contributing to the growth of electro-communication and mechanical industries. Examples are shown in Figure 8-5.

Figure 8–5, Defense Science Technology’s Influence on Civilian Sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industrial Sectors</th>
<th>Defense Science Technology</th>
<th>Influence on Civilian Sectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>• Production of satellite imagery</td>
<td>• Navigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>• Welding/processing for production of tanks • Military vehicles</td>
<td>• Manufacturing of locomotives and trains • Production of trucks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electro-optic detectors</td>
<td>• Electronic guided weapons and radars • Wireless communications equipment • Electro-optic detectors</td>
<td>• Radars to prevent car crash • Wireless phones • Semiconductor builders • video/digital cameras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>• Tank gunnery simulators</td>
<td>• Locomotive simulators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

※ Source: Analysis of the Defense Sector’s Social and Economic Contributions, KDA, June 2004

(3) Provision of Social Overhead Capital (SOC) and Technical Experts

Airports, seaports and bridges constructed for military purposes are shared with the local community in order to save national spending while contributing to social overhead capitals.

The military is a “supplier of national technical personnel” by fostering national technical experts and conducting its own military occupational specialty (MOS) education. From 1975 to 2007, it produced a total of 276,000 nationally certified technical experts—such as industrial and functional specialists—from 120 fields including mechanics, chemicals, electricity and electronics. In addition, it produces 54,000 technical personnel every year in various fields such as communications, aviation, maintenance, etc.
2. Defense Budget and Mid-term Defense Plan

A. 2008 Defense Budget

(1) Budget in General Accounts

The 2008 defense budget was set at 26,649 billion KRW— an increase of 8.8 percent from 2007 figures—due to its increased focus on military reform-related force building as well as improvement in service member’s morale and welfare. The figure is 15.2 percent of the government budget and 2.76 percent of the GDP. The 2008 defense budget and allocations in general accounts are shown in Table 8-4.

Table 8-4, The 2008 Defense Budget and Allocations  
(Unit: KRW 100 million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>2007 Budget</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>2008 Budget</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Increase</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>244,972</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>266,490</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>21,518</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Improvement Programs</td>
<td>66,807</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>76,813</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>10,006</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation &amp; Maintenance</td>
<td>178,165</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>189,677</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>11,512</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Expenses</td>
<td>96,597</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>102,146</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>5,549</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Expenses</td>
<td>81,568</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>87,531</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>5,963</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Force Improvement Programs (FIPs) expenses were 7,681.3 billion KRW—a 15 percent increase from 2007—and focused on two points. First, it reflected requirements for core forces such as airborne warning and control system (AWACS), K1A1 tanks, Korean destroyers (Gwanggaeto II-, III-class), F-15K fighters, next surface to air missiles (SAM-X), etc. Second, it reflected funds to increase investment for developing the core weapons such as unmanned aerial vehicles, Korean utility helicopters, etc. and to reinforce domestic R&D infrastructure,
Ordinary Operation and Maintenance expenses were set at 18,967.7 billion KRW, a 6.5 percent increase from 2007. It focused on guaranteeing requirements in combat readiness-related areas and to promote citizens’ public benefits. First, it secured a maintenance expenses for improved operational rate for key forces such as Army K-series track equipment and Air Force’s KF-16 aircraft, etc. and increased budget for fuel and training centers. Second, it reflected requirements for increased salaries for the enlisted (Army Corporal: KRW 88,000/month, a 10 percent increase from 2007), modernized barracks, and better medical services for divisions and units below. Third, the budget was increased in order to construct military environment facilities and to remove civil residences near ammunition depots.

(2) Budget in Special Accounts

The Ministry’s special account consists of special accounts for military executive agencies, special accounts for defense and military installations, and special accounts for relocating USFK bases. The 2008 special accounts budget is shown in Table 8-5.
Special Accounts for Military Executive Agencies is an account to ensure the Defense Media Agency (DEMA) to guarantee its independence and efficiency, while maintaining its public representativeness. In 2008, 27.7 billion KRW was allocated for the production of its newspaper, broadcasts, films, and satellite TV.

Special Accounts for Defense and Military Installations is an account to fund relocation of military installations from the metropolitan to rural areas and to purchase private land occupied by the military. In 2008, 327.5 billion KRW was allocated to relocate 27 installations and purchase private land.

Special Accounts for Relocating USFK Bases is an account to fund consolidation and relocation of USFK Bases to Pyeongtaek city, etc. In 2008, 262.9 billion KRW was allocated for purposes that include facility construction.

B. The 2009–2013 Mid-term Defense Plan

(1) Size of Mid-term Defense Budget

The 2009-2013 Mid-term Defense Plan focuses on reflecting key requirements to bolster the “Defense Reform Basic Plan.” The defense budget for the next five years has been set to remain at the three percent level of the GDP, with around nine percent expected annual growth rate.

The Ministry plans to progressively extend allocation in the area of Force
Improvement Programs (FIPs)—currently standing at 28.8 percent of the 2008 budget—to reach the 38.6 percent mark by 2013, as shown in Table 8-6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense Budget</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>1760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Growth rate)</td>
<td>(8.8)</td>
<td>(9.9)</td>
<td>(9.9)</td>
<td>(9.8)</td>
<td>(8.2)</td>
<td>(7.0)</td>
<td>(9.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation &amp; Maintenance</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>1130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Allocation)</td>
<td>(71.2)</td>
<td>(68.8)</td>
<td>(66.0)</td>
<td>(63.8)</td>
<td>(62.6)</td>
<td>(61.4)</td>
<td>(64.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Growth rate)</td>
<td>(6.5)</td>
<td>(6.2)</td>
<td>(5.4)</td>
<td>(6.1)</td>
<td>(6.2)</td>
<td>(5.0)</td>
<td>(5.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIPs</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Allocation)</td>
<td>(28.8)</td>
<td>(31.2)</td>
<td>(34.0)</td>
<td>(36.2)</td>
<td>(37.4)</td>
<td>(38.6)</td>
<td>(35.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Growth rate)</td>
<td>(15.0)</td>
<td>(19.0)</td>
<td>(19.8)</td>
<td>(16.9)</td>
<td>(11.8)</td>
<td>(10.4)</td>
<td>(15.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

※ Round off to the nearest 10 billion KRW, then approximate at the nearest 100 billion KRW

(2) Planned Programs by Area

Force Improvement focuses on establishing core capacities to actively cope with future various threats, while consolidating deterrence capabilities against the North. It also seeks to invigorate defense R&D to upgrade the ability to develop weapons systems and to provide an engine for new growth in the national economy.

Operation and Maintenance is allocated to “set the conditions to maximize combat capabilities of existing forces” and “establish an advanced military welfare system.” First, by reflecting maintenance costs of newly fielded equipment, it guarantees normal operating conditions for the K-9 self-propelled artillery, the Gwanggaeto III-class destroyer (Aegis), the F-15K, etc. Second, it extends the groundwork to foster an elite reserve force by establishing new Reserve Force Mobilization Centers and compensation system for training. Third, it plans to complete modernization of barracks during the target period and to gradually install a hazardous area compensation system. Fourth, it reflects demands to improve medical services in divisions and units below.
C. Direction of the 2010–2014 Mid-term Defense Plan

The 2010-2014 Mid-term Defense Plan will be established to reflect the results of the mid-term assessment and a reevaluation of required budget projection of the Defense Reform Basic Plan. The plan seeks to actively support the government’s agenda by assuring necessary elements to advance the military structure, setting positive conditions for existing forces, and completing barrack modernizations early.

3. Efforts to Efficiently Operate Defense Budget

MND is continuing its effort not only to foster an advanced elite military by efficiently managing its budget, but also to contribute to the national economy.

The Ministry is seeking to maximize efficiency in formulating the defense budget, as it formulates the Mid-term Defense Plan and its annual budget. In the meantime, it has eliminated inefficiencies such as decreasing repair item supplies and changing the standard in size of facilities, while introducing a rational basis for budget allocations. It has also achieved a 500 billion won cost-cut by partnering with finance authorities to verify the plans in parallel with drafting the 2008-2012 Mid-term Defense Plan. Details are shown in Table 8-7.

Table 8–7. Achieving Efficiency in the 2008–2012 Mid-term Defense Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Improvement of System</th>
<th>Organization Standard</th>
<th>Cut-down/Close</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific Areas</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Number of cases)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Improve maintenance cycle, etc)</td>
<td>(Modifying TO)</td>
<td>(College scholarship, etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost Cut</td>
<td>5,462</td>
<td>1,785</td>
<td>2,630</td>
<td>1,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(KRW 100 million)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Ministry implements various financing methods in order to overcome the limits involved with relying on government funding. For USFK relocation
--a KRW 3.4 trillion project--it is partnering with the Korea National Housing Corporation based on the “donate and transfer method.” It is also expanding the use of private resources via entrustments and private investment projects (BTL, BTO) while maintaining healthy management of the budget. Use of private resources in the defense sector is shown in Table 8-8.

### Table 8-8. Use of Private Resources in the Defense Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private Investment Project</strong></td>
<td>Military residence Barracks Bachelors officers quarters Info-communication network</td>
<td>2,713</td>
<td>2,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BTL</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>4,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,169</td>
<td>1,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,367</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private Entrustment</strong></td>
<td>Cyber knowledge information room</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Executive Agencies</strong></td>
<td>Outsourcing maintenance of equipment and weapons systems</td>
<td>1,721</td>
<td>4,287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facility management such as heating/cooling, cleaning</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Yearly selection among 35 non-combat units,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Implement related statutes (June 2008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Select first 5 military executive agencies (November 2008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The National Defense Integrated Financial Information System will be fully operational beginning in 2009, providing financial information and performance data for 200 key units in real-time. This has provided a foundation to transparently manage budget-spending of units/projects, enabling a systematic comparison and analysis of business performance.

The Ministry seeks to improve overall productivity by modifying responsibilities and organizations of non-combat units currently managed by each Service, and by eliminating redundancies. Selection of a military executive agency, private entrustment, and privatization will be implemented in areas where private management system has proven to be more efficient and economical.
4. Defense Industry as an Engine for New Economic Growth

MND is promoting the “making of the defense industry into a new economic growth engine” as one of its national tasks in order to allow defense industries to become fresh catalysts for development of the national economy.

The Ministry has contributed immensely to the national economy through transfer of defense science technologies to the private sector as well as through defense industry exports. By 2007, it transferred 102 outstanding defense technologies to 161 private companies and institutions. Defense industry exports remained at US$ 200 million–400 million until 2006 and then jumped to US$ 845 million in 2007. Figure 8-7 shows changes in the defense industry exports and its performance during the last five years.
Such performance records show that a competitive advantage in the defense industry export is a growth engine that contributes to the national economy. The Ministry will exert more efforts to increase exports to a scale of US$ 3 billion by 2012.
A. Expanding Basis for Growth by Invigorating Defense R&D

It is important to upgrade the quality of defense science technology in order to equip defense industries with international competitiveness and contribute to development of the national economy.

To achieve this, MND plans to place more weight on defense R&D by elevating the scale to 7 percent of the defense budget by 2012. It will also encourage an open R&D structure such as joint efforts among industries, academia, and the research sector, and a system that facilitates transfer of defense technologies to the private sector. By reinforcing international cooperation of defense science technology, it will broaden the foundation for the growth of defense industries.

B. Improving Operational Conditions for Defense Industries

Defense industry requires a mid to long-term investment at the national-level. Not only is it a capital-intensive industry that necessitates a considerable size of infrastructure investment, but also an industry of limited market and demand, with the government being its only source of demand.

Considering such circumstances, the Ministry is fostering policies to improve operating conditions for defense industries.

First, it will reinforce financial aid to foster the industry. Second, it will offer a system that encourages self-initiated management innovation by rewarding efforts that rationalize management and costs at the contract signing stage. Third, it will seek to increase the proportion of domestic parts in weapons systems. In 2008, it introduced the Master Plan for Domestic Production as groundwork to systematically continue to produce parts domestically. Furthermore, the Ministry will develop policies to support development funds, in order to encourage domestic production of core parts.

C. Establishing a Government–led Defense Industry Export Support System

Unlike exports in the private sector, defense exports often necessitate government guarantees for stable supply of subsequent parts and technical
support, as well as government-led marketing efforts. In particular, larger-scale defense industry export requires government support efforts, as buyer nations increasingly request for demands such as industrial cooperation and local investment.

The Ministry seeks to diversify its markets by establishing export strategies that differentiate among nations. By organizing a “defense industry export task force” consisting of acquisition and export specialists, it plans to provide customized export support services. Moreover, by operating the Export Support Council for Defense Industries with participation by related agencies, the Ministry will coordinate immediate tasks that include reviewing buyer state’s desired terms and counter-purchase.

MND has increased international defense industry cooperation agreements as shown in Table 8-9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Nations (25)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia (10 nations)</td>
<td>NZ, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Bangladesh, Philippines, Australia, India, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (6)</td>
<td>NED, GER, FRA, Spain, UK, ITA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (3)</td>
<td>Russia, Romania, Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East (2)</td>
<td>Turkey, Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America (2)</td>
<td>U.S., Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America (2)</td>
<td>Venezuela, Columbia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Reinforcing Defense Science and Technology

A. Status of Defense Science and Technology

Korea’s defense science and technology has achieved much under the Agency for Defense Development (ADD)’s leadership, but still has not reached the level of developed nations. Korea still relies on foreign nations for core technologies of main weapon systems, while capacities to
domestically develop advanced weapons are still insufficient. Figure 8-8 details major accomplishments in developing weapons system.

**Figure 8–8. Achievements in Weapons System Development**

![Weapons System Development for Force Improvement](image)

B. Visions and Objectives for Defense Science and Technology

The Ministry’s way forward in the field of defense science and technology is to secure world-class technologies. Its mid-term objective for policies promoting defense science and technology is to advance the development of advanced weapon systems to the level of the world’s leading countries and its long-term goal is to secure capacities to indigenously develop such weapon systems.

C. Direction for Policies to Promote Defense Science and Technology

Direction for policies to promote defense science and technology is as follows:

First, increase investments in defense science and technology and promote efficiency in the defense R&D system, MND plans to give more weight to

18) “Advancing to the level of the world’s leading countries” means possessing the defense science and technology at the level of the world’s eight leading countries,
defense R&D and elevate its ratio to the budget to that of the developed nations standard of 7 percent by 2012. Investment in force improvement will be separated into two—acquisition costs for major military equipment and defense R&D—with priority assigned to the latter. A yearly investment plan for defense R&D until 2012 is shown in Table 8-10.

**Table 8–10. Yearly Investment Plan for Defense R&D**

(Unit: KRW 100 million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense Budget</td>
<td>266,490</td>
<td>285,326</td>
<td>321,867</td>
<td>353,410</td>
<td>382,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D (Compared to defense budget)</td>
<td>14,522</td>
<td>16,090</td>
<td>21,129</td>
<td>24,558</td>
<td>27,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5.4%) (5.6%) (6.6%) (6.9%) (7.3%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*2009 numbers are from a finalized budget, and numbers for 2010 and after 2010 are derived from the Mid-term Defense Plan*

Dividing domains of R&D projects allows ADD to concentrate on core technologies and advanced force capabilities, and enables defense industries to focus on general force improvement. Moreover, by establishing a planning and assessment system for defense science and technology, MND improves evaluation of R&D efforts.

Second, strive for a goal-oriented defense R&D. In other words, concentrate on core technologies applied to future weapons systems and technologies to improve efficiency of existing weapon systems. To achieve this, the Ministry should identify and concentrate its investments on core technologies for weapon systems to be operated in an effect-based network centric warfare (NCW) such as system of systems, strategic weapons, unmanned combat systems, etc. Efforts to develop technologies that improve the quality of existing weapon systems while minimizing costs should be made as well.

Third, revitalize an open R&D structure. Foremost, this implies improvement of the defense science and technology in connection with the National Science Technology Basic Plan. By breaking away from the reclusive R&D structure with defense research organizations as its core, MND should improve exchange with the private sector. The Ministry should also
expand participation of industries, academia, and the research sector in the R&D process and invigorate transfer of defense science and technology to the private sector. Furthermore, it should expand development of dual use (civil and military) technology\(^{19}\) which allows sharing between the private sector and the military. Figure 8-9 shows an example of such efforts. Lastly, the focus should lie on improving cooperation with civilian companies to improve low carbon, green growth technologies, in preparation for an oil-free era.

**Figure 8–9. Missions for Multipurpose Dog–Horse Robots Being Developed via Dual Use Technology**

Fourth, expand infrastructure related to defense R&D. MND should develop and modernize research/testing facilities, and attract talent by finding ways to improve treatment of research personnel.

Fifth, reinforce international cooperation in defense science and technology. MND should improve technology competitiveness by increasing

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\(^{19}\) Dual Use (Civil and Military) Technology
Technology born out of a dual R&D process by the civilian and military sector that can be either jointly applied, as well as those technologies that can be mutually converted for use in each sector.
exchange–offset trading, technical personnel exchange, joint research, etc., with nations possessing advanced technologies. Furthermore, the Ministry should continue to transfer and export defense technology to developing nations in order to achieve a win-win situation.
Section 3
Defense Informatization for the Future

As a reflection on changes in information and communications technologies, MND is facilitating an environment for network-centric defense informatization that enables it to effectively respond to future warfare.

It is also improving defense informatization strategies in line with the national defense policy, and reinforcing the infrastructure for information sharing and assurance. The Ministry supports a low-cost, high-efficiency defense management and seeks to achieve qualitative transformation of military forces through advancement of warfighting and business process information systems. Moreover, it looks to expand the information and communications infrastructure in order to seamlessly run the defense information systems.

1. Shaping a Network-centric Informatization Environment

A. Direction for Advancing Defense Informatization

Defense is an area with the highest need for application of advanced information and communications systems.

Therefore, the Ministry is reinforcing defense informatization in line with national informatization policies. It takes the lead in applying new civil technologies to the defense sector via cooperative projects with the Ministry of Knowledge and Economy (MKE). Such projects are a strategic model that creates a positive value chain between the defense and civilian sectors, thus contributing to their mutual development. For the defense sector, it enables low-cost, high-efficiency defense management as well as upgrade in defense
capacities. For the civil sector, its competitiveness can be improved by securing early demands for their new information and communications technology.

The Ministry has constructed a defense Enterprise Architecture (EA) in order to improve defense enterprise and to carry out informatization projects more effectively. The architecture was established and applied first in the MND in 2007, the JCS in 2008, then to Army/Navy/Air Force headquarters in 2009. Through the defense EA, MND is improving its business process from an organization-based to a function-based one, which is used as a tool for renovation and improvement of business processes. The Ministry will seek to promote informatization return-on-investments by establishing a basis to systematically plan, execute, and evaluate information system projects.

The Ministry plans to publish a Defense Informationization Policy Paper in 2009, which offers comprehensive directions for advancing defense informatization.

Cooperative Projects between MND and MKE to Realize u-Defense

MND and MKE established a Defense Informatization Cooperation Plan in 2006 and have carried out their cooperative projects. The plan includes applying new information and communications technologies in which Korea has an international competitiveness, to the defense sector. Such technologies include RFID, Ubiquitous Sensor Network (USN), and Wireless Broadband (WiBro). In order to apply the new technologies, the Ministry has identified a test unit and began to introduce a USN-based unmanned surveillance system, a multi-pod robot, an RFID-based integrated logistics management system, etc., for a trial run.

The two Ministries continue to develop such cooperative projects into a cooperative governance model in which both the defense and civil sectors can make progress.
B. Assuring Conditions for Information-sharing

MND sets the standards for weapons and non-weapons that require interoperability between systems. The Ministry assures the conditions for information-sharing by establishing an interoperability evaluation and certification system.

MND has reinforced an institutional and organizational basis to improve interoperability between systems. In November 2007, the Ministry enacted the Directive on Management of Defense Interoperability, and modified the Defense Information Technical Architecture (DITA) for application across the acquisition stages as the main standard. In August 2007, the Ministry established a Joint Interoperability Technology Center as an exclusive agency in charge of constructing infrastructure for interoperability and performing technical tests and feasibility reviews.

MND has established a technical basis to improve interoperability between systems as well. The Ministry constructed an information system to manage Common Operating Environment (COE) and Shared Data Environment (SHADE). COE is a set of standards which enables re-use of developed softwares, SHADE is a set of standards for data expressions to improve interoperability.

The Ministry is improving interoperability between systems by strengthening interconnectivity among systems. For example, the battlefield management information system will be linked to the Korean Joint Command & Control System (KJCCS), while the resource management information system will be linked primarily to the finance and logistics information system. Accordingly, the Ministry is identifying specific interface requirements to reinforce the overall interconnectivity. In 2007 it identified approximately 60 tasks, and continues updating via the creation of an information exchange list.

Moreover, the Ministry established a Levels of Information System Interoperability (LISI) model in order to evaluate and certify system interoperability.

Once such information sharing conditions are established, overall cost will
be reduced as the system development time will be curtailed and interoperability improved.

C. Strengthening Information Assurance

MND is strengthening its information assurance in order to maximize its wartime and peacetime mission accomplishment from the ever more malignant and intelligent cyber threats.

The Ministry is reinforcing related regulations and its organizations to be able to swiftly respond to defense cyber threats. In 2007, it modified Information Operations Condition (INFOCON) Regulations and the manual on specific measures and responses in cases of a defense cyber threat. In January 2008, it enacted the National Defense Directive on the Assurance of Biometric Information. In March 2008, the Information Assurance Planning Division was formed in MND Headquarters, in an effort to strengthen organizations dedicated to information assurance. Furthermore, by tasking Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERT) to corps and units above, the Ministry established a comprehensive and systematic assurance system that controls defense information systems on a 24 hour basis.

In order to assure impenetrability, the Ministry introduced and applied advanced technologies to information assurance systems. It increased the installment of a certification function in information systems to be able to control access to systems and important data. Furthermore, to minimize damages from hacking and virus attacks, it has installed a virus blocking software to all PCs connected to the network, and prevented network access to unauthorized PCs. The Ministry has installed firewalls and integrated security control systems in the server and the network management system in order to detect and prevent violations. In addition, MND has implemented an automated diagnosis system to protect individual

21) Biometric Information
As a type of personal information, it refers to information on physical or behavioral characteristics to identify an individual. Examples are fingerprints, face shape, irises, cornea, vein, voice, etc.
information and to periodically assess its status.

Through such efforts on information assurance, the Ministry was selected as an exemplary institution in the 2007 National Institution and Public Agency Information Assurance Inspection.

2. Advancing Information System and Infrastructure

A. Battlefield Management Information System

The battlefield management information system is essential for real-time sharing of battlefield conditions and support of command decisions.

The battlefield management information system can be divided into Command, Control, Communication, Computer & Intelligence (C4I) System and military information system. C4I System can be further dissected into joint strategy C4I system, combined C4I system, Army/Navy/Air Force tactical C4I system and combat command system. Details are shown in Table 8-11.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Strategic C4I System</td>
<td>Korean Joint Command &amp; Control System (KJCCS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined C4I System</td>
<td>Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System Korea (CENTRIX-K) PACOM Automated Data Processor Server Site Korea (PASS-K)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical C4I System for each Service</td>
<td>Army Tactical Command Information System (ATCIS) Korea Naval Command &amp; Control System (KNCCS) Air Force Command &amp; Control System (AFCCS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Command System</td>
<td>Battalion Tactical Command System (BTCS) Korea Naval Tactical Data System (KNTDS) Master Control &amp; Reporting Center (MCRJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Information System</td>
<td>Military Information Management System (MIMS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a joint strategic C4I system, the Korean Joint Command & Control System (KJCCS) was developed and deployed in 2007.
After the wartime operational control (OPCON) transition, a system for combined operations will be developed by 2011 for the ROK to take initiative in the ROK-U.S. combined C4I system.

As for the tactical C4I system for the ground forces, ATCIS has been fielded to Army corps and Marine Corps by 2008, and its first stage quality improvement will continue until 2010. In developing KNCCS, the Navy worked on improving primarily its intelligence and operations-related functions until 2007. And since 2008 the Navy has been focusing on improving its capabilities and gaining additional forces. The Air Force has improved AFCCS to interface with the aviation and resource information system, and allow dissemination of Air Tasking Order (ATO) to squadrons by 2008. The Air Force will focus on improving its capabilities starting in 2009.

For the Military Information Management System (MIMS), the Ministry will promote data standardization and establish integrated database by 2010 in order to support comprehensive military information.

B. Resource Management Information System

The resource management information system can be divided into four functional areas: planning and budget; logistics and facilities; human resources and mobilization; and lastly, electronic administration.

The Ministry is improving the efficiency of the resource management information system by integrating and fortifying the linkage with the finance and logistics information system. Also by linking the national finance information to that of defense, it is establishing a competitive defense management system.

Information systems for each functional area have been built and managed according to Information Systems’ Master Plan in Conditions with Defense EA and Business Process Reengineering/Information Strategy Planning (BPR/ISP). It is thus made possible to specify goals for each information system project and evaluate their performances.
C. Information and Communications Infrastructure

Information and communications infrastructure is a set of computers and network related components that support production, processing, management, and dissemination of information necessary for warfighting and business process management. A diagram of operational concepts of the information and communications infrastructure is shown in Figure 8-10.

Figure 8–10. Diagram of Operational Concepts of the Information and Communications Infrastructure
The Ministry is continuously establishing a reliable, broadband network infrastructure. It plans to establish a high-speed and high-capacity defense broadband convergence network by 2009 via private investment projects (BTL). This will significantly improve each echelon’s bandwidth by up to 10Gbps. The defense broadband convergence network will be an Internet Protocol (IP)-based network, allowing for an effective network management. For tactical network, the Ministry has operated a dual-use (civil and military) satellite system since 2007. Furthermore, the Ministry is developing a Tactical Information and Communications Network (TICN) and a Joint Tactical Data Link System (JTDLS), which offer real-time broadband communications.

The military satellite communications system is a system utilizing commercial and military satellites for military purposes. It consists of a satellite, satellite operation system, and ground terminal equipment. It can cover ground/maritime/aerial command communications within 3000NM radius from the Peninsula. It will be utilized for a strategic and tactical communication network to support integrated combat capabilities.

As for the dual-use (civil and military) satellite communications system, the indigenously developed Mugunghwa Satellite No.5 launched in August 2006 was granted suitable for military use in 2007. This system covers a diameter of 11,000km, a wide area starting from the Marshal Islands in the Pacific (East) to the Straits of Malacca (West), and from Northern Australia (South) to Lake Baikal (North).

One of the achievements of the satellite communications system development is that it established an Army/Navy/Air Force integrated C4I network. The ROK military is now able to perform operations efficiently via integration and real-time sharing of battlefield information.
By 2010, the Ministry plans to supply one PC per staff, as the network infrastructure allows even the smaller-sized units to utilize a reliable broadband information communications service. Also, in order to improve information processing ability and application services, it will upgrade the servers and appropriately install high-capacity storage devices.

Open source software technology is being actively introduced in the area of operating servers and PCs. Common software such as word processors can be used by obtaining an all-military site license.

From this point forward, the Ministry seeks to establish a stable and eco-friendly informatization environment that can improve server performance while reducing power consumption.

**D. Modeling & Simulation System**

Defense modeling and simulation (M&S) system is classified into training, analysis, and acquisition, according to application objectives. It is used to support policymaking related to force building and operation, assist decision-making through scientific verifications, and handle combat experimentation.

For M&S system on training, the Ministry focuses on developing various models to provide a futuristic synthetic battlefield environment. The ROK military operates *Taeguk* Joint Operation Simulation (JOS) model for joint exercises, *Changjo* 21 model for corps/division-level ground training, and Navy’s *Cheonghae* Model, Air Force’s *Changgong* Model and Marine Corps’ *Cheonjabong* Model are still being developed.

The analytical models are used for concept development, force analysis, and formulating OPLAN. The acquisition models are used for confirming requirements, R&D, and test & evaluation.
3. Development of Defense Informatization for the Future

A. Promoting Informatization in Line with National and Defense Policies

The Ministry has been exerting efforts to strengthen the link between defense informatization and national informatization policies. Since 2006, it has executed a cooperative project with MKE to experiment new technologies in the defense sector. Furthermore, it is continuing its government-wide cooperation via the subcommittee of the Informatization Promotion Committee, which was reorganized in 2007.

Defense informatization is a means to materialize defense policies effectively. Therefore, the Ministry will link defense informatization with major defense policies such as the Defense Reform Basic Plan, etc.

Meanwhile, the Ministry is reinforcing international cooperation. In February 2008, it agreed with its U.S. counterpart to annually hold the ROK-U.S. Information Communication Technology (ICT) Forum. Through such venues, cooperation in areas of mutual interests such as information assurance and M&S, etc. will be reinforced.

B. Performance-based Management and Improving the Quality of Services

MND will strengthen its coordination and control function on defense informatization and establish a performance-based management. It will develop evaluation models and improve inspection as well as follow-up measures in order to improve objectivity and fairness.

MND is establishing the Defense Consolidated Data Center in order to upgrade the defense informatization services for Army/Navy/Air Force users. By 2007, it consolidated computer centers scattered across echelons into 77 centers and plans to integrate them into an all-military serving Defense Consolidated Data Center by 2012. It is developing specific plans to optimize facilities and operating environment based on the basic plan established in
2008. The Defense Consolidated Data Center will improve survivability of defense information systems during wartime and peacetime, while increasing the quality of data processing and user satisfaction.

C. Improving the System

MND established the Guidelines for Project Management of Defense Information System in March 2008. The guidelines represent standardization of defense informatization management systems that had been scattered into several guidances and regulations. This is meaningful in a way that it allowed for the standardization of project management by defense information system managers as well as timely application of new technologies.

The Ministry plans to introduce a new legislation to accelerate defense informatization on warfighting and business process management and to improve the projects’ efficiency as well as effectiveness.
MND will establish an enhanced infrastructure that improves training conditions and welfare by consolidating/relocating military bases, and develop a welfare policy that answers to the dedication by professional soldiers through gradually enhancing the barracks environment to an advanced level.

Chapter 9

Improvement of Quality of Life

- Section 1 Defense Manpower Management
- Section 2 Improving Working and Living Conditions
- Section 3 Designing an Advanced Medical Support System
- Section 4 Maximizing Employment Opportunities for Veterans
- Section 5 Stable Management of Military Pension System
Section 1.
Defense Manpower Management

The ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) strives to establish a higher quality military welfare system for service members in order to encourage the willingness to serve his or her country and improve service morale.

It has established a legal basis through the enactment of the Framework Act on Military Personnel Welfare and is formulating the Military Personnel Welfare Basic Plan via a comprehensive surveying of actual conditions. It also built the Armed Forces Welfare Agency by consolidating welfare related groups dispersed across the Services, thereby creating a framework for a systematic promotion of welfare policies.

1. Enactment of the Framework Act on Military Personnel Welfare

The Framework Act on Military Personnel Welfare was enacted in March 2008. This will be an opportunity to improve service member quality of life as well as overall military welfare. The enactment is expected to significantly improve the likes of housing, children education, and medical services which had been tepid due to the lack of legal basis. An overview of the Framework Act on Military Personnel Welfare is shown in Figure 9-1.
2. Surveying the Conditions of Welfare for Military Personnel and Establishing the Basic Plan

MND is surveying the status of military personnel welfare for the first time in history in accordance with the Framework Act on Military Personnel Welfare, and thereby establishing the Military Personnel Welfare Basic Plan.

Since examination on the conditions of military personnel welfare had been conducted rather ad hoc by disparate defense-related agencies, such a consolidated examination and research effort to date was unprecedented. In such light, the research on military welfare conducted in 2008 will generate persuasive statistics on the welfare status. It will also enable establishment and implementation of a comprehensive development plan for military personnel welfare based on scientific and objective indicators.
MND plans to continue to systematically promote stable living conditions and an improved quality of life based on the Military Personnel Welfare Basic Plan for service members.

3. Establishment of the Armed Forces Welfare Agency

The Ministry established the Armed Forces Welfare Agency in September 2008 by consolidating welfare groups operated separately by each Service. The consolidation eliminated inefficiencies caused by redundant facility investments and imbalance in welfare benefits across Services, thereby offering a low-cost and highly-efficient welfare system.

The Armed Forces Welfare Agency plans to improve the management system so that each Service can commonly use welfare facilities scattered across the nation. Responding to user demands and social changes, the Agency also plans to build “welfare towns” in respective clusters, where users can comply with their sight-seeing, sports, and lodging needs all at once.
Section 2.
Improving Working and Living Conditions

MND promotes welfare improvement policies of which the effects can be directly felt by individual service members. The policies are as follows: adopting a remuneration system reflecting the peculiar characteristics of military service; improving provision of service member’s necessities; and upgrading the quality of clothing and outfit. In addition, facilities, housing conditions, and welfare service for families are consistently being ameliorated.

1. Improving Soldier Remuneration and Related Systems

MND is revising the Military Personnel Remuneration Act so that it can develop a remuneration system that realistically reflects the characteristics of military service.

By reflecting unique challenges experienced by service members—working in remote areas, frequent relocations, difficulties in children education, early retirement, challenges for re-employment—into the Military Personnel Remuneration Act, the Ministry seeks to maintain its own particular remuneration system.

MND plans to establish allowances to reflect the uniqueness of military missions and the expertise involved, while also improving the system to
reflect individual circumstances and hazards. To improve the current poor conditions, the Ministry will provide various compensations such as service member allowance, an allowance compensating separation of families, and financial support for college students in the family. It also plans to include daytime/nighttime duty allowances as well as specific duty payments for different positions (for the lieutenant colonel level) within operating costs. Furthermore, MND will introduce special duty remuneration such as allowances for servicing in close contact and special areas and for ship/air/hazardous duties.

Meanwhile, salary payment for enlisted service members increased by 10 percent in 2008, with corporals being paid 88,000 won a month. Salary payment is expected to further increase to 100,000 won that will significantly cover the necessary expenses for daily livelihoods in the barracks.

Measures to indirectly improve conditions for active-duty personnel are being reviewed as well. Such measures include: exempting mandatory servicemen on their parent’s composite income tax; expanding a “system of maximum fare for coastal passengers,” which is currently offered only to island inhabitants; deferring interest payments for students enlisted while on financial aid; and duty-free benefits in welfare clubs.

2. Supply of Necessities, Clothing and Outfit

MND is increasing its annual employment of civilian nutritionists in order to facilitate different appetites and improve satisfaction of meal plans, Table 9-1 shows employment status of civilian nutritionists,
The Ministry also plans to increase the basic costs of meal plans for service members to allow a sufficient nutritional intake, marking a change from focusing on quantity to quality. It plans to increase the cost to that of 90 percent of the level for civilians. Plans to increase basic costs for service members’ meals are shown in Table 9-2.

Table 9-2. Plan to Increase Basic Costs of Meals (Unit: won/a person per day)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Compared to civilians)</td>
<td>5,000 (84%)</td>
<td>5,210 (85%)</td>
<td>5,486 (87%)</td>
<td>5,715 (88%)</td>
<td>5,977 (89%)</td>
<td>6,221 (90%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>5,964</td>
<td>6,143</td>
<td>6,327</td>
<td>6,517</td>
<td>6,713</td>
<td>6,914</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The military is improving the quality and design of clothing and outfit to reach the level of advanced industrialized countries, in order to maximize combatant’s mission capabilities in the future battlefield conditions and to increase satisfaction in the military service. By diversifying the size of military outfits that complies with the relevant KS standard (Korean Industrial Standard) such as commercial clothing, individual service members now can enjoy the comfort of

Section 2 Improving Working and Living Conditions

Table 9-1. Employment of Civilian Nutritionists (Unit: Person)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Units under direct control of MND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battalion-level</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(completed in 2006)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expand to Company-level</td>
<td>1,466</td>
<td>1,281</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remarks (increase)</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 989 nutritionists were employed in 2007. The Ministry plans to progressively increase the number to 1,095 in 2008, 1,280 in 2009, and 1,466 in 2010.

1) Meal Cost for Civilians
Average monthly grocery spending for city households divided by average number of people in a household, (Korea Monthly Statistics, February 2008, Korea National Statistical Office)
wearing better quality uniforms, it is also devising policies to develop next
generation battle dress uniforms (BDUs) and body armor.

In accordance with the Mid-term Improvement Plan for Clothing and
Outfit, the Ministry first improved several essential items such as summertime
BDUs, combat helmets, special operations gear, sporting outfit, and
innerwear. It also supplied new items in 2008 such as knapsacks for track
vehicles and outdoor gripsacks. Furthermore, it plans to annually supply
helmet attachments, winter clothing, individual tents, combat knapsacks,
combat boots, etc., appropriately fitted for carrying out military missions. The
Mid-term Improvement Plan for Clothing and Outfit is shown in Table 9-3.

Table 9-3. The Mid-term Improvement Plan for Clothing and Outfit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Items</td>
<td>combat boots, knapsacks for track vehicles, helmet attachment, outdoor knapsacks</td>
<td>winter clothing, special forces sleeping bags, knapsacks, summer-wear, flight clothing, flight shoes</td>
<td>BDU, body armor, personal tents, combat knapsacks, tankman’s clothing</td>
<td>combat jackets, entrenching shovels, canteens, combat rain gear</td>
<td>sleeping bags, personal equipment and belts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Military Facilities and Living Conditions

Responding to societal developments such as increased standard of living
and social consciousness, MND seeks to gradually renovate old and cramped
barracks as well as officer quarters.

MND improved barracks to a higher level in an effort to minimize the
qualitative discrepancies between the military quarters and the environment
of which individual service members grew up in. It increased the floor
spaces per individual service member from 2.3㎡ to 6.3㎡, and restructured
platoon sized non-bed barracks into a bed-filled accommodation for squad
sized elements. The Ministry is also increasing convenient facilities such as
cyber knowledge information rooms (computer clusters), fitness centers, and
lounges, and female-only facilities. Changes in barracks and their developmental process are shown in Figure 9-2.

**Figure 9-2, Barracks Developmental Process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'50—'60</td>
<td>Tents, Quonset Barracks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| '60—'70 | • Construction of type A barracks (block structure, slate roof)  
         | • Capacity to hold a platoon  
         | • Smoke-free coal heating |
| '70—'82 | • Construction of integrated barracks (Rahmen block structure, flat roof)  
         | • Capacity to hold 1–2 Platoons  
         | • Radiator heating |
| '83—'03 | • Construction of modernized barracks (Rahmen brick structure, tilted roof)  
         | • Capacity to hold 1–2 Squads  
         | • Increase convenient facilities |
| After '04 | • Construction of living quarters (Rahmen structure, tilted roof)  
            • Capacity to hold a squadron, with individual beds  
            • Convenient facilities for females |

By investing 415.4 billion won in 2008, MND improved the following: integrated barracks for 63 Army battalions; 90 living quarters at general outposts (GOPs) and coastal and riverine units; and 82 Navy/Air Force living quarters. Facility improvement projects will focus on forward areas and old living quarters that have yet to be modernized. The Ministry plans to renovate all living quarters with individual beds by 2012.

MND has a total of 70,574 military family houses. By 2007, the Ministry finished upgrading 44,199 cramped houses under 50m² and renovating those that were more than 25 years old. However, there still remain 26,375 houses that are either old or cramped, representing 37.4 percent of the total number of military family houses. The current status of the military housing is shown in Table 9-4.
MND will renovate 26,375 old and cramped military houses to meet the standard of the national average at 80-126㎡. Among them, 20,500 houses will be renovated by 2012 via Build-Transfer-Lease (BTL) contracts, while the rest will be renovated as part of financed projects by 2013.

A considerable number of bachelor officer’s quarters are over 25 years old. Furthermore, only 51 percent of total required quarters are provided for, thereby having 2-3 occupants sharing a single quarter. By taking into consideration the expected increase in junior officers following military force re-structuring, the Ministry plans to focus their investment until 2012 in order to renovate old quarters and build new ones so that it can accommodate one officer per quarter.

Table 9-4. Current Status of Military Housing (As of December 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required (%)</th>
<th>Possession</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>In Good Condition</td>
<td>More than 25 Years Old</td>
<td>Cramped (Under 50㎡)</td>
<td>Shortages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71,025 (100%)</td>
<td>70,574 (99.4%)</td>
<td>44,199 (62.2%)</td>
<td>6,934 (9.8%)</td>
<td>19,441 (27.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Status by Year of Construction |
| Classification | Total | More than 25 Years Old | 16-25 Years | Less than 15 Years Old |
| Number of Families | 70,574 | 6,934 | 24,992 | 38,648 |

| Status by Size |
| Classification | Total | Under 50㎡ | 50㎡-80㎡ | Over 80㎡ |
| Number of Families | 70,574 | 24,754 | 34,447 | 11,373 |

Air Force quarters built via BTL
4. Improving Living Conditions for Military Families

Military families face various challenges as they are stationed far from cities and usually subject to frequent moves. To accommodate such difficulties, MND is exerting efforts to improve living conditions for military families. In October 2008, the Ministry signed a Business Agreement on Providing Professional Support Services to Military Families with the Ministry for Health, Welfare, and Family Affairs (MIHWAF).

A. Supporting Education for Children of Military Families

Career soldiers face challenges in educating their children as they are stationed in remote locations, make frequent moves, and often live apart from families. To accommodate these difficulties, MND is expanding dormitory facilities and increasing benefits under special admission for college.

The Ministry operates twelve dormitories (capacity of 2,000) in ten cities across the nation. It will build a facility in Seoul that holds 300 persons in 2009. Furthermore, it plans to additionally secure a 1,200 capacity dormitory by replacing the current Songpa Institute with a military dormitory.

A total of 835 sons and daughters of military personnel entered college with the benefit of special admission for college between 2007 and 2008, 416 students in 75 colleges in 2007 and 419 students in 77 colleges in 2008. The Ministry annually holds college fairs for students and parents of military families, and uploads related information onto its websites. It also plans to increase the number of universities providing benefits to 80 institutions in

2) Providing Professional Support Services to Military Families

A customized service to prevent conflicts within the family and improve family relationships by supporting consultation, education, and cultural programs. It also provides babysitting for emergencies and care for "latchkey children" whose parents come home late from work.
order to allow more students to receive such benefits in 2009.

MND has been offering Defense Scholarships (Hoguk Scholarship) since 1993 to ratchet up career soldiers’ morale in challenging conditions. In 2007, it offered 1,000,000 won to 5,163 freshmen and 500,000 won to 9,329 upperclassmen. It plans to increase scholarship for freshmen to 1,500,000 won in 2009, then to 3,000,000 won. Moreover, the Ministry is considering making provisions for different scholarships for high-score achievers as well as benefits for engineering students in conformity with the government’s policy.

B. Welfare Support for Multiple-Children Families

To comply with the government’s policy, MND has been implementing policies to promote childbirth[3] in accordance with the MND Guidelines for Incentives to Promote Childbirth. As a result, the Ministry was chosen in March 2007 by the “Presidential Commission on Low Childbirth and Aging Society” as an exemplary institution for creating a workplace that encourages childbirth.

MND modified the Veterans’ Pension Act in order to include the days absent from the workplace due to maternity/childcare leave into total days of active service when calculating retirement allowances. It also revised the Military Personnel Act and the Public Officials Remuneration Regulations to provide allowances for substitutes who come in for those on maternity leave. Furthermore, the Ministry seeks to expand welfare services by establishing childcare facilities for military families.

C. Recreation and Welfare Facilities

MND plans to manage 2,690 accounts for nine central recreation facilities (military-owned) and civilian condominiums to strike a balance between work and rest for service members. It plans to expand the number of procured facilities to areas preferred by soldiers and families.

The Ministry operates 32 golf courses to maintain service members’ vigilance as well as offer opportunities for leisure and fitness. It is currently
extending four new courses\textsuperscript{4} and plans to create more depending on the size of stationing units, the number of veterans nearby, and unit relocation plans.

The Ministry plans to package welfare clubs, condos & recreation facilities, and golf courses together to allow for rest and recreation at a single destination. Through such initiatives, it will improve efficiency in welfare facility management as well as satisfy service members’ increased demands for recreation caused both by the spread of culture that values leisure, individual well-being, and a five-day work week.

\textbf{4) Areas where golf courses are under extension work}
- Daejon Area (Kyeryongdae)
- Army Aviation School
- Navy Pyeongtaek Area
- Air Force Seosan Area (near 20th APW)
Section 3.
Designing an Advanced Medical Support System

MND is developing a military medical support system to improve combat capacities by promoting service members’ health. By establishing the Mid- and Long-term Master Plan for the Development of Military Medical Affairs, it is exerting efforts to improve medical facilities and equipment, and secure talented medical personnel.

1. Establishment of Mid- and Long-term Master Plan for the Development of Military Medical Affairs

MND had established Promotion Programs for the Development of Military Medical Affairs in 2006 by forming a government-level committee to improve the military medical support system. From such initiatives, it established Mid- and Long-term Master Plan for the Development of Military Medical Affairs in July 2008, by reinforcing tasks that failed to reflect the reality of and consensus by each Service. The effort presented a mid/long-term roadmap for improving military medical affairs and it is currently focusing on 18 specific tasks in eight areas.

2. Major Agendas

Medical support system has been developed to provide a patient-based medical service. Instead of assigning designated dates for examinations, it adopted an admission-on-the-spot system. It improved service members’
access to medical treatment by supplying 36 patient transportation buses to 12 front divisions. Moreover, two divisions’ Medical Support Units were reorganized into those at the battalion-level and the number of medical examination categories increased from five to eight or nine.

MND reinforced medical equipment, facilities, and medical support personnel to improve the quality of medical service. It replaced 73 old field ambulances by modernizing them and additionally supplied 52 commercial ambulances, upgrading conditions for patient evacuation. For medical equipment, 37 essential items including digital X-ray and blood testing kits were upgraded while high-tech apparatus such as seven magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) units and five computed tomography (CT) were added to significantly reduce patients’ waiting time. Three division-level medical facilities were constructed or modified in connection with barrack modernization plans in order to fortify primary treatment centers at the division level or lower. Furthermore, Hampyeong Hospital (May 2007) and Pohang Hospital (March 2008) were opened, and 108 expert medical non-commissioned officers including first-aid personnel, nurses, and various medical staff were employed in 2008.

MND is improving the personnel management system in order to secure talented medical personnel and medical non-commissioned officers. The Ministry is improving the remuneration system and working conditions to attract competent medical officers. It is also hiring civilian doctors to upgrade the quality of overall care.
medical treatment. For the first time, five civilian doctors were employed in the Armed Forces Capital Hospital in May 2008. The groundwork for contracting civilian doctors to military hospital was laid in February 2008 when an agreement was signed between the Ministry and Seoul National University Hospital.

In the meantime, the Ministry is restructuring the organizations related to military medical affairs and is entrusting treatment to civilian hospitals. In order to upgrade its level of medical services, it modified 20 hospitals into 15, and in July 2008 it transferred command of Seoul District Hospital from the MND to Military Medical Command. Moreover, it signed service agreements with 69 civilian hospitals in order to care and examine patients who require treatments exceeding capabilities of military hospitals.

3. Future Plans

MND plans to continuously reinforce 25 division-level medical facilities and substitute 964 old ambulances by increasing the ratio of civilian ambulances in order to guarantee rapid transport. It also plans to secure 1,051 expert medical non-commissioned officers by 2013.

The military will offer area-based medical treatment closing system according to the patient’s conditions by dividing military hospitals into “concentrated hospitals,” “mobile support hospitals,” and “outpatient hospitals.” It will also achieve unity of command by placing Pohang Hospital and Maritime Medical Clinic under the Military Medical Command.

The Ministry plans to reinforce Comprehensive Development Plan for the Armed Forces Capital Hospital and establish the National Defense Institute for Medical Science - the military’s supreme tertiary medical institution. Through such efforts, it will establish the Defense Medical School to cultivate military medical personnel and to operate a hospital with a 1,000-bed capacity. Moreover, it will establish research functions in military-specific categories.
MND will also secure field deployable medical facilities\(^{11}\) to leverage for overseas deployment and training during peacetime, and for medical support on mobile corps during wartime. Moreover, it will establish an Air Medical Evacuation Company and secure medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) helicopters in order to improve patient transporting capabilities both in peacetime and wartime.

\(^{11}\) Field Deployable Medical Facility
A medical facility that can connect with containers and tent shelters to deploy and withdraw rapidly in order to provide mobile medical support to supporting units during wartime. It also loads automatically to facilitate movement.
Section 4.
Maximizing Employment Opportunities for Veterans

MND supports the transitioning of retired service members into the social workforce as part of solidifying service morale and providing a stable working condition for active-duty personnel as they focus on current assignments. It is improving the employment support system such as education and career consulting, and offers various employment venues such as job fairs.

1. Direction of Employment Support Policies

MND and veteran’s affairs-related department of the three Services implements systematic and effective measures to support employment for retired service members.

Directions for employment support policies are as follows: First, create positions within the military, public, and private sectors for long-term service members (10 years or more) to offer employment opportunities and improve competitiveness by providing user-based job guidance and education\(^2\) that are in demand within the job market. Second, provide basic employment education and related information for shorter-term service members serving less than 10 years.

12) Job Guidance and Education
Training and education on knowledge, technicalities, skill acquisition, and obtaining license for retired (or planning to retire) officers and NCOs who seek employment.
2. Developing a Vocational Transitioning Support System

MND is developing a vocational transitioning support system in order to offer assistance in efficient job transitions. The vocational transitioning support system broken down into phases is shown in Figure 9-3.

Figure 9–3. A Diagram of Support for Vocational Change per Phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Vocational Change Support Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Years Prior to Retirement</td>
<td>Setting Goals and Plans for Vocational Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-diagnosis and Job Search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Understanding Vocational Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Years Prior</td>
<td>Obtaining Qualifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Years Prior</td>
<td>Improve Work Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Year Prior</td>
<td>Obtaining Qualifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improve Work Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attempt Vocational Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reinforcing on-site Specialty and Adaptability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement</td>
<td>Advanced Education for Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advanced Employment for Self-employing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edu. for Unemployed / Support Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Years after Retirement</td>
<td>Ministry of Patients and Veterans Affairs (MPVA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Implementing Career Consultation Program 3–4 Years Prior to Retirement

MND is implementing a “step-by-step career consultation program” for
officers and NCOs 3-4 years prior to their retirement. Details on the program are shown in Table 9-5.

**Table 9-5, Phase-in Career Consultation Program**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stage 1 Understanding Aptitude</td>
<td>Understand oneself via multilateral diagnosis on personal tendencies, occupational interest, value of jobs, factors stimulating motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2 Career Development</td>
<td>Establish career objectives based on understanding of aptitude and individual career</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3 Life Planning</td>
<td>Establish detailed measures to prepare for various aspects of life</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Career consulting was offered to 75 officers in the greater Seoul Metropolitan area as a pilot program in 2007 with later turnouts that show 93 percent of the participants expressing satisfaction of the program. Thereby in 2008, the Ministry increased the number of participants to 250 and expanded the program to the Daegu and Gwangju area. Also, the three-month period for consulting was extended to four months.

**B. Reinforcing Basic Education on Employment**

MND is reinforcing its basic employment education for retiring officers in order to minimize their anxieties about the future and enable a smooth transition into society. Basic employment education is offered to retiring officers and NCOs stationed in forward remote locations by touring across units. Participants learn about the private industry and ways to adapt after retirement two years before entering job guidance and education.

**C. Managing a User-based, Customized Technical Education**

In order to enhance the competitiveness of retiring officers and NCOs, the
Ministry offers a number of various education programs. In particular, by collaborating with related agencies such as the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs, Korea Polytechnics, etc., the Ministry develops and implements a customized vocational training program in order to improve the capacity for candidates successfully landing a job.

MND operates customized technical education programs directly related to employment. In 2008, it expanded the previously programmed seven courses into twelve, and plans to further increase the courses up to twenty with regard to helping employment chances. A good portion of job guidance and education is currently entrusted to the civil sector, but in the future, the Ministry plans to establish a specialized institute for retiring officers in order to provide a more systematic educational support for vocational transition.

3. Expanding Job Opportunities and Creating Job Positions

MND is exerting efforts to create job positions that can leverage military expertise and experience, consequently resulting in 11,289 secured job positions for long-term service members (10 years or more). Status on secured job positions is shown in Figure 9-4.
Secured job positions include: Professorship positions for retired experienced military professionals teaching subjects in military science and security studies at military institutes and civilian colleges; an observer or control instructor for retired experienced service members overseeing modern survival trainings; and job openings where military expertise are applicable such as ROTC instructors and teaching positions in specialized high schools. The Ministry plans to further create job positions through a governmental effort via the Committee for the Support of Veterans, a subcommittee under the Office of the Prime Minister. Employment results during the past five years are shown in Figure 9-5.

14) Committee for the Support of Veterans
A committee established in 2006 to review necessary items to support retired service members and utilize human resources. The Prime Minister heads the committee, while Ministers of related Ministries and civil experts are its members.
4. Other Employment Supporting Efforts

The Job-Seeking Support Center under MND provides opportunities for employment and self-employment by hosting job fairs every May and by revitalizing a quarterly Job-seeking/Hiring Day. Moreover, it offers useful services such as information on employment/self-employment, corporate services, and on-line consulting through the Employment Information System. The supporting process of the MND Job-Seeking Support Center is shown in Figure 9-6.

In order to publicize competencies of retired service members, the Ministry performs various tasks including the following: Presentations and invitational talks with company’s HR representatives; policy discussions in Korean Force Networks (KFN); sending e-mails to corporate CEOs; and advertisements via radio, daily journals, and billboards on military buses.

15) Corporate Service
A service where companies can sign up to provide online information on employment status and post job openings.
Section 5.

Stable Management of Military Pension System

The military pension system reflects distinctive characteristics of military service, exhibiting a strong sense of remuneration from the nation.

MND has unilaterally managed the military pension system since 1963 and continues to safely manage the fund by revising the Veterans’ Pension Act.

1. Characteristics of Military Pension System

The military pension system was first managed as part of the Public Officials Pension Act (enacted in January 1960). In 1963, considering the uniqueness of serving in the military, the Veterans’ Pension Act was separated from the Public Officials Pension Act and has been managed since then.

Military pension system has the purpose of contributing to a standard of decent living and well-being for its beneficiaries by providing an appropriate amount of pay to service members and families upon honorable retirement, retirement or death due to physical/psychological impediments, or medical leave of absence for illness/injury sustained in line of duty. It is a pension system not only with elements of social insurance and guaranteeing livelihood, but also with a feel of national compensation attached to it.

The reason for the strong sense of national compensation to military pensions is that service members are required to perform missions during crisis in order to protect the nation as well as the lives and properties of its people. Service member’s private lives are limited by regular upkeep of alert
status, trainings, and frequent relocations, and they retire early at ages when expenditures are at an all-time high (between 45-55) irrespective of personal intensions based on a system of placing a ceiling on age. Upon retirement, they face employment challenges as military expertise gathered during service is difficult to translate into the society. Military pension system reflects such characteristics of military service.

To note, military authorities from other developed nations also self-manage military pension by separating them from public service pension and national pension.

In major developed nations, military pension is given preferential treatment over other pensions in terms of the following: Minimum service years for pension receipt; supply commencement age; rate of contribution to pension; level of pension paid; and period of contribution payment. Rate of contribution to military pension by major nations are shown in Table 9-6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributed Entirely by Nation</th>
<th>Individual Contribution &lt; Nation’s Contribution</th>
<th>Individual Contribution = Nation’s Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S., UK, Germany, etc.</td>
<td>Canada, Italy, etc.</td>
<td>ROK, Japan, Argentina, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Efforts to Stabilize Financing

The government is currently amending the shortages in military pension caused in the early days of the system when the number of recipients increased without the military having secured sufficient funds. The reason behind such increase was the military paying out pension while exempting fund contributions for services rendered before 1959 and for the three times during the period of war including the Korean War and the Vietnam War.

MND has been modifying the Veterans’ Pension Act in order to establish systemic measures to stabilize military pension finance. It will soon present measures reflecting the uniqueness of the military after gathering suggestions.
from financial experts and interested parties.

Shareholders and the government have been increasing their share of liabilities from 3.5 percent to 8.5 percent per their monthly income. Starting January 2001, the Ministry stipulated that method of pension increase not be necessarily correlated with recipient’s income but with changes in consumer price index, to estimate pension based on average income of the last three years rather than final income, and to allow even the legal reserve—required for stability in pension financing—to be financed through accumulation. Starting January 2007, with pension being paid out from the legal reserve, the Ministry was to reflect this in their supplied fund two years later to have it financed again through accumulation. Furthermore, starting November 2006, if a pension recipient is determined to have a non-pension income above a certain level, the Ministry can stem portions of their pension payment. Pension recipients per year are shown in Figure 9-7.

**Figure 9–7. Pension Recipients per Year**

Through the Assets Management Guide, military pension strives for growth in fund size and earnings. The Ministry raised the target earning rate in 2008 by modifying Assets Management Guide, and allowed itself to be able to check and control its management risks by establishing a Standard for
Risk Management, earning rate for military pension fund is shown in Table 9-7.

### Table 9–7, Target Earning Rate for Military Pension Fund

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>6.09</td>
<td>6.53</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the meantime, the Ministry plans to use “the system for integrating accumulated period among public pensions” to provide pension to those who had been ineligible as they failed to satisfy the 19 years and six months of required service.

### 3. Providing Service via Internet

Starting May 2006, MND is offering related services on the Internet (http://www.mps.go.kr) for pension recipients through the Military Pension Information System. By making various documents\(^{17}\) such as “a letter to verify the person in receipt of military pension” available by printing it off the Internet and providing updated news regarding pensions, the military is improving overall user satisfaction.

\(^{17}\) Documents Available through Internet Service
- A letter to verify the fact of receipt of military pension
- A letter to verify the person in receipt of military pension
- A letter to verify an acting agent for receipt of military pension
- A supply notice of military pension
- English version of a letter to verify the person in receipt of military pension
- Receipt for withholding

Webpage for Military Pension Information System
MND should enable the armed forces to focus on their original missions and strengthen overall capabilities to garner trust from the nation, guarantee people’s convenience, and realize government policies actively to firmly establish an image of the “citizen in uniform.”

Chapter 10

The Armed Forces Serving the People

- Section 1 Cultivating an Advanced Barracks Culture
- Section 2 Enhancing Public Benefits and Protecting Public Rights
- Section 3 Improvement of Military Service and Administration Systems
- Section 4 Respect and Compensation for Veterans
- Section 5 Defense Policies Reaching out to the People
Section 1.

Cultivating an Advanced Barracks Culture

The ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) is establishing a foundation to cultivate a strong military that fights and prevails by creating a barracks culture within the framework of stern military discipline. MND will establish a systemic unit management structure based on a service environment that embraces mutual respect and care, and improve service conditions to continuously foster an advanced barracks culture. Such efforts will enable service members to focus on their combat missions and cultivate the military into an organization beloved and trusted by its citizens.

1. The Need for an Advanced Barracks Culture

An advanced barracks culture is the embodiment of a rational and democratic military life through which a foundation to fight and prevail victorious is built based on respect for human rights and citizen’s confidence.

Mandatory service members of the younger generation grew up in a social environment wherein strong individualistic tendencies, creativity, and free will were the focus. Some of them are easily alienated and frustrated by the military culture that is the hallmark of supervision and leadership, thereby considering time served in the military as merely lost years. There exists some cultural estrangement between our society and the military and such differences in consciousness and culture interferes in establishing a firm defense posture as well as facilitating social integration. Therefore,
improvement in barracks culture is not only an essential task for force generation but also for fostering national defense and the country.

MND identifies and promotes tasks to create an advanced barracks culture such as developing education to divert officer-first mentality in order to reestablish basic frameworks for barracks culture. The tasks are reinforced continuously by evaluating its progress annually.

In March 2007, the Ministry surveyed 321 service members from nine units of each Service on performance of initiatives to improve barracks culture. The results showed that 66 percent were satisfied with their military lives, while 68 percent were satisfied with the improvement efforts.¹

2. Improving Barracks Culture

A. Systematized Establishment of Unit Management System and Development of an Advanced Leadership

In order to improve barracks culture, it is most important to set conditions to manage units based on norms and systems as well as foster leadership to lead such efforts.

By establishing the Directive on Management of Units which offers details on units and its functions, MND will establish a management system of units. The effort will mark an opportunity to establish a clear standard for service member’s basic rights and responsibilities, and allow service regulations to take root naturally.

MND is undergoing various training to equip officers with a better sense of leadership. Through candidate training² starting 2007, it reinforces education on leadership by specifying qualities and skills for junior officers. In refresher training,³ it teaches ways to renew mentalities and change counseling
methods by reflecting leadership education that befits each echelon and rank into its curriculum.

The Ministry is offering opportunities for commanding officers below regiment levels to verify and develop their leadership during their command period by allowing a specialized institute to diagnose, evaluate, and teach leadership. Development of noncommissioned officer (NCO)’s leadership will also be promoted with the NCO Comprehensive Development Plan.

B. Guaranteeing Service Members’ Basic Rights and Improving Service Conditions

(1) Guaranteeing Service Members’ Basic Rights

MND is continuously developing organizations and systems to promote service members’ basic rights.

By establishing the Human Rights Division in MND Headquarters in January 2006, MND enabled the division to focus on policies and initiatives to promote service members’ basic rights. Furthermore, in December 2007 the Ministry organized the Human Rights Branch in Service Headquarters to supervise subsidiary units’ guarantee of service members’ rights and to implement plans to promote basic rights.

In January 2008, MND amended the Directive on Education for Basic Rights of Service Members to reinforce such education further. It also plans to provide a systemic foundation for service members’ basic rights by establishing the Guideline for Basic Rights of Service Members and Performance Indexes.

The Ministry runs a system where a counselor specializing in basic rights consults individual service members. Specifically, the counselor is a civilian expert in counseling and psychology. They focus on counseling individuals that have difficulty in adapting to the military service, as well as in advising commanding officers on the skills to manage conflicts regarding service members’ basic rights.

The counselor system went through two years of trial testing from 2005 to
2006, and 42 counselors were employed in 2008. They were stationed in units that include: 14 front units under 1st and 3rd ROK Army and the Korea Army Training Center; Operations Command, Fleets, as well as Marine Corps’ Divisions and Education and Training Group for Navy; Operations Command, Logistics Command, and Education and Training Command for Air Force. After 2011, the Ministry plans to select 455 counselors to offer consultation services on basic rights to regiment-level units consultations.

(2) Improving Service Conditions

MND is improving self-discipline in military lives by implementing self-regulating time schedules. It is seeking to establish a military culture where mandatory servicemen participate voluntarily and are offered opportunities to regulate one’s own schedule after work hours such as self-improvement efforts.

In consideration of the environment that the new generation’s mandatory servicemen grew up in, plans to improve barracks strive for a change from “lodgment” to “residence.” Barrack renovation is underway and coupled with plans to establish squad-sized bed type rooms by 2012.

The Ministry plans to increase remuneration for service in special areas, salary for the enlisted, and expenses for squad leaders.

C. Guaranteeing Conditions for Self-Improvement

MND fosters an educational environment that allows for continuous self-development for servicemen while serving. It established Cyber Knowledge Information Rooms (computer clusters) in barracks as well as structural conditions to obtain college credits and various licenses while serving in the military. Furthermore, libraries were built in newly constructed Battalion-size barracks and 400 books were supplied en masse to those in remote locations.

By increasing libraries in the base and campaigns to donate books, the Ministry
supplied 170,000 and 250,000 books in 2007 and 2008 respectively, contributing to service members’ increased level of sensibilities.

D. Establishing Integrated Accident Prevention System

Accidents that occur in the units not only hamper combat capabilities but are also the most critical reason for distrust toward the military, MND is arranging a scientific accident prevention measure to reduce accidents. It plans to achieve this by systematizing scientific accident prevention methods as well as procedures which reflect the characteristics of the new generation’s mandatory servicemen.

(1) Establishment and Use of a Scientific Accident Management System

MND plans to develop a new, more reliable character evaluation tool and utilize this starting late 2009. It will allow an efficient management of mandatory servicemen by processing data automatically and by accurately identifying the mentally ill and the maladjusted through a test that best suits these new generation mandatory servicemen.

Furthermore, the Ministry is developing a method to diagnose stress in the service and a scientific education program suited to the Korean military to prevent suicides. There will be trial tests in late 2008 and the initiatives will then be offered across the military.

Once the scientific accident management system is set, related data such as analysis of precedents and examples of prevention efforts will be accumulated and shared in an integrated way. It will do wonders to prevent accidents as units of all levels can easily utilize related data and share information real-time.

(2) Improvement in Handling of Personnel Ineligible for Military Service (noneffectives)

MND is devising “countermeasures against enlistment of those incompatible to the service” and “early separation measures against the
maladjusted” which can systematically manage such personnel from all phases, from conscription to service.

In the conscription phase, countermeasures against enlistment of those incompatible to the service are reinforced. In the boot training phase, timely measures are available through “phased assessment of individual’s compatibility to active-duty service” prior to training’s completion. In the servicing phase, early separation measures are applied to the maladjusted. Such maladjusted individuals can be efficiently managed throughout the phases as related data are automatically shared.

Moreover, efforts will be made to establish/amend related statutes to transfer maladjusted mandatory servicemen into a replacement or second conscription personnel.

5) Replacement Status
Those judged to be fit for active duty, but excluded from active duty or have been assigned to mandatory public service because of supply and demand circumstances for personnel.

6) Second Eligible Conscription Status
Those who have been determined to be able to perform military support service under wartime labor service mobilization, even if they are found not to be fit to perform active duty or replacement through physical examination for conscription.
Section 2. Enhancing Public Benefits and Protecting Public Rights

The ROK military is putting forth its efforts to go hand in hand with the people in areas that require military support, while remaining vigilant at all times in defending the nation. It strives to defend with the people through efficient management of military installations and easing of regulations, eco-friendly management of forces, active support activities to assist civilians, and high-quality handling of civil petitions.

1. Management of Military Installations in Consideration of Local Development

MND manages military installations to assure military operations, efficiently use land, and promote increased benefits for people’s lives.

A. Readjustments of Land Used by the Military

Based on protection of people’s property rights and a law abiding defense effort, MND is readjusting land used by the military. Land unavoidably used for operational purposes without the owner’s consent is continuously compensated for.

The military actively accepts if an owner wishes to trade his property for military’s idle land. Private land that needs to be continuously used by the military is obtained in accordance with the Act on Acquisition and Compensation regarding Land and etc., for Public Projects. The Ministry obtained 172,07 million m² of land and paid out compensation by investing
586.8 billion KRW between 1983 and 2007. Status of private land readjustments is shown in Figure 10-1.

Figure 10–1. Status of Readjustments on Land Used by the Military

The military returns private land that requires no further military use and follows lawful process such as receiving owner’s prior consent for land that requires urgent operational use.

MND also reinforced related systems by establishing the Directive on the Acquisition of State Property such as the Approval of Execution Plan of Defense and Military Installations Projects, etc, in June 2008.

B. Promoting Relocation of Military Installations

MND has been planning to relocate military installations since 1966, and is considering a balanced city development, efficient use of land, and modernization of military installations as long as they do not interfere with military operations.

Demand for unit relocation is increasing as downtowns expand. On the other hand, relocations are sometimes delayed due to protests from locals of new locations, and delays in land sale sometimes make it difficult to secure relocation costs. The Ministry completed relocation of 79 units by investing 1743.4 billion KRW between 1998 and 2007. In 2008, it promoted relocation of 26 units by investing 302.1 billion KRW, and completed four of them.
plans to promote relocation projects in line with military installation repositioning efforts.

Table 10–1, Details on Relocation of Military Installations (1998–2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Seoul</th>
<th>Gangwon</th>
<th>Gyeonggi</th>
<th>Chungcheong</th>
<th>Gyeongbuk</th>
<th>Gyeongnam</th>
<th>Jeonnam</th>
<th>Jeonbuk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relocated</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Alleviating Regulations on Military Installation Protection Zone

MND is modifying its military installation protection zone and its regulation of conduct to the extent that it does not hinder military operations.

The Ministry established the Protection of Military Bases and Military Installations Act in December 2007. The Act, which was implemented in September 2008, was a composition of the Protection of Military Installations Act, the Naval Bases Act, and the Military Air Bases Act. The law focuses on protecting people’s property rights and minimizing their administrative inconveniences, and contains information related to easing regulations regarding military installation protection zones and simplifying various procedures.

The military installation protection zone was amended as follows.

First, it reduced civilian access control line (CACL)\(^7\) (restricted protection zone) from 15km to 10km of the military demarcation line (MDL).

![Figure 10–2, Modifications of Restricted Protection Zone](image)

Furthermore, it reduced the size of the protection zone for military bases and installations in areas 25km away from the MDL. Furthermore, the “restricted protection zone”\(^8\) was reduced from 500m to within 300m, while

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7) Civilian Access Control Line (CACL)
A line designated by the Minister of National Defense to control civilians’ access for operational reasons in areas adjacent to the MDL that require high-level military activities.

8) Restricted Protection Zone
Areas within military bases and installations protection zone adjacent to MDL that require high-level military activities and areas that require preservation of functions for important military bases and installations.
the “limited protection zone”\(^9\) was reduced from 1,000m to within 500m.

Figure 10–3. Modifications on the Protection Zone 25km Outside of the MDL

Such measures thereby relieved or eased a total area of 450 million \(m^2\) (154 times the size of Yeouido) in 58 areas from a protection zone, thus allowing further protection of people’s property rights.

Specifically, an area of 210 million \(m^2\) (72 times the size of Yeouido) in 38 areas including Seoul, Incheon, Gyeonggi, Gangwon were decategorized from being a military installation protection zone, thereby granting unbridled discretions for new construction or expansion efforts. Areas removed from the “restricted protection zone” to the “limited protection zone” include 240 million \(m^2\) (82 times the size of Yeouido) in 20 areas including Seoul, Gyeonggi, Gangwon, and Chungnam. Residents of these areas can build buildings under three stories high within the span of 200\(m^2\) without consultation from the military.

Along with measures to relieve areas from protection, 11 million \(m^2\) in ten areas including Gapyeong, Gyeonggi and Yuseong, Daejeon were newly selected as military installation protection zones. The areas are required for operational purposes as they include places within the boundaries of Division or above units as well as land used by the military for ammunition storage. A rough outline on modification of military installation protection zone is shown in Figure 10-4.
Along with a modified military installation protection zone, the law enacted in September 2008 reinforces citizen’s exercise of property rights.

In the past, all construction and expansion efforts on buildings or structures in “restricted protection zone” were prohibited. However, except for construction of new housing, it is now possible to receive permission if agreement can be reached with the units of jurisdiction. In addition, MND established the “request for land purchase system.” If an owner wishes to sell land with a considerably diminished utility or land impossible for usage and generation of profits, the military can purchase it within the boundaries of available budget.

As a subsequent measure to law amendment, the Ministry established the enforcement ordinance and regulation in September 2008, and further eased restrictions. Details include simplifying access to the “restricted protection zone”; abrogating a rule that requires prior consultation with military units for small-scale construction efforts that needs be declared under the current
Building Act; offering information on areas appointed as protected zones via the Land Use Regulation Information Service (LURIS); and improving ways to label and set stone posts in protected zones.

The Ministry will continuously ease regulation—such as expanding entrustment of coordinated projects to local governments—to resolve citizen’s inconveniences and enhance their benefits.

D. Reducing Local Residents’ Inconveniences by Improving the Fences

MND seeks to alleviate citizen’s inconveniences while establishing a scientific patrol system by progressively improving iron fencing along coastal and riverside areas.

While maintaining iron fencing in certain areas for security reasons, the Ministry is removing fences in less-vulnerable areas such as beach resorts. It plans to introduce scientific surveillance equipment to supplement such measures and uphold vigilance.

The project to improve iron fencing is divided into phases. For phase 1, the military removed 21.1km of fence in 54 areas along the East Coast in 2007. For phase 2, it is removing 43.2km of them in 40 areas, to be completed by 2009.

2. Eco-Friendly Military Management

The environment is an important determinant for quality of life. Nations around the world, including the Republic of Korea, are striving for sustainable development wherein a balance can be struck between the economy and society and the environment.

In wake of such changes, the Ministry is exerting various efforts to manage the military in an eco-friendly way.
A. Development of Military Environment Management System

MND is handling military environment issues efficiently by establishing a mutual support and coordinating system between the military and the government. As of 1998, the Central Government-Military Environmental Consultative Committee (GMECC) between MND and the Ministry of Environment, and Local GMECC between regional unit commanders and local government office for environment have been held biannually.

MND is reinforcing expertise of those specialized in environment-related fields by improving relevant organizations and developing training and education systems.

First, it is securing expert talent by establishing criteria for environment managing organizations, which reflects characteristics of each Service and subsidiary units. In June 2007, it established two battalion-level units specialized in environmental issues to support early action on pollution-related accidents and purification projects for USFK bases returned to ROK.

In addition, it is developing and operating various education programs to imbue individual service members with an eco-friendly mindset. It is also reinforcing specialized environment-related education as well as military environment education tours through Service schools.

B. Expanding Projects to Prevent Environmental Pollution

Units of each level are conducting themselves in an eco-friendly way by installing pollution preventing facilities as designated by environment-related statutes and by upgrading old equipments currently under operation.
As of late 2007, 3,716 water pollution preventing facilities has been installed and operated in respective units. Units placed within the geographical boundaries of sewage treating areas of local governments are safely handling waste by connecting its pipeline to public sewage disposal plants. Units also heightened measures to prevent water pollution by delegating management and operation of wastewater treatment facilities of military bases to companies with specialized skills.

Furthermore, units installed automatic oil leak detectors and oil-preventing bumps to prevent oil-related pollutions. They are also preventing underground oil leaks by placing oil pipelines above ground. By periodically sampling the pollution level around oil storage facilities, units enable swift purification efforts whenever ground pollution has been detected.

With modification of the Sewerage Act in September 2007, the standard level of water quality allowed to be discharged by wastewater treatment facilities for military bases became more stringent. In response to such changes, the Ministry plans to reflect the budget necessary to improve military environmental facilities into the Mid-term Defense Plan and progressively improve it. Status on efforts to secure and improve military basic environmental facilities is shown in Table 10-2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Total requirement</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008 plan</th>
<th>2009–2013 Mid–term plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,429</td>
<td>5,408</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>2,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water pollution preventing facility</td>
<td>4,784</td>
<td>3,716</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soil pollution preventing facility</td>
<td>3,334</td>
<td>1,472</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>1,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air, Noise, incineration facility</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Unit: establishments)
MND is reinforcing management of military waste disposal and its recycling efforts. Daily trash, if possible, is handled via entrustment to local authorities, while those that cannot be treated are sent to military incinerators. Designated refuse and construction waste that can worsen pollution such as rejected oil and acids are handled by companies that specialize in waste disposal. Status of military waste disposal in 2007 is shown in Table 10-3.

### Table 10-3, Status of Military Waste Treatment in 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Disposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Through entrustment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>360,456</td>
<td>305,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household trash</td>
<td>90,093</td>
<td>70,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food waste</td>
<td>35,329</td>
<td>3,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designated waste</td>
<td>11,848</td>
<td>9,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction waste</td>
<td>223,186</td>
<td>222,527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Civil Support to Protect Nature

The ROK military actively supports national policies regarding preservation of environment to an extent that it does not impede its primary missions. Examples of such activities include: each unit taking care of one mountain and one river; national land cleansing campaigns; supporting efforts to purify
the Han River; supporting efforts to purify remote islands; and supporting waste retrieval in flooded areas. Every year, 1.5 million service members retrieve around 12,000 tons of trash.

Table 10-4, Status of Nature Purifying Efforts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Nature Purification</th>
<th>Civil/Government/Military Cooperative Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Times</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>9,013</td>
<td>1,382,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>9,083</td>
<td>1,641,214</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To note, in late 2007 when the nation’s worst oil spill occurred in Taean region along the West Sea, 160,000 service members were sent to undertake recovery efforts.

Table 10-5, Status on Support for Clearing of Taean Oil-Spill Site

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Waste Material (ton)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 7, 2007–May 30, 2008</td>
<td>164,503</td>
<td>2,297</td>
<td>6,513</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A yearly average of over 50,000 service members participate in activities to preserve the ecosystem by feeding wild animals during the wintertime and retrieving poaching tools such as snares and traps,
D. Measures against Noise from Airfields and Shooting Ranges

Several civil petitions, lawsuits, and conflicts occur annually in relation to noise from military facilities.

MND is establishing and promoting measures to reduce the noise-level in order to guarantee appropriate conditions for military training while minimizing noise-related damages to locals residing near airfields and shooting ranges. Exerted efforts include setting flight routes and altitudes in consideration of densely populated areas nearby and construction of 13 hush houses to minimize noise during aircraft maintenance.

In order to fundamentally resolve the noise issue, the Ministry is seeking to establish the Special Act on Military Noise. It has been examining noise levels in airfields and ranges and it derived the required budget as well as assessment on effects of noise by using research agencies in 2007.

E. Management of Environment in Returned USFK Bases

USFK bases are being returned in accordance with the ROK-U.S. Land Partnership Plan (LPP), the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP), and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). From the target of 80 bases up for return, 40 have been handed over by 2008. From the pool of returned bases, 18 were environmentally sound while the remaining 22 were determined to require purification projects in accordance with domestic environment-related statutes.

Returned USFK bases are passed down to local governments after necessary measures are taken. The Ministry’s measures include: examining
facilities inside the returned bases; establishing returned base management plan and reporting it to the National Assembly; undertaking environment purification projects; and tearing down facilities and determining whether there are assets to be utilized.

When removal of facilities and environment purification are completed after these measures, it would hand the bases over to the appropriate authorities.

The Ministry plans to openly and transparently promote environment purification projects on returned USFK bases in coordination with related local governments.

3. Reinforcing Disaster Management and Support System

A. Prevention of Disasters and Establishing Readiness Posture

There has been a recent increase in natural disasters such as typhoons, floods, and snowstorms as well as accidents such as wildfire, epidemics, and oil leaks. The trend nowadays has been for damages from such disasters to be more massive than ever, thus increasing demands for military support for disaster prevention and recovery efforts.

As the nation’s military working under a comprehensive notion of national security, MND undertakes policies to actively support efforts when national disasters erupt as long as it does not interfere with its basic duties.
First, it is solidifying an inter-agency cooperation system. In August 2005, it signed an agreement on disaster cooperation with the Central Disaster Safety Measures Headquarters. In November 2007, it agreed on detailed procedures among 197 units and 248 local governments by pre-assigning supporting units to local entities. In December 2007, it signed an agreement with the Ministry of Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs (MLTM) and Korea Coast Guard regarding search and rescue coordination for aircraft accidents.

Second, it is modifying and applying regulations and manuals for disaster management. In January 2007, a mission handbook for defense disaster management was published and distributed to inter-departments and agencies. In August, it established a command manual for each of the five major disaster types such as typhoons, heavy snowfalls, and torrential downpours in connection with the government’s standard manual for crisis management.

Third, it is reinforcing education on disaster management and support. It offers education through specialized agencies from within and outside the military as well as lecturing tours to improve proficiency in damage recovery, and participates in the Safe Korea Exercise (SKE). In addition, it offers disaster countermeasures staff meeting, lectures by experts, and seminars to commanding officers, service members, and disaster-related officials from all levels.

Fourth, it is improving infrastructure for disaster management. It enabled the MND Disaster Management Information System (DMIS) to use information on technical personnel on alternative service by adding it into the database. Furthermore, by modifying the Army Disaster Management Information System, it sends out real-time disaster reports and efficiently manages disasters.

MND has determined the standard amount of equipment and materiel necessary by considering disaster types and unit characteristics, and also secured and managed them through coordination with local entities. However, efficient rescue and support missions are limited since it is difficult to secure budgets for disaster-support equipment, calling for further coordination between the Ministry and local entities.
B. Promoting Emergency Rescue and Restoration Support

MND maintains a disaster readiness posture to swiftly undertake emergency rescue support by operating 35 search and rescue units and 210 disaster countermeasure centers. Procedures for disaster support are shown in Figure 10-5.

Major disaster recovery support activities conducted domestically and internationally to date are as follows: recovery efforts for damages inflicted by Typhoon Maggie and the Tsunami in South Asia in 2004; damage recovery from a wildfire in Yeongdong area and heavy snowfall in Honam...
region in 2005; damage recovery from a landslide in the Philippines and an earthquake in Indonesia in 2006; recovery efforts for damages inflicted by Typhoon Nari, and clearing the oil leak in Taean in 2007; and preventative as well as burying efforts in response to the avian influenza and recovery efforts for the Sichuan earthquake in China in 2008. Supportive efforts for disaster recoveries for the past five years are shown in Table 10-7.

Table 10-7, Results of Disaster Recovery Support for Last Five Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Recovery Performance</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troops (1000)</td>
<td>Equipment (pcs.)</td>
<td>Pers. Rescue (pers.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>5,054</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>5,590</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>13,833</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>2,607</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>3,231</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,154</td>
<td>30,315</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Others in 2008
  - Removing Sand/Waste: 4,119 tons/8,608 tons
  - Medical Support: 107, Cargo Transportation: 8,907
  - Burying Support for AI: 1.88million, Supporting Earthquake in China: 26.6 tons
C. Direction of Defense Disaster Management

MND is reinforcing specialized education and practical training to prevent disasters and to respond to disasters in ways of recovery efforts upon occurrence.

It plans to improve its ability to manage disasters by expanding each Service’s organization and staff specialized in disaster management every year and by assigning rescue units that focus on special disasters and islands. Moreover, by actively participating in large-scale disasters in foreign countries, the Ministry seeks to improve the ROK’s status in the global community.

4. Reinforcing Civil Support Activities

Typically, MND offers active civil support by leveraging available personnel, equipment, and skills to places that require military assistance as long as it does not interfere with MND’s everyday duties.

During the farming season, the Ministry supports manpower for rice planting and reaping in rural areas where sowing and harvesting are limited due to scarcity of labor. It also upgrades agricultural infrastructure related to structural changes in rural communities by maintaining waterways and improving rivers. It offers technical support as well, by organizing a “farm machine repair patrol service team,” which makes rounds to areas without service centers to repair farming equipment.
As part of a love the rural community campaign, the Ministry signed a One Company and One Village Campaign and provides assistance in farm work such as harvesting potatoes and apples. It also contributes to improvement in national health by periodically conducting free medical treatment and quarantine efforts in areas with weaker medical services. Status of volunteer efforts to help with farm work is shown in Table 10-8.

Table 10–8, Status of Volunteer Effort to Help Farm Work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Volunteers (person)</th>
<th>Support Equipment (pieces)</th>
<th>Major Support Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Harvesting Support (information)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>575,141</td>
<td>7,672</td>
<td>28,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>357,557</td>
<td>6,547</td>
<td>9,062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>155,466</td>
<td>2,556</td>
<td>2,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>146,794</td>
<td>3,089</td>
<td>4,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>180,103</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>1,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>70,381</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>18,607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,485,442</td>
<td>23,617</td>
<td>64,937</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Improving Civil Petitions Work

In 2006, MND introduced its vision to achieve an advanced defense civil petitions administration, and focused on providing high-quality civil petition-related services.

In January 2007, by modifying the Directive on MND Civil Petitions Treatment, it increased the number of subjects applicable for “File From Anywhere” service\(^{10}\) to fifteen. In February, it published the Guidebook for MND Civil Petitions Process by reinforcing the existing Manual for MND Civil Petitions to promote people’s understanding of defense civil affairs. Furthermore, it introduced a service system to provide unit phone numbers and upgraded conditions for the MND Civil Petitions Office in order to improve overall satisfaction on civil petitions-related services.

(1) Provide Comprehensive Information Service on Military Telephone Numbers

Military units by nature are relatively difficult to access for the average civilian. In fact, unit telephone numbers were only available through the MND or Service HQs’ civil petitions offices. It was especially difficult and inconvenient to get numbers during after-hours, holidays, or during the nighttime. To accommodate such difficulties, the Ministry established a one-stop service system in May 2007 to provide guidance on unit telephone numbers. It allowed a caller to be informed of military unit phone numbers by calling a single 8-digit number (1577-9090) from anywhere across the country at any hour of the day. By knowing just the unit names, civilians can now receive numbers for Battalion or above units and even get connected directly through this service.

The service is earning wide reception from the people as over 20,000 uses were recorded just three months after its initiation.
The Ministry significantly upgraded internal and external conditions of its Civil Petitions Office in September 2007 in order to provide people with a more pleasant environment.

It increased convenience facilities for people including two counseling rooms made available by reshuffling office areas, restrooms for the handicapped, and large television sets. By improving the once rigid, dark atmosphere into a brighter, more comfortable one, it enabled people to comfortably and pleasantly receive civil petitions-related services.
Section 3. Improvement of Military Service and Administration Systems

MND is improving the military service system in order to upgrade the military’s combat capabilities and promote equality in fulfilling conscription duties. Major areas for improvement are: reducing the service period; introducing the extended service system; improving the Alternative Service System; and introducing the civilian service system. Furthermore, the Ministry is ensuring transparency and fairness in the conscription decision process; setting efficient management systems for conscription resources; running a conscriptee-based system; and expanding the internet-based civil petitions system in order to establish an advanced conscription infrastructure.

1. Improving Military Service System

A. Reducing Service Period for the Enlisted

MND is gradually reducing the service period to relieve citizens’ burdens and allow more people to fulfill their obligations by assigning service duties fairly.

Such policy was derived after a comprehensive review of mid and long-term prospects for conscription resources as well as military reforms, under the premise that current military capacities will be maintained. Service time will be gradually reduced by six months over the course of eight years and two months from January 2008 to February 2016. Methods to shorten conscription duties and its reduced period are shown in Figure 10-6.
The six month reduction in service period applies not only to active-duty mandatory servicemen in Army/Navy/Air Force, but also to full-time reservists, riot police, security personnel in correctional facilities, and conscripted firemen. Period reduced for various services are shown in Table 10-9.

### Table 10-9, Period reduced for various services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applied to:</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>After Reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army, Marine Corps, Auxiliary Police,</td>
<td>24 months</td>
<td>18 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security personnel in correctional facilities, full-time reservists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy, Coastal Police, Conscripted Firemen</td>
<td>26 months</td>
<td>20 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>27 months</td>
<td>21 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, service period for some public service personnel will be reduced by four months, from 26 to 22 months, to be treated fair with the active-duty personnel. The recipients of such reduction will be administrative government office staffs who perform security, monitoring, protection, service, or administrative duties at national agencies, local governments, public organizations, and community service facilities.

### B. Introducing Extended Service System

Reducing the service period promotes equality in fulfilling military service duties and relieves citizen’s burdens. There are still concerns, however, that
it can cause reduction in military capacities due to rapid turnover rate of service members and lack of expert servicemen. The Ministry, in order to prevent deterioration of military capacities and efficiently use national human resources, implemented the extended service system in January 2008.

The basic policy guiding the extended service system is the following, First, they are paid and managed the same as the enlisted during their conscription period, Second, they are promoted to staff sergeants and receive treatment due a noncommissioned officer (NCO) during their remainder time in consideration of their proficiency and expertise.

Extended service system is divided into combat and skills expert servicemen and advanced-equipment operating servicemen.

**Table 10-10. Extended Service System per Type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Selected by</th>
<th>Service Time</th>
<th>Service Area</th>
<th>Salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type I</td>
<td>Service Chiefs</td>
<td>6-18 months of additional service</td>
<td>Combat skills related posts (Squad leader, Radar, etc.)</td>
<td>KRW 1.2 million per month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type II</td>
<td>Chief of MMA</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>Posts related to advanced-equipment (Next tanks, KDX-III, etc.)</td>
<td>KRW 1.2 million per month * Subsidy payments not included</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* MMA: Ministry of Manpower Administration

Combat and skill expert servicemen (type I) are selected from experienced servicemen and serve as staff sergeants once they complete their conscriptions. Advanced-equipment operating servicemen (type II) are selected from civilian volunteers prior to their conscription fulfillments and serve for three years. They serve as servicemen during their conscription period and as staff sergeants for the remaining years.
The extended service system is an essential system to transform the military into an advanced, technology-intensive structure. It will be reinforced and improved through trial tests from 2008 to 2009 and will employ 40,000 servicemen by 2020.

C. Improving Alternative Service System

Although the alternative service system contributed to development of national industries and provided general services to the people, it incurred problems in terms of conscription fairness as well as efficiency in use of human resources. In recognition, the Ministry has been continually improving its alternative service system.

Among public interest duties, the Ministry gradually reduced simple administrative office work and expanded tasks in the social service areas. By implementing the non consecutive system, it allowed public service personnel to defer service to treat illness or support household affairs and return to serve his remaining years. It also allowed public service personnel to serve as a skilled industrial personnel if it was his desire to be employed in order to support his household.

The minimum service time required in transferring posts for technical research personnel serving in military-designated institutions such as national research institutes and university/corporate research centers has been reduced from two years to 18 months and their options for institutions have widened in order to promote efficiency in HR management.

Moreover, the policy of allowing the most appropriate personnel, i.e., skilled industrial personnel, to be leveraged in leading corporations has contributed to an improved national industrial competitiveness.
D. Implementing Civilian Service System

In order to reinforce problems in the alternative service system and respond to increasing demand for community service, MND established a plan in July 2007 to improve the military service system which includes the civilian service system.\textsuperscript{13} Its details are shown below.

First, promote equality in the system by modifying current conscription standards to impose civilian service to individuals who are exempted from active-duty but are capable of social activities with partial limitations.

Second, promote efficiency in use of human resources by modifying public service personnel’s areas of service and committing them to work in areas where the community needs help but is unable to supply sufficient manpower, such as providing assistance to the disabled or the elderly.

Third, reinforce civilian service personnel’s sense of responsibility and expertise by offering education on basic knowledge and duties. Basic knowledge education was conducted for 5,000 personnel in 2007. The Ministry provided such education services by establishing an education center for civilian service personnel in six major areas across the nation and developed re-education programs for servicemen regarded as not having totally fulfilled their duties. It also protects civilian service personnel’s rights and interests, while preventing incomplete task fulfillment by establishing 19 Service Management Centers nationally, organizing frequent visits by civilian service supervisors, and offering individual consultations.

Fourth, gradually reduce and abolish the secondment service system\textsuperscript{14} (i.e., auxiliary police, government issued fire fighter, etc.) and the alternative service system (i.e., skilled industrial personnel, etc.). MND will reduce the number of personnel in secondment service by 20 percent each year until 2011 and will abolish this system in 2012. However, the number of auxiliary police will remain at its 2009-level during 2010 to 2011 in order to maintain capacities for public order and will then be shut down in 2012. Among skilled industrial personnel, 4,500 will be assigned to active-duty services until 2011 while its reservist duty personnel will be reduced every year by 20 percent until it is shut down in 2012. Furthermore, it will minimize
accusations of special treatment by overhauling standards regarding assignment of fine arts and sports personnel.

2. Improving Administration of Conscription Affairs

MND is increasing its accuracy in grading physical examinations by securing high-tech equipment and a scientific precision system. It undertakes a transparent examination and decision-making process by expanding the participation of outside civilian staffs.

By expanding a system that embraces individual choice, the Ministry seeks to improve self-regulation in conscription duties and increase satisfaction in civil petitions-related services.

A. Improving Equality and Fairness in Assigning Military Duties

MND is improving the accuracy of physical examinations for conscription by increasing high-tech medical equipment and personnel. Blood cell tests are conducted on all examinees and AIDS tests are handled by all local Military Manpower Administration Offices. Rare, obstinate illnesses that cannot be examined by these offices are entrusted to specializing civilian hospitals. Moreover, transparency in the conscription process is promoted by increasing the participation of outside staff such as those from civil organizations in the examination process.

The Ministry is undergoing research to embody noblesse oblige\(^\text{15}\) in order to ratchet up higher-ranking class’ fulfillment of conscription duties. It plans to promote statutes to专门为specialize manage their fulfillment of duties based on results from research and public hearings.
B. Modifying Related Laws

MND has reinforced related statutes in order to encourage self-regulated duty fulfillment and proper military culture. It has amended the Military Service Act four times since March 2006. Through such efforts, it established foundations for the following: Introducing a system for public interest veterinarians to undertake livestock quarantine tasks (March 2006); abrogating the requirement for permission to travel overseas for those 24 or under yet to have fulfilled their conscription duties (September 2006); introducing doctors and clinical psychologists specializing in physical examinations in order to increase credibility of its grading decisions (October 2006); implementing the extended service system in order to attract and secure talented human resources (July 2007).

In December 2007, the Ministry amended the Enforcement Decree of the Military Service Act. By decreasing the number of individuals from the arts and sporting sectors recommended for public interest duties, the Ministry narrowed the ground for exemption from active or reservist duty services.

In October 2007, by modifying the Enforcement Rule of the Military Service Act it increased people’s convenience in civil petitions by exempting them from submitting technical certificate documents while allowing exchanges directly via an administrative network.

C. Improving Convenience for Service Members Doing Duties

MND assures self-regulation in conscription duties by implementing a system where an individual can choose their enlistment dates and report sites. It plans to stabilize the trend by increasing individual choice to reach over 60 percent, in order to cultivate a sense of autonomy in service fulfillment.
Starting 2006, the Ministry has been running a civil petitions online system. The system enabled all tasks to be filed online and referenced in real-time for its reception and handling. Final results can be notified via text messages or e-mails. It is also operating an integrated Voice of Customer’s System which provides customized service for clients by integrating, analyzing, and returning their demands on administrative issues.

With such accomplishments, the Ministry received international certificate for customer-satisfaction management system for the first time for a government agency and obtained ISO 10002 certificate in August 2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Those Enlisting</td>
<td>194,890</td>
<td>168,401</td>
<td>163,248</td>
<td>150,768</td>
<td>142,565</td>
<td>142,756</td>
<td>135,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Selected</td>
<td>49,268</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>70,411</td>
<td>69,800</td>
<td>81,076</td>
<td>83,273</td>
<td>83,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ISO 10002
A certification provided by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) after evaluations of administrative and public agencies on their systematic management system for client-satisfaction as well as the quality of services provided.
Section 4

Respect and Compensation for Veterans

The government seeks to systematize compensation for sacrificed veterans and grant privileges as a part of national responsibility. It changed the name of the West Sea Conflict in 2002 to the second Naval Battle of Yeonpyeong and elevated its occasion for remembrance to a national commemorative event in order to pay tribute to noble sacrifices made in the line of duty. Furthermore, it is exerting efforts to recover the remains of veterans and to reinforce compensation for accidents and illnesses sustained during service.

1. Recovering Korean War Killed in Action

Recovering Korean War Killed in Action (KIA) is a project to recover remains of 130,000 veterans from the Korean War and lay them to rest in the National Cemetery.

The initiative, which begun under Army leadership as part of the projects in celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Korean War, required a more systematic and organized effort due to the following reasons: limited data on

Joint enshrinement

Activation ceremony for MAKRI (January 10, 2007)
KIA; aging Korean War veterans; and land developments causing rapid changes in topography and damages to the remains.

Therefore the Ministry elevated the project to a MND-led effort and thus established the MND Agency for Killed in Action Recovery & ID (MAKRI) in January 2007 to fulfill the responsibility of worshiping the spirits of national defense.

A. Remains Recovery and Identification

MAKRI benchmarks the U.S. Joint Prisoners of War, Missing in Action Accounting Command (JPAC) and systematically handles the entire process from examination of remains, recovery efforts, to identification.

As a result, 534 remains were recovered in 2007, a 200 percent increase from prior to the group’s establishment and 837 remains in 2008, a considerable jump from the previous year. Moreover, DNA samples (blood) necessary for identification were gathered from war-bereaved families while success in identification and finding families improved significantly. Status on gathering required information is shown in Table 10-12.

Table 10-12. Status on Gathering Required Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>total</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008,9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blood sample</td>
<td>5,652</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>1,418</td>
<td>2,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verified ID</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verified bereaved families</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. Establishing Groundwork for Continuous Promotion of Projects

Recovery of remains is the nation’s eternal responsibility that must be sustained until everyone is brought back home. The Ministry established the Act on Recovery, etc. of the Korean War Killed in Action in March 2008 to establish a legal foundation to persistently pursue the recovery of remains.

The basic spirit of the law expounds that recovering the remains of veterans is a national responsibility. Its details are outlined below.

MND imposes on all citizens the responsibility to protect and manage remains, thereby encouraging their cooperation in examining the possible burial sites of remains and recovery efforts. There are regulations that penalize those who discover remains and fail to report such findings, those who damage such sites or remains, or those who deal with such properties under their own discretions.

In the meanwhile, those who report their discoveries of remains and relics or inform authorities on possible burial sites can receive a reward based on recovery results. Furthermore, local governments are told to cooperate in order to promote such efforts.

The Ministry published the consolidated booklet on the possible burial sites of the Korean War KIA - which identifies on a map where remains may be buried - and distributed this to Regiment or above units and local governments across the nation. Such efforts allowed for a more systematic finding of possible burial sites as well as recoveries, while preventing damages from local developments.

Moreover, the Ministry is putting forth efforts to establish an infrastructure to unilaterally perform the identification process and improve its verification rate. It hired civilian advisors and equipped the Scientific Investigation Laboratory, MND Criminal Investigation Command with facility and

The booklet on the possible burial sites of the Korean War KIA (published in November 2007)
equipment for DNA testing.

In December 2008, the Ministry established an Identification Lab to rid the MND of the old verification method that relied on the naked eye and Preservation House with capacity to preserve unidentified remains. In order to upgrade staff expertise, the Ministry is expanding domestic and international training opportunities while operating advisory groups in each field.

C. Future Tasks

The Ministry’s efforts notwithstanding, successful recovery rate remains low at 1.5 percent of total remains, and the Ministry established the Action Plan to Activate Recovery of the Korean War KIA in July 2008 in order to improve the overall rate. Details for the plan, to be implemented starting 2009, are shown below.

First, the Ministry dispatches regional probes on possible burial sites of Korean War KIA by the Divisions and completes primary level examinations on scattered battle sites within three years.

Second, the Ministry improves success in recovery by departing from a MAKRI-centered recovery and supplementing overall efforts by organizing provisional recovery teams by corps-level echelons to run its own projects.

Third, in order to improve verification rate, gathering blood samples from bereaved families, a service previously only provided by military hospitals, will be offered by public health centers across the nation as well. Fourth, by forming a separate cooperative committee focusing on organic coordination and support between Ministries, the recovery project will be promoted as a government-wide initiative.

In the meantime, as the two Koreas agreed at the Defense Ministerial Talks in November 2007 to cooperate in recovery of remains, the government plans to focus on recovering remains buried in North Korea as well as the DMZ.
2. Increasing Compensation for Accidents and Illness during the Service

Compensation for service members sacrificed in the line of duty is comparable to around 60 percent of the compensation level for accidents involving civilians. This is an extremely low figure considering service member’s contributions to the nation. In particular, compensation for those sacrificed during military service is only 36.56 million KRW, calling for proper national-level compensation.

Therefore the Ministry is seeking to increase the standard remuneration to grant proper compensation for service members sacrificed in the line of duty.

Moreover, by increasing overall medical support including treatment of illness sustained during service, the Ministry is improving service member’s overall health as well as their confidence for the military.

If a service member requires continuous treatment after retirement because of an illness or a disability sustained during service, he/she can defer retirement for six months and receive medical treatment from a military facility. If a military facility is incapable of such treatments, then the Ministry allows entrusted treatment from civilian hospitals. Furthermore, the number of veterans eligible for military medical treatment increased as the required twenty years of service was reduced to ten,
Section 5.

Defense Policies Reaching out to the People

In order to encourage people’s proper understanding of major defense policies and reach consensus, MND is publicizing more information and stepping up its PR activities. Moreover, it embodies the concept of defending with the people by expanding civil expert participation and collecting opinions from all spectrums during the policymaking process.

1. Efforts to Satisfy People’s Right to Know

A. Expand Disclosure of Information

Popular demand for open information is increasing as the people’s sense of rights as well as desires to exercise their rights to know is growing.

Figure 10–7. Status of Information Disclosure per Year
Ministry is disclosing more information in order to satisfy citizen’s rights to know and build proper understanding as well as consensus on defense policies.

(1) Invigorate System for Disclosure of Information

Keeping abreast with the government’s information disclosure system, in July 2006 the Ministry amended MND Guidelines on Disclosure of Administration Information established in 2003 and widened the extent of disclosure for administrative information. Also, by increasing the number of outside members in Information Disclosure Council from one to two, it strengthened the council’s function of pre-deliberation. It also imposed ROK JCS, Service HQs, and chiefs of direct and subsidiary agencies the responsibility to disclose spending of operating costs. This had been previously imposed only on MND agency chiefs.

Starting 2004, the Ministry inspects and assesses the status of information disclosure activities by agencies of different levels. It sends out examples of exemplary agencies across the military and offers a variety of incentives such as meritorious service citations.

(2) Disclosing Original Texts of Signed Documents

Although in the past the Ministry had to list information on its website by hand, the listing can now be done automatically. It also expanded its extent of disclosures by allowing original texts of non-confidential signed documents to be listed online.

While the majority of other Ministries merely offer information lists on their websites, the MND operates a system that even discloses original texts of signed documents. In 2007, the Ministry disclosed 36,195 information lists and 4,896 signed papers of original texts.

The Ministry strives to achieve administrative transparency that can be felt by citizens by actively guaranteeing their right to know, except for confidential information related to national security.
B. Invigorating Defense PR

MND not only relies on existing media but actively promotes a two-way marketing via new media such as internet portal sites and blogs in order to spread news on defense policies more effectively. It is also improving a planned marketing system to revitalize policy marketing while identifying PR subjects during the weekly Defense PR Meetings.

(1) Invigorating Defense PR

The Ministry relays national topics of interest through regular daily briefings and timely briefings given to the press gallery. Moreover, the military’s marketing medium such as the Defense Daily, Korea Forces Network Television (KFN-TV), and the Defense Journal are also utilized to convey defense policies to the people in real-time.

KFN-TV, a military broadcasting station, has established itself as an efficient medium to directly convey news from the military through satellite broadcasting and local cable networks.

The Ministry is steadily improving its online marketing in step with the Information Era. It is continuously upgrading the MND website to improve
people’s understanding and accessibility while using its blog—On the Same
Boat (http://mnd9090.tistory.com)—as a main channel of communication
with the Netizens (network-using citizens). Furthermore, starting in 2003, it
began a Policy Customer Service\textsuperscript{18} which sends policy-related data to the
direct parties or those interested via e-mail.

In addition to online efforts, the Ministry is reinforcing its PR activities off-
line as well. It offers activities such as policy presentations and security site
tours to those from different social circles who can lead public opinion. It
sponsors defense training activities for teenagers, military experiencing
events, production of movies and TV films, and local cultural events and
simplifies procedures to enter security sites during tours.

(2) Reinforcing Capacities for a Planning PR System

The Ministry strives to build understanding as well as consensus on
defense policies and secure nation-wide support.

In such spirit, the Ministry establishes PR plans as it shapes major policies,
with assistance from marketing specialists. It seeks to improve marketing
capacities of all its staff by periodically offering situation-specific PR
education. Moreover, the Ministry identifies subjects for strategic marketing
for the MND, ROK JCS, and each Service and discusses various agendas
during the weekly Defense PR Meetings.

2. Expanding Civil Expert Participation in Defense
Policymaking

A. Management of Defense Policy Advisory Committee

Since 1983 the Ministry has been operating the Defense Policy Advisory
Committee consisting of experts from various social sectors with abundant
knowledge and experience.

The Committee aims to increase understanding and consensus as well as
transparency and objectivity in defense-related affairs by collecting advisory

\textsuperscript{18} Policy Customer Service
A set of activities to earn support and understanding for defense policies through
a two-way communication with policy clients such as mail advertising and opinion
gathering.
opinions during the planning and implementing stages of defense policy making.

The Defense Policy Advisory Committee consists of eleven subcommittees specializing in different policy fields. One office-level plenary session is held every year and more than one subcommittee meetings are organized every quarter.

In addition to official meetings, expert opinions are collected at any time via visits, letters, phone calls, and e-mails if an urgent problem occurs.

The Ministry receives in-depth consultation on major defense policies including the North Korean nuclear issue, Defense Reform, and strengthening of the ROK-U.S. Alliance. Organization of advisors for subcommittees in 2008 is shown in Table 10-13.

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<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Policy Planning</td>
<td>Inf’l Policy</td>
<td>EDU Policy</td>
<td>Budget Planning</td>
<td>Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will continue to improve the Defense Policy Advisory Committee by organizing experts from academia, research, press, and legal sectors according to their specialties, and enable a diverse and well-balanced gathering of opinions.

**B. Managing the MND Self-Evaluation Committee**

MND evaluates major areas of defense affairs based on Framework Act on Evaluation of the Government Policies. It maintains reliability and objectivity
of its evaluations and uses the results in a practical manner by organizing the MND Self-Evaluation Committee that consists of expert university professors and civilian researchers.

The MND Self-Evaluation Committee consists of three subcommittees that focus on major policies, financial projects, and agency capacities. Each subcommittee reviews policy implementation and self-evaluation plans, and performs progress evaluation and comprehensive assessment every two quarters. It also consistently reviews policy progress to convey the results to related departments. Organization and status of the MND Self-Evaluation Committee is shown in Table 10-14.

Table 10-14. Status of the MND Self-Evaluation Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcommittee</th>
<th>Major Policies</th>
<th>Financing Projects</th>
<th>Agency Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Unit: Person)
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2. Timeline of Services’ Introduction of Weapon Systems

Military Capabilities and Expenditures of Major Countries
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Founding of the Armed Forces

1945-1950

As division between South-North was increasingly being imbedded following independence from Japan, the Republic of Korea established its official government in 1948 and renamed Department of Internal Security—the legacy of the U.S. military oversight era ('45-'48)—to the Ministry of National Defense. In 1948, the ROK reorganized Korean Constabulary and Korean Coast Guard into ROK Army and Navy. Marine Corps and Air Force was established in 1949, completing so-called "National Armed Forces' Three Branch of Service System."

Founding of the Armed Forces

**1945-1950**

- **Aug. 15, 1945**: Independence of Korea from Japan
- **Nov. 13, 1945**: Establishment of Office of the Director of National Defense
- **Jan. 15, 1946**: Establishment of 1st Regiment of Korean Constabulary
- **Jun. 15, 1946**: Establishment of Korean Coast Guard
- **Aug. 15, 1948**: Establishment of the official ROK government and the Ministry of National Defense
- **Sep. 5, 1948**: Renamed into the ROK Army and the ROK Navy
- **Nov. 30, 1948**: Proclamation of the Act on the Organization of National Armed Forces
- **Apr. 15, 1949**: Establishment of the ROK Marine Corps
- **Oct. 1, 1949**: Establishment of the ROK Air Force
- **Dec. 6, 1949**: First-ever physical examination for conscription is conducted

Defense Organization Immediately after the Establishment of the ROK Government (November 30, 1948)

- President
- Supreme National Defense Committee
- Defense Resources Management Committee
- Central Intelligence Agency
- Military Upper House
- Minister of National Defense
  - Vice Minister of National Defense
  - Chief of Staff
  - Vice Chief of Staff
- Army Headquarters
  - Chief of Staff
- Navy Headquarters
  - Chief of Staff

**Ministry of National Defense**

- **Ministry of National Defense, August 15, 1948**
- **Department of Internal Security, June 15, 1946**
- **Department of National Defense, March 29, 1946**
- **Office of the Director of National Defense, November 13, 1945**

Names of the Ministry of National Defense

- Office of the Director of National Defense was renamed to Department of National Defense on March 29, 1946. When a Russian representative protested against the term "national defense" during U.S.-Russia Joint Commission in May, the U.S. military acceded by renaming it to Department of Internal Security. But it was renamed to Ministry of National Defense during the state-building period, in 1948.
The Korean War, caused by North Korea’s invasion of the South, did not only result in massive human casualties and property damages, but also underscored the importance of having a national military to defend the nation. The government signed the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty on October 1, 1953, and laid the groundwork for a combined defense system to recover from war damages and to prepare for further invasion from the North.

Countries that Participated in the Korean War under the United Nations

Nations that dispatched combat units (16 nations)
U.S., UK, Canada, Turkey, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, the Netherlands, Colombia, Greece, New Zealand, Ethiopia, Belgium, France, South Africa, Luxembourg

Nations that dispatched Medical support and Facilities (5 nations)
Denmark, India, Norway, Sweden, Italy

North Korean Force’s Preemptive Strike
Three years of Korean War began when a North Korean artillery unit fired from across the 38th Parallel at 0400 on June 25, 1950.

Pedestrian Overpass in Han River Collapsed
As the National Armed Force purposely destroyed the footbridge in order to block North Koreans from advancing south, evacuees were forced to use the pontoon bridge nearby.

Establishment of Women’s Army Training Center (September 6, 1950)
General MacArthur Commanding an Amphibious Operation
Korean National Flag Hoisted to Signify Recovery of Seoul (September 27, 1950)

Signing the Armistice Agreement (July 27, 1953)
Recovering Han River Bridge in Seoul

 Signing of the ROK–U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty (October 1, 1953)
ROK Foreign Minister Byun Yeong-tae and Secretary Alex of the U.S. State Department initial the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty at the Blue House as President Syngman Rhee and Cabinet members watch on.

Jun. 25, 1950
North Korean Forces illegally cross the 38th Parallel (Outbreak of the Korean War)

Sep. 6, 1950
Establishment of Women’s Army Training Center

Jul. 27, 1953
Signing of the Armistice Agreement

Dec. 15, 1953
Establishment of First ROK Army Command (PROKA)

Feb. 17, 1954
Establishment of the Joint Staff Council (JSC) in MND HQ

Oct. 1, 1953
Signing of the ROK–U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty

Jun. 1950-
May 1961
**Building the Defense System**

The ROK achieved political/economic/social changes via modernization in accordance with its Five-year Economic Development Plan of the 1960s. Furthermore, it stabilized the national defense structure by enhancing defense-related systems—through modernizing equipment, amending the Military Service Act, and improving the training and education system—introducing a ROTC system that fosters junior-level commanding officers, and establishing the Homeland Reserve Force.

### Dispatch of Troops to Vietnam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>First foreign dispatch of ROK Military (120 troops from the 1st Mobile Army Surgical Hospital and ten Taekwondo Instructors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>Establishment of ROK Military Support Group in Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>Dispatch of combat units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>Reinforcement of the 9th Division and Capital Division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ROK’s decision to dispatch troops to Vietnam was made on May 21, 1964, to block communist aggression against peace in Asia as well as Vietnam and to reciprocate allied support during the Korean War.

### Modernizing ROK Military Equipment

- **Introducing NIKE long-range surface-to-air missile (1966)**
- **Introducing M48A2C Tank (1971)**
- **Receiving DD-911 Chungmu, signaling the beginning of ROK Navy’s ‘Destroyer Era’ (May 16, 1963)**
- **Introducing the F-5A (April 30, 1965)**

The ROK’s development in modernization included various arms and equipment systems, enhancing its military capabilities and response to potential threats.
## Building the Self-reliant Defense

The ROK systematized its first self-reliant force improvement project with the First Phase of the Force Improvement Plan (Yulgok Project) on February 25, 1974 which modernized equipment and cultivated defense industries in order to improve military capacities and establish a foundation for a self-reliant defense. Furthermore, by activating ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) on November 7, 1978, the ROK established a robust combined defense system to deter war and assure security in the Korean Peninsula.

### The First Phase of the Force Improvement Plan (1974–1981)

#### Army
- Transformation from a manpower-based military to a mobility-based, Division-level force.
- Developing individual firearms, Korean-model tanks, and new, improved artillery.

#### Navy
- Strengthening maritime surveillance system in major coastal areas and anti-submarine attack capabilities.
- Developing and producing Korean-model frigate and patrol gunboat missile.
- Extension/establishment of ROK MC Divisions and Brigades.

#### Air Force
- Establishing Fighter Wings and introducing high-tech weapons system and equipment.
- Introduction of O–2A, A–37, and F–4E.

### Modernization of the ROK Military and Yulgok Project

- **F–4E introduced (1977)**
  - F–4E is a multi-purpose fighter-bomber with capacities to outperform communist fighters by going airborne for over three hours, boasting supreme mobility, equipped with air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons, etc. It was ROKAF’s main aircraft for interception and close air support ICASS operations until F–16s were introduced.

- **M–16 Rifles produced (1974)**
  - As domestic production of M–16 rifles was made possible during earlier phase of Force Improvement Plan (Yulgok Project) in 1974, existing M–16s and carbines were able to be replaced.

- **Domesticated M–48 series tanks produced (1978)**
  - The ROK military accumulated technical capacities to produce tanks by improving/producing M–48 series tanks purchased from the U.S.

- **500MD Helicopters produced (1976)**

- **First Commissioning of Korean-model Frigate (1980)**
  - By building and commissioning 1500 ton Korean-model Frigate for the first time ever with domestic technical staff, the ROK Navy established a foundation for improvement in Naval capacity.

### Key Dates

- **Dec. 29, 1972** Establishment Defense Objectives
- **Mar. 23, 1973** Withdrawal of ROK Forces in Vietnam completed
- **Jul. 1, 1973** Establishment of the Third ROK Army (TROKA)
- **Oct. 10, 1973** ROK MC integrated to ROK Navy
- **Feb. 25, 1974** The First Phase of the Force Improvement Plan (Yulgok Project) implemented
- **Jun. 7, 1976** The first ‘Team Spirit’ exercise conducted
- **Nov. 7, 1978** Establishment of the ROK-U.S. CFC
- **Mar. 14, 1979** ROK-U.S. 1st Corps reorganized into Combined Field Army (CFA)

### Establishments

- **Establishment of the Third ROK Army (Jun. 1, 1973)**
  - As U.S. 7th Division withdrew in early 1971, the Third ROK Army (TROKA) was established to lift the burden off TROKA in charge of 155 miles of front-line.

- **Establishment of ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (November 7, 1978)**
  - As U.S. President Jimmy Carter declared withdrawal of U.S. Ground Forces in Korea on March 9, 1977, ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command was established in accordance with the decisions from the Tenth Round of the ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul May, 1977 in order to reiterate U.S. commitment of defense of the ROK and as a supplementary measure to the withdrawal.
**Strengthening the Self-reliant Defense (1981-1990)**

Entering the 1980s, the ROK re-organized its military command and administration system, developed defense industries, and performed the Second Phase of the Force Improvement Plan (Yulgok Project). Moreover, with "defense planning and management system," the military was reorganized into a Korean model joint military structure and provided extensive support for successful 1986 Asian Games and the 24th Olympic Games in Seoul.

### Force Improvement Projects

- **Production of K-1 Tanks (a.k.a. 88 Tank)**
  - K-1 Tanks were indigenously designed and developed to dominate North Korea’s newest T-72 and T-92 Tanks, and to fit Korea’s market. As well as Korea’s defense industry's effort to establish self-reliant defense and to modernize its equipment, its first product was introduced in 1986.

- **Production of 155mm Self-propelled Howitzer (K-55)**
  - It was jointly developed by the ROK-U.S. for mobile fire support, and was fielded in 1985.

- **Production of indigenous fighter Cheongk (KF-5E/F)**

- **Introducing the first domesticated patrol combat corvette (PCC)**
  - (November 18, 1982)

- **Developing and fielding domesticated frigates (FF)**
  - The ROK boasted its combat ship-building skills to the world and laid the groundwork for future ship exports by producing indigenous frigates with domestic technologies in 1989 and by fielding them in 1991.

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**The Second Phase of the Force Improvement Plan (1982-1986)**

**Army**
- Reinforcing Division capabilities and reinforcing armored and artillery capacity,
  - Mass production of K-1 tanks, K-200 armored vehicle, and 155mm self-propelled howitzer,
- Securing anti-submarine forces and enhancing surface/air three-dimensional capacities,

**Navy**
- Reinforcing Korean-model frigates,
- Developing and producing patrol combat corvette,
- Introducing landing vehicle tracked (LVT7A1)

**Air Force**
- Strengthening transport and air operational capabilities,
  - Purchasing C-130 cargo aircraft and F-16 fighters,
  - Production of indigenous fighter Cheongk (KF-5E/F),

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### The establishment of ROK JCS

Plate-hanging Ceremony for the ROK JCS (October 1, 1990)

The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff was established on October 1, 1990, to maximize integrated capabilities of the Services. Military command structure including command of operations was integrated into the ROK JCS, enhancing Army/Navy/AF Forces' joint operational capabilities as well as allocation of capacities and resources, thus establishing a basis for a truly self-reliant defense posture.

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The Asian Games in 1986 (September 20, 1986)
Skydiving performance during the Opening Ceremony.

The 24th Olympic Games in Seoul (September 17, 1988)
Gosuam, a traditional cultural game, is performed by military servicemen.
Enhancing the Defense Posture

In the 1990s the ROK military cultivated a self-reliant, futuristic elite military force, strengthened ROK-U.S. combined capacities, and assumed peacetime OPCON. Currently, the ROK military is heightening its potency as well as national prestige within the international community by actively participating in PKO efforts.

Enhancing the Defense Posture
1991- Present

International Peacekeeping Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 17, 1991</td>
<td>Depaching ROK Navy HQ, military medical support group to Gulf War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 17, 1993</td>
<td>ROK military moved to Gyeryongsan area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1, 1994</td>
<td>Peacetime OPCON transitioned back to the ROK military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 25, 2000</td>
<td>First round of South-North Korea defense ministerial talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 18, 2002</td>
<td>Establishment of Zaylyun Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 23, 2004</td>
<td>Signing of Yongsan base relocation agreement and implementation agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 26, 2004</td>
<td>National Assembly passes defense reform act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 24, 2007</td>
<td>War time OPCON transition confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 30, 2008</td>
<td>Transfer of ten USFK missions completed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Status of the ROK Military

Force Improvement

K-9 Self-propelled Howitzer
K-9 Howitzer’s firing range was extended by 40km compared to existing 155mm models, and the firing rate as well as mobility was significantly enhanced.

Commissioning of ROKS Son Won-II (September 6, 2006)
Commissioning of ROK Navy’s newest submarine, Son Won-II. ROKS Son Won-II boasts upgraded sub-water operational capabilities and is significant as it indigenously produced domesticated technologies.

First domesticated KF-16 (June 30, 1997)
The nation’s aviation industry moved into a new epoch when 32% out of 30% parts were made by roughly 100 domestic companies.

Next Tank (Black Leopard)
Black Panther is a Korean-model, next-generation tank that reflects the changes in future warfare. Its prototype was introduced in March 2007 and it will be fielded in 2011 following a series of test evaluations.

ROKS Sejong the Great
ROKS Sejong the Great is a cutting-edge warship equipped with AESA system. It was fielded following its commissioning on December 22, 2008.

F-15K
F-15K is a high-tech aircraft capable of performing missions throughout the peninsula. It was phased-in from December 2005 to September 2008 and was leveraged for patrol missions and etc since July 10, 2008.

In the 1990s the ROK military cultivated a self-reliant, futuristic elite military force, strengthened ROK-U.S. combined capacities, and assumed peacetime OPCON. Currently, the ROK military is heightening its potency as well as national prestige within the international community by actively participating in PKO efforts.
Special Annex 2

Timeline of Services’ Introduction of Weapon Systems
### Timeline of Services’ Introduction of Weapon Systems

(The dates indicated in the table are the years when the systems were first fielded. A system was fielded in phases over several years, then the year when its first system was introduced is used.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tank</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Armored vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>Field artillery/MLRS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air defense/Guided weapons (Fixed/Stationary)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helicopter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat vessel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mine operations vessel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amphibious</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support vessel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submarine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft/ Helicopter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air mobility aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2/ISR aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training aircraft</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\[1\] XX-2 Black Leopard is currently being tested and will be fielded in 2011.

\[2\] Infantry Fighting Vehicle IX-21 is currently being tested and will be fielded in 2009.

\[3\] Due to limitations in available photographs, photos of equivalent models are shown (Gun Sangdong → PF-65 Nakdonggang, Suseong → PCS-203 Mokseong, Noryang → PCE-50 Geojin, Busan → AKL-905 Jinm Anglo, Inwang → ATA-31 Yongmun).
Appendix 1. Military Capabilities of Neighboring Countries

**Total**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Troops</td>
<td>1,498,157</td>
<td>1,027,000</td>
<td>2,205,000</td>
<td>240,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>593,327</td>
<td>360,000</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>148,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>341,588</td>
<td>142,000</td>
<td>255,000</td>
<td>44,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>336,081</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>45,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>186,661</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Guards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift 35,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic 80,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command/Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 2nd Artillery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff 2,111</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Army**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>593,327</td>
<td>360,000</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>148,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>10 (BCT* 49)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light tanks</td>
<td>7,620</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>7,660</td>
<td>910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicles</td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance tanks</td>
<td>6,719</td>
<td>15,140</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored vehicles</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towed artillery</td>
<td>19,931</td>
<td>9,900</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-propelled artillery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLRS</td>
<td>2,087</td>
<td>6,010</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>3,976</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,066</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,550</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti–tank guided weapons</td>
<td>SP* 2,005</td>
<td>526**</td>
<td>SP 24</td>
<td>SP 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portable</td>
<td>19,950</td>
<td></td>
<td>Portable 7,176</td>
<td>Portable 2,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface–to–air Missiles</td>
<td>1,281</td>
<td>2,465</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>4,093</td>
<td>1,278</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* BCT: Brigade combat team, SP: Self-propelled
** Numbers are obtained from 'The Military Balance 2008' without differentiating between SP and Portables,
### Navy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>341,588</td>
<td>142,000</td>
<td>255,000</td>
<td>44,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines (strategic)</td>
<td>71(14)</td>
<td>67(15)</td>
<td>62(3)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft carriers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corvettes</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweepers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious ships</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious craft</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support vessels</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation vessels</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve transportation</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Air Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>336,081</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>45,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic bombers</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance aircraft</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command aircraft</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters (including bombers)</td>
<td>2,624</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>1,730</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo aircraft</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tankers</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWACS</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training aircraft</td>
<td>1,572</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian reserve aircraft</td>
<td>1,122</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Appendix 2. Defense Budget of Major Countries

(Translated into English and Chinese)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>GDP (U.S. $ billions)</th>
<th>Defense Budget (U.S. $ billions)</th>
<th>Defense Budget Ratio to GDP (%)</th>
<th>Defense Budget per Capita (U.S.$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>13,400</td>
<td>535.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>4,570</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>9,380</td>
<td>121.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,710</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2,410</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2,910</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>1,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1,407</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


※ GDP is rounded off to the nearest 1 billion, and is estimated based on defense expenditure and defense budget ratio to GDP from the Military Balance 2008
### Appendix 3. Comparison of Military Capabilities between ROK and DPRK

(As of December 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>DPRK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Troops (Peace time)</td>
<td>More than 655,000</td>
<td>More than 1,190,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>522,000</td>
<td>1,020,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>68,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps Units</td>
<td>10 (including Special Warfare Command)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maneuver Brigades</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>69 (10 Reserve Military Training Unit not included)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>3,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored vehicles</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>2,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field artillery</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>8,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLRS</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>5,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-surface guided weapons</td>
<td>30 (launchers)</td>
<td>100 (launchers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat vessels</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing vessels</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine warfare ships</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support vessels</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2–ISR aircraft</td>
<td>50 (including naval aircraft)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air mobility aircraft</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>330 (including AN–2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training aircraft</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>680 (including all helicopters of the 3 services)</td>
<td>7,700,000 (including Reserve Military Training Unit, Worker/Peasant Red Guards and Red Youth Guards)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Naval troops of the ROK include 27,000 troops of the Marine Corps, Ground forces units (division, brigade), and equipment include those of Marine Corps, Field artillery of the North does not include infantry regiment’s 76.2mm guns, Owing to limitation as for the expression of qualitative assessment, the above table indicates only quantitative comparison for public discretion.
Appendix 4. Comparison of Economic Indices between ROK and DPRK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>DPRK</th>
<th>Comparison of ROK and DPRK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNI ($ billions)</td>
<td>887.3</td>
<td>971.3</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI per capita ($)</td>
<td>18,372</td>
<td>20,045</td>
<td>1,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth rate (%) by GNI</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>–1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total trade volume ($ billions)</td>
<td>634.85</td>
<td>728.33</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population (millions)</td>
<td>48,30</td>
<td>48,46</td>
<td>23.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

※ GNI (Gross National Income): International organizations such as the UN, IMF, etc., and major advanced nations are using GNI instead of GNP. (GNI = GNP)

Appendix 5. Chronology of Major Events Related to the North Korean Nuclear Issue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Major Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Jan, 29, 2005 | • A spokesman for DOS, Rich Boucher’s Briefing:  
  – We expressed clearly our position that we were ready to resume the six-party talks early without any preconditions, |
| Feb, 10    | • The North Korean Foreign Ministry announced that it had suspended participation in the six-party talks indefinitely and made a declaration that it possessed nuclear weapons, |
| Feb, 21    | • The Chairman of the National Defense Committee, Kim Jong Il mentioned the following at the time of receiving Chinese DG of Foreign Liaison Office, Wang Jiarui  
  – To maintain denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and stress a peaceful solution through dialogue  
  – To make no opposition to the six-party talks and give his word to make efforts for the success of the talks |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Major Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Mar, 23, 2005 | • Chinese President Hu Jintao proposed three principles on North Korea’s nuclear issue in an interview with Prime Minister Pak Pong-ju during his visit to China,  
  - Three principles:  
    (1) to maintain denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,  
    (2) to resolve North Korea’s matters of concern,  
    (3) to maintain peace and stability in accordance with common interests |
| Mar, 30 | • Former Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Gallucci mentioned that the transfer of nuclear materials could prompt a U.S. for military attack against North Korea,  
  - In the case that North Korea transfers nuclear materials to other actors, it would be time for the U.S. to review a military attack against North Korea |
| May 11 | • The spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry claimed it had completed the work to withdraw spent fuel rods, |
| Jun, 11 | • The ROK-U.S. summit agreed to move ahead with promoting U.S.-North Korea relations in case North Korea gave up its nuclear program, |
| Jun, 17 | • When the Chairman of National Defense Committee, Kim Jong II met special envoy of the South, Chung Dong-young, he suggested the “return to the six-party talks upon normalizing relations with the U.S.” |
| Jul, 12 | • Minister of Unification, Chung Dong-young, announced a “gave proposal to North Korea”  
  - “If North Korea agrees to the dismantlement of its nuclear program, the ROK will provide two million kw of electricity.” |
| Jul, 26 | • Opening of the fourth round of the six-party talks |
| Sep, 15 | • U.S. Department of Treasury froze the North Korean accounts in the BDA, |
| Sep, 13–19 | • Opening of the second session of the fourth round of the six-party talks, Adoption of the Joint Statement |
| Oct, 24 | • The spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry announced the participation in the six-party talks in early November, |
| Nov, 9–11 | • Commencement of the first session of the fifth round of the six-party talks |
| Dec, 3 | • The spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry urged to hold a bilateral meeting to lift financial sanctions, |
| Jan, 18, 2006 | • Kim Gye-gwan and Hill met,  
  - Agreed to the need for early resumption of the six-party talks but maintained their initial positions |
| Mar, 7 | • U.S.-North Korea met in New York  
  - Reaffirmed that North Korea would not participate in the six-party talks unless the currently frozen BDA funds were paid, |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Major Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Apr, 27–28, 2006 | • Tang Jiaxuan’s visit to North Korea  
  – The Chairman of the National Defense Committee, Kim Jong Il conveyed his intention to deny a return to six-party talks in advance, |
| Jun, 19   | • The U.S. Secretary of State, Rice, gave North Korea a warning against its preparation for launching missiles:  
  – North Korea’s launching of missiles was to withdraw an obligation of moratorium, a part of the Sep. 19 Joint Statement, and we would regard it as an evident provocative action, |
| Jul, 5    | • North Korea test-fired seven missiles in total including a Taepodong, |
| Jul, 15   | • UNSC Resolution 1695 was unanimously adopted, |
| Jul, 25   | • The U.S. Senate unanimously passed the North Korea Nonproliferation Act, |
| Sep, 13   | • The U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Relations Committee unanimously passed the North Korea Nonproliferation Act, |
| Sep, 15   | • The ROK-U.S. summit agreed to make a united effort to prepare for a comprehensive way of approach, |
| Oct, 3    | • The North Korean Foreign Ministry announced a “plan for a nuclear test,” |
| Oct, 5    | • Chinese Ambassador to the UN, Wang Guangya, made a public warning of serious consequences upon carrying out of nuclear test North Korea by,  
  – If North Korea presses ahead with a nuclear test, it will face serious consequences, |
| Oct, 6    | • UNSC announced Chairman’s Statement that urged North Korea to abandon its nuclear test, |
| Oct, 9    | • The North Korean Central News announced that a nuclear test succeeded, |
| Oct, 11   | • The statement of a spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry implied an additional nuclear test, |
| Oct, 15   | • Adoption of the UNSC Resolution 1718  
  – To prohibit the transfer of materials and technologies relevant to the WMDs such as nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, etc;  
  – To prohibit the export of luxuries  
  – To intercept the transfer of nuclear/WMD–related funds  
  – To prohibit the entry of WMD transfer–related figures  
  – Cargo inspection to prevent nuclear/WMD transfer |
| Oct, 18–19 | • Tang Jiaxuan’s visit to North Korea, and his remarks as to the additional nuclear test is reported,  
  – The Chairman of National Defense Commission, Kim Jong Il, “we have no additional nuclear tests planned but cannot keep still if the U.S. pressures us,” |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Major Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct, 31, 2006</td>
<td>The Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that the resumption of six-party talks was agreed at an informal trilateral meeting among China, U.S., and North Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov, 1</td>
<td>The spokesman for North Korean Foreign Ministry expressed that it had decided to return to six-party talks on the premise of discussing &amp; resolving the issue of financial sanctions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov, 28–29</td>
<td>U.S.–North Korea’s head of delegations for the six-party talks met in Beijing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- U.S. proposed “initial actions for the implementation” to North Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 18–22</td>
<td>The second session of the fifth round of the six-party talks was held in Beijing’s Diaoyutai State Guesthouse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- North Korea remained hard-lined, insisting that nuclear disarmament talks was inevitable (Dec, 18).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Discussions on specific initial actions were not conducted as North Korea insisted on resolving BDA issues first.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan, 16–18,</td>
<td>U.S.–North Korea met in Berlin,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>- Hill and Kim Gye-gwan met at the Embassies,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Discussed working-level agreements on the BDA issue and resumption of six-party talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb, 8–13</td>
<td>The third session of the fifth round of the six-party talks (Beijing’s Diaoyutai State Guesthouse),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Results from U.S.–North Korea talks in Berlin were elaborated upon,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Discussed initial actions for the implementation and the potential agreements for organizing five working groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb, 13</td>
<td>Initial actions for the implementation Sep, 19th joint statement (abbreviated as the Feb, 13th Agreement) was derived.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To implement the initial actions within 60 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To form a working group to undertake the initial actions regarding the joint statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To resume the sixth round of the six-party talks as well as six-party ministerial-level meetings in order to discuss plans for next phase actions for the implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar, 5–6</td>
<td>The first working group meetings for normalization on U.S.– North Korea relations (New York)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- North Korea indicated that nuclear facilities would be shutdown and sealed after BDA issues were resolved, five tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) were supplied, and IAEA Chief’s visit was completed (March 13–14),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Nuclear weapons issue is an item to discuss during the final stage as U.S.–North Korea relations remained hostile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar, 6–7</td>
<td>The first working group meetings for normalization on Japan– North Korea relations (Hanoi, Vietnam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Japan insisted on resolving abduction issues, while North Korea responded by urging Japan to apologize for their colonial rule.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Major Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Mar, 15, 2007 | • The first working group meetings on economy and energy cooperation (ROK Embassy in China)  
– Reiterated U.S.–Korean intentions for early energy assistance, Heard reports on status of North Korean energy, |
| Mar, 16    | • The first working group meetings on Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism (Russian Embassy in China),  
– The nations offered statements to enhance mutual trust in the region, |
| Mar, 17–18 | • The first working group meetings on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (Beijing’s Diaoyutai State Guesthouse)  
– Discussed initial actions, next phase actions for the implementation and IAEA activities, |
| Mar, 19–22 | • The first session of the sixth round of the six–party talks (Beijing’s Diaoyutai State Guesthouse),  
– Adjourned without substantial discussion due to contentions on transfer of BDA–frozen funds, |
| Mar, 14–Jun, 13 | • Resolution of the BDA issue,  
– North Korea requested integration of 40 BDA accounts ($23 Million) then transfer to the Russian commercial bank,  
– North Korea made official references to BDA issue being solved, |
| Jun, 26–30, | • IAEA working group representatives visited North Korea (Four including the Director–General),  
– Discussed ways to monitor and verify shutdown and sealing of five nuclear–related facilities, |
| Jul, 12–Aug, 2 | • Provision of HFO in connection to initial actions for implementation, ROK supplied 50,000 tons, |
| Jul, 14–Aug, 11 | • IAEA’s Monitor and Verification Team visits North Korea (ten people) to monitor shutdown & sealing of nuclear facilities and set up surveillance cameras, |
| Jul, 18–20 | • The head of delegation meeting of the six–party talks (Beijing),  
– North Korea’s intentions and positions on declaration and disablement were ascertained,  
– Discussed holding five working group meetings before the end of August, next six–party talks, and foreign ministerial talks, |
| Aug, 7–8 | • The second working group meetings on economy and energy cooperation (Panmunjeom)  
– Discussed ways to provide the equivalent of 950,000 tons of HFO for the next phase,  
– That was the assistance up to 450,000 tons of HFO (supplying 50,000 tons every month) and equipment & materials for energy up to the equivalent of 500,000 tons of HFO, |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Major Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Aug, 16–17, 2007 | • The second working group meetings on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (Shenyang): North Korea presented basic positions regarding declaration and disablement,  

  - Declaration: nuclear facilities, material, and elaborations on Uranium Enrichment Project (UEP) would be included, but nuclear detonating devices would be excluded,  
  - Disablement: SMWe nuclear reactor, re-processing facilities, and fuel-rod producing plant would be included. |
| Aug, 20–21   | • The second working group meetings on Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism (Moscow),  

  - The nations offered statements about principles for security cooperation in Northeast Asia and trust-building. |
| Sep, 1–2     | • The second working group meetings on normalization of U.S.– North Korea relations (Geneva),  

  - Agreed to make complete declaration, implement disablement measures, and lift sanctions against North Korea before the year-end, |
| Sep, 5–6     | • The second working group meetings on normalization of Japan– North Korea relations (Ulan Bator, Mongolia),  

  - Decided to have further discussions on matters such as abduction issues (agreed to convene working group meetings). |
| Sep, 11–15   | • U.S.–China–Russia’s expert group visited Yongbyon nuclear facilities in North Korea,  

  - The parties expected to hear the team’s reports on discussions about inspection/progress of disablement, technical issues, and related expenses during the next six–party talks. |
| Sep, 27–30   | • The second session of the sixth round of the six–party talks (Beijing). Agreed on the second phase actions for the implementation (the October 3 agreement),  

  - Agreed to disable existing nuclear facilities and make a complete & correct declaration of all North Korea’s nuclear programs before the year–end (the second visit of the expert group to North Korea in two weeks),  
  - Decisions to remove the designation of the DPRK as state sponsor of terrorism and to terminate the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK would be made in parallel with the DPRK’s actions,  
  - Economic, energy and humanitarian assistance equivalent of one million tons of HFO would be provided to North Korea,  
  - The parties reiterated that the six–party ministerial meeting would be held in Beijing at an appropriate date. |
| Oct, 11–18   | • U.S. expert group visited North Korea and produced the Agreement on Disablement Measures,  

  - To implement disablement measures of three Younbyon nuclear facilities (11 measures) by a U.S.–led effort,  
  - To store & seal & monitor separated (removed) devices (materials) in a mutually–accepted area within North Korea, |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Major Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Oct, 29–30, 2007 | • The third working group meetings on economy and energy cooperation (Panmunjeom)  
|                  |   – Discussed assistance up to 500,000 tons of HFO, equipment and materials for energy up to the equivalent of 500,000 tons of HFO,  
|                  |   – Standard HFO price was fixed at $400 per ton and $21 per ton for incidental expenses,                                              |
| Nov, 1–15        | • Disablement team made its first visit to North Korea  
|                  |   – Simultaneously underwent facility disablement (11 measures),                                                                             |
| Nov, 10–13       | • The first ROK–China–DPRK working–level meeting (Shenyang),  
|                  |   – Agreed on ways to assist equipment and materials for energy up to the equivalent of 500,000 tons of HFO,                             |
| Nov, 27–29       | • Korea–China–Russia–Japan the six–party disablement survey team visited North Korea,  
|                  |   – Inspected the ongoing disablement process in three Yongbyon nuclear facilities,                                                          |
| Dec, 3–5         | • Assistant Secretary Christopher Hill visited North Korea (to deliver President Bush’s hand–written letter),  
|                  |   – Checked progress of disablement and conveyed U.S. position on North Korean declaration,                                                 |
| Dec, 11–12       | • Unofficial working group meetings on economy and energy cooperation (Beijing),  
|                  |   – Discussed ways to assist HFO and non–oil resources,                                                                                   |
| Dec, 25–26       | • The second ROK–China–DPRK working–level meeting (Pyongyang),  
|                  |   – Reached a three–way agreement for second round assistance of equipment and materials to North Korea,                                    |
| Jan, 4, 2008     | • North Korean Foreign Ministry issued a statement on the nuclear issue,  
|                  |   – North Korea insisted that nuclear declaration had been submitted and that notification was made to the U.S, in November 2007,  
|                  |   – North Korea denied neither uranium enrichment nor supporting of Syrian nuclear program,                                               |
| Jan, 7–12        | • Christopher Hill visited six–party nations (Korea, Japan, China, and Russia),  
|                  |   – Emphasized the need for a complete and correct declaration and related parties’ consolidated efforts,                                 |
| Jan, 31–Feb, 1   | • Sung Kim, Director of Korean Office at the U.S. State Department, visited North Korea,  
|                  |   – Discussed fine–tuning of North Korean nuclear declaration and resumption of the head of delegation meeting of the six–party talks,  
|                  |   – Urged early implementation of the October 3 agreement,                                                                                   |
| Feb, 17–20       | • Christopher Hill visited Korea, China, and Japan,  
<p>|                  |   – Provided video evidenc proving North Korea’s cooperation with Syria to Korea and China,                                                   |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Major Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Feb, 20–21, 2008 | • The third ROK–China–DPRK working–level meeting (Beijing).  
  – Discussed third round of assistance in equipment and materials to North Korea and assessed current work and progress. |
| Mar, 13      | • U.S.–North Korea talks convened in Geneva,  
  – U.S. offered North Korea the methods in which to “indirectly admit HEU,”  
  – North Korea refused to agree, emphasizing that it was a direct order from Pyongyang.                                         |
| Mar, 24      | • U.S.–North Korea working–level meeting was held in New York,  
  • North Korea delivered its draft of nuclear declaration to the U.S.                                                                                                                                     |
| Mar, 27–28   | • A working–level consultation between ROK and DPRK delegation of the six–party talks EEC/WG (Panmunjeom),  
  – Exchanged opinions on third round of assistance in equipment & materials and overall assistance by the parties.                                                                                       |
| Apr, 8       | • U.S.–North Korea talks convened in Singapore,  
  – Agreed to include North Korea–Syria nuclear cooperation, acknowledgment of past on UEP, and pledges to prevent relapse,  
  – U.S. still pursued a complete and correct declaration, but was willing to accept uncertainty in order to move on to the next phase,  
  – Reached provisional agreement on format of North Korean declaration.                                                                                                                                    |
| Apr, 10      | • The second session of the third ROK–China–DPRK working–level meeting (Beijing)  
  – Reached provisional agreement on ways to provide third round of assistance in equipment and materials (ROK: 35,000 tons, China: 15,000 tons).                                                  |
| Apr, 22–24   | • U.S.–North Korea expert consultations convened in Pyongyang (five including Sung Kim),  
  – U.S. made demands to include nuclear waste storage area and radioisotope production laboratory in the draft of the declaration,  
  – Agreed to blow up the cooling tower within one–two days of submitting declaration to symbolize its disablement effort,  
  – Discussed substantial ways to declare and verify.                                                                                                                                                  |
| Apr, 28      | • U.S.–ROK’s head of delegations met in Washington DC,  
  – Emphasized the importance of establishing a mechanism within the six–party talks in charge of verification and monitoring,  
  – Shared results from U.S.–North Korea expert consultations and discussed ways forward.                                                                                                              |
| May 8–10     | • U.S. envoy visited North Korea for the second time (Pyongyang, five including Sung Kim),  
  – Received 314 volumes of supplement data for declaration (18,822 pages),  
  – North Korea indicated that it would deliver its declaration form in connection with U.S. indication to remove the designation of the North Korea as state sponsor of terrorism, |
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Major Details</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| May 8–10, 2008| - North Korea reaffirmed its intent to destroy the cooling tower within 24 hours of U.S. removal of North Korea as state sponsor and North Korea’s declaration of nuclear programs,  
- Fine-tuned declaration forms and checked whether specific U.S. demands were included, |
| May 13        | • ROK–China’s head of delegations met in Beijing,  
- Confirmed positive progress on nuclear declaration and discussed handling of unused fuel–rods,  
- Discussed the next six–party talks, |
| May 19        | • ROK–U.S.–Japan’s head of delegations met in Washington DC,  
- Assessed work and progress of six–party talks and discussed ways forward, |
| May 27–28     | • U.S.–North Korea’s head of delegations of the six–party talks met in Beijing,  
- Discussed holding technical expert group meeting and etc, before the North Korean declaration, |
| May 27–31     | • Christopher Hill visited China and Russia,  
- Discussed nuclear declaration and resumption of six–party talks, |
| Jun, 2        | • The number of spent fuel–rods produced was reduced (30 per day→15) (IAEA inspector), |
| Jun, 10       | • Meetings between five assistance–providing parties took place in Seoul,  
- Discussed preliminary agenda for working group meeting on economic and energy cooperation, |
| Jun, 11       | • The fifth working group meetings on economic and energy cooperation convened in Panmunjeom (reached provisional agreements),  
- Agreed to provide remaining HFO by December 2008,  
- Agreed to write an agreement to provide remaining equipment and materials by August 2008,  
- Agreed to provide anthracite–related (smokeless coal) equipment first, |
| Jun, 11–12    | • The third working group meeting on normalization of Japan– North Korea (Beijing)  
- North Korea announced that it would cooperate in re–investigation of abduction issues and Yodo–go hijacking issue,  
- Japan hinted at lifting portions of their sanctions against North Korea, |
| Jun, 12       | • North Korean Foreign Ministry announced successful discussions via broadcast,  
- Sung Kim, Director of Korean Office at the U.S. State Department, arrived in Korea on June 9, visited Pyongyang on June 10 via land, returned to Korea on June 11, and held press interviews on June 12, |
<p>| Jun, 19, 2008 | • ROK–U.S.–Japan’s head of delegations of the six–party talks met in Beijing, |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Major Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Jun, 26  | • North Korea submitted its nuclear declaration to China,  
  - On June 26, same date in U.S. ET, President Bush notified the Congress of the removal of North Korea from the list of terror–sponsoring states (the decision would come into effect on August 11 after 45 days of processing time starting June 27). |
| Jun, 27  | • Yongbyon’s 5MWe nuclear reactor was destroyed and the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK was terminated,  
  - Sung Kim, Director of Korean Office at the U.S. State Department, visited North Korea on June 27–28 and watched the destruction of the cooling tower, |
| Jun, 30  | • The number of spent fuel–rods produced was increased from 15 per day to 30.                                                                                                                                 |
| Jul, 10–12| • The second head of delegations of the six–party talks and the third working group meeting on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (Beijing),  
  - Discussed evaluation of declaration, development of a verification system, completing second phase, and denuclearization negotiations for third phase,  
  - Agreed to establish a verification system and to complete disablement and economic support by the end of October,  
  - The working group meeting failed to produce an agreement on plans to implement verification (protocol), |
| Jul, 23  | • Unofficial six–party foreign ministerial talks (Singapore),  
  - Agreed on North Korea’s completion of second phase of denuclearization and six clauses specifying participating parties’ efforts, |
| Jul, 30–Aug, 1 | • Sung Kim, Director of Korean Office at the U.S. State Department, visited China and discussed plans to verify North Korea’s declaration, Kim also contacted North Korea and explored ways and means forward, |
| Jul, 31–Aug, 1 | • Sung Kim, U.S. special envoy to the six–party talks, and Ri Gun, Director–General of the U.S. Affairs Bureau at North Korea’s Foreign Ministry, met twice in Beijing,  
  - North Korea did not express intentions to allow gathering of sample ores, |
| Aug, 11–12 | • The fourth working group meeting on normalization of Japan– North Korea relations (Shenyang),  
  - Discussed re–investigation of abductors of Japanese citizens, early lifting of sanctions against the North, extradition of Yodo–go hijackers, and settlement of past history, |
<p>| Aug, 14  | • North Korea stopped producing spent fuel–rods (North Korean Embassy in China notified the Chinese Foreign Ministry), |
| Aug, 14–16 2008 | • Sung Kim, U.S. special envoy to the six–party talks, visited China and discussed plans to verify North Korea’s declaration, U.S.–North Korea discussions did not occur as North Korean staff decided not to visit China, |
| Aug, 17  | • U.S. delivered 6,000 tons of HFO to Songrim, North Korea, Remaining 10,000 tons were to be delivered to Sonbong, |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Major Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Aug. 22 | • U.S.–North Korea met in New York.  
  – U.S. presented implementation plans for a complete and correct nuclear verification to North Korea and demanded an early reply.  
  * Sung Kim, U.S. special envoy to the six-party talks, and Kim Myong-gil, North Korea’s deputy envoy to the United Nations, were presumed to have met. |
| Aug. 26 | • The spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry announced that North Korea was considering suspension of all Yongbyon disablement efforts and restoration of its facilities starting August 14. |
| Sep. 2  | • Began to resume operation of nuclear facilities;                                                                                           |
| Sep. 5–6| • ROK–U.S.–China–Japan’s head of delegations of the six-party talks met in Beijing.  
  – Exchanged views on plans to implement verification and countermeasures against North Korea’s decision to suspend disablement efforts and to restore its facilities; |
| Sep. 19 | • The spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry announced that ‘Yongbyon’'s nuclear facilities were being restored;  
  • The Inter–Korea working–level meeting on economic and energy cooperation (Pannunjeom House of Peace),  
  – Hwang Joon–kook (ROK’s Director–General of North Korean Nuclear Affairs Bureau of the MOFAT) and Hyun Hak–bong (North Korea’s Deputy Director–General of the American Affairs Bureau in the DPRK’s Foreign Ministry),  
  * Concluded without specific agreements on ROK’s assistance; |
| Sep. 21 | • ROK–U.S.’ head of delegations of the six-party talks met,  
  – Discussed ways to prevent deterioration of North Korean nuclear situation and to complete the second phase of disablement; |
| Sep. 22 | • President Bush and President Hu Jintao conducted telephone conversations,  
  – Agreed to persuade North Korea to abide by course of actions discussed in the six–party talks,  
  • IAEA Director General indicated that North Korea demanded IAEA inspectors to remove seals and surveillance cameras,  
  – IAEA inspectors confirmed that some equipment had been restored; |
| Sep. 23 | • President Bush addressed the UN General Assembly,  
  – Urged UN to enforce sanctions on North Korea and Iran; |
| Sep. 24, 2008 | • IAEA inspection team removed seals from Yongbyon re–processing facility and surveillance cameras per North Korea’s demands. North Korea notified injection of nuclear material; |
| Oct. 1–3 | • Assistant Secretary Hill visited North Korea and discussed nuclear issues with Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Kim Gye–gwan, Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Eui–chun, and Colonel General Ri Chan–bok,  
  – Proposed submitting nuclear facility verification plans first and ways to verify UEP/Syrian nuclear cooperation in piecemeal fashion; |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Major Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct, 11</td>
<td>U.S. State Department announced the removal of North Korea from the list of terror-sponsoring states,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct, 12</td>
<td>The spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry announced that North Korea welcomed U.S. State Department’s action and that it would resume disablement efforts (October 14) as well as allow U.S./IAEA inspectors’ missions,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct, 25</td>
<td>(North) Korean Central Broadcasting (KCB) insisted on curtailing Japan from the six-party framework,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct, 28</td>
<td>U.S.–Japan’s head of delegations of the six-party talks met in New York, discussed North Korean nuclear issues,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct, 31</td>
<td>The number of spent fuel-rods produced was reduced (30 per day →15),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec, 8–11</td>
<td>Head of delegations of the six-party talks met in Beijing,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Failed to produce agreements due to contentions on gathering of sample ores,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 6. North Korea’s Missile Development and Specifications

Chronology of North Korea’s Missile Development and Production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Development and Production Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early 70s</td>
<td>Involved in China’s missile development project and acquired missile technology (estimation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976–81</td>
<td>Introduction of USSR–made Scud–Bs and launchers from Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr, 1984</td>
<td>First test–firing of improved Scud–B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1986</td>
<td>Test–firing of Scud–C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Operational deployment of improved Scud–B/C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1990</td>
<td>First test–firing of the Rodong missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun, 1991</td>
<td>Launching of the Scud–C missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1993</td>
<td>Test–firing of the Rodong missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan, 1994</td>
<td>First identification of the Taepodong–1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Operational deployment of Rodong missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug, 1998</td>
<td>Test–firing of the Taepodong–1 (North Korea claimed that it had launched a satellite)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul, 2006</td>
<td>Test–firing of the Taepodong–2 and launching of Rodong &amp; Scud missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Operational deployment of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Specifications of North Korea’s Missiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>SCUD–B</th>
<th>SCUD–C</th>
<th>Rodong</th>
<th>IRBM</th>
<th>Taepodong–1</th>
<th>Taepodong–2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Range (km)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>Over 6,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warhead Payload (kg)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>650–1,000 (Estimated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress Status</td>
<td>Operational deployment</td>
<td>Operational deployment</td>
<td>Operational deployment</td>
<td>Operational deployment</td>
<td>Test–firing</td>
<td>Under development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 7. Chronology of Inter–Korean Military Talks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Details of Major Consultations · Agreements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1st Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working – level Talks</td>
<td>Nov. 28, 2000</td>
<td>Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion</td>
<td>- Major details of the discussion: (proposed) Inter–Korean Agreement on Military Assurances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Designation of the timing and scope of the Joint Administrative Area (JAA), location of the roads, and construction of facilities in the JAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Security assurance issue for DMZ construction works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Simultaneous commencement of landmine removal in the DMZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Finalization of the routes of the inter–Korean roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Discussion of the designation and operation of the JAA as well as joint regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Agreement of signature/entry into force of the agreements regarding safety issues during construction in the ministerial talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Narrowing the differences regarding the simultaneous commencement of landmine removal in the DMZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3rd Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working – level Talks</td>
<td>Dec. 21, 2000</td>
<td>Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion</td>
<td>- Centering around the South’s response to the issue regarding the concept of main enemy posed by the North,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– The meeting ended after the South explained and delivered its proposed agreement to the North. The two sides decided to discuss the proposed agreement in ensuring talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Designation and operation of the JAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Mine removal in the DMZ, method of road &amp; railway reconnection works, and the method of contact and communication between the military personnel in charge of the construction sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Security on construction personnel &amp; equipments and safety assurance issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Classification</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Details of Major Consultations · Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 6  | 5th Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working – level Talks | Feb, 8, 2001 | Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion | • Agreement on Military Assurances for Designation of the Joint Administrative Area in the East/West Coast Districts and the Construction of Railways and Roads Connecting the South and North  
    ※ Signature/entry into force was delayed due to the excuse of the concept of main enemy. |
| 7  | 6th the Inter–Korean Military Working – level Talks | Sep, 14, 2002 | Panmunjeom House of Peace | • Adoption of the Agreement on Military Assurances for Designation of the Joint Administrative Area in the East/West Coast Districts and the Construction of Railways and Roads Connecting the South and North  
    → agreed to sign/exchange/come into force agreement through additional two rounds of talks (September 16/17) |
| 8  | 7th Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working – level Talks | Sep, 16, 2002 | Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion | • Confirmation and initial exchange of the text of the Military Assurance Agreement, and discussion of the procedures of the 7th Inter–Korean Military Working–level Talks |
| 9  | 8th Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working – level Talks | Sep, 17, 2002 | Panmunjeom House of Peace | • Exchange and effectuation of the Agreement on Military Assurances for Designation of the Joint Administrative Area in the East/West Coast Districts and the Construction of Railways and Roads Connecting the South and North |
| 10 | 9th Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working – level Talks | Oct, 3, 2002 | Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion | • Exchange and discussion of the mutual construction plans by timeline and route diagrams for the reconnection of railways and roads  
    • Issue to support of communication equipments |
<p>| 14 | 13th Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working – level Talks | Nov, 13, 2002 | Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion | • Discussion of matters regarding verification of balanced construction of road/railway construction, joint survey and communication line connection for the Donghae Line |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Details of Major Consultations · Agreements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>14th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working − level Talks</td>
<td>Dec, 23, 2002</td>
<td>Panmunjom House of Peace</td>
<td>• Consultations over the (proposed) makeshift road passage agreement regarding the Gyeongeui Line and Donghae Line, and connection of the communication lines concerning the Donghae Line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>15th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working − level Talks</td>
<td>Jan, 27, 2003</td>
<td>Panmunjom Unification Pavilion</td>
<td>• Adoption and effectuation of the Provisional Agreement on Military Assurances for passage of Makeshift Roads in the Joint Administrative Area in the East and West Coast Districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>16th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working − level Talks</td>
<td>Jun, 4, 2003</td>
<td>Panmunjom House of Peace</td>
<td>• Agreement on mutual visits to the construction sites for inspections (Number of personnel: 10 persons each for the east and west coast districts on June 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>17th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working − level Talks</td>
<td>Sep, 17, 2003</td>
<td>Panmunjom Unification Pavilion</td>
<td>• Adoption and effectuation of the Supplementary Agreement on the Provisional Agreement on Military Assurances for Passage of Makeshift Roads in the Joint Administrative Area in the East and West Coast Districts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 19 | 18th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working − level Talks | Nov, 14, 2003 | Panmunjom House of Peace | • Expression of mutual positions on the proposed Agreement on Installation and Operation of Guard Posts in the Joint Administrative Area  
• Consultation of date for the contact between persons in charge of communication in relation to connection of communication lines of Donghae line |
<p>| 20 | 19th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working − level Talks | Nov, 28, 2003 | Panmunjom Unification Pavilion | • Consultation over Agreement on Installation and Operation of Guard Posts                                                                                                                                 |
| 21 | 20th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working − level Talks | Dec, 23, 2003 | Panmunjom House of Peace | • Exchange and effectuation of the Agreement on and Installation Operation of Guard Posts in the Joint Administrative Area in the East and West Coast Districts |
| 22 | 1st Round of the Inter-Korean General Officer − level Talks | May 26, 2004 | Mt. Geumgang | • Expression of mutual positions regarding measures to prevent accidental Naval clashes in the West Sea and to stop propaganda activities and remove propaganda apparatus from the DMZ |
| 23 | 2nd Round of the Inter-Korean General Officer − level Talks | Jun, 3–4, 2004 | Mt. Seorak | • Adoption and effectuation of the Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Naval Clashes in the West Sea, and the Cessation of Propaganda Activities and the Elimination of Propaganda Apparatus from the DMZ |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Details of Major Consultations · Agreements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>21st Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working – level Talks</td>
<td>Jun. 10–12, 2004</td>
<td>Gaeseong</td>
<td>• Adoption and effectuation of the Subsequent Agreement on the Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Naval clashes in the West Sea, and the Cessation of Propaganda Activities and the Elimination of Propaganda Apparatus from the DMZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>22nd Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working – level Talks</td>
<td>Jun. 29–30, 2004</td>
<td>Paju</td>
<td>• Assessment regarding prevention of accidental naval clashes in the West Sea and first–stage propaganda apparatus removal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>23rd Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working – level Talks</td>
<td>Jul. 5, 2004</td>
<td>Gaeseong</td>
<td>• Consultation over differences regarding the subjects of first–stage propaganda apparatus removal, agreement to implement second–stage works, ROK suggested improvement measures to prevent accidental clashes in the West Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>24th Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working – level Talks</td>
<td>Jul. 20, 2005</td>
<td>Panmunjeom House of Peace</td>
<td>• Consultation over differences regarding the subjects of second–stage propaganda apparatus removal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Consultation over initiating third–stage propaganda apparatus removal (July 25–August 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Agreement to setting up the communication liaison office to prevent accidental naval clashes in the West Sea (since August 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Suggestion of the Supplementary Agreement Pertaining to Improvement Measures to Prevent Accidental Clashes in the West Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>25th Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working – level Talks</td>
<td>Aug. 12, 2005</td>
<td>Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion</td>
<td>• Consultation over differences regarding the subjects of third–stage propaganda apparatus removal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>26th Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working – level Talks</td>
<td>Nov. 3, 2005</td>
<td>Panmunjeom</td>
<td>• Agreement to discuss the Agenda for General Officer–level Talks and the Military Assurance Agreement on Railway/Road Passage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>27th Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working – level Talks</td>
<td>Feb. 3, 2006</td>
<td>Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion</td>
<td>• Agreement to convene the third round of the General Officer–level Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Agreement to discuss the Military Assurance Agreement on Railway/Road Passage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>3rd Round of Inter–Korean General Officer – level Talks</td>
<td>Mar. 2–3, 2006</td>
<td>Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion</td>
<td>• ROK, to make proposals on prevention of accidental clashes in the West Sea and establishment of Joint fishing area, and conclusion of the Military Assurance Agreement on Railway/Road Passage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• North Korea, to bring up issues on re–establishing the West Sea Maritime Borderline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Classification</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Details of Major Consultations · Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 32 | 4th Round of Inter–Korean General Officer – level Talks | May 16-18, 2006 | Panmunjom House of Peace | • ROK, expression of the intention to discuss in the Inter–Korean Defense Ministerial Talks on the basis of following two principles as regards Maritime Borderline in the West Sea  
  ① Respect/observe NLL as agreed in the Basic Agreement  
  ② Comprehensive implementation as for agreed items of military area in the Basic Agreement  
  • North Korea, to deny insisting that re–establishing West Sea Maritime Borderline is the basic problem that must be resolved first, |
| 33 | 28th Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working – level Talks | Oct. 2, 2006 | Panmunjom Unification Pavilion | • North Korea, to protest against scattering leaflets and violation of East/West area transportation order,  
  • ROK, to raise military assurance measures for economic cooperation project and expansion of confidence–building |
| 34 | 5th Round of Inter–Korean General Officer – level Talks | May 8–11, 2007 | Panmunjom Unification Pavilion | • Joint press release for the General Officer–level Talks,  
  • Adoption of the Provisional Agreement on Military Assurances of Railroad Test Runs, |
<p>| 35 | 29th Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working – level Talks | Jun. 8, 2007 | Panmunjom House of Peace | • Discussion about implementation of agreements from the joint press release of the fifth round of the General Officer–level Talks, |
| 36 | 30th Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working – level Talks | Jul. 10, 2007 | Panmunjom Unification Pavilion | • Discussion about implementation of agreements from the joint press release of the fifth round of the General Officer–level Talks, |
| 37 | 31st Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working – level Talks | July 16, 2007 | Panmunjom House of Peace | • Discussion about implementation of agreements from the joint press release of the fifth round of the General Officer–level Talks, |
| 38 | 6th Round of the Inter–Korean General Officer – level Talks | Jul. 24–26, 2007 | Panmunjom House of Peace | • Discussed prevention of west sea clashes, establishment of joint fishing area, and military assurances to inter – Korean economic cooperation but ended with no progress, |
| 39 | 32nd Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working – level Talks | Nov. 12, 2007 | Panmunjom Unification Pavilion | • Discussion about working–level issues on the second round of inter–Korean Defense Ministerial Talks, |
| 40 | 33rd Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working – level Talks | Nov. 20, 2007 | Panmunjom House of Peace | • Discussed working–level procedures yet to be agreed and fine–tuned drafts for agreements for the second round of the Defense Ministerial Talks, |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Details of Major Consultations · Agreements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>34th Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working</td>
<td>Nov, 24, 2007</td>
<td>Panmunjom House of Peace</td>
<td>• Fine-tuned drafts for agreements for the second round of the Defense Ministerial Talks,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– level Talks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>2nd Round of the Inter–Korean Defense</td>
<td>Nov, 27–29, 2007</td>
<td>Pyongyang Songjeon Pavilion</td>
<td>• Adoption of the Agreements from inter–Korean Defense Ministerial Talks to implement the Declaration for inter–Korean Development and Peaceful Prosperity, consisting of seven Sections and 21 Paragraphs,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministerial Talks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– level Talks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 44 | 7th Round of the Inter–Korean General Officer    | Dec, 12–14, 2007 | Panmunjom House of Peace     | • Adopted the Agreements on Military Assurances for Passage/Communication/Customs for Joint Administrative Area in East/West Area, but it failed to be implemented  
① Extending passage time (07:00–22:00) and guaranteeing passage everyday  
② Allowing wire/wireless communication and internet communication from 2008  
③ Simplifying procedures to shorten passage time, etc.  
• Discussed the establishment of joint fishing area and peace zone but it ended with no progress due to contentions on location of joint fishing areas, |
|    | – level Talks                                    |               |                              |                                                                                                             |
| 45 | 36th Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working  | Jan, 25, 2008 | Panmunjom House of Peace     | • Discussion about railroad cargo transportation between Munsan and Bongdong                                 |
|    | – level Talks                                    |               |                              |                                                                                                             |
| 46 | 37th Round of the Inter–Korean Military Working  | Oct, 2, 2008  | Panmunjom House of Peace     | • Discussion about implementation issues between the two militaries  
※ North Korea persistently focused on South’s civilian organization’s leaflet scattering across the North, |
|    | – level Talks                                    |               |                              |                                                                                                             |
Appendix 8. Agreement on the Second Round of South-North Defense Ministerial Talks

Concerning the implementation of the declaration on the improvements in inter-Korean relations and peace and prosperity

The second round of the South-North Defense Ministerial Talks ("the Talks") was held in Pyongyang for three days from November 27, 2007.

At the Talks, the two sides agreed as follows after discussing how to implement military actions concerning the implementation of the Declaration on the improvements in inter-Korean relations and peace and prosperity adopted at the historic Summit:

1. The two sides agreed to take actual steps to put an end to military hostility relations, alleviate tension and assure peace between them, including the following:
   ① The two sides shall not take any action that may foster hostility between them and will try to resolve all military issues between two sides peacefully through mutual cooperation,
   ② The two sides shall thoroughly comply with all military agreements adopted between two sides, including the one signed on June 4, 2004.
   ③ The two sides shall not engage in any military hostilities in the air, at sea or on the ground,
   ④ The two sides shall amend and/or supplement systematic instruments so as not to induce conflicts between two sides and, should accidental conflicts do occur, take immediate actions to stop and resolve the conflict through dialogue.

With regard to the aforementioned issue, the two sides shall modernize the existing communication/liaison system between two sides and positively utilize and expand existing negotiating channels,
2. The two sides agreed to take military actions to oppose recommencement of war and to comply with their respective non-aggression obligations firmly, including the following:

① The two sides agreed to adhere to the existing non-aggression demarcation line and areas under respective jurisdiction.

② The two sides agreed to discuss/resolve issues concerning the maritime non-aggression demarcation line and military confidence-building measures through South-North Joint Military Commission.

③ The two sides reconfirmed the principle of the non-use of force against each other and the peaceful settlement of conflicts, and agreed to take steps to put the principle into practice.

3. The two sides agreed to take substantial measures to prevent conflicts in the West Sea and to assure peace, including the following:

① The two sides agreed to discuss/settle the issue of designating a joint fishing zone and a peaceful zone, sharing the view about the need for such a designation, at general officer-level talks at the earliest possible date to ease military tension and prevent conflicts in the West Sea.

② The two sides agreed to designate an area for the collection of aggregates near the estuary of the Han River and Imjin River.

③ The two sides agreed to discuss/settle a measure for assuring military confidence in each other to prevent conflicts in the West Sea at the South-North Joint Military Commission.

4. The two sides agreed to cooperate militarily with each other to put an end to the current armistice system and to establish an everlasting peace system, including the following:

① The two sides share the view that what the Korean people desire and demand is a declaration of the end of the war and the establishment of an effective peace regime.

② The two sides agreed to promote military cooperation with each other to foster conditions for the declaration of the end of the war.

③ The two sides agreed to discuss/settle the issue of recovering the remains of those killed in action (KIA) during the Korean War, sharing the view that this issue relates to the
fostering of military trust in each other and constitutes an official means of putting an end to the war.

5. The two sides agreed to take steps to provide military assurance to projects for exchange and cooperation between the two Koreas, including the following:

① The two sides agreed to take steps to provide an immediate military assurance concerning exchange and cooperation conducive to the joint prosperity of the Korean nation and the easing of military tension.

② The two sides agreed to take military assurance measures concerning the West Sea Special Zone for Peace and Cooperation.

The two sides agreed to discuss/settle military assurance measures concerning projects for exchange and cooperation, including joint fishing in the West Sea and joint use of the Han River estuary, on a priority basis at inter-Korean military working-level talks.

The two sides agreed to take military assurance measures for the designation of the relevant shipping routes and procedures concerning permission for the North’s civilian ships’ direct passage to Haeju Port.

③ The two sides agreed to provide military assurance for railroad transportation of cargoes between Munsan and Bongdong, starting on December 11, 2007 so that the cooperation projects in Gaesung and Geumgangsan may be further invigorated, and to discuss/adopt a military assurance agreement for passage, communication and customs clearance in the joint administrative area at Tongilgak, Panmunjom, in early December 2007.

④ The two sides agreed to discuss/settle military assurance measures concerning the opening of the path for direct access to Baekdusan to facilitate tours of the mountain by the general public.

6. The two sides agreed to start normal operation of their respective consultative bodies for the implementation of this Agreement, including the following:

① The two sides agreed to hold the third round of the South-North Defense Ministerial Talks in Seoul at a proper time in 2008,
② The two sides agreed to hold the first talks of the South-North Joint Military Commission, upon its composition.

7. This Agreement shall take effect on the day on which the two sides exchange a signed copy with each other after completing the procedure for its due effectuation.

① This Agreement may be amended or supplemented as and when required with mutual consent.

② This Agreement is executed in two counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but both of which shall together constitute one and the same instrument.

November 29, 2007

Minister of National Defense
Republic of Korea
Kim, Jang Soo

Minister of People’s Armed Forces
National Defense Committee
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Vice Marshall Kim, Il-chul
People’s Armed Forces
## Appendix 9. Status of the Dispatch of ROK Troops

(As of Dec. 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Current Personnel</th>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>First Dispatch</th>
<th>Rotation Cycle</th>
<th>Total # of pers.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,075</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal (Multi-National Force activities)</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal (Iraq)</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19,104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Iraq* (3 nations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Current Personnel</th>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>First Dispatch</th>
<th>Rotation Cycle</th>
<th>Total # of pers.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zaytun Division</td>
<td>Subtotal (Zaytun)</td>
<td>524</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Command, Direct subordinate unit</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Arbil</td>
<td>Apr, 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td>17,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Embassy guard team</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>Dec, 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kuwait support unit</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Sep, 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Arbil</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dec, 2006</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58 air transportation group</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>Kuwait, Qatar</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct, 2004</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>1,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Cooperation team</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>Feb, 2003</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jul, 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>CJTF–101</td>
<td>Cooperation team</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bagram</td>
<td>Jul, 2002</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S., CENTCOM (Tampa, Florida)</td>
<td>Cooperation team</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>Nov, 2001</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S., 5th Fleet Command</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Manama</td>
<td>Jan, 2008</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF–HOA (1 nation)</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Feb, 2003</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### UN PKO Activities (7 nations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Current Personnel</th>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>First Dispatch</th>
<th>Rotation Cycle</th>
<th>Total # of pers.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal (UN PKO activities)</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India/Pakistan United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Rawalpindi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct, 1994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sukhumi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nov, 1994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission group in Liberia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Monrovia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct, 2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan support group</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jul, 2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission group in Sudan</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nov, 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Operations in Lebanon</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>Tyre</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jul, 2007</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>Staff officers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Naqoura</td>
<td>Jan, 2007</td>
<td>1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staff in the Western Brigade</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mar, 2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Dispatch units to Iraq (3 nations) have returned home in December 2008 upon completion of duties.
Appendix 10. Joint Communiqué
The 39th U.S.–ROK Security Consultative Meeting

November 7, 2007, Seoul

1. The 39th Republic of Korea-United States Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) was held in Seoul on November 7, 2007. ROK Minister of National Defense Kim Jang Soo and U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates led their respective delegations, which included senior defense and foreign affairs officials. Before the SCM, the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Kim Kwan Jin and the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael G. Mullen presided over the 29th ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting (MCM) on November 6, 2007.

2. Secretary Gates expressed appreciation for the ROK’s continued support to the War on Terror, highlighting the important contributions of the ROK armed forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan and their role in advancing freedom for the Iraqi and Afghan people. The Minister and the Secretary reviewed the way ahead and agreed that bilateral cooperation between the two countries on the Global War on Terrorism continues to strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

3. The Minister and the Secretary welcomed the progress achieved in inter-Korean relations at the 2007 South-North Summit. Minister Kim explained that South Korea and North Korea agreed to jointly endeavor to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula, and hold a defense ministers’ meeting to discuss military confidence-building measures in this regard. The Minister and the Secretary agreed that the ROK-U.S. Alliance would continue to assist in advancing peace and stability on the peninsula and in the region and further agreed to closely consult and coordinate in this regard.

4. The Secretary and the Minister welcomed the resumption of the Six Party Talks and the progress made toward the implementation of the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement. They noted positively that the ROK and U.S. are committed to work together to achieve the early
and complete denuclearization of North Korea, establish peace on the Korean Peninsula and promote peace and security in Northeast Asia through the complete implementation of the September 19 Joint Statement wherein North Korea agreed to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, to return, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. In addition, the Minister and the Secretary agreed that North Korea’s continued development of WMD and long-range missiles, along with the danger of the proliferation, were a challenge to the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

5. The Minister and the Secretary agreed that the ROK-U.S. Alliance, along with the U.S, forces stationed in Korea, continuously ensure the security of the Korean Peninsula and the stability of Northeast Asia. Secretary Gates offered assurances of firm U.S, commitment and immediate support towards the ROK, including continuation of the extended deterrence offered by the U.S, nuclear umbrella, consistent with the ROK-U.S, Mutual Defense Treaty. Minister Kim reaffirmed the ROK commitment to mutual defense for the preservation of peace and security.

6. The Minister and the Secretary received reports on the results of the ROK-U.S, Security Policy Initiative (SPI) discussions and expressed satisfaction that through close consultations, the ROK and the U.S are making progress on pending issues, including the transition of the wartime operational control of ROK forces and the relocation of United States forces based in Korea. The Minister and the Secretary agreed to continue SPI consultations in 2008 and beyond, based on the significant accomplishments of the past three years.

7. The Secretary and the Minister shared the view that since 2003, the two nations have successfully resolved alliance issues including relocation and realignment of the U.S, Forces Korea, transition of the wartime operational control, and strategic flexibility, in order to transform and strengthen the ROK-U.S, Alliance to meet the demands of the changing security environment and future security needs. The Minister and the Secretary agreed that
the ROK-U.S. Alliance remains vital to the future interests of the two nations and that a solid combined defense posture should be maintained in order to secure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Both sides stressed their determination to ensure that the capabilities of the ROK-U.S. combined forces remain at peak readiness and continue to improve.

8. The Minister and the Secretary reviewed the progress since the ROK-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting held on February 23, 2007, where the two countries agreed to complete the transition of wartime operational control on April 17, 2012. Both sides highly praised the substantial and significant progress that has been made toward implementation since the ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Senior United States Military Officer Assigned to Korea, representing the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agreed upon the Strategic Transition Plan (STP) on June 28, 2007. In noting the strong momentum behind this effort, Secretary Gates offered firm assurances that the transition of wartime operational control will be carried out in a manner that strengthens deterrence and maintains a fully capable ROK-U.S. combined defense posture on the Korean Peninsula. The Secretary reaffirmed that the U.S. will continue to provide significant bridging capabilities until the ROK obtains full self-defense capabilities. Secretary Gates further noted that the U.S. will continue to contribute U.S. unique capabilities to the combined defense for the life of the Alliance. Noting that the transition of wartime operational control will strengthen deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, both sides pledged their fullest commitment to meeting agreed upon benchmarks and timelines regarding the transition. In particular, efforts will be made to work together closely to develop new operational plans based on the new supporting-to-supported command relations structure created by the transition of wartime OPCON and to implement a robust combined exercise schedule to further ensure readiness.

9. The Secretary and the Minister praised agreements reached on the Roadmap for the Armistice Maintenance Responsibility (AMR) adjustment through the Senior Level Working Group, and expressed their satisfaction with the progress. In accordance with the Roadmap,
both sides agreed to complete the AMR adjustment between the UNC and the ROK military before the transition of wartime operational control in 2012.

10. The Minister and the Secretary expressed satisfaction with the progress of USFK base relocation and returns. Secretary Gates expressed his appreciation towards the ROK government for the dedicated efforts made for in this regard, and both sides agreed to exert a joint effort to advance the relocation and return of USFK bases.

11. The Secretary and the Minister noted that the successful completion of the modernization of the Jik-do training range is helping to ensure appropriate training conditions for the ROK and U.S. Air Forces. Both sides acknowledged that ensuring sufficient and sustained training conditions for USFK is of critical importance for combined readiness and agreed to make continuous efforts to enhance training conditions.

12. The Minister and the Secretary welcomed the conclusion of the Special Measures Agreement for 2007-2008, and assessed that defense cost-sharing contributes to strengthening combined defense capabilities on the Korean Peninsula. Secretary Gates offered his appreciation for the ROK’s contributions to the stationing costs for U.S. forces in the ROK. Both sides agreed to improve the current cost-sharing system and continue consultations toward that end.

13. The Secretary and the Minister voiced their strong support for legislation introduced in the U.S. Congress in July to elevate ROK Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Status noting that this would enhance defense cooperation between the two countries and further strengthen ROK-U.S. combined defense capabilities.

14. Both sides positively recognized the work of the SCM subcommittees (the Security Cooperation Committee (SCC), the Defense Technology and Industrial Cooperation Committee (DTICC), and the Logistics Cooperation Committee (LCC)). Both sides noted that negotiations are on-going regarding the War Reserve Stockpile for Allies-Korea
(WRSA-K) and encouraged both teams to conclude an agreement in the coming year and report to the 40th SCM on the results.

15. The Secretary and the Minister concurred that through intense discussions on alliance issues, the 39th SCM and the 29th MCM not only strengthened the ROK-U.S. Alliance but also significantly contributed to its continued development into a future-oriented, comprehensive, dynamic and mutually beneficial partnership. Both sides agreed to hold the 40th SCM at a mutually convenient time in 2008 in Washington D.C.
Appendix 11. Joint Communiqué
The 40th U.S.–ROK Security Consultative Meeting

October 17, 2008, Washington, D.C.

1. The 40th United States - Republic of Korea Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) was held in Washington, D.C. on October 17, 2008. ROK Minister of National Defense Lee, Sanghee and U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates led their respective delegations, which included senior defense and foreign affairs officials. Before the SCM, the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Kim, Tae Young and the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael G. Mullen presided over the 30th ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting (MCM) on October 16, 2008. In this 40th SCM, the Minister and the Secretary noted with satisfaction that since 1968, the U.S.-ROK SCM has made invaluable contributions to strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance and to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

2. The Minister and the Secretary reaffirmed the commitment of the ROK and U.S. Presidents to develop the U.S.-ROK Alliance into a strategic and future-oriented structure to better address changes and future needs in the security environment for the 21st Century, as agreed in the Joint Statement of the ROK-U.S. Summit on August 6, 2008. They also agreed to closely consult and coordinate to further articulate the broad vision for the future development of the strategic Alliance.

3. The Minister and the Secretary agreed that the two countries have continued close cooperation on the Global War on Terrorism. In this regard, Secretary Gates expressed appreciation for the significant contribution the ROK armed forces have made for the past four years to the stability and reconstruction of Iraq, and congratulated the “return on success” of the ROK armed forces for successfully accomplishing its mission with honor and dignity. Secretary Gates also expressed appreciation for the ROK’s continued support in Afghanistan with the Korea Medical and Vocational Training Team in Bagram. The Minister
and the Secretary shared the view that the support of the international community would be required for bringing greater stability and reconstruction to Afghanistan. The two further agreed that bilateral cooperation between the two countries on the Global War on Terrorism will continue to strengthen the U.S.-ROK Alliance.

4. The Minister and the Secretary affirmed that the Six-Party Talks represents the best way forward for achieving the verifiable denuclearization of North Korea in accordance with the September 19 Joint Statement of 2005, and has contributed to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Both welcomed the Six-Party Talks being brought back on track through the recent agreements on verification, the subsequent U.S. action to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and the resumption of the disablement measures by North Korea. The Minister and the Secretary urged North Korea to fully cooperate on the verification regime. The Minister and the Secretary recognized the importance of close consultation between the ROK and the U.S. in the Six-Party process. The Minister and the Secretary agreed that North Korea’s continued development of its Weapons of Mass Destruction program, along with its ballistic missiles and the threat of proliferation, pose a serious challenge to the U.S.-ROK Alliance and the peace and security of Northeast Asia.

5. The Minister and the Secretary shared the view that inter-Korean dialogue should resume expeditiously in order to address pending issues of mutual concern. They also agreed to continue to consult and coordinate closely on issues related to inter-Korean relations. The Minister and the Secretary agreed to closely cooperate to effectively address any future changes and emerging needs in the security environment, recognizing the important role that the U.S.-ROK Alliance has in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

6. The Minister and the Secretary, reiterating the mutual commitments to the fundamental mission of the U.S.-ROK Alliance through a robust combined defense posture, also affirmed that the U.S.-ROK Alliance remains vital to the future interests of the two nations and ensures the security of the Korean Peninsula and the stability of Northeast Asia.
Gates reaffirmed the commitments of the U.S. and ROK Presidents during the April 19, 2008 Summit Meeting at Camp David to maintain the current U.S. troop level in Korea, and agreed to implement the commitment of both Presidents.

7. Secretary Gates assured Minister Lee of firm U.S. commitment and immediate support toward the ROK, including continuation of the extended deterrence offered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, consistent with the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Minister Lee reaffirmed the ROK commitment to mutual defense for the preservation of peace and security.

8. The Minister and the Secretary received a report on the results of the U.S.-ROK Security Policy Initiative (SPI) discussions and expressed satisfaction that through close consultations, the U.S. and the ROK are making progress on the realignment of the Alliance and a range of other security issues, including United Nations Command Armistice Maintenance Responsibility adjustment, wartime operational control (OPCON) transition, U.S., Forces - Korea (USFK) base relocation, and the upgrade of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) status for the ROK. The Minister and the Secretary agreed to continue SPI consultations in 2009 and beyond, based on the significant accomplishments of the past four years and the mutual desire to continue to enhance the U.S.-ROK Alliance.

9. The Minister and the Secretary agreed that the U.S.-ROK Alliance can play an important role in fostering regional stability, and shared the view on the need for security consultation among the states in the region.

10. The Minister and the Secretary praised the substantial progress for the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) of ROK military forces in accordance with the Strategic Transition Plan (STP), and reconfirmed the commitment for the April 17, 2012 wartime OPCON transition date. Secretary Gates offered firm assurances that the transition of wartime OPCON will be carried out in a manner that strengthens deterrence and maintains a fully capable U.S.-ROK combined defense posture on the Korean Peninsula, noting that
the U.S. remains committed, both now and into the future, to respond quickly with appropriate military power to restore peace and stability to the Korean Peninsula. The Secretary reaffirmed that the U.S. will continue to provide significant bridging capabilities until the ROK obtains full self-defense capabilities, Secretary Gates further noted that the U.S. will continue to contribute U.S. unique capabilities to the combined defense for the life of the Alliance. The Minister and the Secretary also affirmed that the implementation of the Strategic Transition Plan will be assessed and reviewed at the annual SCM/MCM and reflected in the transition process, The Minister and the Secretary praised the successful results of the Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) exercise that was held in August 2008 in preparation for wartime OPCON transition, and agreed to continually conduct combined exercises for the maintenance of a strong combined defense readiness posture, The Minister and the Secretary agreed to work closely together to develop new operational plans based on the post-OPCON transition command relations structure.

11. The Minister and the Secretary praised agreements reached by the Senior Working Group for the Armistice Maintenance Responsibility (AMR) on the first phase of the Roadmap that was briefed at the 39th SCM, and expressed their intent to continue to make progress during the second phase. The Minister and the Secretary agreed to develop an implementation plan for AMR adjustment starting in 2009 and to have it fully carried out prior to the wartime OPCON transition in 2012.

12. The Minister and the Secretary reviewed the progress in implementing USFK relocation and base returns, and shared the view that successful completion of these cooperative joint efforts are in the best interest of both nations, The Minister and the Secretary shared the view that tour normalization for USFK service members would contribute to an enhancement in combined operational readiness and strengthen the long-term commitment of the United States to the development of the enduring Alliance.

13. The Minister and the Secretary shared the assessment that host nation support contributes to strengthening the combined defense capabilities on the Korean Peninsula and to
developing a stable stationing environment for USFK, Secretary Gates offered his appreciation for ROK contributions to the stationing cost of USFK. Reaffirming their commitments to support defense cost-sharing, the Minister and the Secretary agreed to improve the Special Measures Agreement system in consideration of the value and importance of the U.S.-ROK Alliance.

14. The Minister and the Secretary voiced their strong support for the legislation approved in the U.S. Congress to elevate the ROK’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) status, noting that this would enhance defense cooperation between the two countries and further strengthen U.S.-ROK combined defense capabilities. Minister Lee expressed deep appreciation for the strong support that Secretary Gates and the U.S. government gave for the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) status upgrade for the ROK.

15. The Minister and the Secretary received a report on the Military Committee Meeting (MCM) from General Sharp, Commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, highlighting the robust capabilities and operational readiness of the U.S. and ROK combined forces.

16. The Minister and the Secretary praised the mutually beneficial agreement reached between two countries on the War Reserve Stockpile for Allies-Korea (WRSA-K) transfer, and signed the WRSA-K transfer Memorandum of Agreement, which will result in an enhancement of the combined defense capabilities.

17. Minister Lee expressed sincere appreciation to Secretary Gates for the courtesy and hospitality extended to him and his delegation by the Government of the United States, and for the excellent arrangements which contributed to the success of the meeting. The Minister and the Secretary agreed that the discussions during the 40th SCM and 30th MCM not only strengthened the U.S.-ROK Alliance, but also significantly contributed to its development into a future-oriented strategic Alliance. Both sides agreed to hold the 41st SCM in Seoul at a mutually convenient time in 2009.
## Appendix 12. Major International Arms Control Regimes and Organizations

(As of Dec, 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Signed Nations (Enactment/Established)</th>
<th>ROK–DPRK Member States</th>
<th>Key Elements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Weapons</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 191 nations (to be effectuated in Mar, 1970) ROK (Apr, 1975) DPRK (Dec, 1985)</td>
<td>• Prevents proliferation of nuclear weapons and promotes peaceful use of nuclear energy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 145 nations (established in Jul, 1957) ROK (Aug, 1957) DPRK (Jun, 1974) ※Jun, 1994, withdrawal</td>
<td>• Accelerates peaceful use of nuclear energy and performs international cooperation to prevent it from being used for military purposes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 180 nations signed (not effectuated) ROK (Sep, 1999) DPRK (did not sign)</td>
<td>• Bans nuclear testing from all areas including underground/underwater /atmosphere/space in order to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biochemical Weapons</td>
<td>Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 162 nations (to be effectuated in Mar, 1975) ROK (Jun, 1987) DPRK (Mar, 1987)</td>
<td>• Bans all development/production/conservation efforts on biological weapons (agents, toxins)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 185 nations (to be effectuated in Apr, 1997) ROK (Apr, 1997) DPRK (did not sign)</td>
<td>• Bans all development/production/conservation/use of chemical weapons • All chemical weapons must be abandoned within ten years of signing ※ Can be extended for five years if necessary,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 185 nations (established in May 1997) ROK (Apr, 1997) DPRK (did not sign)</td>
<td>• An executive organization to verify and inspect CWC obligations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missle</td>
<td>Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) 130 nations (established in Nov, 2002) ROK (Nov, 2002) DPRK (did not sign)</td>
<td>• A voluntary international board to control activities under consensus that MTCR's export control effort will not effectively stop proliferation of ballistic missiles, ※ Bans supporting missile development for nations with propensity to develop or acquire WMD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classification</td>
<td>Signed Nations (Enactment/Established)</td>
<td>ROK–DPRK Member States</td>
<td>Key Elements</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zangger Committee (ZC)</td>
<td>36 nations (established in Aug, 1974)</td>
<td>ROK (Oct, 1995) DPRK (did not join)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Export Control System</td>
<td>Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)</td>
<td>45 nations (established in Jan, 1978)</td>
<td>ROK (Oct, 1995) DPRK (did not join)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>An export control system for nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies. Non–NPT member states may join the group. Controls export of dual–use items and technologies related to nuclear energy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classification</td>
<td>Signed Nations (Enactment/Established)</td>
<td>ROK–DPRK Member States</td>
<td>Key Elements</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Export Control System</td>
<td>Australia Group (AG)</td>
<td>41 nations (established in Jun, 1985)</td>
<td>ROK (Oct, 1996) DPRK (did not join)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)</td>
<td>34 nations (established in Apr, 1987)</td>
<td>ROK (Mar, 2001) DPRK (did not join)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)</td>
<td>40 nations (established in Jul, 1996)</td>
<td>ROK (July 1996) DPRK (did not join)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN–related Organizations</td>
<td>First Committee</td>
<td>192 nations</td>
<td>ROK (Sep, 1991) DPRK (Sep, 1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC)</td>
<td>192 nations</td>
<td>ROK (Sep, 1991) DPRK (Sep, 1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conference on Disarmament (CD)</td>
<td>65 nations (established in 1979)</td>
<td>ROK (June 1996) DPRK (June 1996)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Visits to the ROK</th>
<th>Overseas Visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| January 2007 | • China’s Deputy Chief of Staffs of PLA  
• Russia’s Chief Director of Intelligence | • Subcommittee Meetings in Tokyo Defense Forum                                   |
| February  |                                                                                  | • Minister of National Defense (MinDef) visits U.S. and Japan                     |
|           |                                                                                  | • Chairman of ROK JCS visits U.S.                                                |
| March     | • Malaysia’s Vice Prime Minister / Defense Minister  
• Japan’s Chief of Joint Staff Office (JSO) | • The Eighth Round of the ROK–China Defense Policy Talks                          |
| April     | • Mongolia’s Chief of Staffs  
• Students from Australia National Defense University (NDU) | • MinDef visits China  
• Chairman of ROK JCS visits Japan                                                 |
| May       | • China’s Chief of General Staff  
• Peru’s Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staffs | • MinDef visits India  
• Army Chief visits Germany, Switzerland, France  
• Defense Security Command (DSC) Commander visits U.S., and Russia  
• The Sixth Round of the ROK–Japan Security Policy Council (Tokyo)  
• ARF Security Policy Meetings (Philippines)  
• The Third Round of the ROK–China Diplomatic Security Talks  
• Participates in International Maritime Defense Industry Exhibition in Singapore |
| June      | • Japan Air Self–Defense Force (JASDF) Western Air Defense Force Commander  
• Vietnam’s 7th Military District Commander | • Asia Security Meetings (Singapore)  
• Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) visits U.S., and Japan  
• CFC Deputy Commander visits U.S.  
• First ROK Army (FROKA) Commander visits Russia  
• Second ROK Army (SROKA) Commander visits Russia  
• Marine Corps (MC) Commander visits U.S., and Japan |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Visits to the ROK</th>
<th>Oversea Visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 2007</td>
<td>• China Jinan Military Region Commander</td>
<td>• AF Chief visits Spain and Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Fifteenth Round of the ROK–Japan Defense Policy Talks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>• Indonesia’s Commander of Joint Forces</td>
<td>• Navy CNO visits Russia and China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Thailand’s Navy Commander</td>
<td>• ARF Foreign Minister’s Talks (Philippines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>• Japan Self-Defense Naval Forces’ Cruise Training Fleet</td>
<td>• Participates in Tokyo Defense Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Russian cruise fleet (SAREX)</td>
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<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>• Mongolia’s Defense Minister</td>
<td>• MC Commander visits Indonesia and Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Indonesia’s Air Force Chief of Staff</td>
<td>• Meetings on the sidelines of the ARF Confidence building/preventive diplomacy meetings (Brunei)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Seventh Round of the ROK–Japan Security Policy Consultation</td>
<td>• ARF NDU Chancellor Meetings (Australia, NZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>• JASDF Western Air Defense Force Commander</td>
<td>• Chairman of ROK JCS visits China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Russia’s ground training observer team</td>
<td>• AF Chief visits Greece, Kuwait, and UAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Third ROK Army (TRÖKA) Commander visits China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The Ninth Round of the ROK–China Defense Policy Talks</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>• Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (Russia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>• The Fifteenth Round of the ROK–Russia Defense Policy Talks</td>
<td>• MinDef visits Saudi Arabia and France</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>• Vice Minister visits Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• ROK–France Defense Strategic Talks</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• ROK–Germany Defense Policy Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The First Round of the ROK–Japan Defense Exchange Cooperation Work–level Meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The Fourth Round of the ROK–U.S.–Japan J–5 Strategic Meetings (Hawaii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The Ninth Round of the ROK–Japan ROK JCS–JGS Department Chief Meetings</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• ROK–India Diplomatic Security Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Participated in International Maritime Air Defense Industry Exhibition in Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2008</td>
<td>• Vietnam’s Navy Commander</td>
<td>• Army Chief visits U.S., China, and Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Indonesia’s Marine Corps Commander</td>
<td>• Navy CNO visits Turkey, Italy and Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• MC Commander visits Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Participates in 2008 NATO Symposium (Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Visits to the ROK</td>
<td>Oversea Visits</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb, 2008</td>
<td>• Thailand’s Marine Corps Commander</td>
<td>• Subcommittee Meetings in Tokyo Defense Forum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| March  | • Indonesia’s Navy Chief  
• Russia’s Deputy Commander of the Far East Forces Military District  
• The Tenth Round of the ROK–Australia Defense Policy Talks  
• The Eighth Round of the ROK–NZ Defense Policy Talks | • The First Round of the ROK–Ukraine Defense Policy Talks  
• ARF PKO Expert Meetings (Singapore)  
• ARF Maritime Security Training (India)  
• NATO HQ and International Disarmament Organization |
| April   | • China Jinan Military Region Director of Political Department  
• Students from Australian NDU                                               | • Chairman of ROK JCS visits Japan  
• AF Chief visits Russia, China and Japan  
• Navy CNO visits Indonesia, Thailand and India  
• ARF Confidence building/preventive diplomacy meetings (Canada) |
| May     | • Greece’s Vice Minister of Defense                                              | • Asia Security Meetings (Singapore)  
• Chairman of ROK JCS visits Lebanon, Qatar, and Iraq  
• Special Warfare Command (SWC) Commander visits U.S.  
• AF Southern Combat Commander visits JASDF Western Air Defense Force Japan  
• ARF Security Policy Meetings (Singapore) |
| June    | • U.S, SecDef  
• Uzbekistan’s Defense Minister  
• Ghana’s Defense Minister  
• Thailand’s Chief Commander  
• The First Round of the ROK–Indonesia Defense Policy Talks  
• Students from Israeli NDU | • Vice Minister visits Brazil, Columbia and U.S.  
• Army Chief visits Saudi Arabia and Turkey  
• MC Commander visits U.S.  
• The First Round of the ROK–NATO Policy Conference Consultative Meetings (Belgium) |
| July    | • Norway’s Vice Minister  
• China Guangzhou Military Region Commander  
• ROK–Russia consultative meeting for execution of the Agreement on Prevention of Maritime Accidents | • MinDef visits Turkey  
• Navy CNO visits UK and France  
• The Sixteenth Round of the ROK–Japan Defense Policy Talks  
• ARF Foreign Minister Meetings (Singapore) |
| August  | • New Zealand Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Students                | • The First Round of the ROK–Singapore Defense Strategic Talks  
• The First Round of the ROK–Mongolia Defense Policy Talks  
• The First ROK–U.S.–Japan SAREX (Hawaii) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Visits to the ROK</th>
<th>Oversea Visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| September 2008 | • Singapore’s Defense Minister  
• Singapore’s AF Chief                                           | • AF Chief visits Indonesia, Ireland, and France  
• CFC Deputy Commander visits U.S.                                                                 |
| October       | • ROK–Russia Military Academic Conference  
• Students from UK Royal NDU | • MinDef visits U.S. (SCM)  
• The Ninth Round of the ROK–Canada Defense Policy Talks  
• ARF confidence building/preventive diplomacy meetings (Singapore)  
• Plenary session of Tokyo Defense Forum |
| November      | • China People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Commander  
• China’s Vice Chiefs of Staffs of PLA  
• Guatemala’s Minister of National Defense  
• Representatives from Russia CGSC  
• ROK–Russia Defense Academic Conference  
• Representatives from NATO Parliamentary Assembly | • MinDef visits Iraq, Lebanon, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia  
• Chairman of ROK JCS visits Turkey, Russia  
• CFC Deputy Commander visits Japan  
• DSC Commander visits Italy, France, Germany, and UK  
• The Twelfth Round of the ROK–U.S.–Japan Security Discussion (U.S.)  
• The Sixteenth Round of the ROK–Russia Defense Policy Talks  
• Northeast Asia Cooperation Talks (China)  
• Army Training Observation Team visits Russia  
• The Eighth Round of the ROK–Japan Security Policy Consultation  
• The Tenth Round of the ROK–China Defense Policy Talks  
• The Tenth Round of the ROK–Australia Council for Politics and Military  
• The Sixth Round of the ROK–NZ Council for Politics and Military  
• ROK–Russia Joint Military Committee |
| December      | • ROK–France Defense Strategy Talks  
• The Second Round of the ROK–Japan Defense Exchange Cooperation Working–level Meetings  
• ROK–U.S.–Japan J–5 Strategic Meetings  
• ROK–Japan ROK JCS–JGS Department Chief Meetings | • Navy Operations Commander visits Russia  
• 1st Fleet Commander visits Japan  
• ARF Disaster Relief Meetings (Indonesia)  
• The Fourth Round of the ROK–Indonesia Council for Politics and Military |
# Appendix 14. Status of Defense Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Defense Budget (100 million Won)</th>
<th>Ratio of Defense Budget to GDP (%)</th>
<th>Ratio of Defense Budget to National Budget (%)</th>
<th>Defense Budget Increase Rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>26,979</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
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<td>5.60</td>
<td>33.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
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<td>4.99</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>4.24</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>47,454</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>55,202</td>
<td>4.03</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
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<td>3.89</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>66,378</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>74,764</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>84,100</td>
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<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>92,154</td>
<td>3.17</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>100,753</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>110,744</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>137,490</td>
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<td>16.4</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
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<td>2.47</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>163,640</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
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<td>14.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
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<td>15.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>211,026</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>225,129</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>244,972</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>266,490</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
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</table>
## Composition of Defense Budget by FY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Defense Budget</th>
<th>Ordinary Operation &amp; Maintenance</th>
<th>Force Improvement Programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Increase rate</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>41,580</td>
<td>12.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>47,454</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>26,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>55,202</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>30,550</td>
</tr>
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<td>60,148</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>34,155</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>66,378</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>38,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>74,764</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>44,988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>84,100</td>
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<td>9.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>79,772</td>
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<td>1997</td>
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<td>89,032</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>138,000</td>
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<td>87,098</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
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<td>144,774</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>153,884</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>101,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>163,640</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>108,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>175,148</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td>138,039</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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<td>167,052</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>244,972</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>178,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>266,490</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>189,677</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* As Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) was established, budget transfer funds and SMA fund which has little relation to force improvement is classified under MND Operation & Maintenance (Force Improvement Programs: FIPs: 33.3 → 25.8%, Ordinary Operation and Maintenance (OOM): 66.7 → 74.2%).

** An increase rate for OOM and FIPs for 2006 is derived by reclassifying 2005 estimates in accordance with the changes made in 2006.
### Year 2008 National Defense Budget by Category

(Unit: 100 million won)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>2007 Budget</th>
<th>2008 Budget</th>
<th>Increase (Decrease)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Defense Budget</strong></td>
<td>244,972</td>
<td>266,490</td>
<td>21,518</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Improvement Programs expenses</td>
<td>66,807</td>
<td>76,813</td>
<td>10,006</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary Operation and Maintenance expenses</td>
<td>178,165</td>
<td>189,677</td>
<td>11,512</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operation of Personnel Strength</strong></td>
<td>110,831</td>
<td>116,817</td>
<td>5,986</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel expenses</td>
<td>96,597</td>
<td>102,146</td>
<td>5,549</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food, Clothing &amp; Outfits expenses</td>
<td>14,234</td>
<td>14,671</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>3.1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Force Maintenance (Project expenses)</strong></td>
<td>67,334</td>
<td>72,860</td>
<td>5,526</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Information</td>
<td>3,340</td>
<td>4,290</td>
<td>950</td>
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<tr>
<td>Service Members Welfare</td>
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<td>2,035</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>17.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistics Support</td>
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<td>27,620</td>
<td>3,919</td>
<td>16.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cultivating Human Resources and Education &amp; Training</td>
<td>2,764</td>
<td>3,019</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of Military Installations</td>
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<td>10,023</td>
<td>−136</td>
<td>−1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of Reserve Forces</td>
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<td>441</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Planning and International Cooperation</td>
<td>8,763</td>
<td>8,339</td>
<td>−424</td>
<td>−4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance and Support of Integrated Forces</td>
<td>7,252</td>
<td>8,128</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense Administration Support</td>
<td>7,057</td>
<td>7,345</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transfer Payment for Military Executive Agency and USFK Base Relocation</strong></td>
<td>2,206</td>
<td>1,620</td>
<td>−586</td>
<td>−26.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

※ Round off to the nearest 10 million won, then approximate at the nearest 100 million won
### Appendix 15. Status of Signing International Defense Industry Cooperation Agreements

#### Nations and Year Signed for International Defense Industry Cooperation Agreements (Memorandum of Understanding)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nations</th>
<th>Year signed</th>
<th>Nations</th>
<th>Year signed</th>
<th>Nations</th>
<th>Year signed</th>
<th>Nations</th>
<th>Year signed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Sep, 1993</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Nov, 1997</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Jan, 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Status of Signing on Other Defense Industry Cooperation Agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Agreement on Exchange of Scientists/Technical Information (Five Nations)</th>
<th>Agreement on Quality Assurance (18 Nations)</th>
<th>Agreement of Price Information Disclosure (Four Nations)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nations</td>
<td>U.S., France, UK, Italy, Israel</td>
<td>U.S., UK, France, Spain, Switzerland, Canada, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Australia, Philippines, Germany, Israel, Turkey, Indonesia, New Zealand, Greece</td>
<td>U.S., UK, Germany, Netherlands</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Defense White Paper 2008
Appendix 16. Combined/Joint Training and Exercises

### ROK–U.S. Combined Exercises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ulchi–Freedom Guardian (UFG) Exercise</td>
<td>Military CP and Government Exercise</td>
<td>• To improve theater–level operational capacity of ROK JCS and U.S. KORCOM during wartime OPCON Transition period,                                     • To gain proficiency in execution of Choongmu Plan and OPLAN,                                                                                           • Exercises Crisis Management procedures,                                                                                           • Exercises conversion to wartime footing,                                                                                           • Exercises OPLAN Execution,                                                                                           • Senior Leader Seminar (SLS) and Joint Tactical Discussions,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Resolve (KR)/Foal Eagle (FE) Exercise</td>
<td>CP Exercise and Field Training Exercise (FTX)</td>
<td>• To gain proficiency in OPLAN execution procedures in order to maintain combined defense posture during wartime OPCON Transition period,                                                                 • To maintain ROK Forces’ capability for war sustainability,                                                                                      • Exercises Crisis Management procedures,                                                                                           • Exercises conversion to wartime footing,                                                                                           • Exercises OPLAN Execution Procedure,                                                                                           • Gaining proficiency in RS01 procedures in Combined Area of Operations,                                                                 • Senior Leader Seminar (SLS) and Joint Tactical Discussions,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Joint Exercises/Training (ROK Forces)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taeguk Exercise</td>
<td>Theater–level CP Exercise</td>
<td>• To improve ROK JCS–led theater–level crisis management and operational capacity,</td>
<td>• Exercises Crisis Management/ conversion to wartime footing, defensive exercise based on war simulation,                                    • Examines ROK JCS restructuring plans, roles, and functions,                                                                                           • Establishing real–time operation executing system in line with Operations Commands,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoguk Exercise</td>
<td>Theater–level large scale Joint Exercise</td>
<td>• To display joint capacity and develop Operations Command–level joint operational capacity,</td>
<td>• Two–way Corps training/ simultaneous training with joint capacities supported by Operations Commands,                                           • Verifying air/ground/sea joint operational system,                                                                                           • Gaining proficiency in integrated warfighting per echelons,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Other Major Combined Exercises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combined counter-terrorism Exercise</td>
<td>Each year</td>
<td>ROK, U.S., Russia</td>
<td>• Physical training, Overcoming of obstacles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK–US, Russian Federation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Rappelling/climbing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK–U.S. anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise (GUAMEX)</td>
<td>Biennial (odd years)</td>
<td>ROK, U.S., Singapore, etc.</td>
<td>• Countermeasures training (Mine Search/Sweep)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK–JAPAN Search and Rescue Exercise</td>
<td>Biennial (odd years)</td>
<td>ROK, Japan</td>
<td>• Basic tactical training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Pacific Countermeasures Exercise (MCMEX)</td>
<td>Biennial (even years)</td>
<td>ROK, Japan, Australia, etc.</td>
<td>• Search and rescue training for stranded vessels and aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Reach</td>
<td>Every 3 years</td>
<td>ROK, U.S., Australia, etc.</td>
<td>• Submarine evacuation and rescue exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK–U.S. anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise (GUAMEX)</td>
<td>Biennial (odd years)</td>
<td>ROK, U.S.</td>
<td>• Submarine to submarine exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Landing Operation Exercise</td>
<td>Each year (with FE)</td>
<td>ROK, U.S.</td>
<td>• CSOF/LOC protection exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Large Force Employment (CLFE)</td>
<td>6 times a year</td>
<td>ROK, U.S.</td>
<td>• Laying offensive mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative Cope Thunder (RED FLAG–Alaska)</td>
<td>Biennial</td>
<td>ROK, Japan, Singapore, Thailand, Australia, etc.</td>
<td>• Mid-altitude infiltration training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK–JAPAN Search and Rescue Exercise</td>
<td>Biennial (odd years)</td>
<td>ROK, Japan</td>
<td>• Promotion of survival/mission performance capabilities during infiltration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Pacific Countermeasures Exercise (MCMEX)</td>
<td>Biennial (even years)</td>
<td>ROK, Japan, Australia, etc.</td>
<td>• Arbitrary selection of similar targets, mastery of peace time attack procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Reach</td>
<td>Every 3 years</td>
<td>ROK, U.S.</td>
<td>• Loading/advance unit operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK–U.S. anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise (GUAMEX)</td>
<td>Biennial (odd years)</td>
<td>ROK, U.S.</td>
<td>• Three-dimensional amphibious assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Landing Operation Exercise</td>
<td>Each year (with FE)</td>
<td>ROK, U.S.</td>
<td>• Maritime maneuver, maritime fire support exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Large Force Employment (CLFE)</td>
<td>6 times a year</td>
<td>ROK, U.S.</td>
<td>• Ground operation(secure/defend coastal bridgehead)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative Cope Thunder (RED FLAG–Alaska)</td>
<td>Biennial</td>
<td>ROK, Japan, Singapore, Thailand, Australia, etc.</td>
<td>• Integrated fire operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK–JAPAN Search and Rescue Exercise</td>
<td>Biennial (odd years)</td>
<td>ROK, Japan</td>
<td>• Mission of low-altitude infiltration and freight dropping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Pacific Countermeasures Exercise (MCMEX)</td>
<td>Biennial (even years)</td>
<td>ROK, Japan, Australia, etc.</td>
<td>• Tactical assault takeoff/landing training on non-pavement airstrip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Reach</td>
<td>Every 3 years</td>
<td>ROK, U.S.</td>
<td>• Promotion of practical air infiltration capability of pilots/crew</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Appendix 17. Organization of the Ministry of National Defense (MND)
Appendix 18. Members of the National Defense Committee, National Assembly (As of November 2008)

Chairman
Kim, HakSong

The Grand National Party (Executive Member)
Yoo, SeongMin
Kim, DongSung
Kim, MokSung
Kim, SungHai
Kim, YoungWoo
Kim, OkLee

Kim, JangSoo
Kim, HyoJae
Yim, TaeHae
Hong, JoonPyo

Ahn, GyuBack
Moon, HeeSang
Seo, JongPyo
Jeong, KukKyo

Lee, JinSam
Sim, DaePyung

The Park’s Party
Seo, CheongWon

The Democratic Party (Executive Member)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Mar, 1–13, 2007 | • 1st Relief in Place for 6th Shift unit of Zaytun Division (Segaero Operations I)  
                     - Deployed Troops: 569 (including 49 for Daiman Unit)  
                     - Withdrawn Troops: 1,174 (including 49 for Daiman Unit)  
                     - Deployed Troops after relief in place: 1,670 (617 reduced) |
| Apr, 26, 2007   | • 2nd Relief in Place for 6th Shift unit of Zaytun Division (Segaero Operations II)  
                     - Deployed Troops: 197 (including 36 for Daiman Unit)  
                     - Withdrawn Troops: 603 (including 39 for Daiman Unit)  
                     - Deployed Troops after relief in place: 1,670 (415 reduced) |
| June 7, 2007    | • 3rd Relief in Place for 6th Shift unit of Zaytun Division (Segaero Operations III)  
                     - Deployed Troops: 370 (including 36 for Daiman Unit)  
                     - Withdrawn Troops: 366 (including 39 for Daiman Unit)  
                     - Deployed Troops after relief in place: no changes |
| Sep, 6, 2007    | • 1st Relief in Place for 7th Shift unit of Zaytun Division (Miraero Operations I)  
                     - Deployed Troops: 544 (including 47 for Daiman Unit)  
                     - Withdrawn Troops: 544 (including 47 for Daiman Unit)  
                     - Deployed Troops after relief in place: no changes |
| Dec, 22, 2007   | • Submit Plans for Zaytun Division Mission Termination to the National Assembly  
                     - Downsize Zaytun Division and cut its missions by half by the end of 2007 (1,255–669)  
                     - Complete all missions and pull out by the end of 2008 |
| Nov, 26, 2007   | • 2nd Relief in Place for 7th Shift unit of Zaytun Division (Miraero Operations II)  
                     - Deployed Troops: 361 (including 61 for Daiman Unit)  
                     - Withdrawn Troops: 620 (including 84 for Daiman Unit)  
                     - Deployed Troops after relief in place: 949 (257 reduced) |
| Dec, 15, 2007   | • Withdraw of troops due to organizational changes in Zaytun Division (1,255 → 659)  
                     (Miraero Operations III)  
                     - Withdrawn Troops: 324 (including 30 for Daiman Unit)  
                     - Deployed Troops after relief in place: 659 |
| Mar, 20, 2008   | • 1st Relief in Place for 8th Shift unit of Zaytun Division (Seungriro Operations I)  
                     - Deployed Troops: 257 (including 43 for Daiman Unit)  
                     - Withdrawn Troops: 280 (including 43 for Daiman Unit)  
                     - Deployed Troops after relief in place: no changes |
| May 29, 2008    | • 2nd Relief in Place for 8th Shift unit of Zaytun Division (Seungriro Operations II)  
                     - Deployed Troops: 358 (including 46 for Daiman Unit)  
                     - Withdrawn Troops: 358 (including 46 for Daiman Unit)  
                     - Deployed Troops after relief in place: no changes |
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
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| Sep, 25, 2008 | • 1st Relief in Place for 9th Shift unit of Zaytun Division (Seungriro Operations III)  
  - Deployed Troops: 264 (Including 45 for Daiman Unit)  
  - Withdrawn Troops: 264 (Including 45 for Daiman Unit)  
  • Deployed Troops after relief in place: no changes |
| Dec, 1, 2008 | • Handover of Zaytun’s Operational Units and Mission Termination Ceremony  
  - Transfer of equipment and materiel to the regional government (KRG): Dec, 3 |
| Dec, 19, 2008 | • Zaytun Division Pulls out, troops return home                         |
## Appendix 20. Status of Defense R&D Investments

### Ratio of Defense R&D to Defense Budget and National R&D

(Unit: 100 million won)

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<th>'04</th>
<th>'05</th>
<th>'06</th>
<th>'07</th>
<th>'08</th>
<th>'09</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense R&amp;D</td>
<td>7,219</td>
<td>7,757</td>
<td>9,087</td>
<td>10,595</td>
<td>12,584</td>
<td>14,522</td>
<td>16,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Budget</td>
<td>175,148</td>
<td>189,41</td>
<td>211,026</td>
<td>225,129</td>
<td>244,97</td>
<td>266,490</td>
<td>285,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of R&amp;D to Defense Budget (%)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National R&amp;D</td>
<td>66,154</td>
<td>70,827</td>
<td>77,996</td>
<td>89,096</td>
<td>97,629</td>
<td>110,784</td>
<td>123,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of R&amp;D to National R&amp;D (%)</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Ratio of R&D to Defense Budget for major nations (2006): U.S. 13.6%, UK 9.1%, France 10.1%

### Details on Defense R&D (2007–2009)

(Unit: 100 million won)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
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<th>'08</th>
<th>'09</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense R&amp;D</td>
<td>12,584</td>
<td>14,522</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Defense Technologies</td>
<td>2,983</td>
<td>3,731</td>
<td>25.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADD–led system development (Including reinforcement of R&amp;D infrastructure)</td>
<td>3,783</td>
<td>3,292</td>
<td>22.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating ADD</td>
<td>1,374</td>
<td>1,957</td>
<td>13.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporation–led system development</td>
<td>2,594</td>
<td>3,422</td>
<td>23.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D for national policies</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>2,120</td>
<td>14.60</td>
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* ADD: Agency for Defense Development

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<tr>
<td>Army/Navy/Air Force Satellite Information System (ANASIS)</td>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK Joint Command &amp; Control System (KJCCS)</td>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea Naval Command &amp; Control System (KNCCS)</td>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force Command &amp; Control System (AFCCS)</td>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ground Force Capability</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K1A1 Tank</td>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
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<tr>
<td>K-9 155mm Self-propelled Artillery</td>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
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<tr>
<td>Munitions Transporting Vehicle (K-10)</td>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
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<tr>
<td>Large-caliber MLRS</td>
<td>Import Technology for Production</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newly Developed Decontamination Vehicle</td>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
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<td><strong>Naval Force Capability</strong></td>
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<td>Destroyer (DDH-II)</td>
<td>Domestic Construction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submarine (SS-II)</td>
<td>Domestic Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Transport Ship Helicopter (LPH)</td>
<td>Domestic Construction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amphibious Assault Vehicle</td>
<td>Import Technology for Production</td>
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<td><strong>Air Force Capability</strong></td>
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<td>Foreign Purchase</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aerial Control Aircraft (KA-1)</td>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advanced Trainer (T-50)</td>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Air Defense Capability</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short–Range Surface to Air Missile (Chunma)</td>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30mm Self–propelled Anti–aircraft Artillery (Biho)</td>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man–portable Air Defense (Shingung)</td>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
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<td>SAM–X (Patriot)</td>
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