



Australian Government
Defence

NATIONAL DEFENCE STRATEGY

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Defence acknowledges the Traditional Custodians of Country throughout Australia. Defence recognises their continuing connection to traditional lands and waters and would like to pay respect to their Elders both past and present.

Defence would also like to pay respect to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people who have contributed to the defence of Australia in times of peace and war.

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Foreword

There is no greater responsibility for the Government than defending Australia. That is why the Albanese Government is committed to deploying all elements of national power to protect our security, interests and way of life.

This National Defence Strategy acknowledges that Australia's security and prosperity are inextricably linked. Australia's future depends in large part upon protecting our economic connection to the world, upholding the global rules-based order, maintaining a favourable regional strategic balance and contributing to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific.

The 2023 Defence Strategic Review recommended a biennial strategic update through a National Defence Strategy. This should be done in combination with a biennial review of the Integrated Investment Program. Accordingly, the 2024 National Defence Strategy is the first iteration of the strategic update and should be read in conjunction with the 2024 Integrated Investment Program.

Australia's strategic environment

The Defence Strategic Review observed that Australia faced its most challenging strategic environment since the Second World War. It also reaffirmed that Australia no longer enjoys the benefit of a ten-year window of strategic warning time for conflict. Since then, our strategic circumstances have continued to deteriorate, consistent with the trends the Defence Strategic Review identified.

Entrenched and increasing strategic competition between the United States (US) and China is a primary feature of our security environment. It is being accompanied by an unprecedented conventional and non-conventional military build-up in our region, taking place without strategic reassurance or transparency. The challenges to regional stability and prosperity arising from this competition are being compounded by a range of other security risks, including climate change, grey-zone activities and technological advancements.

Beyond the Indo-Pacific, Russia's unprovoked, illegal and immoral invasion of Ukraine and Iran's support for Hamas and other proxies are examples of how revisionist states continue to challenge the rules and norms that are so important to our interests and our own region's continued security, stability and prosperity.

While a major conflict is not inevitable, this new reality is making the pursuit of Australia's interests more challenging.

A new approach to Australia's defence

Australia's strategic environment demands a fundamentally new approach to the defence of Australia and its interests. Accordingly, the Government has urgently assessed the most consequential security risks we face and developed a comprehensive strategy to address them.

This new approach is the foundational principle that underpins the National Defence Strategy and is based on the concept of *National Defence* – a coordinated, whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach that harnesses all arms of national power to defend Australia and advance our interests. Just as important as strategy are the tools available to effect that strategy. The National Defence Strategy must therefore be read in parallel with the Integrated Investment Program, which sets out the specific defence capabilities the Government will invest in.

These two documents build on the Defence Strategic Review, which concluded that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as it was then constituted and equipped was not fully fit for purpose. It called for a fully integrated and more focused ADF characterised by enhanced lethality and greater range, and for Defence policy and activities to be better coordinated with Australia's broader statecraft.

The National Defence Strategy sets out the Government's strategic framework to guide the significant and urgent changes required to transform Defence's capability, force posture, force structure, acquisition, recruitment and international engagement.

The National Defence Strategy will see a Strategy of Denial become the cornerstone of Defence planning. This approach aims to deter any conflict before it begins, prevent any potential adversary from succeeding in coercing Australia through force, support regional security and prosperity and uphold a favourable regional strategic balance.

Together, the National Defence Strategy and the Integrated Investment Program are designed to ensure the ADF has the capacity to:

- ▶ defend Australia and our immediate region;
- ▶ deter through denial any potential adversary's attempt to project power against Australia through our northern approaches;
- ▶ protect Australia's economic connection to our region and the world;
- ▶ contribute with our partners to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific; and
- ▶ contribute with our partners to the maintenance of the global rules-based order.

Capability priorities

The adoption of *National Defence* means the ADF will shift from a balanced force capable of responding to a range of contingencies, to an integrated, focused force designed to address Australia's most significant strategic risks. We have reset our defence capability priorities to deliver this fundamental change. This reset has involved a complete rebuild of the Integrated Investment Program to ensure it is a coherent, logical and affordable plan for defence capability.

In rebuilding the Integrated Investment Program, the Government has made decisions to prioritise and fund the acquisition of key capabilities to bolster Australia's deterrence capabilities. We have also made tough but necessary decisions to cancel, divest, delay or re-scope projects or activities that are not critical to delivering the force our strategic circumstances require. This reprioritisation has enabled us to accelerate new, immediate and longer-term priority projects and capabilities.

People

People are Defence's most important asset. As the ADF transitions to an integrated, focused force, Defence's workforce plans must change to effectively respond to the workforce crisis it faces. It must recruit, retain and grow the highly specialised and skilled workforce required to meet Defence's capability needs and achieve the objectives of *National Defence*. Defence must also continue to evolve its culture to underpin the significant reform required to deliver the National Defence Strategy.

The Government has introduced several key initiatives to improve recruitment and retention. This includes the ADF Continuation Bonus, enhanced access to study opportunities, expanded health benefits, and additional services and allowances for ADF members and dependants. Defence is also widening eligibility criteria to enable more people to join the ADF, among other important initiatives. These are important steps, but more work will be needed to address Defence's workforce crisis.

Partnerships

To respond effectively to the strategic environment we face, Australia must work even more closely with our international partners to maintain regional peace and prosperity and ensure a favourable regional strategic balance. These partnerships are also critical to protect Australia's economic connection to the world and support the global rules-based order.

Our Alliance with the US remains fundamental to Australia's national security. We will continue to deepen and expand our defence engagement with the US, including by pursuing greater scientific, technological and industrial cooperation, as well as enhancing our cooperation under force posture initiatives. Along with the United Kingdom (UK), our technology and capability cooperation with the US under the auspices of AUKUS is essential to building the ADF's capacity to deliver impactful projection across the full spectrum of proportionate response.

Australia will also invest in deepening our defence relationships with partners across Southeast Asia and the Pacific, as well as in the Indian Ocean and North Asia regions. This includes continuing to expand our partnerships with Japan and India. Australia will also continue to work closely with like-minded partners outside the Indo-Pacific including key European nations.

Budget

Resourcing will underpin our ability to deliver the National Defence Strategy. To this end, we are making a generational reinvestment in the ADF's posture, capability and structure.

The Government has increased Defence funding to historic proportions which will see an additional investment of \$5.7 billion over the next four years to 2027-28 and \$50.3 billion over the next decade to 2033-34, above the previous trajectory over that period.

We have also improved the quality of spend through our commitment to a minimum viable capability approach to acquisition and by reforming and streamlining processes to minimise the burden of working with Defence.

The path forward

This National Defence Strategy and the Integrated Investment Program provide a blueprint to deliver an ambitious transformation of the ADF into an integrated, focused force that will be positioned to safeguard Australia's security and contribute to regional peace and prosperity for decades to come.

The Government has committed to a biennial National Defence Strategy cycle to ensure Defence policy, strategy, capability and planning keep pace with the rapidly evolving strategic environment, respond to Australia's national security priorities and provide clarity of process and approach to defence industry.

The next National Defence Strategy will be delivered in 2026.



The Hon Richard Marles MP

Deputy Prime Minister

Minister for Defence

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Chapter 1:

Strategic Environment

- 1.1 The Defence Strategic Review identified a new strategic reality for Australia. It observed that, while conflict in the Indo-Pacific is not inevitable, Australia faces its most complex and challenging strategic environment since the Second World War.
- 1.2 Australia's strategic environment has continued to deteriorate since the release of the Defence Strategic Review, consistent with the trends it identified. The optimism at the end of the Cold War has been replaced by the uncertainty and tensions of entrenched and increasing strategic competition between the US and China. This competition is being framed by an intense contest of narratives and values.
- 1.3 The competition is playing out in military and non-military ways, including economic and diplomatic. It is accompanied by an unprecedented conventional and non-conventional military build-up in our region, taking place without strategic reassurance or transparency. The effects of this build-up are occurring closer to Australia than previously. This build-up is also increasing the risk of military escalation or miscalculation that could lead to a major conflict in the region.
- 1.4 At the same time, volatility is manifesting in conflict and crises in multiple regions, including Europe and the Middle East. Russia's unprovoked, illegal and immoral invasion of Ukraine demonstrates the destructive reality of modern conflict when a nation attempts to achieve its ambitions through force.
- 1.5 These dynamics are making the pursuit of Australia's interests more challenging. They also reaffirm the judgement, first set out in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and confirmed in the Defence Strategic Review, that there is no longer a ten-year window of strategic warning time for conflict.

- 1.6 In this environment, Australia must work even more closely with the US, our closest ally and principal strategic partner. We must also work with other key partners – notably New Zealand, Japan, our partners in Southeast Asia and the Pacific family, the Republic of Korea, India as well as the UK and other European nations – that share our concerns and are prepared to strengthen cooperation in support of shared interests.
- 1.7 These shared interests include maintaining regional peace and prosperity and ensuring the regional strategic balance supports all countries being able to peacefully pursue their objectives free from coercion. An unfavourable balance would increase the risk of regional countries, including Australia, being coerced and losing their ability to pursue their sovereign interests peacefully.
- 1.8 Maintaining a favourable regional strategic balance is as important for Australia's economy as it is for our security. As a middle-power maritime nation, Australia relies on the free flow of goods, services and finance in the global market, and the rules and norms that protect these activities. As such, Australia's economic prosperity and security remain intimately tied to developments in the international system and the maintenance of global peace and stability.

Strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific

- 1.9 Increasing strategic competition between the US and China is a primary feature of Australia's security environment and will likely have the greatest impact on the regional strategic balance. While it has global implications, this competition is sharpest and most consequential in the Indo-Pacific.
- 1.10 As China's strategic and economic weight grows, Australia expects it will continue to seek to play a more prominent role in the region. This will include leveraging all elements of its power as it pursues its strategic objectives, including to change the current regional balance in its favour.
- 1.11 However, China has employed coercive tactics in pursuit of its strategic objectives, including forceful handling of territorial disputes and unsafe intercepts of vessels and aircraft operating in international waters and airspace in accordance with international law. Some of China's initiatives in the Indo-Pacific also lack transparency around their purpose and scope.
- 1.12 The risk of a crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait is increasing, as well as at other flashpoints, including disputes in the South and East China Seas and on the border with India. There is increasing competition for access and influence across the Indian Ocean, including efforts to secure dominance over sea lanes and strategic ports.

- 1.13 That said, US-China dialogue, both at the leader-level and military-level, is useful in preventing miscalculation and ensuring differences can be worked through in a way that supports stability.
- 1.14 In the context of this competition, Australia and all countries in the Indo-Pacific have a vital role and interest in maintaining a region where state sovereignty is protected, international law is followed and nations can make decisions free from coercion.
- 1.15 Another feature of Australia's strategic environment is increasing competition for influence and access in the Pacific, including security cooperation. Leaders of the Pacific have committed to a Pacific family-first approach to security, as outlined in the 2022 Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Communique. It is in the region's interest that security challenges in the Pacific continue to be addressed through regional, Pacific-led approaches. The strong and deep relationships within the Pacific, including with the Pacific nations of Australia and New Zealand, provide a strong foundation on which to uphold regional prosperity and resilience. Australia's aim is to remain the partner of choice for the Pacific family, including in security cooperation.
- 1.16 The Australian Government encourages all countries to be transparent about their strategic intentions and to ensure their actions support regional security and stability.

US engagement in the Indo-Pacific

- 1.17 The US is deepening its engagement with its Indo-Pacific partners and allies, recognising that collective approaches are crucial to maintaining the regional balance and enhancing collective defence, military-industrial, economic and diplomatic capabilities.
- 1.18 Australia's security will continue to be underpinned by the strength of our partnerships with regional countries and our Alliance with the US. Australia-US security arrangements, interoperability, intelligence sharing and industrial cooperation are critical to Australia's national security. The Australian Government is also pursuing greater defence and technology cooperation with the US in the Alliance context and with the UK, including through AUKUS.

Compounding security risks

- 1.19 The challenges to regional stability and prosperity arising from strategic competition are being compounded by a range of other risks including climate change, which is posing an unprecedented challenge.
- 1.20 The effects of climate change are amplifying existing stressors across the region, such as poverty, food security and cross-border migration and displacement. These effects may also intensify transboundary tensions and have impacts on Australia's national security. The increasing frequency of climate events will place higher demands on the ADF for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations regionally and domestically, placing greater stress on ADF capability, capacity and infrastructure. There remains potential for state volatility which could require support from Australia or the broader Pacific family.
- 1.21 Grey-zone activities have also expanded in the Indo-Pacific. In addition to conventional military forces, some countries are employing para-military forces more frequently, including China's actions in the South China Sea. Threats posed by state and non-state actors in the cyber domain are also multiplying.
- 1.22 North Korea has continued its destabilising behaviours, including its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, flouting UN Security Council resolutions and threatening the Republic of Korea and the broader region.
- 1.23 Beyond the Indo-Pacific, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and Iran's support for Hamas and other proxies are examples of how revisionist states can undermine peace and stability. Russia continues to prosecute the war in Ukraine, including through the use of lethal aid supplied by Iran and North Korea. These countries are deepening cooperation with each other and their behaviour is challenging the global rules-based order.
- 1.24 There remains potential for tension and miscommunication between India and Pakistan, and between India and China – with the risk of nuclear weapons use or proliferation a factor in each potential flashpoint. The threat of terrorism from politically and religiously motivated extremist groups will endure, fuelled in part by ongoing violence and volatility in the Middle East.
- 1.25 The state-based pursuit of weapons of mass destruction will likely grow as arms control frameworks come under greater strain and strategic competition intensifies. Russia, China and North Korea are building more diverse and sophisticated nuclear arsenals, while Iran continues to breach its nuclear-related obligations. Australia's best protection against the increasing risk of nuclear escalation is US extended nuclear deterrence and the pursuit of new avenues of arms control.

Technological advancement and disruption

- 1.26 Technology has already overturned one of Australia's long-standing advantages – geography. Geography cannot protect Australia against new long-range missiles, space and cyber-attacks, disinformation, supply chain disruptions and the erosion of global rules and norms. Russia's invasion of Ukraine spurred inflation and exacerbated a global food and fuel crisis, while also invoking the threat of nuclear weapons use which would have global consequences.
- 1.27 Countries in the Indo-Pacific are investing in new and sophisticated weapons. These weapons are frequently characterised by greater range and speed and are increasingly difficult to counter. It is natural for countries to seek to modernise their armed forces and keep pace with technology. However, it is vital for stability and to minimise tensions that such modernisation is accompanied by transparency and strategic reassurance.
- 1.28 In line with its growing strategic and economic weight, China is improving its capabilities in all areas of warfare at a pace and scale not seen in the world for nearly a century. This is happening without transparency about its strategic purpose. Some of the capabilities it is designing and deploying are highly advanced, including a growing number of nuclear weapons, new missiles, more potent warships and nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines. Since the Defence Strategic Review, China has continued fielding new strike missiles including hypersonic missiles, land-attack cruise missiles and advanced long-range surface-to-air missiles.
- 1.29 Space and cyber capabilities play a significant role in safeguarding national security, which means they are equally as important as the maritime, land and air domains that they support and enable. Space is a critical enabler of military operations, supporting communications, targeting and situational awareness. Malicious cyber operations will be used by states to pursue their goals, including to support espionage and disinformation. Malign actors – both state and non-state – are improving their cyber capabilities, increasing the risk of disruptions to Australia's critical systems, infrastructure and networks.
- 1.30 The greatest gains in military effectiveness in the coming decade will be generated by better integrating existing and emerging technologies. Broader institutional innovations – including boosting military-industrial capacity and military adaptation – will play a critical role in this regard. Ukraine's experience has demonstrated the high value of maintaining military preparedness. This includes building a robust military-industrial base with secure supply chains and developing the ability to effectively integrate emerging technologies.
- 1.31 The following chapter sets out how this new strategic reality requires a fundamentally new approach to Australia's defence – one that leverages and coordinates all arms of national power to achieve an integrated approach to Australia's national security.

2



Chapter 2:

National Defence

- 2.1 As set out in the Defence Strategic Review, the current strategic environment has diminished Australia's historical and geographical advantages and demands a new approach to defending Australia and its national interests. This new approach is based on the concept of *National Defence*.
- 2.2 *National Defence* is a coordinated, whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach to meet the strategic challenges Australia faces, including the threat of conflict and the prospect of coercion. It is much broader than the previous military strategic concept of *Defence of Australia*: it harnesses all arms of Australia's national power to establish a holistic, integrated and focused approach to protect our security and advance our interests.
- 2.3 This concept draws on Australia's innate strengths and unique contributions to the region. These include our status as an influential middle power; our enduring democratic values; our history of safeguarding international rules and contributing to regional architectures; the strong foundations of our economy; and the strength of our partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.
- 2.4 As a key element of *National Defence*, the Government is making a generational reinvestment in the ADF's posture, capability and structure. The Government is determined to ensure that Australia becomes more capable, self-reliant and takes greater responsibility for its own security.

2.5 In addition to its investment in the ADF, *National Defence* works alongside broader initiatives aimed at achieving:

- ▶ **Integrated statecraft** – by taking a whole-of-government approach to advancing shared economic and security interests, involving all tools of statecraft. This includes by building regional trust and confidence, being transparent about Australia’s military capabilities and strategic intent, ensuring a favourable regional strategic balance and resisting all forms of coercion.
- ▶ **National resilience** – by bolstering Australia’s ability to anticipate, prevent, absorb and recover from natural and human-induced threats and hazards. Building national resilience requires closer partnerships between the Commonwealth, states, territories and industry. These partnerships will help address challenges that require effective coordination between all levels of government, including threats to sovereignty, social cohesion, critical infrastructure and transport security. These partnerships will also enable more effective responses to foreign interference, espionage, terrorism and violent extremism. National resilience includes ensuring that civil society and civil infrastructure can support ADF requirements, including our network of northern bases, roads, railways, ports and telecommunication networks. National resilience also requires the Commonwealth to work with states and territories to develop alternative capabilities for crisis response and recovery so that the ADF is only used as a force of last resort.
- ▶ **Industry resilience** – by developing and maintaining a stronger defence industrial base with the domestic capability and capacity to support the ADF during crisis or conflict. This includes developing the knowledge and skills of Australia’s domestic workforce, investing in domestic research and development in technologies with a clear pathway to acquisition, and maintaining a domestic footprint for local manufacturing. Close industrial collaboration with key international partners will reduce Australia’s vulnerability to coercion, diminish the impacts and utility of coercion against Australia and our partners, and bolster the resilience of Australian industry. It will also help strengthen these partnerships.
- ▶ **Supply chain resilience** – by accelerating efforts between the Commonwealth, states, territories and industry to secure Australia’s supply chains and strengthen Australia’s capacity to recover from – and minimise the impact of – supply disruptions. This includes diverse supply chains, protected suppliers, civil transport capacity and secure lines of communication. These efforts will be bolstered by initiatives to integrate supply chains with key international partners and the establishment of a maritime strategic fleet.

- ▶ **Innovation, science and technology** – by ensuring Australia’s research and innovation sector supports the most pressing defence and security priorities to accelerate the delivery of next-generation capabilities to the ADF, including through significant investments in the Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA) and under AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities.
- ▶ **A workforce and skills base** – by achieving the generational uplift in capability needed for *National Defence*, which requires a skilled, professional and diverse workforce across all sectors of national security activity. Initiatives like the joint Commonwealth and South Australian Government Defence Industry Workforce and Skills Taskforce and the Commonwealth and Western Australia Nuclear Powered Submarine Steering Group are essential tools to ensure a workforce with the necessary skills is available to meet our security challenges. Our workplaces must prioritise inclusion, wellbeing and safety.
- ▶ **A robust National Intelligence Community** – by providing strategic decision-making advantage, strategic warning, as well as direct support to ADF operations and domestic security.

Defence’s contribution to National Defence

- 2.6 Defence plays a unique and vital role in *National Defence* as the only arm of the Government that generates and employs military power.
- 2.7 The adoption of *National Defence* means the ADF will shift from a balanced force designed to respond to a range of contingencies to an integrated, focused force designed to address the nation’s most significant strategic risks. The capabilities required to address these risks will also provide the ability to respond to a range of other Government priorities and tasks.
- 2.8 The following chapter sets out the Government’s Defence Strategy, which directly contributes to *National Defence*.

3



Chapter 3:

Defence Strategy

- 3.1 Against the backdrop of intensifying strategic competition, and in concert with Australia's other tools of statecraft, Australia's Defence Strategy seeks to deter any actions that could lead to conflict, military coercion or direct action against Australia or our interests.
- 3.2 To focus Defence planning on this objective, the Government has adopted a Strategy of Denial. The Strategy of Denial aims to deter any conflict before it begins, prevent any potential adversary from succeeding in coercing Australia through force, support regional security and prosperity, and uphold a favourable regional strategic balance.
- 3.3 Delivering the Strategy of Denial requires credible ADF capabilities that will complicate the calculus of any potential adversary. The Government will achieve this by increasing the range and lethality of the ADF, strengthening Australia's national resilience and focusing Defence's international engagement efforts on enhancing interoperability and collective deterrence.
- 3.4 The Strategy of Denial guides Defence's contribution to *National Defence* and spans five domains – maritime, land, air, space and cyber. It focuses on safeguarding Australia's interests in our primary area of military interest, the immediate region encompassing the Northeast Indian Ocean through maritime Southeast Asia into the Pacific. This region includes our northern approaches.

Strategy of Denial

Designed to deter a potential adversary from taking actions that would be inimical to Australia's interests and regional stability. The Strategy of Denial involves working with the US and key partners to ensure no country attempts to achieve its regional objectives through military action. By signalling a credible ability to hold potential adversary forces at risk, this strategy also seeks to deter attempts to coerce Australia through force. Both objectives involve altering any potential adversary's belief that it could achieve its ambitions with military force at an acceptable cost.

- 3.5 The Strategy of Denial requires a re-weighting of the three prevailing strategic defence objectives:
- ▶ **Shape** Australia's strategic environment;
 - ▶ **Deter** actions against Australia's interests; and
 - ▶ **Respond** with credible military force, when required.
- 3.6 While previously these objectives had been given equal weight in Australia's strategic settings, deterrence is now Australia's primary strategic defence objective. Accordingly, Defence's shaping activities and the signalling of Australia's response capabilities must more clearly support deterrence.
- 3.7 The Government's defence strategy, capability plans and resources are now focused on:
- ▶ responding to the threat of conflict and the prospect of coercion;
 - ▶ Australia's primary area of military interest – while acknowledging that developments in cyber, space, nuclear and long-range precision strike mean Australia's security interests are not bound by geography alone;
 - ▶ aligning efforts across Government to deliver *National Defence*; and
 - ▶ coordinating with the US and other key partners to contribute to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific as a priority, while providing calibrated contributions outside of Australia's primary area of military interest as appropriate and necessary.

Deter actions against Australia's interests

- 3.8 Deterrence is the use of the military and other elements of national power to discourage or restrain a potential adversary from taking unwanted actions. It involves having in place measures and responses that change a potential adversary's risk assessment and therefore decision-making calculus.
- 3.9 To deter actions against Australia's interests, Defence must work with other government agencies, the US and other key partners to make a credible contribution to a favourable regional strategic balance and be able to hold at risk forces likely to target Australian interests. This includes by:
- ▶ demonstrating our capability and resolve to respond to and withstand attacks on Australian territory, including by conducting advanced military exercises with the US and key regional partners;
 - ▶ protecting Australia's critical sea lines of communication;
 - ▶ supporting the maintenance of the global rules-based order;
 - ▶ strengthening defence cooperation with our closest neighbours in Australia's primary area of military interest;
 - ▶ strengthening the individual and collective capabilities of Australia, the UK and the US under AUKUS, including through enhanced trilateral defence capability and technology sharing; and
 - ▶ signalling our high level of situational awareness in Australia's primary area of military interest.

Shape Australia's strategic environment

- 3.10 Defence's international engagement is an important part of Australia's efforts to maintain regional peace and prosperity, and to prevent conflict before it occurs. Defence must focus its international engagement on maintaining regional stability in the Pacific, Southeast Asia and the Northeast Indian Ocean. This includes:
- ▶ deepening engagement between the ADF and its close partners in the region to build trust and confidence;
 - ▶ developing security partnerships that demonstrate a collective resolve and capability to withstand military coercion;
 - ▶ leveraging Australia's strong diplomatic, intelligence and security relationships to reinforce Australia's reliability as a partner and commitment to transparency;

- ▶ developing strong defence industry links that support a favourable regional and global strategic balance;
- ▶ contributing to strategic stability mechanisms to reduce the risk of conflict;
- ▶ providing reassurance to regional partners through transparent statements of strategic intent and capability;
- ▶ working with partners to enhance Australia and the region's resilience; and
- ▶ contributing to a region that reinforces agreed rules and supports regional architecture.

Respond with credible military force


3.11 Credible military capability underpins the Strategy of Denial. Defence must possess sufficient capability to credibly hold at risk forces that could attempt to project power against Australian territory and our northern approaches. This requirement has implications for the ADF's structure, posture and preparedness planning, including the need for:

- ▶ increasing lethality;
- ▶ enhancing the ability to project and sustain deployed forces in Australia's primary area of military interest, and to operate with the US in support of shared security objectives;
- ▶ improving Defence's ability to withstand attacks and continue operations;
- ▶ maintaining awareness of regional military trends and strategic intent;
- ▶ investing in the enabling capabilities that support the exercise of effective command and control, including intelligence and warfighting networks;
- ▶ adequate levels of recruitment and retention to achieve and sustain the required Defence workforce;
- ▶ appropriate levels of preparedness; and
- ▶ maintaining the ability to support stability operations and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Indo-Pacific.

The ADF's five tasks

- 3.12 Australia's interests remain global. In an interconnected world, events outside the Indo-Pacific can directly affect our interests, including through supply chain disruption, disinformation and attempts to reshape the multilateral system. As the conflict in Ukraine shows, events in Europe can have implications for the Indo-Pacific.
- 3.13 Accordingly, the defence of Australia's interests lies in the protection of our economic connection to the world and the maintenance of the global rules-based order. The ADF must maintain the capacity to:
- ▶ **Defend** Australia and our immediate region;
 - ▶ **Deter** through denial any potential adversary's attempt to project power against Australia through our northern approaches;
 - ▶ **Protect** Australia's economic connection to our region and the world;
 - ▶ **Contribute** with our partners to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific; and
 - ▶ **Contribute** with our partners to the maintenance of the global rules-based order.
- 3.14 The Strategy of Denial and the ADF's five tasks provide focus for Defence, including for its force structure planning. The implications of this are set out in more detail in the next chapter.

4



Chapter 4:

Defence Force Structure, Posture and Bases

ADF structure

- 4.1 The ADF is shifting from a balanced force capable of responding to a range of contingencies, to an integrated, focused force designed to address the nation's most significant strategic risks. This force must be more capable of the impactful projection of military power.
- 4.2 The ADF force structure must also be integrated across five domains – maritime, land, air, space and cyber – with the capabilities that are vital to the ADF's posture and preparedness.
- 4.3 Through focused investment over the next decade, the Government will progressively enhance the ADF's ability to deter a potential adversary from projecting force against Australia and, if required, sustain operations during a crisis or conflict.

ADF preparedness and national resilience

- 4.4 Preparedness and resilience are central to effective deterrence. The Government is strengthening the ADF's ability to withstand, endure and recover from disruption. This is an important part of the broader approach to enhancing national resilience, emergency management and crisis response and recovery capabilities set out in Chapter 2.

Three epochs

- 4.5 The Government will evolve ADF force structure, posture and preparedness over three critical time periods in order to achieve a more impactful force posture:
- ▶ now until 2025 – the **Enhanced Force-in-Being** will focus on immediate enhancements that can be made to the current force.
 - ▶ 2026 to 2030 – the **Objective Integrated Force** will see the accelerated acquisition of critical capabilities.
 - ▶ 2031 and beyond – the **Future Integrated Force** will see the delivery of an ADF that is fit for purpose across all domains and enablers.
- 4.6 The Government’s capability plans as set out in the Integrated Investment Program focus on transforming the ADF in the medium to long-term by introducing next-generation capabilities as soon as possible. A generational uplift in Defence’s capabilities will provide a more credible ability to implement the Strategy of Denial.

Six capability effects

- 4.7 This transformation will focus on delivering the following six key capability effects.

Project force

- 4.8 The ADF will be optimised for impactful projection to deter any attempts to project power against Australia. This includes ensuring the ADF has the ability to rapidly deploy and employ forces in response to direct threats to our national security.

Hold a potential adversary’s forces at risk

- 4.9 The ADF requires the ability to hold at risk any potential adversary forces that could target our interests during a conflict, complicating their cost and risk calculus.

Protect ADF forces and supporting critical infrastructure in Australia

- 4.10 Defence’s ability to protect its personnel, critical facilities and information in Australia underpins its ability to defend Australia, project force and hold the forces of any potential adversary at risk. The ability to withstand and recover from attack signals to any potential adversary the extent of Australia’s resolve to defend itself.

Sustain protracted combat operations

- 4.11 The ADF must be able to sustain protracted operations during a conflict, including in circumstances involving disruptions to command and control networks, infrastructure, logistics networks and communications systems. Defence's ability to sustain protracted operations despite these disruptions underpins the ability to credibly respond to threats.

Maintain persistent situational awareness in our primary area of military interest

- 4.12 Defence, working with other government agencies, must be able to maintain persistent situational awareness of our primary area of military interest. This includes an awareness of the strategic intent and capability of any potential adversary in order to provide warning time and decision-making space for the Government.

Achieve decision advantage

- 4.13 Defence must be able to exercise effective command and control during conflict. This ability must be able to withstand disruption to enable the ADF to achieve its operational objectives when and where needed. At the same time, Defence must also be able to undermine a potential adversary's ability to exercise its own effective command and control in order to complicate its cost and risk calculus.

ADF basing requirements

Domestic force posture

- 4.14 Defence must posture to enable the impactful projection of military effects from Australia, to project and sustain a deployed force and to drive efficient use of training areas. Defence's domestic force posture is to:
- ▶ deliver a logistically networked and resilient set of bases, predominantly across the north of Australia, to enhance force projection and improve Defence's ability to recover from an attack;
 - ▶ maintain a resilient network of southern basing infrastructure focused on force generation, sustainment, health networks, and logistics nodes to sustain combat operations and support the projection of Australian forces;
 - ▶ increase protection of bases and provide the ability to withstand disruption in crisis or conflict;

- ▶ enable enhanced US and key partner training and cooperation on Australian territory where these activities are in our national interest;
- ▶ adopt climate adaptation strategies and energy resilience; and
- ▶ adopt civil-military arrangements for infrastructure in the event of a crisis or conflict.

4.15 Defence must focus force posture efforts and resourcing on bases most appropriate to the strategic circumstances. Bases no longer meeting this criterion must be appropriately divested. Effective management and rationalisation of the Defence estate is a complex but essential undertaking.

4.16 The Defence Estate Audit report, commissioned as part of the Government's response to the recommendations of the Defence Strategic Review, makes key recommendations for reorienting the Defence estate to meet current and future security challenges. The Government will finalise specific responses to the audit later in 2024. Defence estate holdings will be reviewed as part of the biennial National Defence Strategy cycle to ensure continued alignment with Defence priorities.



5



Chapter 5:

People

- 5.1 People are Defence's most important asset. Defence is focused on recruiting, retaining and growing the highly specialised and skilled workforce required to meet Defence's capability needs.
- 5.2 As the ADF transforms from a balanced to an integrated, focused force, Defence's workforce plans must also change to effectively respond to the workforce crisis it faces, noting the ADF is currently around 4,400 personnel under strength. This crisis is impacting both ADF recruitment of new personnel and retention of existing, highly skilled personnel.
- 5.3 Defence must address immediate workforce needs while also building a long-term workforce pipeline. To achieve this, Defence is placing a strong focus on enhancing the culture of the organisation and improving workforce wellbeing. Defence is also prioritising programs to prevent suicide and is positioned to respond with urgency to the Government's accepted recommendations from the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide.

Recruitment and retention

- 5.4 Defence must fundamentally transform its recruitment and retention systems to achieve its workforce priorities. Improved recruiting and retention efforts must focus on:
 - ▶ widening eligibility criteria to enable more people to join the ADF, including developing options to recruit, where appropriate, non-Australian citizens;
 - ▶ streamlining the recruiting system to translate this wider pool of eligible applicants into an increase in the number of ADF recruits;

- ▶ improving processes to enable faster recruiting so that skills gaps are met more quickly; and
 - ▶ encouraging current personnel, who have built the skills and expertise the ADF needs, to stay and serve longer through retention initiatives.
- 5.5 The highly competitive national labour market across all sectors and record low levels of unemployment will continue to put pressure on Defence's ability to attract and retain the right people.
- 5.6 The Government has implemented targeted financial and non-financial initiatives to increase the size of the ADF. This includes the ADF Continuation Bonus which provides eligible individuals access to a \$50,000 payment at the end of their initial service period. Defence has also enhanced access to study opportunities and expanded the ADF Health Benefits Program, providing additional services and increasing allowances to ADF members and dependants.
- 5.7 The Government will also continue to prioritise targeted recruitment of Australian Public Service (APS) personnel with skills and experience in STEM-related fields and project management to support the delivery of the National Defence Strategy and the Integrated Investment Program. The Government is also focused on upskilling and professionalising the APS workforce to further reduce reliance on contracted staff and develop the APS workforce agility required to meet future capability needs.

Future workforce requirements

- 5.8 Defence is focused on recruitment, retention and skilling initiatives to grow the workforce and make Defence an even more attractive employer.
- 5.9 While the Defence workforce is becoming more representative of wider society, to achieve a generational uplift in capabilities there must be diverse teams across a wider range of Defence's workforce segments. This involves greater representation of gender, First Nations people, those from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds, and people with a range of experiences to strengthen collaboration, problem solving and decision making.
- 5.10 The 2020 Force Structure Plan outlined an ADF workforce requirement of around 69,000 personnel by 2030, based on force structure assumptions at the time. In 2022, the former Government announced a plan to increase Defence's total permanent workforce, encompassing ADF and civilian personnel, to over 101,000 by 2040, with the total number of permanent ADF personnel to increase to almost 80,000. This announcement represented workforce growth of 18,500 over the growth outlined in the 2020 Force Structure Plan.

- 5.11 Of the additional 18,500 workforce growth, 12,500 were funded and 6,000 were unfunded. Between 2020-21 and 2022-23, ADF recruitment achieved approximately 80 percent of its target growth, equating to a shortfall of around 4,400 ADF personnel. APS recruitment is currently on track with a workforce of around 17,500.
- 5.12 To enable effective and achievable workforce planning that reflects the force structure requirements, Defence will develop a new comprehensive workforce plan in 2024 that is aligned to the National Defence Strategy and the Integrated Investment Program. This will help meet the current and future needs of the ADF, APS and external workforce.

Culture

- 5.13 Culture is fundamental to achieving the Defence mission and implementing the National Defence Strategy.
- 5.14 Defence's culture must continue to evolve and strengthen to achieve the significant reform required to deliver the National Defence Strategy. It must be values-based, address current cultural challenges and promote a positive, inclusive and psychologically safe workplace.
- 5.15 The Government acknowledges the importance of addressing cultural shortcomings, including those highlighted in the 2020 Inspector-General of the ADF Afghanistan Inquiry and those in the ongoing work of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide. While work is already underway to shape a positive and effective environment for Defence people, enduring culture change requires deliberate and sustained effort through action and continuous improvement. In addition to existing initiatives, the Government will consider the findings of the final report of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide, which will further aid and inform strategies to improve Defence's culture.
- 5.16 Defence will continue to drive reform to improve the mental health and wellbeing support for its people, as well as for ADF families who play a vital role in supporting ADF members and veterans. Trust is integral to supporting and strengthening the mental health and wellbeing of the Defence workforce and delivering the National Defence Strategy.
- 5.17 Families are critical to the retention and operational effectiveness of ADF personnel. The Government recognises and values the pivotal role Defence families provide in supporting the health and wellbeing of Defence's people.
- 5.18 The Government is committed to supporting ADF members and their families by providing timely access to the right support and information, at the right time, to enable ADF personnel to be healthy, fit and able to perform their roles.

6



Chapter 6:

Capability Investment Priorities

- 6.1 To deliver an integrated, focused force and the capability effects set out in Chapter 4, the Government has reset its defence capability acquisition plans. This reset has involved a complete rebuild of the Integrated Investment Program to ensure it is a coherent, logical and affordable plan for defence capability.
- 6.2 The integrated, focused force is designed using the minimum viable capabilities required to ensure resources are maximised and military capabilities are brought into service as quickly as possible. It includes deliberate choices to prioritise the introduction of next-generation capabilities as soon as possible, such as the replacement of the Anzac class with a new general purpose frigate. The Government will also ensure the ADF maintains the ability to provide options for Australia to respond to crises in the short term and will make targeted investments to increase the capabilities of the current force.
- 6.3 To enable the shift to an integrated, focused force, Defence is moving away from a domain-centric approach to ADF force design. Force design will instead be focused on capability development that addresses specific strategic and operational needs based on realistic and prioritised scenarios. It also involves bringing minimum viable capabilities into service as efficiently and effectively as possible. This will ensure capability development is appropriately aligned with strategy and resources.
- 6.4 The Government has already commenced reshaping the ADF's capabilities to enhance Australia's capacity to deter coercion and to increase the ADF's capacity for impactful projection. This includes the acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines, the transformation of the Army into one focused on littoral manoeuvre, investments in long-range strike capabilities and the enhanced lethality of Navy's surface combatant fleet.

- 6.5 The Government has significantly increased the level of investment in defence capability over the next decade, as outlined in Chapter 10. In rebuilding the Integrated Investment Program, the Government has also made tough but necessary decisions to cancel, divest, delay or re-scope projects or activities that are not critical to delivering the force our strategic circumstances require. This reprioritisation and additional funding has enabled the Government to accelerate new immediate and longer-term priority projects that are critical to delivering the force our strategic circumstances require.

Priorities for the integrated, focused force

- 6.6 The Integrated Investment Program advances the implementation of the Government's six immediate priorities announced in response to the Defence Strategic Review:
- ▶ acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines through AUKUS to improve our deterrence capabilities;
 - ▶ developing the ADF's ability to precisely strike targets at longer-range and manufacture munitions in Australia;
 - ▶ improving the ADF's ability to operate from Australia's northern bases;
 - ▶ initiatives to improve the growth and retention of a highly skilled Defence workforce;
 - ▶ lifting Australia's capacity to rapidly translate disruptive new technologies into ADF capability, in close partnership with Australian industry; and
 - ▶ deepening Australia's diplomatic and defence partnerships with key partners in the Indo-Pacific.
- 6.7 Across the coming decade, investment in the integrated, focused force will be extended to deliver increases in combat and enabling abilities in the following capability priorities:
- ▶ undersea warfare to undertake a broad range of missions to project force, hold a potential adversary force at risk and maintain persistent situational awareness;
 - ▶ targeting and long-range strike to provide a greater capacity, at longer ranges, to deter any attempts to project power against Australia;
 - ▶ space and cyber capabilities that strengthen situational awareness, the ability to project force and decision advantage;
 - ▶ amphibious capable combined-arms land system, enabled by Navy and Air Force combat capabilities and supported by Navy's amphibious capability, to optimise the Army for littoral manoeuvre and control of strategic land positions, and to enable the ADF to undertake rapid stabilisation and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations;

- ▶ maritime capabilities for sea denial and localised sea control operations that provide Defence with the ability to deny the use of an area of the sea when needed and provide the ADF with freedom of action;
- ▶ expeditionary air operations to project force into Australia's primary area of military interest to deter attempts to project power against Australia or target Australian interests, and maintain persistent situational awareness;
- ▶ missile defence to protect critical Defence infrastructure, Defence facilities and the ADF from long-range and high-speed missile capabilities;
- ▶ theatre logistics to support the ADF's ability to concentrate forces and sustain protracted operations during a conflict;
- ▶ theatre command and control that enables integrated ADF forces to plan and act at speed in order to exercise effective command and control during a conflict and remain resilient during disruptions to command and control networks;
- ▶ a Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) enterprise to build stocks, strengthen supply chains and support a domestic manufacturing capability; and
- ▶ northern bases to ensure the ADF can project deployed forces and continue to operate through disruption.

6.8 The integrated, focused force will deliver:

- a. A Navy with enhanced maritime, air and land strike capability through:
 - ▶ the acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines, providing a step change in Australia's undersea warfare capability;
 - ▶ the development and introduction of uncrewed underwater and surface vehicles to complement the Navy's surface combatant fleet and conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines;
 - ▶ enhancing the lethality of Navy's surface combatant fleet by integrating and demonstrating the Tomahawk weapon system, the Naval Strike Missile and the Standard Missile-6 long-range air defence missile, providing Navy with the demonstrated ability to strike maritime, land and air targets at long-range;
 - ▶ enhancements to the undersea warfare capability of Navy's surface combatant fleet, including six new Hunter class frigates; and
 - ▶ enhancements to the broader lethality of the surface fleet through 11 new general purpose frigates, six new Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels, upgrades to the Hobart class destroyers and, with the Australian Border Force, a combined 25 minor war vessels.

- b. An Army optimised for littoral manoeuvre with a long-range land and maritime strike capability through:
- ▶ the acquisition of a littoral manoeuvre capability, including domestically produced medium and heavy landing craft, enhancing the ADF's ability to deploy and sustain land forces in Australia's primary area of military interest;
 - ▶ the accelerated and expanded acquisition of land based long-range fires, providing the ADF with a deployable strike capability with the range to protect Australia's northern approaches;
 - ▶ progressively introducing increments of Precision Strike Missiles to extend the range and variety of targets that land based long-range fires are capable of striking;
 - ▶ progressively increasing stockpiles of land based long-range fires munitions; and
 - ▶ continued investment in the combined-arms land system, including infantry fighting vehicles and combat reconnaissance vehicles, main battle tanks, uncrewed tactical systems and a new attack helicopter, ensuring Army can secure and control strategic land positions and provide protection for the ADF.
- c. An Air Force that can deliver long-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and an enhanced maritime, land and air strike capability through:
- ▶ integration of the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile with the P-8A, F/A-18F and F-35A, and investigating integration of the Joint Strike Missile on the F-35A, providing the ability to strike maritime targets at longer ranges;
 - ▶ integration of the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile – Extended Range with the EA-18 and F-35A, allowing the ADF to target radar systems;
 - ▶ integration of the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile – Extended Range on the F/A-18F and F-35A, enhancing the ADF's ability to strike land targets;
 - ▶ development of hypersonic air launched weapons for the F/A-18F;
 - ▶ replacement of the E-7A Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft with a next-generation aircraft;
 - ▶ continued investment in uncrewed and autonomous systems, including collaborative combat aircraft like the MQ-28A Ghost Bat, providing a potentially asymmetric surveillance and strike capability; and
 - ▶ the acquisition of a modern Joint Air Battle Management System to integrate the ADF's air and missile defence capabilities.

- d. Space capabilities that enhance intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, provide resilient communications and counter emerging space threats through:
- ▶ continued investment in Australia's first sovereign-controlled satellite communications system, enhancing ADF communications in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions;
 - ▶ the Deep-space Advanced Radar Capability, which is a collaborative project with the UK and US, providing greater situational awareness in space;
 - ▶ investment in geospatial intelligence capabilities; and
 - ▶ investment in space control capabilities, providing the Government with options to assure Australia's access to space.
- e. Cyber capabilities that enable enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, deliver resilient communications and provide computer network defence and disrupt options through:
- ▶ continued investment in the Australian Signals Directorate through REDSPICE, significantly enhancing Australia's cyber capabilities, providing more options to defend Australian networks and supporting other ADF capabilities;
 - ▶ an uplift to Defence's communications networks, providing greater network efficiency, resilience and redundancy; and
 - ▶ enhancing defensive cyber capability through investment in workforce and cyber mission systems.
- f. The integrated, focused force will also be supported by:
- ▶ a sovereign GWEO enterprise that can produce, maintain, repair, store and overhaul select weapons;
 - ▶ an uplift in Defence's logistics capability, including stocks of critical supplies, to enable and support operations from the north of Australia during a crisis or conflict;
 - ▶ enhanced targeting capabilities supported by intelligence and other capabilities;
 - ▶ special operations capabilities that integrate across domains and with other government agencies;
 - ▶ a network of northern bases that is resilient and enhances Australia's ability to project force; and
 - ▶ a resilient theatre command and control network.

AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine pathway

- 6.9 Under AUKUS, a trilateral partnership with the UK and the US, Australia's acquisition of a fleet of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines will enhance our ability to deter aggression and contribute to stability in the Indo-Pacific.
- 6.10 All three countries have committed to ensuring this initiative sets the highest standards for safety, security and non-proliferation.
- 6.11 The Optimal Pathway for Australia to acquire conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines will be implemented as a conditions-based three-phase program, consisting of:
- ▶ **Phase One:** the US, as commenced in 2023, and the UK, commencing in 2026, will make longer and more frequent nuclear-powered submarine visits to Australia. These enhanced visits will lay the groundwork for Submarine Rotational Force – West to begin operating from Western Australia as early as 2027, growing to a mature state of up to four rotational US nuclear-powered submarines and one rotational UK nuclear-powered submarine;
 - ▶ **Phase Two:** sale of three US Virginia class submarines to Australia, with the potential to sell two more if needed, from the early 2030s; and
 - ▶ **Phase Three:** a trilateral joint delivery program building 'SSN-AUKUS' based on a next-generation UK design integrating technologies from all three countries, including cutting-edge US submarine technologies to be operated by Australia and the UK, with the first delivery of an Australian-built submarine in the early 2040s.
- 6.12 Australia's conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines will be owned, operated, maintained and regulated by Australia and under Australian command. They will be a sovereign Australian capability, commanded by Royal Australian Navy officers under the ADF's chain of command. Decisions on their deployment, missions and operations will be matters for the Australian Government, as with all of Australia's sovereign defence capabilities.

Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance enterprise

- 6.13 The conflict in Ukraine has highlighted how vital the supply of munitions is to modern armed forces, how quickly stockpiles can be depleted in conflict and the fragility of supply chains for global weapons. The Government is pursuing a comprehensive approach to build Defence's GWEO stocks, strengthening supply chains and supporting a domestic manufacturing capability. This will ensure Defence has access to the stocks of ordnance it would need in a conflict. Further information on the Government's plan for GWEO will be in the forthcoming GWEO Enterprise Plan, which will be released later this year.
- 6.14 Australia's self-reliance will be enhanced through an ability to produce, maintain, repair and overhaul select weapons. As outlined in the Defence Industry Development Strategy, the domestic manufacture of GWEO and munitions is one of Defence's seven Sovereign Defence Industrial Priorities. A resilient and secure GWEO supply chain will enhance the ADF's ability to sustain its strike capabilities in conflict.
- 6.15 Through the Integrated Investment Program, the Government is investing in:
- ▶ the development of a sovereign ability to produce, maintain, repair and overhaul select weapons;
 - ▶ the expertise Defence needs to strengthen Australia's contribution to the industrial base it shares with the US and other key partners;
 - ▶ the manufacture of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System missiles in Australia, commencing in 2025, representing an important first step toward establishing domestic missile manufacturing on a large scale; and
 - ▶ the construction and uplift of storage and distribution facilities to accommodate Defence's growing GWEO inventory.
- 6.16 Further information on the Government's capability investments to achieve the objectives of the National Defence Strategy are set out in the Integrated Investment Program.



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Chapter 7:

International Partnerships

- 7.1 Defence's international engagement activities will be focused on achieving outcomes that contribute to regional security and stability and strengthen deterrence against the threat of military coercion or a major conflict.
- 7.2 The Government will continue to use diplomacy to reduce tensions and create pathways for peace and stability. Regional defence engagement is a vital pillar of Australia's diplomacy. It aims to shape a region that is peaceful, stable and prosperous, that operates by rules, standards and norms and in which countries exercise their own agency to safeguard sovereignty. Importantly, it builds connections among defence forces and forges people-to-people links that can be drawn upon during periods of tension.
- 7.3 Australia remains committed to transparency about Australia's strategic intentions and defence capabilities as a means to build strategic trust and understanding – and demonstrate Australia's value as a credible and reliable defence partner for the region. Regional engagement is also important for developing a shared understanding of the security environment.
- 7.4 Though focused on Australia's primary area of military interest, Australia retains global interests and global partners. The Government remains committed to supporting activities outside of the Indo-Pacific when they are in Australia's national interest to do so, including non-combatant evacuation operations and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

- 7.5 Strong global partnerships are also critical to protect Australia's economic connection to the world and support the global rules-based order. Investing in these partnerships ensures the Government can respond to unexpected events that impact Australia's interests, such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine and conflict in the Middle East.

The US Alliance

- 7.6 Australia's Alliance with the US is fundamental to our national security and the ADF's capacity to generate, sustain and project credible military capability. Australia and the US share values and ideals, and our Alliance is underpinned by mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and national interests.
- 7.7 Australia and the US, and its other partners, are deepening defence engagement to enhance and maintain the capability to make greater contributions to collective deterrence, as well as to regional and global stability. Concurrently, the US is increasing investments in infrastructure, capability and equipment to enhance its cooperation with the ADF in Australia as part of mutually beneficial activities under the force posture initiatives.
- 7.8 The Government will continue to strengthen its defence engagement with the US to:
- ▶ ensure joint exercises and capability rotations with the US are focused on enhancing collective deterrence and force posture cooperation;
 - ▶ acquire the technology and capability required to enhance deterrence, including through increasing collaboration on defence innovation, science and technology;
 - ▶ drive interoperability and interchangeability in the development of the ADF's force structure and enable Australian access to US systems and capabilities, including through technology transfer, information sharing, innovation, co-development, co-production and co-sustainment programs;
 - ▶ leverage Australia's strong partnership with Japan in its trilateral context, including opportunities for Japan to participate in Australia-US force posture cooperation activities, to enable interoperability and contribute to deterrence; and
 - ▶ progress enabling reforms to export controls, procurement policy and information sharing to deliver a more integrated industrial base.

Engagement with Indo-Pacific partners

- 7.9 Australia's security and prosperity is inextricably linked to developments in the Indo-Pacific. Australia continues to benefit from the economic dynamism of the region and the defence of Australia lies in the collective security of the region.
- 7.10 The Government will continue to strengthen defence engagement with Indo-Pacific partners, embracing bilateral, minilateral and multilateral opportunities to support mutual interests, build trust, deepen cooperation and maintain peace, security and prosperity in the region.

The Defence Cooperation Program and Pacific Maritime Security Program

- 7.11 The Defence Cooperation Program remains the primary mechanism for Australia's practical defence engagement in the Indo-Pacific.
- 7.12 The Government will continue to deliver capability to enhance maritime security through the Pacific Maritime Security Program (PMSP). Funding to the PMSP meets critical sustainment and maintenance requirements that cannot be met by Pacific economies.

Pacific

- 7.13 The Pacific is vital to Australia's security and prosperity. It sits astride Australia's northern and eastern lines of communication. The Government will continue to invest in security relationships within the Pacific family, working together to achieve shared security objectives, build partner capacity, enhance interoperability and address common challenges, including upholding sovereignty, protecting resources and mitigating the effects of climate change. Australia's aim is to remain the partner of choice for the Pacific family, including in security cooperation.
- 7.14 Defence engagement activities in the Pacific – both bilaterally and through regional institutions – are intended to integrate forces to enhance regional capacity and interoperability. They maximise Australia's value as a security partner and enable Pacific-led responses to Pacific security challenges, in accordance with the decision of all Pacific leaders at the 2022 Pacific Islands Forum Leaders meeting.
- 7.15 Australia will seek to enhance interoperability with New Zealand and – building on our alliance and long history of close cooperation – jointly pursue security and stability in our region. The Government will also enhance defence cooperation in the Pacific with France.

Southeast Asia

- 7.16 ASEAN member states and Timor-Leste are central to Australia's national interests and Australia has broad, deep and long-standing defence partnerships across the region. Australia wants to see a regional order with ASEAN at its centre, providing an essential stabilising influence.
- 7.17 The Government will continue to strengthen and leverage defence engagement with Southeast Asian partners under the ASEAN framework and continue to invest in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) in pursuit of a peaceful, stable and prosperous region.
- 7.18 The FPDA is the only multilateral security arrangement of its kind focusing on Southeast Asia and is Australia's longest-standing regional security mechanism. It supports habits of cooperation and practical interoperability between Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the UK and makes a valuable contribution to regional security and economic prosperity.
- 7.19 Indonesia is an essential and enduring partner. Australia will continue to invest in our bilateral defence partnership, including by deepening the complexity of our cooperation and working together in support of regional security.
- 7.20 The Government will continue to strengthen defence cooperation with other Southeast Asian partners, including Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines. This cooperation will support regional security, enhance interoperability and improve the ADF's ability to work in partnership to address common challenges such as climate change.
- 7.21 The Government will also sharpen its defence engagement with Southeast Asian partners to focus on:
- ▶ maturing defence training and exercises – including more advanced capability cooperation – to strengthen our relationships, build robust and interlocking networks of partners, increase interoperability and demonstrate collective resolve; and
 - ▶ enhancing policy engagement and information sharing to inform regional decision-making and build resilience to disinformation.

North Asia

- 7.22 Japan is an indispensable partner for achieving regional peace and prosperity. Our elevated Special Strategic Partnership is underpinned by a strong convergence of values and interests and our growing interoperability, including in a trilateral context with the US.
- 7.23 The Government will continue to strengthen strategic alignment and coordination with Japan, including consultation on regional contingencies and increasing collaboration on defence innovation, science and technology. Defence will also enhance high-end interoperability with the Japan Self-Defense Forces, focused on the scope, objectives and forms of our operational cooperation. Advancing our cooperation on integrated air and missile defence, counterstrike, undersea warfare, and increasing Japan's participation in force posture initiatives in Australia are key bilateral and trilateral priorities.
- 7.24 The Government will also elevate our defence relationship with the Republic of Korea, pursuing targeted engagement opportunities that serve to advance our interests in capability, defence industry, innovation, science and technology.
- 7.25 While Australia and China have different values and political systems, a stable and constructive relationship is in the interest of both nations. The Government will remain patient, calibrated and deliberate in its approach to China, cooperating where we can, disagreeing where we must and engaging in Australia's national interests.
- 7.26 The Government will also continue to raise, both privately and in public, issues that matter to Australia, including destabilising, provocative or unsafe actions by the People's Liberation Army, China Coast Guard and maritime militia. Consistent with efforts to pursue mechanisms to reduce tensions and the scope for miscalculation, the Government is committed to pursuing a defence dialogue with China.

Indian Ocean region

- 7.27 India is a top-tier security partner for Australia. Through the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Australia and India, the Government is continuing to prioritise practical and tangible cooperation that directly contributes to Indo-Pacific stability.
- 7.28 Australia will continue to support India's key role in the region by increasing the depth and complexity of our defence cooperation. The Government will continue to seek opportunities with India to drive practical bilateral and multilateral cooperation, defence industry cooperation and information sharing.

7.29 The Northeast Indian Ocean is central to Australia's security and sea lines of communication. In addition to our engagement with India, the Government's defence engagement in the Indian Ocean region will focus on:

- ▶ regularising the ADF's presence, including increasing deployments, training and exercises with Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Bangladesh; and
- ▶ strengthening Australia's defence cooperation with Indian Ocean region countries through regional maritime domain awareness, growing defence industry engagement and increasing education and training cooperation.

Working with partners to support a global rules-based order

7.30 Australia's bilateral, trilateral and multilateral defence arrangements are critical components of the Government's global engagement. That engagement includes cooperation through the US Alliance and with NATO, capability and technology sharing arrangements through AUKUS, and diplomatic partnerships such as the Quad.

7.31 The ADF will continue to integrate with the US and key partner defence forces – particularly Japan, Indonesia, India, the Republic of Korea, the UK, France, Germany, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines – to coordinate our collective strengths and minimise gaps in our global security engagement.

7.32 Australia's defence engagement with like-minded partners outside the Indo-Pacific will focus on the Indo-Pacific, shared global interests and advancing capability and defence industry outcomes.

The Five Eyes partnership

7.33 The Five Eyes partnership – comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US – remains a vital element of Australia's security settings. Australia's participation in the Five Eyes significantly enhances Australia's situational awareness and supports ADF operations. It is also vital for the development and acquisition of defence capability, intelligence sharing and supporting our collective deterrence efforts.

The AUKUS partnership

- 7.34 AUKUS is a transformative technology-sharing partnership that will contribute to strengthening the individual and collective capabilities of Australia, the UK and the US. It builds on decades of close defence, capability and technology cooperation between our countries.
- 7.35 Under AUKUS, leveraging cutting-edge technology to build asymmetric capabilities will help maintain the collective capability edge of the AUKUS partners in the coming decades. This includes harnessing the ingenuity of industry and academia across the three nations and aligning enabling systems and processes.
- 7.36 Importantly, Australia, the UK and the US will progress Australia's acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines in a way that sets the highest non-proliferation standard and maintains the integrity and strength of the non-proliferation regime.
- 7.37 Defence's nuclear-powered submarine acquisition will occur within the framework of Australia's safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency in a manner fully consistent with AUKUS partners' respective non-proliferation obligations and commitments.

International partner cooperation in Australia

- 7.38 Force posture initiatives with the US, and our enhanced defence cooperation and activities with key partners, build depth and trust in Australia's relationships, support collective deterrence and demonstrate Australia's value as a reliable partner.
- 7.39 Australia will continue to enhance the size, scale and complexity of our engagement with the US and other key partners in Australia, including Japan and Singapore.
- 7.40 Australia's force posture cooperation with the US will continue to be a key pillar in the Alliance. It supports Australia's ability to deter and respond, provides credibility and resilience to US force posture in the region, and supports broader collective deterrence efforts.
- 7.41 Australia's cooperation with international partners, including the US, is managed through robust policy frameworks and principles that maintain and protect our sovereignty. These frameworks govern the activities of foreign governments in, from or through Australia. They also guide how we partner together to conduct activities and acquire capabilities in line with Australia's national interests.

7.42 The Government carefully manages all foreign defence force access, posture and training on Australian territory by ensuring all such activities align with Australia's national interests and preserve Australia's sovereign decision-making. These decisions are not dictated by the interests of other nations – rather they are mutually agreed activities in the interests of participating countries. These activities only occur at the invitation of the Australian Government with full respect for our sovereignty, and domestic and international laws. The fundamental principle underpinning these activities is the long-standing policy of having no foreign bases on Australian sovereign territory.



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Chapter 8:

Defence Industry and Acquisition Reform

- 8.1 Delivering the right capabilities at the right time is central to this National Defence Strategy. To achieve this, the Government is reforming the defence capability acquisition system and the Government's relationship with defence industry. This reform agenda is articulated in greater detail in the Defence Industry Development Strategy.

Capability acquisition reform

- 8.2 The Government is committed to simplifying and accelerating Defence's acquisition processes to deliver capability more quickly in partnership with industry. This includes embracing greater levels of risk both within Defence and across government agencies involved in these processes.
- 8.3 The One Defence Capability System, which connects capability processes across Defence to plan, acquire, deliver, sustain and dispose of capabilities, will be reformed to deliver capability faster and in ways that are more responsive to changing priorities.
- 8.4 The Government is also reforming its approach to contracting with defence industry, removing unnecessary and repetitive steps in the engagement, solicitation and selection processes. More flexible contracting mechanisms will be developed to support agile and developmental projects where technology is rapidly changing or where the ADF's requirements cannot be fully known.
- 8.5 As outlined in the Defence Industry Development Strategy, the Government will adopt a more tailored approach to its procurement based on several criteria:
- ▶ the availability of the desired or minimum viable capability solutions and the potential sources;

- ▶ the urgency of the capability need, and whether there is a clear justification for Defence to prioritise speed of delivery over competition;
- ▶ whether there is a clear strategic justification for Defence to intervene in the market, either to establish or sustain strategically important industry capability; and
- ▶ the risks associated with the delivery of the capability.

Strategic partnerships

- 8.6 The Government is committed to establishing strategic partnerships with industry that provide long-term opportunities on progressive capability development and innovation. These partnerships provide greater certainty to industry on their long-term investment, incentivise growth in the workforce and support small and medium businesses through the expansion of supply chains.
- 8.7 As outlined in the Defence Industry Development Strategy, strategic partnerships will initially be pursued to support:
- ▶ land and joint maintenance, repair, overhaul and upgrade; and
 - ▶ test and evaluation, certification and systems assurance.

Minimum viable capability

- 8.8 The Government has adopted a minimum viable capability model to get new capabilities into service faster. A minimum viable capability is a capability that can be introduced into service successfully, sustained effectively and achieve the directed effect in the required time. It is underpinned by minimum viable products, which achieve or enable the lowest acceptable mission performance in the required time. This approach retains a focus on value for money, but places greater emphasis on speed to acquisition.
- 8.9 Minimum viable capability supports innovation and developmental projects, allowing Defence to embrace risk, support speed to capability and work with Australian industry to undertake iterative upgrades, rather than waiting for a perfect solution.

Defence industry

- 8.10 A sovereign defence industrial base is vital for developing higher levels of military preparedness and self-reliance. It also accelerates innovation and capability delivery.
- 8.11 A sovereign defence industrial base is not one characterised by complete self-reliance, but is rather underpinned by industrial capability resident in Australia that, if necessary, can effectively leverage international defence industry to deliver defence capabilities in the timeframes required.
- 8.12 As outlined in the Defence Industry Development Strategy, Australia's defence industrial base must be:
- ▶ **capable** of delivering the capacity, size and scale to meet Defence's needs as well as the agility to rapidly scale;
 - ▶ **resilient** to disruptions beyond our control by strengthening our network of supply chains;
 - ▶ **competitive** by providing the systems, technologies, materials, services and products Defence needs to support its mission; and
 - ▶ **innovative** by maintaining a technological edge and developing the asymmetric technologies needed by Defence.
- 8.13 Australia's strategic circumstances require the targeted development of the sovereign defence industrial base in areas of strategic priority. The Government will support businesses to increase their scale and competitiveness to enable them to deliver Sovereign Defence Industrial Priorities.
- 8.14 The Government has identified seven Sovereign Defence Industrial Priorities, as outlined in the Defence Industry Development Strategy:
- ▶ maintenance, repair, overhaul and upgrade of ADF aircraft;
 - ▶ continuous naval shipbuilding and sustainment;
 - ▶ sustainment and enhancement of the combined-arms land system;
 - ▶ domestic manufacture of guided weapons, explosive ordnance and munitions;
 - ▶ development and integration of autonomous systems;
 - ▶ integration and enhancement of battlespace awareness and management systems; and
 - ▶ test and evaluation, certification and systems assurance.

- 8.15 The Government will generate detailed industrial priorities as part of the biennial review and update of the Defence Industry Development Strategy, which will occur in line with the biennial National Defence Strategy cycle.
- 8.16 Targeted support will be delivered to Australian defence industry by tailoring Government grants to grow industrial capabilities in areas of strategic priority. A single Australian defence industry development grant will replace the Sovereign Industry Capability Priority, Skilling Australia's Defence Industry, Defence Global Competitiveness and Capability Improvement grants. The new Defence Industry Development Grant will simplify grant arrangements by giving Australian businesses a single access point.
- 8.17 The Government will also support Australian defence industry to pursue export opportunities, including through an increased focus on government-to-government sales. The Government will also work to integrate Australian companies into global supply chains, including through co-design, co-development, co-production and co-sustainment activities, as well as through the Global Supply Chain program. This will bring scale, resilience and sustainability to Australia's industrial base and mitigate challenges that can result from companies having Australia's Department of Defence as their only customer.

Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise Strategy

- 8.18 Naval shipbuilding and sustainment is a whole-of-nation endeavour critical to our national security and sovereignty, requiring a significant uplift in Australia's shipbuilding workforce, industry and infrastructure to generate a modern and capable naval capability. The Government is committed to supporting the growth of a productive and resilient sovereign shipbuilding and sustainment industrial enterprise, including its underpinning supply chains and workforce. This is reflected in the most significant investment in maritime capability in Australia's history, which encompasses building, sustaining and upgrading naval vessels and maritime capabilities, including nuclear-powered submarines.
- 8.19 The dual objectives of the Government's Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise Strategy are to:
- ▶ uplift the capacity, productivity and resilience of Australia's shipbuilding and sustainment industrial ecosystem, to provide national preparedness as a direct input to the operations of the ADF; and
 - ▶ generate ongoing economic, export and employment opportunities for decades to come.

8.20 Australia's Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise Strategy comprises the following lines of effort:

- ▶ optimising Australia's existing naval shipbuilding and sustainment industrial base to support continuous naval shipbuilding at two principal shipyards in South Australia and Western Australia, accompanied by a national maritime sustainment network, in conjunction with establishing a nuclear-powered submarine industrial base to support the acquisition and sustainment of nuclear-powered submarines;
- ▶ balanced investment over significant planning and delivery timeframes to support the timely and cost-effective acquisition, upgrade and sustainment of minimum viable maritime capability, whilst also providing a predictable pipeline of work and consistent demand signal to industry to encourage investment;
- ▶ developing strategic partnerships with industry to strengthen the industrial base and to improve capability and participation of mid-tier supply chain companies;
- ▶ managing workforce demand pressures through new and innovative approaches to upskill and support over 8,500 direct jobs by 2030 in conventional shipbuilding and sustainment as well as around 20,000 direct jobs over the next 30 years as part of the nuclear-powered submarine pathway;
- ▶ expanding infrastructure capability and capacity to support planned acquisition and sustainment activities, while optimising productivity at the principal shipyards;
- ▶ enhancing physical security measures at the principal shipyards and supporting Australian industry partners to uplift security standards and compliance for defence industry, their workforce and supporting supply chains; and
- ▶ national and international partnering and collaboration, including with state and territory governments, industry partners, academic and training institutions, and international partners.


8.21 Realising the ambitions of Australia's Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise Strategy will see a transformational uplift of Australia's industrial and advanced manufacturing capability, and enhanced national resilience and prosperity through:

- ▶ a productive and resilient industry that can innovate and rapidly scale with manageable risk to meet the needs of the ADF;
- ▶ an appropriately skilled and experienced workforce, developed as an enduring sovereign asset to deliver and operate maritime capability and generate broader national security and economic effects;
- ▶ a modern shipbuilding and sustainment infrastructure network, expanding Australia's industrial capacity and overall force flexibility; and
- ▶ a risk-based approach to the security of acquisition and sustainment activities.

- 8.22 The implementation of Australia’s Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise Strategy will be detailed in an updated Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Plan to be released later this year, which will be updated biennially in conjunction with the biennial National Defence Strategy cycle and the Defence Industry Development Strategy.
- 8.23 The 2024 Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Plan will set out the Government’s approach to supporting the growth of a productive and resilient sovereign shipbuilding and sustainment industrial enterprise. It will be complemented by a Shipbuilding Forecast for industry and the public to build confidence in Australia’s shipbuilding industry. Future iterations of the forecast will be issued in line with the biennial National Defence Strategy cycle.



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Chapter 9:

Defence Innovation, Science and Technology

Innovation, science and technology

- 9.1 Investing in innovation, science and technology is fundamental to properly equipping and preparing a modern fighting force in a technology-dominated world. The Government is transforming Australia's defence innovation, science and technology ecosystem through significant investments in the Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA) and AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities. These initiatives represent a step change in Australia's ability to enhance defence cooperation with partners, industry and academia to rapidly develop and introduce technologically advanced military capabilities into service.
- 9.2 Innovation should focus on emerging technologies with the potential to address the strategic risks Australia faces. The Government will prioritise those areas of research and development that align with the National Defence Strategy, and that will deliver enhanced military capability at the earliest opportunity. The Government is also exploring opportunities to rapidly adopt existing proven technologies at scale.
- 9.3 The Government's ability to deliver advanced capabilities to the ADF is underpinned by comprehensive partnerships with industry, academia and international partners, access to specialised infrastructure and a highly skilled workforce.
- 9.4 The Government's defence innovation, science and technology priorities are hypersonics, directed energy, trusted autonomy, quantum technology, information warfare and long-range fires.

Asymmetric advantage

- 9.5 Australia's middle power status means we must seek military advantage in innovative ways. Developing asymmetric advantage is one way to do this. It refers to military capabilities that pit strength against weakness, at times in a non-traditional or unconventional manner, and that disrupt a potential adversary's decision calculus. Countering, eliminating or enduring asymmetric advantage imposes disproportionate costs, and in some cases there may be no effective response. Defence's innovation, science and technology plans and resources are aligned with this intent.

Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator

- 9.6 ASCA was established to rapidly translate disruptive new technologies into defence capability in close partnership with Australian industry and research organisations. ASCA is a key element of Australia's defence innovation, science and technology efforts and will accelerate the delivery of minimum viable capabilities that can be put into operational use rapidly.
- 9.7 ASCA comprises three programs: missions, innovation incubation and emerging and disruptive technologies.
- ▶ **ASCA's missions** are focused on rapidly pulling through disruptive technologies into capabilities that will meet Defence's most pressing needs. Missions will typically be time-bound to three years with clear performance targets to ensure a 'fail fast' approach is applied to technology that ceases to be viable or affordable or to projects that are not delivering capability.
 - ▶ **ASCA's Innovation Incubation Program** identifies and supports opportunities to partner with Australian industry and universities to rapidly adapt, test and acquire new or commercial technology for military purposes. Challenge statements are used to elicit industry and university responses for short-term funding on low-cost projects.
 - ▶ **ASCA's Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Program** provides investment in long-term research partnerships for the development of new technologies that may improve existing capabilities or that help identify opportunities for the development of asymmetric capabilities.
- 9.8 ASCA will also support the co-development of priority capabilities identified through AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities, leveraging the respective strengths of each country's industrial base.

- 9.9 As the system and process matures, consideration may be given to broaden ASCA's remit to support other national security agencies and domestic partners to deliver whole-of-government innovation outcomes.

AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities

- 9.10 AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities – is focused on harnessing joint research and development of technologies with the UK and US to rapidly deliver asymmetric capabilities for the three partners. The AUKUS partnership is focusing on key operational problems common to Australia, the UK and the US and identifying areas where collaboration will accelerate delivery.
- 9.11 The Government is pursuing a range of trilateral projects and incorporating emerging technologies. Immediate priorities for this area of AUKUS collaboration are: advanced cyber; artificial intelligence and autonomy; electronic warfare; hypersonics and counter-hypersonics; quantum technologies; and undersea warfare. Together, these projects will enhance AUKUS partners' capabilities, collective security and deterrence.
- 9.12 The Government is also fostering an AUKUS partnership that deepens trilateral cooperation, enhances information and technology sharing, and integrates our defence industrial bases to further strengthen joint capability and increase resilience across the three nations. These initiatives will enable a more seamless transition of technology into military capability for the ADF. Key areas to enhance trilateral innovation and industrial base collaboration include:
- ▶ **Technology transfer** – the Government will continue to drive technology transfer reform between AUKUS partners, including to enable co-design, co-development and co-production of military capability. This includes developing and implementing a trilateral export licence-free environment;
 - ▶ **Alignment** – the Government will pursue frameworks to integrate trilateral defence innovation and procurement ecosystems to enable seamless military capability development and delivery. This includes fostering collaboration across each partner's defence innovation organisations; and
 - ▶ **Engagement** – the Government will establish criteria, pathways and mechanisms for industry and private equity firms to participate in AUKUS.
- 9.13 The Government will also explore trilateral delivery pathways for Australian industry providers that demonstrate world-leading technology in the AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities areas of focus.



10

AUSTRALIA

Chapter 10: Resourcing

10.1 To provide funding certainty for Defence, the Government is continuing the long-standing policy of providing a ten-year funding model for Defence. This funding model will provide Defence, including the Australian Signals Directorate and the Australian Submarine Agency, with total funding of \$765 billion to 2033-34.

Investing in National Defence

10.2 The Defence Strategic Review identified that the Defence budget was carrying significant pressures, and that Defence funding should be increased to meet our strategic circumstances. The Government is investing an additional \$5.7 billion over the next four years to 2027-28 and \$50.3 billion over the next decade to 2033-34, above the previous trajectory over that period. This investment will see the Defence budget grow over the next ten years to \$100.4 billion by 2033-34. The total funding of \$765 billion over the decade includes \$330 billion in capability investment, compared to \$270 billion in capability investment for the decade to 2029-30 when the 2020 Defence Strategic Update was released.

Table 1: Total Defence Funding Profile 2024-25 to 2033-34
(including the Australian Signals Directorate and Australian Submarine Agency)

	2024-25 \$bn	2025-26 \$bn	2026-27 \$bn	2027-28 \$bn	2028-29 \$bn	2029-30 \$bn	2030-31 \$bn	2031-32 \$bn	2032-33 \$bn	2033-34 \$bn
Defence Funding (including ASD and ASA)	55.5	58.4	61.2	67.9	74.8	79.1	84.2	88.3	95.6	100.4

10.3 The Defence budget, not including funding for operations, comprises three major categories of costs: acquisition of new capability; sustainment of capability; and the critical Defence workforce. In addition, a fourth category is Defence’s operating budget, which is relatively small.

10.4 Over the decade to 2033-34, the Government plans to increase annual investment in the three major categories of costs, with:

- ▶ the acquisition of new capability to grow from \$17.6 billion to \$42.1 billion;
- ▶ sustainment of current and future capability to grow from \$17.8 billion to \$29.1 billion; and
- ▶ the Defence workforce to grow from \$17.1 billion to \$25.2 billion.

10.5 The breakdown of the categories of Defence funding, including the Australian Signals Directorate and Australian Submarine Agency, is illustrated in the chart below.




Chart 1: Total Defence funding model by category 2024-25 to 2033-34 (including the Australian Signals Directorate and Australian Submarine Agency)

Reforming Defence's funding model

- 10.6 The Government has reformed Defence's funding model to ensure value for money and to maximise accountability through reforms to over-programming levels, management of unfunded contingency and greater assurance of the Defence budget and the Integrated Investment Program.
- 10.7 The Government is also improving project assurance and control in the stages after a project is approved. These reforms will ensure that projects achieve an appropriate balance between the need for speed and flexibility in the development and approval stages and the need for disciplined and focused project delivery once approved. These reforms include:
- ▶ creating an Independent Performance and Project Management Office;
 - ▶ establishing a new biannual Health of the Project Delivery System report to the Government;
 - ▶ utilising, once established, a new Joint Statutory Committee on Defence to provide greater parliamentary oversight and scrutiny of major projects; and
 - ▶ enforcing the need for regular independent reviews of projects.

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Chapter 11:

Reform Agenda

Defence reform agenda

- 11.1 The Government's Defence reform agenda is one of the most consequential in Australia. Rising to the challenges of the current strategic environment will require unprecedented effort and a culture of excellence.
- 11.2 Defence has adopted significant and ongoing strategic and enterprise reform aimed at gaining and sustaining a competitive advantage in the current strategic environment.

Strategic Reform is the transformation of the core elements of Defence that deliver effects to achieve the Strategy of Denial. Strategic reform encompasses:

- ▶ **Strategy reform** to ensure Defence is holistically working towards agreed targets and all decisions are aligned to and informed by the Strategy of Denial;
- ▶ **Force structure reform** to ensure Defence is acquiring and maintaining a structure comprised of the right mix of capabilities and workforce to deliver the effects required for the Strategy of Denial; and
- ▶ **Force posture, preparedness and employment reform** to ensure Defence's disposition, size, strength and readiness enables the Strategy of Denial.

Enterprise reform is the transformation of Defence's enabling elements that drive performance, including:

- ▶ **Leadership and direction reform** to drive commitment to excellence and deliver clear, aligned direction across all levels;
- ▶ **Capability acquisition systems and procurement reform** to urgently acquire and integrate critical capabilities and better sustain the defence industrial base;
- ▶ **Workforce systems reform** to achieve a fully staffed, fully qualified and security-cleared workforce to enable the force structure and posture to deliver the Strategy of Denial;
- ▶ **Training and skilling reform** to build a more agile, scalable and integrated training system that delivers effects to enable the Strategy of Denial, with the ability to quickly reskill, retrain and reallocate as strategic circumstances evolve; and
- ▶ **Cultural reform** to create a flexible and positive workplace that attracts and retains a workforce that accepts and embraces organisational change.

- 11.3 The Government will continue to take a disciplined approach to Defence reform. This includes transforming Defence's enabling systems and frameworks so that they are fit for purpose in the current environment.

Budget Process Operational Rules reform

- 11.4 The Government has agreed to reform the Budget Process Operational Rules to streamline and accelerate processes related to the management of the Defence budget and Integrated Investment Program to deliver capability faster and improve assurance and governance mechanisms. These reforms will deliver processes with the speed and agility necessitated by Australia's strategic circumstances.
- 11.5 These reforms will provide greater flexibility for the Government to manage the Integrated Investment Program, with the necessary assurance to the Government that the financial risk introduced by a project will not exceed agreed funding levels.

Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems reform

- 11.6 The Government is undertaking ICT systems reform to urgently deliver timely and effective ICT outcomes to support the ADF. This includes the launch of the Defence Digital Group, providing greater support to the enhancement and operation of the Defence ICT environment. The Government has also prioritised upgrades to Defence's communications networks.

Legislative reform

11.7 The Government intends to progress legislative reform to address potential gaps in the legal framework necessary to deliver capabilities and activities to support the ADF. This includes ensuring that the domestic legal framework allows for the development, testing, manufacturing, sustainment, security and export of defence capabilities, including those in collaboration with Australia's defence industry and international partners.


Guiding principles of transformation

- 11.8 Successful transformation of the Defence enterprise will be underpinned by the application of three foundational principles:
- ▶ **Simplification** to reduce the complexity in processes, structures and systems to improve efficiency, reduce costs and enhance agility. This includes streamlining workflows, eliminating redundant processes and creating a more straightforward and agile enterprise environment;
 - ▶ **Workforce optimisation** to strategically align people and resources with business objectives to enhance productivity, employee satisfaction and performance. This includes the efficient utilisation of staff, development of skills and the implementation of technologies to create a high-performing and adaptable workforce; and
 - ▶ **Digitisation** to convert manual data, processes and operations into a digital format, leveraging technologies to enhance efficiency, accessibility and innovation. This involves the integration of digital tools, technologies and data-driven insights to streamline workflows and improve decision-making.

Biennial National Defence Strategy cycle

- 11.9 The move to a biennial National Defence Strategy cycle provides a structured basis to regularly evaluate and prioritise efforts to maintain a more lethal ADF that is capable of credibly holding potential adversaries at risk – including as military forces modernise and strategic challenges continue to evolve.
- 11.10 More broadly, the biennial cycle allows Government policy, strategy, planning and reform efforts to keep pace with the rapidly evolving strategic environment, respond to Australia's national security priorities and provide clarity of process and approach to defence industry.
- 11.11 The next National Defence Strategy will be delivered in 2026.







Australian Government
Defence



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Defence

INTEGRATED INVESTMENT PROGRAM

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Defence acknowledges the Traditional Custodians of Country throughout Australia. Defence recognises their continuing connection to traditional lands and waters and would like to pay respect to their Elders both past and present.

Defence would also like to pay respect to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people who have contributed to the defence of Australia in times of peace and war.

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1

Chapter 1:

Investing in the National Defence Strategy

2024 National Defence Strategy

- 1.1 The 2024 National Defence Strategy outlines a fundamentally new approach to the defence of Australia. *National Defence* is a coordinated, whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach to meet the strategic challenges Australia faces, including the threat of conflict and the prospect of coercion. It harnesses all arms of Australia's national power to establish a holistic, integrated and focused approach to protect our security and advance our interests.
- 1.2 The adoption of *National Defence* means the Australian Defence Force (ADF) will shift from a balanced force capable of responding to a range of contingencies, to an integrated, focused force designed to address Australia's most significant strategic risks. This transformation is designed to maintain the capacity to achieve the ADF's five tasks:
- ▶ **defend** Australia and our immediate region;
 - ▶ **deter** through denial any potential adversary's attempt to project power against Australia through our northern approaches;
 - ▶ **protect** Australia's economic connection to our region and the world;
 - ▶ **contribute** with partners to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific; and
 - ▶ **contribute** with partners to the maintenance of the global rules-based order.

- 1.3 The National Defence Strategy sets out the six capability effects Defence is required to deliver in order to achieve these tasks:
- ▶ project force;
 - ▶ hold a potential adversary's forces at risk;
 - ▶ protect ADF forces and supporting critical infrastructure in Australia;
 - ▶ sustain protracted combat operations;
 - ▶ maintain persistent situational awareness in our primary area of military interest; and
 - ▶ achieve decision advantage.

Defence capability investment priorities

- 1.4 The 2024 Integrated Investment Program sets out the specific capabilities the Government will invest in to give effect to the National Defence Strategy. It provides a generational uplift in Defence's capabilities and shifts the ADF to an integrated, focused force. The Government has reset its defence capability investment priorities to deliver this fundamental change.
- 1.5 Defence's capability investment priorities were reset through a rigorous prioritisation process using realistic scenarios that evaluated the investments the ADF would require to deliver the six capability effects set out in the National Defence Strategy. This reset has involved a complete rebuild of the Integrated Investment Program to develop a coherent, logical and affordable plan for defence capability.
- 1.6 In rebuilding the Integrated Investment Program, the Government has made decisions to prioritise and fund the acquisition of key capabilities to bolster Australia's deterrence capabilities. The Government has also made tough but necessary decisions to cancel, divest, delay or re-scope projects or activities that are not critical to delivering the force our strategic circumstances require. This reprioritisation and additional funding have enabled the Government to accelerate new and more potent immediate and longer-term priority projects and capabilities.
- 1.7 To ensure our investment plans remain aligned with our strategic settings and take account of advances in technology and developments in our strategic environment, the Integrated Investment Program will be revised biennially, in line with the cycle for updating the National Defence Strategy.

Capability investment priorities for the integrated, focused force

	Undersea warfare
	Maritime capabilities for sea denial and localised sea control operations
	Targeting and long-range strike
	Space and cyber
	Amphibious capable combined-arms land system
	Expeditionary air operations
	Missile defence
	Theatre logistics
	Theatre command and control
	Guided weapons and explosive ordnance
	Enhanced and resilient northern bases

Note: In addition to these capability priorities, the Integrated Investment Program also outlines investment in the enabling areas of enterprise infrastructure and enterprise data and information and communications technology (ICT) that are needed to support, sustain and inform ADF operations. The Integrated Investment Program also outlines the Government's approach to naval shipbuilding, which supports multiple capability priorities.




Funding the integrated, focused force

- 1.8 The Government is investing an additional \$5.7 billion over the next four years to 2027-28 and \$50.3 billion over the next decade to 2033-34, above the previous trajectory over that period. This investment will see the Defence budget grow over the next ten years to an estimated \$100 billion by 2033-34. The total funding of \$765 billion over the decade includes \$330 billion in allocated funding for the capabilities set out in the Integrated Investment Program. This funding has been allocated by the Government through the 2024-25 Budget process.
- 1.9 In rebuilding the Integrated Investment Program, the Government has made the hard but necessary decisions to cancel, divest, delay or re-scope projects or activities that are not critical to delivering the force our strategic circumstances require. This reprioritisation, coupled with significant additional funding, has enabled the Government to accelerate new immediate and longer-term priority projects to deter any potential adversary from taking actions that would lead to conflict or military coercion.
- 1.10 The integrated, focused force is designed using the minimum viable capabilities required to ensure resources are maximised and military capabilities are brought into service as quickly as possible. It includes deliberate choices to prioritise the introduction of next-generation capabilities as soon as possible, such as the replacement of the Anzac class frigate with a new general purpose frigate. The Government will also ensure the ADF maintains the ability to provide options for Australia to respond to crises in the short-term and will make targeted investments to increase the capabilities of the current force.
- 1.11 Chart 1 shows the breakdown of investment across the capability priority areas, as well as essential enabling areas and the Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA). Collectively, investment in these capability priorities will drive the shift from a balanced force to an integrated, focused force more capable of the impactful projection of military power.

Chart 1


Proportional investment for the decade 2024-2034 by capability priority



Note: For Chart 1, individual investments have been solely attributed based on an assessment of the capability priority to which they will contribute most. The percentages provided in Chart 1 should not be seen as an upper limit to investment within any particular capability priority, as many projects will contribute to multiple capability priorities. For example, maritime capabilities for sea denial and localised sea control operations includes planned investments that also contribute to other capability effects, such as missile defence and targeting and long-range strike. Investments in the Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise have been included within the capability priorities it directly supports, including undersea warfare and maritime capabilities for sea denial and localised sea control.

1.12 Chart 2 shows a breakdown of investments across the five Defence domains of maritime, land, air, space and cyber, in addition to Defence's enterprise and enabling functions for the next decade. Compared with the 2020 Force Structure Plan, the Integrated Investment Program provides an increased level of investment in defence capability. It includes investment across all domains in the capabilities needed to strengthen the ADF's ability to project force. It also lifts investment as a proportion of the overall total in key maritime capabilities and enabling capabilities such as data, ICT systems, logistics, guided weapons, explosive ordnance and infrastructure.

Chart 2
Proportional investment for the decade 2024-2034 by domain



Note: For Chart 2, investments have been attributed according to the domain in which projects are managed and delivered, rather than according to the future capability priority to which they will contribute most. The use of this narrower framework, underpinned by different assumptions relative to Chart 1, results in some differences in attribution. For example, some planned investments attributed to cyber in Chart 2 have been attributed to targeting in Chart 1. Not all investments in Chart 2 have been attributed on an identical basis to the 2020 Force Structure Plan.

- 1.13 While these charts provide a useful basis for comparing planned investment, it is important to note that the development of an integrated, focused force requires sustained investment across multiple capability priorities and domains. This applies even where a specific effect is delivered in only one domain or capability priority area. For example, the development of effective and integrated targeting and long-range strike capabilities requires investment across all domains.
- 1.14 Integrated air and missile defence provides an example of how the integrated, focused force will operate. Capabilities from all domains will integrate to detect, track, identify and then respond to air and missile threats. This will include the use of early warning aircraft, radar systems and other sensors operated by Navy, Army, Air Force and intelligence agencies, to detect and track air and missile threats. Sensor data will be compiled and analysed by an advanced joint air battle management system that will be integrated with the Defence targeting enterprise, through a common data network. The joint air battle management system will inform command judgements on how to best respond to the threat. The ADF's response to the threat might come from a surface combatant operated by Navy, from an Air Force fighter aircraft or from a short-range ground based air-defence system operated by a deployed Army unit.

2024 Defence Industry Development Strategy

- 1.15 The 2024 Defence Industry Development Strategy established the framework and principles for an Australian defence industrial base that is:
- ▶ **capable** of delivering the capacity, size and scale needed to meet Defence's needs with the agility to rapidly scale;
 - ▶ **resilient** to disruptions beyond our control, by strengthening our network of supply chains;
 - ▶ **competitive**, by providing the systems, technologies, materials, services and products Defence needs to support its mission; and
 - ▶ **innovative**, by maintaining a technological edge and developing the asymmetric technologies needed by Defence.
- 1.16 The Sovereign Defence Industrial Priorities (SDIPs) in the Defence Industry Development Strategy are embedded in and have informed the design of the Integrated Investment Program. By ensuring consistent and sustainable demand for the SDIPs, the Integrated Investment Program will support industry's ability to deliver on these priorities and broader industry and workforce resilience in line with *National Defence*.

- 1.17 The Integrated Investment Program provides a holistic approach to supporting the seven SDIPs, which are:
- ▶ maintenance, repair, overhaul and upgrade of ADF aircraft;
 - ▶ continuous naval shipbuilding and sustainment;
 - ▶ sustainment and enhancement of the combined-arms land system;
 - ▶ domestic manufacture of guided weapons, explosive ordnance and munitions;
 - ▶ development and integration of autonomous systems;
 - ▶ integration and enhancement of battlespace awareness and management systems; and
 - ▶ test and evaluation, certification and systems assurance.
- 1.18 The Government will support Australian defence industry to pursue export opportunities, including through an increased focus on government-to-government sales. It will also work to integrate Australian companies into global supply chains, including through the Global Supply Chain program. This will help bring scale, resilience and sustainability to Australia's industrial base.
- 1.19 The Government will also help establish Australia as a strategic regional hub for key capabilities. This includes participation in the development program for the Precision Strike Missile, which will develop Australian industry while contributing to Australia's ability to produce, maintain, repair and overhaul guided weapons and explosive ordnance (GWEO).
- 1.20 Defence will share its capability priorities with industry through enhanced Defence-led industry engagements. This will include more regular and direct classified briefings in secure information environments with trusted industry partners.



Building on the response to the Defence Strategic Review

1.21 In line with the National Defence Strategy, the Integrated Investment Program will evolve the ADF's force structure over three critical time periods:

- ▶ now until 2025 – the **Enhanced Force-in-Being** will focus on immediate enhancements that can be made to the current force.
- ▶ 2026 to 2030 – the **Objective Integrated Force** will see the accelerated acquisition of critical capabilities.
- ▶ 2031 and beyond – the **Future Integrated Force** will see the delivery of an ADF that is fit for purpose across all domains and enablers.

1.22 The Integrated Investment Program extends funding across these three periods to deliver the immediate priorities the Government identified in response to the 2023 Defence Strategic Review:

- ▶ acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines through AUKUS to improve our deterrence capabilities:
 - \$9 billion was announced in May 2023 for the period 2023-24 to 2026-27; the Integrated Investment Program provides \$53-\$63 billion for conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines over the decade from 2024-25 to 2033-34;
- ▶ developing the ADF's ability to precisely strike targets at longer range and manufacture munitions in Australia:
 - \$4.1 billion was announced in May 2023 for the period 2023-24 to 2026-27; the Integrated Investment Program provides \$16-\$21 billion for GWEO, including domestic manufacture of select weapons and components, and \$28-\$35 billion for targeting and long-range strike over the decade from 2024-25 to 2033-34;
- ▶ improving the ADF's ability to operate from Australia's northern bases:
 - \$3.8 billion was announced in May 2023 for the period 2023-24 to 2026-27; the Integrated Investment Program provides \$14-\$18 billion for northern bases over the decade from 2024-25 to 2033-34; and
- ▶ lifting our capacity to rapidly translate disruptive new technologies into ADF capability in close partnership with Australian industry:

- \$900 million was announced in May 2023 for the period 2023-24 to 2026-27; the Integrated Investment Program provides up to \$3.8 billion for ASCA over the decade from 2024-25 to 2033-34.

1.23 The Government's immediate priorities in response to the Defence Strategic Review also included initiatives to deepen diplomatic and defence partnerships with key partners in the Indo-Pacific and improve the growth and retention of a highly skilled Defence workforce. The Integrated Investment Program includes \$510 million over the decade to 2033-34 to strengthen maritime security with regional partners under the Pacific Maritime Security Program, as part of a broader package of investment in deepening diplomatic and defence partnerships in our region. While Defence's workforce is not directly funded through the Integrated Investment Program, Defence is continuing to progress initiatives to improve the growth and retention of a highly skilled Defence workforce.

Reforms to capability acquisition

1.24 Defence requires a more efficient capability acquisition system better suited to our strategic circumstances. Defence's capability acquisition system will be transformed through:

- ▶ a cultural shift empowering greater initiative to achieve agreed capability outcomes with speed;
- ▶ systems, processes and tools to improve the risk analysis that underpins procurement decisions;
- ▶ a more flexible procurement and contracting framework to improve speed to delivery;
- ▶ faster and more agile budgetary governance and processes;
- ▶ improved project assurance and oversight activities, including greater visibility for the Government on project performance; and
- ▶ legislative reforms to strengthen the development, testing, manufacturing, sustainment and security of defence capabilities.

1.25 The concept of minimum viable capability was integral in the development of the Integrated Investment Program. Minimum viable capability refers to a capability that can successfully achieve the lowest acceptable level of the directed effect in the required time and be able to be acquired, introduced into service and sustained effectively.


1.26 At its core, minimum viable capability is about getting new capabilities into service faster. This approach retains a focus on value for money, through processes that deliver greater speed to capability acquisition. It supports innovation and developmental projects and will allow Defence to embrace risk and work more closely with Australian industry on iterative upgrades.

A highly skilled and integrated workforce

- 1.27 The Government's investment in a highly skilled ADF and Defence civilian workforce across the coming decade will be critical to the successful delivery and operation of the capabilities set out in the Integrated Investment Program. Defence is focused on recruitment, retention and skilling initiatives to grow the workforce and become an even more attractive employer.
- 1.28 As the Government transitions the ADF to an integrated, focused force, Defence's workforce strategy must also change to effectively respond to the workforce crisis it faces. This will involve addressing immediate workforce needs, while building the long-term workforce pipeline.
- 1.29 The 2020 Force Structure Plan outlined an ADF workforce requirement of around 69,000 personnel by 2030, based on force structure assumptions at the time. In 2022, the former Government announced a plan to increase Defence's total permanent workforce, encompassing ADF and civilian personnel, to over 101,000 by 2040, with the total number of permanent ADF personnel to increase to almost 80,000. This announcement represented workforce growth of 18,500 over the growth outlined in the 2020 Force Structure Plan.
- 1.30 Of the additional 18,500 positions, 12,500 were funded and 6,000 were unfunded. Between 2020-21 and 2022-23, ADF recruitment has achieved approximately 80 percent of its target growth, equating to a shortfall of over 4,400 ADF personnel. Australian Public Service (APS) recruitment is currently on track with a workforce of around 17,500.
- 1.31 To enable effective and achievable workforce planning that reflects the force structure requirements, Defence will develop a new comprehensive workforce plan for its ADF, APS and external workforce that is aligned to the National Defence Strategy and the Integrated Investment Program.
- 1.32 ADF reservists will continue to form an essential component of the Defence workforce, representing thousands of personnel fully trained and ready to serve. Coming from all walks of life, reservists will continue to contribute their unique combinations of skills, knowledge and experience to Defence's mission.
- 1.33 Workforce is at the heart of delivering the sovereign defence industrial base needed for *National Defence*. The measures in the Defence Industry Development Strategy to grow and train the defence industrial workforce require collaboration between the Commonwealth and state and territory governments, in consultation with defence industry, unions and education providers, to build Australia's defence industry workforce in priority areas.

Innovation, science and technology

National Defence Strategy priorities for defence innovation, science and technology



- 1.34 Delivering on *National Defence* includes ensuring that Australia’s research and innovation sector supports the most pressing defence and security priorities to accelerate the delivery of next-generation capabilities to the ADF.
- 1.35 The conflict following Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated how military forces can exploit the use of next-generation technologies to achieve operational outcomes and asymmetric advantage in non-traditional and unconventional ways. Asymmetric capabilities possess qualities that can circumvent a potential adversary’s strengths, disrupt their decision calculus and impose disproportionate costs to endure, counter or remove.
- 1.36 Given regional military modernisation and the rapid pace of technological change, the Integrated Investment Program needs to ensure that Defence is positioned to take full advantage of next-generation technologies in ways that provide an asymmetric military advantage and help deliver the Strategy of Denial.



- 1.37 The focus on innovation, science and technology in the Integrated Investment Program will drive new technology solutions, accelerate technology maturity and support capability delivery. Defence innovation, science and technology will play a critical role in maturing technology and bringing next-generation technologies into defence capabilities through spiral development and risk reduction.

The AUKUS technology partnership

In the face of an evolving security environment, the AUKUS partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States presents a generational opportunity to modernise and enhance longstanding partnerships and support security and stability in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

Under AUKUS Pillar I, Australia is acquiring conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines that will enhance our ability to deter aggression and contribute to stability in the Indo-Pacific.

As a nation connected to the world through three oceans, submarines are an essential capability for Australia. Relative to conventionally-powered submarines, nuclear-powered submarines provide a superior deterrence capability. They are harder to detect, have longer range and endurance, and provide a more versatile platform for weapon systems and sensors. This enhanced capability is critical given the complex and challenging strategic environment Australia faces.

AUKUS partners are collaborating to deliver this capability at the earliest possible date and all three countries have committed to ensuring the initiative sets the highest standards for safety, security and non-proliferation.

Under AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities, AUKUS partners are pooling the talents of our defence and innovation sectors to catalyse the delivery of advanced capabilities, including the integration of our defence industrial bases, research sectors and investor networks to accelerate trilateral capability development.

AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities is contributing to strengthening AUKUS partners' industrial bases by eliminating barriers to information sharing and to technological and industrial cooperation.

- 1.38 Through the Integrated Investment Program, the Government is investing up to \$3.8 billion over the next decade in ASCA. ASCA will translate asymmetric technologies into defence capability in close collaboration with defence industry, including Australian primes, small and medium-sized businesses and research organisations. ASCA's priorities will be driven by the National Defence Strategy and AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities.

1.39 The Integrated Investment Program will enable Defence to invest in trilateral cooperation on AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities, initially including:

- ▶ undersea capabilities;
- ▶ quantum technologies;
- ▶ advanced cyber;
- ▶ hypersonics and counter-hypersonic capabilities;
- ▶ electronic warfare; and
- ▶ artificial intelligence and autonomy.

1.40 Investments in emerging technologies through the Integrated Investment Program include:

- ▶ highly advanced, extremely capable autonomous systems able to operate and survive in contested warfighting environments, including the MQ-28A Ghost Bat collaborative combat aircraft and the Ghost Shark uncrewed underwater vehicle;
- ▶ smaller, low-cost and expendable robotic and autonomous systems that could be deployed in larger groups across the maritime, land and air domains; and
- ▶ the development of advanced intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and early warning sensors, including through continued development of CEA Technologies' advanced radar capabilities and the Jindalee Operational Radar Network.

1.41 In line with advances in technology, the Integrated Investment Program includes investment in a range of uncrewed and autonomous systems that can work together and complement crewed systems on a range of missions that will support a Strategy of Denial, hold potential adversary forces at risk and increase the potency of our capabilities.

1.42 All weapons and weapon systems acquired by Defence will comply with Australia's domestic and international legal obligations and will be subject to legal reviews prior to employment in accordance with Article 36 of Additional Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions.

2



Chapter 2:

Undersea Warfare

- 2.1 The modernisation of regional undersea surveillance and detection capabilities means Australia needs more stealthy, survivable and lethal undersea capabilities that can operate effectively at longer ranges. The Integrated Investment Program prioritises investment in undersea warfare capabilities that will strengthen the ADF's ability to project force, hold potential adversary forces at risk and provide awareness of potential threats to Australia's security.

Conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines

- 2.2 A fleet of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines will be central to *National Defence*. They are harder to detect, have longer range and endurance, and provide a more versatile platform for weapon systems and sensors, which will enable us to hold a potential adversary's assets at risk at the greatest distance possible from Australia's shores.
- 2.3 Through the AUKUS partnership, Australia will acquire, operate and sustain a sovereign, conventionally-armed fleet of nuclear-powered submarines equipped for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and undersea warfare and strike missions, consisting of:
- ▶ three Virginia class submarines to be acquired from the United States, with an option to seek approval for a subsequent acquisition of an additional two Virginia class submarines if required. Australia's Virginia class submarines will be sovereign Australian submarines operated by the Royal Australian Navy. These submarines will provide Australia with a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability within the earliest possible timeframe, eliminating any capability gap prior to the delivery of Australia's first SSN-AUKUS submarine. The first Virginia class submarine is expected to be delivered in the early 2030s; and

- ▶ trilaterally developed SSN-AUKUS submarines to be constructed in South Australia. SSN-AUKUS will be based on the United Kingdom's next-generation design and will incorporate advanced and interoperable technology from all three AUKUS nations, including cutting-edge United States submarine technologies. The first Australian built SSN-AUKUS is expected to be delivered in the early 2040s.
- 2.4 The transition to SSN-AUKUS will be streamlined through commonality in systems across the Virginia class and SSN-AUKUS, which will enhance interoperability and interchangeability of capability and workforce skillsets between AUKUS partners.
- 2.5 The acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines represents the largest single defence capability investment in Australian history and is an essential investment given the strategic circumstances we face. The Government's commitment to conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines will require funding of approximately 0.15 percent of Gross Domestic Product averaged out over the life of the program, in line with 2023-24 Budget projections. This is a transformative step that will significantly contribute to Australia's national security, regional stability and the Australian economy.
- 2.6 The Government will invest \$53-\$63 billion in this capability over the next decade through the Integrated Investment Program, including submarines and supporting infrastructure. In addition to this funding, the Government is resourcing the Australian Submarine Agency, the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator and other government agencies.
- 2.7 The uplift in Australian industrial capability and capacity to support the acquisition and sustainment of the conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine fleet is unprecedented and will be a whole-of-nation undertaking. There will be significant opportunities across defence and related industries, innovation, science and technology programs and Australia's education and training institutions to meet the demands of the nuclear-powered submarine program.

Infrastructure for conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines

- 2.8 Australia's SSN-AUKUS conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines will be manufactured in the Osborne naval shipyard in South Australia. Work to deliver these submarines is already well under way, and key land acquisition and infrastructure initiatives have already commenced, to ensure construction of Australia's first SSN-AUKUS can begin before the end of this decade.

- 2.9 The Submarine Construction Yard created for the build of Australia's next-generation conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines will make Osborne one of the most advanced technological hubs in the world. In the next few years alone, it is estimated at least \$2 billion will be invested in South Australian infrastructure.
- 2.10 Investment in infrastructure works over the coming decade to support conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines includes investment at HMAS *Stirling* in Western Australia. HMAS *Stirling* has been undergoing a significant program of works to support new Navy capabilities. Around \$8 billion in additional investment is planned in infrastructure in Western Australia out to the mid-2030s to support the transition to a sovereign Australian nuclear-powered submarine operating base. Investment in large vessel infrastructure in Henderson will be underpinned by the requirements of the nuclear-powered submarine program, as well as the future surface fleet, and will be considered by Government based on forthcoming advice.
- 2.11 In September 2023, the Government approved an initial \$1.5 billion investment to deliver priority works required to enable a United Kingdom and United States submarine rotational presence to commence from 2027 under Submarine Rotational Force – West (SRF-West). Subsequent works will be required to support the full SRF-West presence of up to four United States Virginia class submarines and one Astute class submarine from the United Kingdom.
- 2.12 The priority facilities required by 2027 to ensure safe and secure operation of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines include:
- ▶ operational berths that meet the requirements for conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines on the existing submarine pier;
 - ▶ a shore power supply to berthed submarines;
 - ▶ intermediate maintenance facilities to support in-water, routine SSN maintenance activities;
 - ▶ regulated facilities for naval nuclear propulsion maintenance activities, including for the management of operational low-level radiological waste generated from those activities;
 - ▶ emergency preparedness and response capabilities;
 - ▶ a submarine crew training centre; and
 - ▶ a physical security uplift for the base.
- 2.13 Subsequent maturation of these priority works to support the full SRF-West capability from 2030 will include:

- ▶ additional staff working accommodation;
- ▶ expanded training facilities for Navy crew;
- ▶ expanded torpedo storage and maintenance facilities; and
- ▶ additional logistic warehousing capacity.

2.14 The Government has agreed in-principle that an east coast facility should be established for Australia's future submarine capability.

Australian industry opportunities in AUKUS Pillar I

There will be significant opportunities for Australian industry to be part of Australia's conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine program.

These opportunities will extend from the delivery of the submarine construction yard in Osborne in South Australia, infrastructure works at HMAS *Stirling* in Western Australia, sustainment of Australia's Virginia class submarines, to building and supporting the operation of the SSN-AUKUS submarines.

The Government will ensure opportunities for Australian businesses are developed as a core priority to deliver Australia's future submarine capability, including integrating Australian businesses into the supply chains of our AUKUS partners.

This will see Australian businesses contribute to the maintenance of conventionally-armed United Kingdom and United States submarines and the manufacture of components for their production lines.

A critical mechanism will be the Defence Industry Vendor Qualification Program, which was initiated by AUKUS partners in January 2024 to streamline and accelerate the qualification of suppliers into United States supply chains.

A second phase of United States qualification will commence in mid-2024 targeting machined parts, electrical components and medium valves, with a further three phases planned for other major product families over the following 18 months.

Qualification of Australian suppliers will be completed against the major product families critical to sustaining Virginia class submarines in time for SRF-West.

Once qualified, Australian companies will be well-positioned to contribute to the supply of the items and components that make up each submarine and therefore contribute to a more resilient trilateral industrial base.

Over time, the program will be expanded to integrate Australian businesses into the United Kingdom submarine supply chain.

Collins class submarines

- 2.15 The Government will invest \$4-\$5 billion to ensure that the six Collins class submarines will continue to provide a potent and credible capability to conduct operations to safeguard Australia's maritime approaches and sea lines of communication alongside the ADF's surface fleet and airborne and land based capabilities. This will include:
- ▶ the Collins life-of-type extension project;
 - ▶ upgrades to the Collins class sonar suite; and
 - ▶ ongoing sustainment of the Collins class, including cooperative capability assurance programs with the United States.
- 2.16 Australia's transition to conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines will be underpinned by the ongoing availability of the Collins class submarine fleet. The continued operation of the Collins class will maintain essential skills for Defence and industry workforces and provide steps to build the future workforce for the conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines.

Subsea warfare and uncrewed maritime systems

- 2.17 To complement crewed undersea warfare capabilities and Navy's surface combatant fleet, the Government will invest \$5.2-\$7.2 billion in the development and acquisition of subsea warfare capabilities and new autonomous and uncrewed maritime vehicles, including through AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities.
- 2.18 The development and acquisition of uncrewed surface vessels and uncrewed undersea vehicles will take advantage of technological advancements in autonomous, robotic and uncrewed systems. This will include investments in expendable, low-cost systems that can be produced at scale and deployed in larger groups on operational missions. Navy's uncrewed systems will be optimised for persistent, long-range defence missions in high-risk environments including maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.



2.19 Planned investments include the development and acquisition of highly capable large and extra-large uncrewed and autonomous underwater vehicles to undertake stealthy missions in high-risk environments, alongside continued acquisition of Bluebottle uncrewed surface vessels to undertake persistent maritime surveillance. The dedicated undersea support vessel ADV *Guidance* will continue to provide support to undersea surveillance systems trials, including the ability to deploy undersea crewed and uncrewed vehicles, and robotic and autonomous systems. Enabling capabilities such as command and control systems, robotic and autonomous systems and capabilities for the collection and analysis of hydrographic data will be integrated into ADF operations.

Underwater range systems

2.20 To further safeguard Australia’s undersea capability, the Government will invest \$550-\$650 million to develop and acquire acoustic underwater range systems and expanded undersea warfare facilities and infrastructure.




Table 1:
Investments in undersea warfare

Capability Element	Approved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Unapproved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Total Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)
<i>Conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines and infrastructure</i>	\$13bn	\$40bn - \$50bn	\$53bn - \$63bn
<i>Collins class submarines</i>	\$1.0bn	\$3.0bn - \$4.0bn	\$4.0bn - \$5.0bn
<i>Subsea warfare and uncrewed maritime systems</i>	\$170m	\$5.0bn - \$7.0bn	\$5.2bn - \$7.2bn
<i>Underwater range systems</i>	\$250m	\$300m - \$400m	\$550m - \$650m
Total	\$14bn	\$48bn - \$61bn	\$63bn - \$76bn

Note: A range of capabilities beyond those described in this section and listed in Table 1 contribute to the ADF’s anti-submarine warfare capability, including the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, the Hunter class frigates and intelligence, space and cyber capabilities.

3



Chapter 3:

Maritime Capabilities for Sea Denial and Localised Sea Control Operations

- 3.1 To achieve the Strategy of Denial, Navy needs to be able to operate in the Indo-Pacific. As a maritime trading nation dependent on the security of our oceans, it is essential for Navy to have sufficient modern capabilities suitable to operate in an increasingly complex environment.
- 3.2 The Integrated Investment Program prioritises investment in maritime capabilities that can hold potential adversary forces at risk in Australia's northern approaches, contributing to the security and stability of our region. This total investment of \$51-\$69 billion includes the acceleration of an expanded surface combatant fleet with enhanced lethality and delivers continuous naval shipbuilding in both South Australia and Western Australia.

Enhanced lethality surface combatant fleet

3.3 The Integrated Investment Program includes funding of \$39-\$55 billion to deliver the Government's response to the review of Navy's surface combatant fleet. This investment will enhance the surface fleet's strike, air-defence and undersea warfare capabilities, and bolster its ability to conduct presence operations. The enhanced lethality surface combatant fleet will consist of:

- ▶ three Hobart class air warfare destroyers upgraded to the Baseline 9 Aegis combat system with enhanced strike and air-defence capabilities;
- ▶ six Hunter class anti-submarine frigates of a single design that will boost Navy's undersea warfare, strike and air-defence capabilities;
- ▶ 11 new general purpose frigates, constructed through an offshore then onshore build strategy to accelerate delivery, to replace the Anzac class frigates. These vessels will operate independently and in conjunction with the Hobart class air warfare destroyers and Hunter class frigates to secure maritime trade routes and northern approaches and escort military assets;
- ▶ six Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels to be built in Western Australia to increase Navy's long-range strike capacity and overall fleet lethality, to be delivered in the 2030s. These systems can provide high endurance at a lower cost, and will be optimised for operating in company with the rest of the surface combatant fleet. These vessels will be provided with up to 32 vertical launching system cells to increase long-range strike capacity and overall fleet lethality. Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels are currently being developed by the United States Navy; and
- ▶ six Arafura class offshore patrol vessels and 10 Evolved Cape class patrol boats as part of Navy's minor war vessel program. The Arafura class offshore patrol vessels will perform a maritime patrol and response role for Navy. Of the 10 Evolved Cape class vessels, the last of the eight fulfilling a maritime security role will be delivered by the end of 2024 and the remaining two vessels, which will provide a navigation and seamanship training capability, will be delivered by end of 2026.

3.4 Defence will decommission the two oldest Anzac class frigates as per their planned service life. HMAS *Anzac* will be withdrawn from service in 2024, and HMAS *Arunta* will be decommissioned in 2026, subject to an assessment of its condition. The remaining six ships will remain operational, enabling Navy to maintain its fleet availability levels while retaining workforce and industry skills. This will provide improved value for money relative to previous plans, with the Government prioritising funding for the acceleration of new general purpose frigates rather than an extended period of sustainment for the oldest Anzac class frigates.

- 3.5 Supporting the growth in the number of major fleet vessels, the Fleet Air Arm will expand its fleet of multi-role helicopters to a total of 36 MH-60R Romeo helicopters from mid-2025. These highly capable helicopters will provide airborne anti-submarine warfare capabilities and perform logistic roles in support of maritime operations.
- 3.6 The Government will also further enhance the lethality of the existing surface combatant fleet through a range of additional projects, including:
- ▶ upgrading existing Phalanx close-in weapon systems to enhance anti-ship missile defence capabilities and provide the ability to engage targets including slow flying aircraft, uncrewed aerial vehicles and surface vessels. Upgraded systems will be deployed onto the Hobart class destroyers and HMAS *Choules*;
 - ▶ enhancing Nulka missile decoys that attract anti-ship missiles away from their targets through the provision of next-generation Nulka rounds and a sovereign support facility. This system is fitted to the Canberra class landing helicopter dock, the Anzac class frigates and the Hobart class destroyers and will be fitted to the Hunter class frigates;
 - ▶ acquiring the Tomahawk weapon system to allow Navy to hold targets at risk at longer ranges, including for the Hobart class destroyers and, subject to a feasibility assessment, Hunter class frigates;
 - ▶ replacing the Harpoon anti-ship missile with the Naval Strike Missile on the Hobart class destroyers and Anzac class frigates and fitting the Naval Strike Missile to the Hunter class frigates; and
 - ▶ providing upgrades to the Aegis Baseline 9 combat system and Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) long-range, air-defence missiles for the Hobart class destroyers and Hunter class frigates, providing the ability to counter airborne threats, including ballistic missiles.
- 3.7 Essential logistics support and amphibious capabilities for the fleet will be maintained through continued investment in the two Supply class replenishment oilers and sustainment enhancements to the two Canberra class landing helicopter docks and HMAS *Choules*. The Government is also investing in surface fleet support infrastructure, including the redevelopment of the Garden Island Defence Precinct in Sydney, to ensure these facilities can securely and efficiently berth, maintain and repair Navy vessels.
- 3.8 Consolidation of the Henderson precinct in Western Australia is currently under way, as recommended by the Defence Strategic Review. Successful and timely consolidation will enable eight new general purpose frigates to be built at the Henderson precinct and will also enable a pathway to build six new Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels in Western Australia.



Hydrographic systems

- 3.9 Defence is partnering with the commercial hydrographic industry to undertake maritime surveys of Australia's Exclusive Economic Zone and improve its understanding of our maritime environment. From 2024, around \$1 billion will be invested over the decade through the HydroScheme Industry Partnership Program to collect, collate and produce nautical charts and publications within the Australian Charting Area with the Australian Hydrographic Office.

Maritime mining

- 3.10 To safeguard against the possibility of a contested maritime domain within Australian waters, the Government will invest \$640-\$670 million over the decade in capabilities to help secure Australia's regional maritime approaches and augment Defence's ability to protect littoral operations. This includes the acquisition of advanced, multi-sensor sea mines capable of being deployed from sub-surface vessels, ships and aircraft.

Maritime support to regional partners

- 3.11 The Government will invest \$510 million over the decade to support regional partners under the Pacific Maritime Security Program. The Pacific Maritime Security Program is a comprehensive package of capability, infrastructure, sustainment, training and coordination designed to increase national and regional maritime security.
- 3.12 Deliveries of Pacific patrol boat replacements will continue as part of the Pacific Maritime Security Program's delivery of capability to enhance maritime security. The Government is providing 22 Guardian class patrol boats to the region, with 19 vessels delivered to date.
- 3.13 ADV *Reliant* will continue to perform its role providing support to Australia's Pacific partners and remains prepared for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations when called upon.



Table 2:
Investments in maritime capabilities for sea denial
and localised sea control operations

Capability Element	Approved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Unapproved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Total Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)
Surface combatant fleet			
<i>Hobart class</i>	\$1.5bn	\$5.0bn - \$7.0bn	\$6.5bn - \$8.5bn
<i>Hunter class</i>	\$2.3bn	\$20bn - \$30bn	\$22bn - \$32bn
<i>General purpose frigates</i>	nil	\$7.0bn - \$10bn	\$7.0bn - \$10bn
<i>Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels</i>	nil	\$400m - \$500m	\$400m - \$500m
<i>Arafura class</i>	\$2.2bn	\$1.0bn - \$1.5bn	\$3.2bn - \$3.7bn
<i>Evolved Cape class</i>	\$150m	nil	\$150m
<i>Anzac class</i>	\$120m	nil	\$120m
MH-60R Romeo	\$1.7bn	\$700m - \$1.0bn	\$2.4bn - \$2.7bn
Surface combatant fleet support			
<i>Nulka missile decoys</i>	\$110m	\$500m - \$700m	\$610m - \$810m
<i>Surface fleet support systems</i>	\$13m	\$2.0bn - \$3.0bn	\$2.0bn - \$3.0bn
<i>Supply class</i>	\$12m	nil	\$12m
<i>Canberra class</i>	\$2m	\$400m - \$500m	\$400m - \$500m
<i>Surface fleet support infrastructure (including Garden Island Defence Precinct)</i>	\$160m	\$3.0bn - \$4.0bn	\$3.2bn - \$4.2bn
<i>Pacific support vessel</i>	\$2m	\$150m - \$200m	\$150m - \$200m
Hydrographic systems	\$1.0bn	nil	\$1.0bn
Maritime mining	\$620m	\$20m - \$50m	\$640m - \$670m
Maritime support to regional partners	\$510m	nil	\$510m
Total	\$10bn	\$40bn - \$58bn	\$51bn - \$69bn

Note: Planned investment for the Tomahawk weapon system, Naval Strike Missiles, Aegis Baseline 9 upgrade and SM-2/SM-6 is included in Table 3, targeting and long-range strike.



4



Chapter 4:

Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise

- 4.1 Australia's ability to build and sustain modern naval capabilities is critical to our national security and sovereignty. The Integrated Investment Program will deliver a continuous naval shipbuilding program through investment in naval shipbuilding and sustainment activities at Osborne in South Australia and Henderson in Western Australia.
- 4.2 Naval shipbuilding and sustainment is a whole-of-nation endeavour, requiring a significant uplift in Australia's shipbuilding workforce, industry and infrastructure to generate a modern naval capability. The Government is committed to supporting the growth of a continuous, productive and resilient sovereign shipbuilding and sustainment industrial enterprise, including its underpinning supply chains and workforce, in line with *National Defence*.
- 4.3 Over the decade, the Government is making an historic investment in building, sustaining and upgrading naval vessels and maritime capabilities, including conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines. This includes \$53-\$63 billion in conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines and facilities, \$39-\$55 billion in Navy's surface combatant fleet and \$12-\$17 billion in littoral manoeuvre vessels and facilities.

Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise Strategy

4.4 The dual objectives of the Government's Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise Strategy are to:

- ▶ uplift the capacity, productivity and resilience of Australia's shipbuilding and sustainment industrial ecosystem, to provide national preparedness as a direct input to the operations of the ADF; and
- ▶ generate ongoing economic, export and employment opportunities for decades to come.

4.5 Australia's Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise Strategy comprises the following lines of effort:

- ▶ optimising Australia's existing naval shipbuilding and sustainment industrial base to support continuous naval shipbuilding at two principal shipyards in South Australia and Western Australia, accompanied by a national maritime sustainment network, in conjunction with establishing an industrial base to support the acquisition and sustainment of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines;
- ▶ balanced investment over significant planning and delivery timeframes to support the timely and cost-effective acquisition, upgrade and sustainment of minimum viable maritime capability, while also providing a predictable pipeline of work and consistent demand signals to industry to encourage investment;
- ▶ developing strategic partnerships with industry to strengthen the industrial base and to improve the capability and participation of mid-tier supply chain companies;
- ▶ managing workforce demand pressures through new and innovative approaches to upskill and support over 8,500 direct jobs by 2030 in conventional shipbuilding and sustainment, as well as around 20,000 direct jobs over the next 30 years as part of the nuclear-powered submarine pathway;
- ▶ expanding infrastructure capability and capacity to support planned acquisition and sustainment activities, while optimising productivity at the principal shipyards;
- ▶ enhancing physical security measures at the principal shipyards and supporting Australian industry partners to uplift security standards and compliance for defence industry, their workforce and supporting supply chains; and
- ▶ national and international partnering and collaboration, including with state and territory governments, industry partners, academic and training institutions, and international partners.

2024 Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Plan

- 4.6 The Government's shipbuilding investment includes major changes to defence shipbuilding that will result in a Navy equipped with a major surface combatant fleet over twice as large as previously planned, including eleven new general purpose frigates, six Hunter class frigates and six new Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels. It will also result in an Army equipped with 18 landing craft medium and eight landing craft heavy.
- 4.7 South Australia will be the primary location for designing and building the Hunter class frigates and upgrading the Hobart class destroyers, with construction of the Hunter class frigate commencing at the Osborne shipyard in 2024. The Hunter class will be immediately followed by construction of the replacement for Navy's Hobart class destroyers. Australia's SSN-AUKUS conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines will also be built in the Osborne precinct.
- 4.8 Consolidation of the Henderson precinct in Western Australia is being achieved through the delivery of landing craft medium and landing craft heavy. This consolidation will set the conditions for eight new general purpose frigates to be built at Henderson and provide a pathway to build six new Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels in Western Australia in the 2030s.
- 4.9 Further detail on how these changes to Defence shipbuilding will be implemented will be provided in an updated Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Plan to be released later this year. The 2024 Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Plan will set out the Government's approach to supporting the growth of a productive and resilient sovereign shipbuilding and sustainment industrial enterprise. It will be complemented by a Shipbuilding Forecast for industry and the public to build confidence in Australia's shipbuilding industry. Future iterations of the Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Plan and the Shipbuilding Forecast will be issued in line with the biennial National Defence Strategy cycle.

5



Chapter 5:

Targeting and Long-range Strike

- 5.1 The Government will invest \$28-\$35 billion to develop and enhance targeting and long-range strike capabilities across Defence. This includes acquiring advanced guided weapons that can deliver potent effects at longer ranges, building weapons stockpiles and developing and integrating targeting capabilities, including sensors and ICT systems, to ensure these weapons can be used effectively. These capabilities will provide the integrated, focused force with a greater capacity to hold at risk a potential adversary's forces that could target Australia's interests during a conflict.

Defence targeting enterprise

- 5.2 An advanced and resilient network of sensors and communications and intelligence systems will be brought together to form a Defence targeting enterprise. The Defence targeting enterprise will provide Defence with the timely ability to detect, identify and track targets more precisely and at longer ranges in highly contested operating environments. The Defence targeting enterprise will be underpinned by a highly trained workforce and will be interoperable with the capabilities of the United States and other key partners.

Long-range strike

- 5.3 The Integrated Investment Program includes investment in long-range strike capabilities for the Navy, Army and Air Force.

Navy

- 5.4 The Government will acquire the Tomahawk weapon system from the United States to allow Navy's Hobart class destroyers, Hunter class frigates, subject to a feasibility assessment, and, in the future, Virginia class submarines, to hold targets at risk at longer ranges.
- 5.5 Next-generation Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile Block II, SM-2 and SM-6 missiles capable of being deployed in the Hobart class destroyers and Hunter class frigates will be acquired. This will provide Navy with a greater capacity to target aircraft and missiles.
- 5.6 The integration of the Naval Strike Missile into Australia's fleet of surface combatants will continue. The Naval Strike Missile will provide an advanced capability against heavily protected maritime and land targets.

Army

- 5.7 The acquisition of land based long-range fires will be accelerated and expanded. Army's first long-range fires regiment will be equipped with 42 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems armed with Precision Strike Missile and Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System munitions. This regiment will provide enhanced land and maritime strike and strengthen Army's ability to prevent an adversary's forces from entering an operational area.
- 5.8 An additional long-range fires regiment will further expand Army's strike capabilities, strengthening its ability to deliver persistent land based maritime strike.
- 5.9 The introduction of new land based radar systems and communications capabilities will extend Army's sensor and command and control networks. These capabilities will provide an important contribution to the Defence targeting enterprise by improving the integrated, focused force's ability to detect and track approaching threats.

Air Force

- 5.10 The Long Range Anti-Ship Missile capability will be acquired for integration into the F/A-18F Super Hornet, P-8A Poseidon and F-35A Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. Defence is also investigating the integration of the Joint Strike Missile for the F-35A.

- 5.11 The integration of the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile – Extended Range capability onto the F/A-18F Super Hornet and F-35A Joint Strike Fighter will enable Air Force to defeat a more diverse set of land targets at longer ranges.
- 5.12 The integration of the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile – Extended Range onto the EA-18G Growler and the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter will improve Air Force’s ability to disrupt potential adversary surveillance and targeting capabilities.
- 5.13 The development of hypersonic air-launched weapons for employment from the F/A-18F Super Hornet will provide the ability to engage targets at longer ranges with high-speed weapons.
- 5.14 Loitering precision munitions and their associated launch platforms and enabling systems will support land and maritime targeting operations. These munitions will enable the ADF to respond to threats more quickly without placing ADF people and systems in harm’s way.




Table 3:
Investments in targeting and long-range strike

Capability Element	Approved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Unapproved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Total Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)
Defence targeting enterprise	\$580m	\$5.0bn - \$7.0bn	\$5.6bn - \$7.6bn
Long-range strike			
<i>Navy – sea based strike</i>	\$5.3bn	\$7.0bn - \$10bn	\$12bn - \$15bn
<i>Army – land based strike</i>	\$1.9bn	\$2.0bn - \$3.0bn	\$3.9bn - \$4.9bn
<i>Air Force – air-launched strike</i>	\$260m	\$3.0bn - \$4.0bn	\$3.3bn - \$4.3bn
<i>Air Force – hypersonic weapons</i>	\$1.5bn	\$1.0bn - \$1.5bn	\$2.5bn - \$3.0bn
Total	\$9.5bn	\$18bn - \$26bn	\$28bn - \$35bn

Note: Planned investments in new weapons for Navy, Army and Air Force to enhance their strike capabilities are included in Table 3. Planned investments in Australia’s domestic GWEO enterprise capabilities are included in GWEO investments at Table 10.

6



Chapter 6:

Space and Cyber

- 6.1 The Integrated Investment Program includes \$27-\$36 billion in investments to enhance space and cyber capabilities and improve their integration with other ADF capabilities. This will improve the ADF's understanding of the operating environment and its ability to gain a decision advantage over potential adversaries and respond to threats effectively and decisively.

Enhanced space capabilities

- 6.2 Space capabilities underpin the ADF's warfighting effectiveness by providing critical services, including communications, weather, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and positioning, navigation and timing information.
- 6.3 The Government will invest \$9-\$12 billion in enhanced space capabilities through the Integrated Investment Program to provide resilient communications, surveillance and reconnaissance, and improved space domain awareness and space control. This will include:
- ▶ the delivery of a sovereign-controlled Australian Defence Satellite Communications (SATCOM) system capability over the Indo-Pacific. This system will include communications satellites with ground stations and operations centres across Australia and an integrated SATCOM management system;

- ▶ the introduction of the Deep-space Advanced Radar Capability, integrated with sites in the United Kingdom and United States, to provide continuous detection, tracking and identification of objects in deep space. The Deep-space Advanced Radar Capability will provide continuous global detection and observation of satellites and other space objects and increase Defence's ability to understand and monitor threats to its space capabilities; and
- ▶ measures to enhance Defence's space control capability to deny attempts to interfere with, or attack, Australia's use of the space domain. These will help ensure the ADF is able to continue using the space capabilities it needs to support its operations.

Enhanced cyber capabilities

- 6.4 Enhanced cyber capabilities are needed to protect the ADF's warfighting networks as well as understand and counter threats in the cyber domain that are increasing in scale and complexity.
- 6.5 The Government will invest \$15-\$20 billion in enhanced cyber domain capabilities to develop both defensive and offensive options to impose costs on malicious cyber activity in an increasingly contested cyber domain. These investments will provide greater visibility of threats to critical infrastructure, increase the resilience of our infrastructure to cyber attacks, provide new intelligence functions and enable offensive cyber operations.
- 6.6 Defence and the Australian Signals Directorate, alongside domestic and international partners, will continue work to ensure Australian networks remain stable and secure. The Australian Signals Directorate helps defend Australia from cyber threats by comprehensively understanding the cyber threat, providing proactive advice and assistance to improve the management of cyber risks and applying its offensive capabilities offshore, including to support military operations.



6.7 REDSPICE represents the largest ever investment in Australia's signals intelligence and cyber capability. The Government has prioritised REDSPICE funding in the Integrated Investment Program to enhance Australia's cyber capabilities, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and deliver resilient communications and computer network defence and disrupt options. REDSPICE will provide:

- ▶ new offensive cyber capability to support the ADF;
- ▶ enhanced strategic and operational intelligence;
- ▶ new national cyber defence capabilities to defend Australia's most critical systems and infrastructure;
- ▶ increased survivability and resilience of communications, classified networks and the Australian Signals Directorate's most critical functions;
- ▶ enhanced space capability to support the ADF and resilient worldwide communications; and
- ▶ foundational capabilities such as data science, automation and machine learning to deal with increasing volumes of data.

6.8 The Government is also investing in the delivery of an enhanced deployable defensive cyber operations capability for the ADF and a comprehensive training program to support the growth of the ADF cyber workforce.

6.9 The Integrated Investment Program also provides capabilities to enhance Defence's ability to understand, operate in and secure the cyber terrain in which cyber activities occur. This includes:

- ▶ improving the warfighting cyber capabilities of Defence's networks and strengthening their cyber interoperability with the United States and other key partners;
- ▶ developing joint warfighting networks and applications that will improve communications access for ADF forces operating in challenging environments and strengthen network security and resilience;
- ▶ enhancing strategic communications systems;
- ▶ developing alternative position, navigation and timing capabilities; and
- ▶ modernising Defence's cryptography to provide enduring communications security.

Electronic warfare

6.10 The Government is investing \$2.7-\$3.7 billion in the development and integration of electronic warfare capabilities that can protect the ADF’s electronic capabilities from being interfered with, for instance through jamming and can enable the ADF to locate and disrupt a potential adversary’s electronic signals. One of the ways in which the ADF’s electronic warfare capabilities are being enhanced is through AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities, including through the AUKUS electronic warfare innovation challenge launched in 2024.




Table 4:
Investments in space and cyber

Capability Element	Approved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Unapproved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Total Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)
Enhanced space capabilities			
<i>Satellite communications</i>	\$150m	\$5.0bn - \$7.0bn	\$5.2bn - \$7.2bn
<i>Space sensors</i>	\$250m	\$3.0bn - \$4.0bn	\$3.3bn - \$4.3bn
<i>Space control</i>	\$190m	\$300m - \$400m	\$490m - \$590m
Enhanced cyber capabilities			
<i>Cyber capabilities</i>	\$1.4bn	\$5.0bn - \$7.0bn	\$6.4bn - \$8.4bn
<i>Cyber terrain</i>	\$1.9bn	\$7.0bn - \$10bn	\$8.9bn - \$12bn
Electronic warfare	\$720m	\$2.0bn - \$3.0bn	\$2.7bn - \$3.7bn
Total	\$4.5bn	\$22bn - \$31bn	\$27bn - \$36bn



7

Chapter 7:

Amphibious Capable Combined-arms Land System

- 7.1 The Integrated Investment Program prioritises investments of \$36-\$44 billion to enable Army to rapidly transform in response to Australia's changing strategic circumstances. By 2026, Army's divisions, commands and formations will have a new structure and posture. This significant investment and restructure will ensure Army is ready to operate in defence of Australia as part of an integrated, focused force.
- 7.2 Army will have the capability to hold potential adversary forces at risk, control key strategic land positions, maintain persistent forward partnerships and protect and sustain deployed forces within Australia's primary area of military interest. Army's amphibious capable combined-arms land system will be capable of assuring the security of populations and controlling territory in the most challenging threat environments, in cooperation with other ADF capabilities.
- 7.3 To perform these critical tasks, Army's structure will include specialised combat and support brigades, along with a new dedicated fires brigade and littoral manoeuvre group. Army will consolidate its aviation capability to reduce the cost of aircraft ownership and better generate capability. If required, these same forces will be able to undertake rapid stabilisation and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

Littoral manoeuvre

- 7.4 The Government will prioritise the acquisition of new littoral manoeuvre capabilities and infrastructure through an investment of \$7-\$10 billion in littoral manoeuvre vessels and \$5-\$7 billion in related facilities. These capabilities will strengthen the ADF's capacity to rapidly project force in a crisis or conflict and sustain ADF operations in the region.
- 7.5 Army will acquire and operate 18 landing craft medium and eight landing craft heavy, which will be distributed across the three units based in South East Queensland, northern Queensland and Darwin. The littoral manoeuvre vessels will be manufactured in Australia and delivered between 2026 and 2037 to support continuous naval shipbuilding and contribute to Australia's national industrial base. Defence will also invest in up to 15 amphibious capable support vehicles, which will be built in Australia.

Combined-arms land system

- 7.6 The Government will continue to invest in an upgraded amphibious capable combined-arms land system that will be better able to identify threats, protect ADF units, move quickly and respond decisively within our region. This will involve developing land capabilities that can be deployed by the ADF's strategic lift assets such as the Air Force's C-17A Globemaster III and C130J Hercules, Army's new littoral manoeuvre vessels and Navy's Canberra class vessels.
- 7.7 Investment in the enhanced combined-arms land system includes:
- ▶ the modernisation of, and operational enhancements for, Defence's protected mobility fleet, including the Hawkei protected mobility vehicle – light, the Bushmaster protected mobility vehicle – medium and protected medium and heavy trucks;
 - ▶ the replacement of the main battle tank fleet with 75 M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks to provide significant increases in lethality, mobility, protection and communications. The new main battle tanks, which are to be delivered between 2024 and 2028, will provide unmatched firepower and protection, enabling land forces to operate in high-threat environments. Main battle tanks will be able to operate with other elements of the combined-arms land system to meet the most demanding land challenges in our region;
 - ▶ the acquisition of 129 Redback infantry fighting vehicles capable of providing highly protected close-combat capabilities. These vehicles will be manufactured in Australia from 2026 for delivery between 2027 and 2029. The Redback will provide Army with an improved ability to operate in hostile environments and strike targets more effectively;

- ▶ the continued delivery of 211 Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicles to meet Army's land combat reconnaissance requirements. Domestic production of these vehicles is ongoing. The Boxer is replacing and enhancing the mounted combat reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance capabilities previously provided by the Australian light armoured vehicle;
- ▶ the acquisition of 30 AS9 Huntsman self-propelled howitzers and 15 AS10 armoured ammunition resupply vehicles that will provide indirect fire support in close cooperation with other combat forces. These capabilities will be complemented by upgrades to the artillery digital terminal control system and the acquisition of new ammunition types. These systems are being manufactured in Australia and the first system will enter service this year;
- ▶ the acquisition of an enlarged and enhanced fleet of bridging, breaching, engineer support and combat engineering vehicles, including 29 armoured breaching vehicles and 17 joint assault bridges; and
- ▶ further investment in low-cost and expendable small uncrewed aerial systems for the amphibious capable land force that can undertake a range of operational roles, including intelligence and surveillance, while improving force protection. From 2025, the Shadow 200 tactical uncrewed aerial system will be replaced with the Integrator, which will provide greater performance in payload, endurance, deployability, connectivity and interoperability.

7.8 Army will continue to explore the utility of uncrewed ground vehicles, including integrating uncrewed systems into combat missions and support roles, in order to enhance operational effectiveness and reduce risks to personnel. The Government will also invest in deployable counter-small uncrewed aerial systems capabilities.

7.9 The Government will also continue to invest in world-leading protection and lethality for ADF personnel through ongoing acquisition and sustainment of advanced small arms, direct fire support weapons, night-fighting equipment, combat equipment, simulation systems for training and other technologies to maintain a decisive edge on the battlefield.

7.10 Advanced sensors, effectors and exploitation capabilities will also be acquired in order to enhance the ADF's ability to understand, detect, evade and neutralise explosive threats.

7.11 Investment in the Army Reserve will deliver enhanced domestic security and response capabilities, which will strengthen its ability to provide security for northern bases and critical infrastructure and help it prepare for potential future contingencies.





Battlefield aviation

7.12 Battlefield aviation provides land forces with enhanced situational awareness, logistic support and the ability to manoeuvre quickly and attack adversary forces. The Government will invest \$9-\$10 billion to recapitalise Army's battlefield aviation capabilities. This will include:

- ▶ acquisition of 40 UH-60M Black Hawk and supporting systems to rapidly replace Army's fleet of MRH-90 Taipan multi-role helicopters. The UH-60M Black Hawks commenced delivery under an accelerated acquisition process in 2023. Continued investment in this fleet will provide a proven combat and logistic capability with the ability to rapidly deploy on a wide variety of missions including land, amphibious and littoral combat, special operations and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief;
- ▶ replacement of the current fleet of Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopters with 29 AH-64E Apache attack helicopters. Entering service from 2026, the Apache will deliver advanced sensing and communication capabilities, command and control functions and crewed and uncrewed teaming capabilities. It will provide air support to land forces, close-combat attack, reconnaissance and escort duties and will complement the introduction of uncrewed systems and loitering munitions. The Apache will be an integral part of the combined-arms land system and an essential capability to support integrated, focused force operations in our region; and
- ▶ continued investment in the expanded fleet of 14 CH-47F Chinook helicopters as Defence's battlefield cargo helicopter capability. Expanding the fleet of Defence's largest helicopter will strengthen Army's airlift capability and increase its ability to support operations.

Special operations capability

7.13 Defence's special operations forces are a vital component for Australia's national security and the ADF's integrated, focused force. The Government will invest \$1.6-\$2.1 billion to modernise the special operations capability so it can continue to conduct a suite of specialist military activities across all domains including reconnaissance, targeting, strike, technical operations and enhanced engagement with allies and partners. Special operations forces will also continue to provide support to state and territory counter-terrorism response.



Table 5:
Investments in amphibious capable combined-arms
land system

Capability Element	Approved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Unapproved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Total Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)
Littoral manoeuvre			
<i>Littoral manoeuvre vessels</i>	\$35m	\$7.0bn - \$10bn	\$7.0bn - \$10bn
Combined-arms land system			
<i>Hawkei protected mobility vehicle – light</i>	\$63m	nil	\$63m
<i>Bushmaster protected mobility vehicle – medium</i>	\$210m	\$1.5bn - \$2.0bn	\$1.7bn - \$2.2bn
<i>M1A2 Abrams main battle tank</i>	\$1.5bn	\$50m - \$75m	\$1.6bn
<i>Redback infantry fighting vehicle</i>	\$6.4bn	\$200m - \$300m	\$6.6bn - \$6.7bn
<i>Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicle</i>	\$2.3bn	nil	\$2.3bn
<i>Land mobility vehicles</i>	\$160m	nil	\$160m
<i>Combat vehicle systems</i>	nil	\$100m - \$150m	\$100m - \$150m
<i>Huntsman self-propelled howitzer</i>	\$580m	\$15m - \$20m	\$580m - \$600m
<i>Artillery ammunition and control</i>	\$34m	\$500m - \$700m	\$530m - \$730m
<i>Combat engineering</i>	\$130m	\$1.0bn - \$1.5bn	\$1.1bn - \$1.6bn
<i>Uncrewed tactical systems</i>	\$190m	\$500m - \$700m	\$690m - \$890m
<i>Individual combat equipment</i>	\$240m	\$2.0bn - \$3.0bn	\$2.2bn - \$3.2bn
<i>Counter explosive hazards</i>	\$180m	\$700m - \$1.0bn	\$880m - \$1.2bn
<i>Reserves recapitalisation</i>	nil	\$200m - \$300m	\$200m - \$300m
Battlefield aviation			
<i>UH-60M Black Hawk</i>	\$3.0bn	\$1.0bn - \$1.5bn	\$4.0bn - \$4.5bn
<i>AH-64E Apache</i>	\$4.3bn	\$100m - \$150m	\$4.4bn - \$4.5bn
<i>CH-47F Chinook</i>	\$170m	\$400m - \$500m	\$570m - \$670m
Special operations capability	\$620m	\$1.0bn - \$1.5bn	\$1.6bn - \$2.1bn
Total	\$20bn	\$16bn - \$23bn	\$36bn - \$44bn

Note: Planned investment in facilities for the amphibious capable combined-arms land system is captured in northern bases and enterprise infrastructure.

8



Chapter 8:

Expeditionary Air Operations

- 8.1 Modernisation of air power capabilities across the region has resulted in a need for more survivable and potent air domain capabilities that can operate at longer ranges. The Integrated Investment Program includes investment of \$28-\$33 billion in capabilities that will enable Air Force to undertake expeditionary air operations to project force into our primary area of military interest. These capabilities will provide aerial surveillance of our maritime approaches, hold at risk, at extended ranges, potential adversary forces that could target our interests during a conflict and deter attempts to project power against Australia.

Air mobility

- 8.2 The Government will invest an estimated \$11 billion to ensure Air Force has an air mobility capability equipped to enable and sustain rapid deployments of Australian personnel and equipment into our region, including to harsh and hazardous environments impacted by conflict or humanitarian disasters. This will include existing and new capabilities, alongside approved upgrade programs to:
- ▶ replace Defence's current fleet of 12 Hercules aircraft with a new and expanded fleet of 20 C-130J Hercules medium air mobility aircraft, of which the first aircraft is expected to be introduced into service in 2027-28;
 - ▶ ensure the C-17A Globemaster III and KC-30A multi-role tanker transport aircraft can continue to support the rapid deployment of personnel and equipment through the 2030s, under the air mobility capability assurance program;
 - ▶ increase the capacity of Air Force's pilot, aircrew and mission controller training to a level that supports the increased need for qualified air-warfare personnel; and

- ▶ enhance Defence's network of northern air bases to provide a more resilient and sustainable platform for force projection. This will allow Defence to maintain a higher tempo of activities and continue operations despite disruption.

Air intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

8.3 The ADF operates specialised capabilities to undertake surveillance of Australia's vast maritime environment and detect, deter and respond to potential adversary capabilities, including submarines. Investment of an estimated \$4 billion will enhance the ADF's air intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and maritime patrol and response capabilities, through:

- ▶ sustainment and upgrades to Australia's fleet of 14 P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft to enhance anti-submarine warfare, maritime strike and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Upgrades to the P-8A fleet will ensure continued interoperability with the United States and other key partners and strengthen Defence's ability to secure and protect Australia's maritime interests;
- ▶ the acquisition of a fourth MQ-4C Triton remotely piloted aircraft system. The first MQ-4C is due to be delivered to Australia in 2024. With its extended range and endurance, the MQ-4C fleet provides the ADF with the ability to undertake maritime surveillance at greatly extended ranges; and
- ▶ the delivery of a fleet of MC-55A Peregrine aircraft to provide an airborne intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and electronic warfare capability. The capability will be a critical enabler for advanced ADF capabilities and will provide important intelligence information to support ADF missions.

Air combat capability

8.4 Investment of \$10-\$12 billion will upgrade Australia's fleet of combat aircraft to mitigate advanced threats and maintain interoperability with partners and allies across the region. Investments in priority capability enhancements to these aircraft will increase their lethality and survivability against air, land and maritime threats at extended ranges, operating alongside electronic warfare systems. Key air combat capabilities include the:

- ▶ F-35A Joint Strike Fighter, which will continue to be Australia's most capable and survivable aircraft for conducting air-to-air combat missions against advanced threat aircraft and air-surface missions against well-shielded targets. Continued investment in the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter fleet will provide incremental improvements to the aircraft's capabilities, including through the integration of long-range strike munitions such as the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile and potentially the Joint Strike Missile;

- ▶ F/A-18F Super Hornet, which has a range of advanced capabilities that complement the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter, including a large and diverse weapons capacity. Together, these two air combat aircraft will provide the integrated, focused force with multiple credible and valuable strike and missile defence options; and
- ▶ EA-18G Growler aircraft, which will continue to support ADF ground, sea and air operations through its capability to detect, analyse, identify, disrupt, deter and destroy radar and communications systems.

8.5 The F/A-18F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler will be provided with lethality and survivability upgrades, while maintaining their interoperability with the United States and other key partners. Defence is looking to extend the operational life of both these capabilities to 2040.

Uncrewed air systems

8.6 The Government will invest \$4.3-\$5.3 billion in the development and acquisition of uncrewed aerial systems for Air Force to augment its crewed capabilities on a range of missions. Initial areas of focus include autonomous collaborative capabilities able to perform intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and combat roles including:

- ▶ the MQ-28A Ghost Bat. The Government is continuing to invest in this collaborative combat aircraft and has approved its next stage of development, which will see the delivery of three Block 2 aircraft with enhanced design and improved capabilities. This investment will progress the development of the unique Australian technology that allows MQ-28A aircraft to work with each other and with crewed aircraft as one team to achieve their mission. It will also enable further development of the MQ-28A's mission payloads, integrated combat system and autonomous systems; and
- ▶ other developmental uncrewed aerial systems. In line with the Defence Industry Development Strategy, the Government is exploring opportunities to further enhance the integration of uncrewed aerial systems into the ADF's force structure. Co-development of uncrewed aerial systems with Australian industry will provide Defence with a range of effective, expendable and economical capability options into the future.





Table 6:
Investments in expeditionary air operations

Capability Element	Approved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Unapproved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Total Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)
Air mobility			
<i>C-130J Hercules</i>	\$7.5bn	\$700m - \$1.0bn	\$8.2bn - \$8.5bn
<i>Air mobility</i>	\$540m	\$1.0bn - \$1.5bn	\$1.5bn - \$2.0bn
<i>Air training and support systems</i>	\$210m	\$700m - \$1.0bn	\$910m - \$1.2bn
Air intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance	\$2.9bn	\$700m - \$1.0bn	\$3.6bn - \$3.9bn
Air combat capability			
<i>F-35A Joint Strike Fighter</i>	\$2.3bn	\$2.0bn - \$3.0bn	\$4.3bn - \$5.3bn
<i>EA-18G Growler</i>	\$2.3bn	\$1.5bn - \$2.0bn	\$3.8bn - \$4.3bn
<i>Air-to-air weapons</i>	\$500m	\$1.0bn - \$1.5bn	\$1.5bn - \$2.0bn
Uncrewed air systems	\$280m	\$4.0bn - \$5.0bn	\$4.3bn - \$5.3bn
Total	\$17bn	\$12bn - \$16bn	\$28bn - \$33bn

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Chapter 9:

Missile Defence

- 9.1 Military modernisation has enabled more countries to project combat power across greater ranges within our region through advanced long-range and high-speed missile capabilities. In this context, our integrated, focused force needs capabilities that can defend against, and reduce the effectiveness of, air and missile attacks.
- 9.2 The Integrated Investment Program includes an extensive investment in integrated air and missile defence (IAMD), spread across the capability priorities outlined in the National Defence Strategy. This includes investment in advanced active IAMD defence capabilities that can defeat key air and missile threats in flight, including missile launchers and munitions. It also includes investment in sensors, command and control systems and communications capabilities and critical IAMD supporting systems. The Government is also investing in passive IAMD capabilities that can degrade the effectiveness of an air and missile attack, which are an essential part of any IAMD framework.
- 9.3 The Government is establishing the underpinning architecture for our IAMD system through the development of the joint air battle management system, which will link together sensors and active missile systems, both planned and into the future.
- 9.4 This architecture will connect the active missile defence systems that will be acquired through the Integrated Investment Program and provide the foundation for further systems to be integrated over time. The acquisition of new active missile defence systems will be considered as technology matures, including in the context of the 2026 National Defence Strategy, taking into account developments in the technology used by the United States and other key partners.

A layered approach to integrated air and missile defence

- 9.5 The Government is investing in a layered IAMD capability that can efficiently and effectively sense and respond to air and missile threats. This will include integrated sensors, command and control systems and active and passive missile defence capabilities operating across a common network. Planned investment in a layered approach to IAMD is spread across multiple elements of the integrated, focused force.
- 9.6 Key IAMD command and control and sensor capabilities include:
- ▶ the development of an advanced joint air battle management system, which will provide the underpinning architecture for the ADF to effectively track and engage air and missile targets;
 - ▶ investment in advanced sensors including upgrades to the Jindalee Operational Radar Network, continued investment in CEA Technologies' advanced radar technologies and investment in space based sensors and geospatial intelligence capabilities, to detect and locate air and missile threats; and
 - ▶ maintaining the effectiveness of the E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) fleet ahead of its scheduled replacement with a next-generation capability to maintain battlespace awareness and coordinate command and control.
- 9.7 IAMD sensor capabilities will be integrated with the Defence targeting enterprise across a common network and be interoperable with the United States and key partners.
- 9.8 Key active missile defence response capabilities include:
- ▶ the acquisition and integration of the Aegis Baseline 9 combat system onto the Hobart class destroyers and introduction of Hunter class frigates fitted with Aegis Baseline 9. The Aegis combat system will provide the ability to counter airborne threats, including ballistic missiles, through the integration of SM-2 and SM-6 missiles;
 - ▶ the acquisition of the enhanced ground-based National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System in service with NATO countries, which will have the ability to intercept fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, cruise missiles and uncrewed aerial systems;
 - ▶ F-35A Joint Strike Fighter and F/A-18F Super Hornet aircraft fleets, currently in service, with the capability to detect airborne threats and employ air-to-air missiles to intercept and destroy fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, cruise missiles and uncrewed aerial systems; and
 - ▶ the development of counter-small uncrewed aerial systems in response to the proliferation of uncrewed aerial systems and loitering munitions.



- 9.9 Key passive missile defence capabilities will include measures to enhance Australia's network of northern bases – to ensure they can continue to operate through disruption – and improve logistics preparedness and responsiveness. This will increase Defence's ability to withstand and respond to a hostile action while degrading the effectiveness of air and missile threats.
- 9.10 This layered approach to IAMD also includes strengthening Defence's reserve of munitions and providing the ability to scale up the production of munitions through the GWEO enterprise.



Table 7:
Investments in missile defence

Capability Element	Approved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Unapproved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Total Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)
Command and control and sensor capabilities			
<i>Joint air battle management system</i>	\$690m	\$5.0bn - \$7.0bn	\$5.7bn - \$7.7bn
<i>E-7A Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft</i>	\$84m	\$500m - \$700m	\$580m - \$780m
<i>AEW&C replacement</i>	nil	\$5.0bn - \$7.0bn	\$5.0bn - \$7.0bn
<i>Jindalee Operational Radar Network</i>	\$660m	\$300m - \$400m	\$960m - \$1.1bn
Active missile defence (excluding planned investment captured under other capability priorities)	\$370m	\$1.0bn - \$1.5bn	\$1.4bn - \$1.9bn
Total	\$1.8bn	\$12bn - \$17bn	\$14bn - \$18bn

Note: The Government's investment in missile defence is spread across multiple elements of the integrated, focused force with many planned investments in missile defence captured elsewhere. For instance, planned maritime missile defence investments are captured in Tables 2 and 3. Planned air-to-air combat investments are included in Table 6. Other relevant investments are included in Table 9. Planned investment in passive missile defence measures is included in Tables 8 and 11.

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Chapter 10:

Theatre Logistics

- 10.1 An enhanced theatre logistics system that can effectively facilitate the flow of people, capabilities and key supplies to bases and forward operating locations will underpin the ADF's posture, preparedness and ability to deter threats and project force. The integration of this system with civil society and civil infrastructure will also be strengthened, as a key element of national resilience and *National Defence*.
- 10.2 The Government is investing in a joint theatre logistics system that will enable the ADF to rapidly concentrate forces, sustain protracted operations during a conflict and scale up when needed, even when logistics networks and communications systems are disrupted. To develop the joint theatre logistics system, the Integrated Investment Program includes investments of \$15-\$21 billion in:
- ▶ logistics command, control, communications, computers, data and intelligence;
 - ▶ supply;
 - ▶ distribution;
 - ▶ maintenance;
 - ▶ engineering;
 - ▶ infrastructure support; and
 - ▶ health and personnel support services.

Additional logistics centres and capacity

10.3 The Government will invest \$11-\$15 billion to further develop and enhance additional logistics centres and supporting capabilities to support and sustain the integrated, focused force. This includes the establishment of additional logistics centres and capacity in central and northern Australia to enhance Defence's ability to rapidly move forces and supplies where they are needed. This investment will also ensure that stocks of critical supplies, resilient storage and warehousing facilities and distribution networks are readily available. Greater integration with Australian industry will ensure Defence can draw on additional capacity to meet demand during a crisis or conflict.

Fuel holdings, storage and distribution capacity

10.4 Fuel security is an integral component of *National Defence*. Defence is reliant on access to the right fuel in sufficient quantities, at the right time and in the right location, to effectively respond to threats to Australia's national security. Defence will continue to work with industry, the Commonwealth and state and territory governments as part of a national approach to improving the resilience of its fuel supply. This national approach will help ensure Defence retains a sovereign capability that can support the integrated, focused force on operations.

10.5 The Government is investing \$3.7-\$4.8 billion in improvements to develop and enhance fuel holdings and storage and distribution capabilities. Defence's current deployable bulk fuel distribution capability will be replaced and modernised with new vehicles and systems that will provide timely and reliable transport, storage and distribution of fuel.

Improved health capability and protective measures

10.6 The Government will invest around \$1 billion in further developing and enhancing health capabilities and protective measures to provide the ADF with the health support it needs to sustain forces engaged in operations. This includes:

- ▶ continuing the transformation of the ADF's deployable health system to provide a cutting-edge deployable military healthcare capability, including the delivery of clinical and operational medical training and shelters and other deployable infrastructure;
- ▶ developing a new health knowledge management system for garrisons, ships and deployed environments. The system will enable a longitudinal health record for serving members and the veteran community that will connect Defence with Commonwealth agencies to improve health readiness and enhance the delivery of health services;

- ▶ providing a scalable and flexible chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defence capability that will enhance the protection of ADF personnel against exposure to CBRN substances and toxic industrial materials across land, maritime and air domains; and
- ▶ continuing the acquisition of a suite of dedicated, modern and purpose-built rescue and firefighting vehicles to replace the existing fleet of aviation fire vehicles and enable emergency response to airfield incidents and bushfire suppression.



Table 8:
Investments in theatre logistics

Capability Element	Approved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Unapproved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Total Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)
Additional logistics centres and capacity	\$100m	\$10bn - \$15bn	\$10bn - \$15bn
Fuel holdings, storage and distribution capacity			
<i>Improved fuel resilience</i>	\$330m	\$3.0bn - \$4.0bn	\$3.3bn - \$4.3bn
<i>Bulk fuel distribution</i>	\$160m	\$200m - \$300m	\$360m - \$460m
Improved health capability and protective measures			
<i>Deployable health capability</i>	\$220m	\$300m - \$400m	\$520m - \$620m
<i>CBRN defence</i>	\$8m	\$400m - \$500m	\$410m - \$510m
<i>Rescue and firefighting vehicles</i>	\$67m	\$20m - \$50m	\$87m - \$120m
Total	\$890m	\$14bn - \$20bn	\$15bn - \$21bn

Note: Additional logistics centres and capacity includes capabilities such as logistics vehicles, systems, storage and warehousing, deployable basing infrastructure and enhancements to support services for deployed forces, such as provision of clean water and power generation.



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Chapter 11:

Theatre Command and Control

- 11.1 ADF commanders need to be able to quickly develop a comprehensive appreciation of key threats and opportunities on operations so they can make fast and effective decisions. The ADF also needs the ability to undermine a potential adversary's ability to exercise effective command and control in order to complicate its risk calculus. The ability to exercise effective command and control in complex and rapidly evolving operational situations is underpinned by ICT networks and systems that can rapidly collect, sift and integrate a diverse range of information from different sources.
- 11.2 The Integrated Investment Program includes investments of \$11-\$15 billion in capabilities to enable ADF decision-makers to assess complex situations, plan effectively and act quickly on operations. This includes investments in enhancing and modernising Defence's joint, sea, land and air warfighting command and control systems and intelligence capabilities. Robust intelligence capabilities are central to *National Defence* as they directly support ADF operations and provide strategic decision-making advantage.



Command and control

11.3 The Government is modernising the ADF’s command and control systems to improve their integration, resilience and responsiveness. These investments will also better synchronise command and control across all ADF domains and strengthen interoperability with the United States and other key partners. Key investments include:

- ▶ enhancement of the theatre land command and control architecture to support improved planning and decision making and provide new communications and geospatial data capabilities. This will also strengthen cyber security, resilience and interoperability;
- ▶ continued replacement of Defence’s existing air traffic management and theatre air control systems. This will enhance the ability to manage aircraft movements in an agile, efficient manner, including in complex and disrupted operating environments; and
- ▶ the acquisition of a secure suite of ICT systems, applications and supporting infrastructure for Navy to support critical national command and control and interoperability and continued rollout of communications links for sharing data across deployed maritime units.



Table 9:
Investments in theatre command and control

Capability Element	Approved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Unapproved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Total Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)
Warfighting networks and strategic communications	\$560m	\$2.0bn - \$3.0bn	\$2.6bn - \$3.6bn
Decision advantage and intelligence	\$270m	\$1.0bn - \$1.5bn	\$1.3bn - \$1.8bn
Land command systems	\$150m	\$5.0bn - \$7.0bn	\$5.2bn - \$7.2bn
Air command systems	\$5m	\$500m - \$700m	\$510m - \$710m
Air traffic management and control capability	\$370m	\$400m - \$500m	\$770m - \$870m
Maritime command systems	\$610m	\$200m - \$300m	\$810m - \$910m
Total	\$2bn	\$9.1bn - \$13bn	\$11bn - \$15bn



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Chapter 12:

Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance

- 12.1 The conflict in Ukraine has highlighted how vital the supply of munitions is to modern armed forces, how quickly stockpiles can be depleted in conflict and the fragility of supply chains for global weapons. The Government is pursuing a comprehensive approach to building Defence's GWEO stocks, strengthening supply chains and supporting the establishment of a domestic manufacturing capability, in line with *National Defence*.
- 12.2 Australia's self-reliance will be enhanced through an ability to produce, maintain, repair and overhaul select weapons. As outlined in the Defence Industry Development Strategy, the domestic manufacture of guided weapons, explosive ordnance and munitions is one of Defence's seven Sovereign Defence Industrial Priorities. A resilient and secure GWEO supply chain will enhance the ADF's ability to sustain its strike capabilities in conflict.
- 12.3 The Government's investments in GWEO will complement the targeting and long-range strike investments also included in the Integrated Investment Program. They will deliver a domestic manufacturing capability that supports national resilience and ensures Australia has the GWEO stocks it would need in a time of conflict.
- 12.4 The Government will invest \$16-\$21 billion in Australia's GWEO enterprise over the next decade. This investment prioritises the development of a sovereign ability to produce, maintain, repair and overhaul selected weapons. It also includes the acquisition of a sufficient stock of weapons and munitions to help ensure sustained operations in a time of conflict and the expansion of storage and distribution facilities to accommodate Defence's growing GWEO inventory.

- 12.5 Australia’s contribution to the international munitions industrial base it shares with the United States and other key partners is being strengthened. The GWEO enterprise will establish Australian access to the technical data, processes and training needed to develop our own guided weapons manufacturing capability and integrate Australian businesses into global guided weapons supply chains.
- 12.6 The initial focus for Australia’s domestic GWEO manufacturing capability will be the domestic assembly of imported components and materials. The number of munitions components made in Australia will increase over time. The manufacturing of an initial batch of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System munitions in Australia in 2025 will represent an important first step toward establishing domestic missile manufacturing on a large scale.
- 12.7 Over time, as domestic capability and capacity grows, the focus will shift to the manufacture of higher complexity weapons and components. In the immediate term, the Government will also seek opportunities for Australian engagement in development programs for weapons such as future increments of the Precision Strike Missile. This will ensure Australian industry is prepared to take advantage of future co-production and co-sustainment opportunities.
- 12.8 Defence is working with industry to develop detailed costed plans for the domestic manufacture of GWEO. The Government will release the GWEO Enterprise Plan later in 2024.
- 12.9 Undertaking essential sustainment activities for critical guided weapons domestically will also improve Australia’s security and resilience. Using the Mark 48 torpedo as an exemplar, the Government will work with the United States and other key partners to explore opportunities for weapons system co-sustainment activities.



Table 10:
Investments in GWEO

Capability Element	Approved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Unapproved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Total Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)
GWEO enterprise	\$820m	\$15bn - \$20bn	\$16bn - \$21bn
Total	\$820m	\$15bn - \$20bn	\$16bn - \$21bn



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Chapter 13:

Northern Bases

13.1 The Integrated Investment Program includes investments of \$14-\$18 billion to ensure Defence has a logistically connected and resilient set of bases, ports and barracks across Australia's north. This is pivotal to enhance force projection and improve Defence's resilience and ability to sustain operations through a crisis or conflict.

Enhanced basing capacity for force projection

13.2 Ongoing investment in a range of projects and activities across northern Australia will enhance the ADF's ability to project force. These investments include:

- ▶ the development of Cocos (Keeling) Islands airfield infrastructure to enable improved support to maritime surveillance operations by P-8A Poseidon aircraft;
- ▶ the development of the Defence estate across Darwin and Townsville to address force posture requirements and enhance the integrated, focused force's ability to undertake operations from northern Australia;
- ▶ upgrades to the RAAF Base Learmonth airfield to enable KC-30A multi-role tanker transport aircraft operations, including additional runway capacity, in-ground refuelling and climate resilience measures;
- ▶ the redevelopment of the Larrakeyah Defence Precinct in Darwin, including facilities upgrades and new berthing capabilities to accommodate major surface combatants and submarines at HMAS *Coonawarra*;
- ▶ upgraded range facilities and associated infrastructure at Robertson Barracks Close Training Area and at the Kangaroo Flats, Mount Bundeby and Bradshaw Field Training Areas;

- ▶ the delivery of airfield improvements at RAAF Base Tindal to enable enhanced air refuelling operations by KC-30A multi-role tanker transport aircraft;
- ▶ infrastructure enhancements to Defence sites in Far North Queensland; and
- ▶ new facilities in northern Australia and South East Queensland to house and support Army's littoral manoeuvre capabilities and enable logistics vessels to be loaded and unloaded.

Enhanced basing resilience

13.3 The Government is also investing in projects to enhance resilience across northern Australia and strengthen Defence's ability to sustain operations, with a particular focus on air base remediation activities. This will include:

- ▶ major maintenance to airfield pavements, lighting and drainage at RAAF Base Darwin and Mount Bunday Airfield;
- ▶ the redevelopment of RAAF Base Townsville including facilities enhancements, capacity improvements and upgrades to engineering services;
- ▶ airfield works at RAAF Bases Curtin and Learmonth; and
- ▶ sustainment, maintenance and enhancements to airfield pavements and supporting infrastructure at prioritised airfield sites.



Table 11:
Investments in northern bases

Capability Element	Approved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Unapproved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Total Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)
Enhanced basing capacity for force projection and enhanced basing resilience			
<i>Northern operational base infrastructure</i>	\$430m	\$7.0bn - \$10bn	\$7.4bn - \$10bn
<i>Northern air base infrastructure</i>	\$2.6bn	\$3.0bn - \$4.0bn	\$5.6bn - \$6.6bn
<i>Northern logistics network</i>	nil	\$400m - \$500m	\$400m - \$500m
<i>Northern training area enhancements</i>	\$330m	\$20m - \$50m	\$350m - \$380m
Total	\$3.4bn	\$10bn - \$15bn	\$14bn - \$18bn

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Chapter 14:

Enabling Capabilities

Enterprise infrastructure

- 14.1 The Defence Strategic Review found there was a need for a network of well-established bases and facilities in the south-east of Australia to provide a level of depth to ADF basing and the national support base. The Integrated Investment Program includes investments of \$17-\$22 billion in infrastructure across key defence facilities. This includes significant upgrades to training institutions in southern Australia that will help support workforce growth, meet training needs and provide living-in accommodation. These investments also include funding for national programs to maintain and upgrade Defence's airfields and maritime infrastructure.
- 14.2 Enterprise infrastructure investments strengthen Defence's ability to withstand disruption in crisis or conflict, adopt climate adaption strategies and improve energy resilience. Defence will accelerate its transition to clean energy, as directed by the Government's response to the Defence Strategic Review, with a plan to be presented to the Government by 2025. Defence is also developing a net-zero strategy to guide action in response to climate change.
- 14.3 The Defence Estate Audit report, commissioned as part of the Government's response to the recommendations of the Defence Strategic Review, makes key recommendations for re-orienting the Defence estate to meet current and future security challenges. The Government will finalise specific responses to the audit later in 2024. Defence estate holdings will be reviewed as part of the biennial National Defence Strategy cycle to ensure continued alignment with Defence priorities.

Training and workforce growth infrastructure

- 14.4 Defence and Defence Housing Australia are working together to meet future demand for ADF housing with a particular focus on locations that support the priorities of the National Defence Strategy.
- 14.5 As the size of the Defence workforce grows, Defence will need investments across the entire estate. The Integrated Investment Program includes investments to meet Defence's future training facilities and office accommodation needs. Key ADF training establishments in Australia's south will receive upgrades to base infrastructure to support planned workforce growth.
- 14.6 For example, the Riverina Redevelopment Program will deliver three discrete projects to provide base infrastructure upgrades and meet training and accommodation needs at each site. These are:
- ▶ Blamey Barracks Kapooka Redevelopment for Army recruit training;
 - ▶ RAAF Base Wagga Redevelopment for Air Force recruit and initial employment training; and
 - ▶ Albury Wodonga Military Area Redevelopment for Defence logistics initial employment training and career continuation training.
- 14.7 The Australian Defence Force Academy living-in accommodation project will support the recruitment, retention and wellbeing of trainee officers through the provision of essential living-in accommodation at Defence's largest and only tri-service military training academy. It will replace and expand existing facilities to provide contemporary, safe and suitable accommodation with room for future workforce growth.
- 14.8 The *Young Endeavour* will be replaced with a new ship that will be operated by Navy and used to provide youth development and sail training through the Young Endeavour Youth Scheme.

Base infrastructure

- 14.9 Continued investment in Defence's bases, which provide a home for Navy, Army and Air Force units, will ensure the ADF can generate operational capability. Planned investment includes enhancements to HMAS *Stirling*, Gallipoli Barracks, Holsworthy Barracks and HMAS *Harman*. Continued investment in air bases will also ensure the Air Force can train with and maintain its complex fleet of aircraft. This will include significant investment in the Edinburgh Defence Precinct and RAAF Bases Amberley, Pearce and Richmond.

Science and technology infrastructure

14.10 Defence’s science and technology infrastructure will be enhanced through investment in critical digital, technical and estate capabilities needed to support *National Defence* priorities. This will include the delivery and refresh of high-performance computing capabilities, specialised experimental facilities and digital infrastructure systems to capture, analyse and share research.

National capital works

14.11 National capital works include upgrades to sites supporting command, control and communications functions and investment in initiatives to address environmental management and energy security.



Table 12:
Investments in enterprise infrastructure

Capability Element	Approved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Unapproved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Total Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)
Training and workforce growth infrastructure			
<i>Training infrastructure</i>	\$2.5bn	\$700m - \$1.0bn	\$3.2bn - \$3.5bn
<i>Workforce growth infrastructure</i>	\$37m	\$4.0bn - \$5.0bn	\$4.0bn - \$5.0bn
<i>Base infrastructure</i>	\$860m	\$5.0bn - \$7.0bn	\$5.9bn - \$7.9bn
<i>Science and technology infrastructure</i>	\$160m	\$1.5bn - \$2.0bn	\$1.7bn - \$2.2bn
<i>National capital works</i>	\$340m	\$2.0bn - \$3.0bn	\$2.3bn - \$3.3bn
Total	\$3.9bn	\$13bn - \$18bn	\$17bn - \$22bn

Enterprise data and information and communications technology

- 14.12 The ability to acquire, move and use data is a foundational enabler for the ADF's warfighting capability. High quality, secure data is critical to decision advantage, preparedness, operations, enterprise services and advanced targeting capabilities. The Government's investments in enterprise data and ICT will strengthen security and resilience and improve the ability to share data efficiently and at scale. The integration of automated processes, such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, will enable a greater volume of data to be processed, exploited and disseminated faster.
- 14.13 The Government is investing in projects that will strengthen Defence's ability to manage its data as a strategic asset by:
- ▶ uplifting the network of ICT capabilities across Defence, and the people and systems that support it;
 - ▶ enhancing interoperability and connectivity with allies and partners to support communications, situational awareness and targeting;
 - ▶ ensuring military capabilities are more interconnected; and
 - ▶ ensuring the integrated, focused force is supported by secure networks.
- 14.14 Through the Integrated Investment Program, the Government will invest \$8.5-\$11 billion in data and ICT at the enterprise level through the:
- ▶ delivery of modern, secure and survivable networks and applications capable of fulfilling current and future corporate, intelligence and warfighting needs. This includes an uplift of Defence's single information environment to strengthen network security and agility and deliver next-generation Defence networks;
 - ▶ delivery of the OneDefence Data Program, which will improve the storage, management, acquisition and discovery of data. This will also provide advanced data analytics and strategic decision support to enhance business functions and warfighting capabilities; and
 - ▶ establishment of a consolidated enterprise resource planning and management system across Defence. This will simplify and integrate core business functions and standardise information processes including logistics, maintenance, human resources and finance to improve the efficiency, agility and speed of Defence's business operations.



Table 13:
Investments in enterprise data and ICT

Capability Element	Approved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Unapproved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Total Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)
Enterprise networks	\$790m	\$5.0bn - \$7.0bn	\$5.8bn - \$7.8bn
Enterprise systems	\$660m	\$2.0bn - \$3.0bn	\$2.7bn - \$3.7bn
Total	\$1.5bn	\$7.0bn - \$10bn	\$8.5bn - \$11bn

Appendix A



Appendix A:

Budget Summary

Table 14:
Integrated Investment Program planned investment summary

Capability Element	Approved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Unapproved Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)	Total Planned Investment (2024-25 to 2033-34)
ASCA	\$3.1bn	\$500m - \$700m	\$3.6bn - \$3.8bn
Undersea warfare	\$14bn	\$48bn - \$61bn	\$63bn - \$76bn
Maritime capabilities for sea denial and localised sea control operations	\$10bn	\$40bn - \$58bn	\$51bn - \$69bn
Targeting and long-range strike	\$9.5bn	\$18bn - \$26bn	\$28bn - \$35bn
Space and cyber	\$4.5bn	\$22bn - \$31bn	\$27bn - \$36bn
Amphibious capable combined-arms land system	\$20bn	\$16bn - \$23bn	\$36bn - \$44bn
Expeditionary air operations	\$17bn	\$12bn - \$16bn	\$28bn - \$33bn
Missile defence	\$1.8bn	\$12bn - \$17bn	\$14bn - \$18bn
Theatre logistics	\$890m	\$14bn - \$20bn	\$15bn - \$21bn
Theatre command and control	\$2.0bn	\$9.1bn - \$13bn	\$11bn - \$15bn
GWEO	\$820m	\$15bn - \$20bn	\$16bn - \$21bn
Northern bases	\$3.4bn	\$10bn - \$15bn	\$14bn - \$18bn
Enterprise infrastructure	\$3.9bn	\$13bn - \$18bn	\$17bn - \$22bn
Enterprise data and ICT	\$1.5bn	\$7.0bn - \$10bn	\$8.5bn - \$11bn
Grand Total	\$92bn	\$240bn - \$330bn	\$330bn - \$420bn

Notes on the Integrated Investment Program and the presentation of financial information

- [1] **Purpose of the public Integrated Investment Program.** The public Integrated Investment Program has been developed in order to:
- ▶ provide the Australian public with transparency of the Government’s plans to develop defence capabilities over the coming decade, in line with the National Defence Strategy; and
 - ▶ provide defence industry with information on Defence’s capability goals and requirements to support industry planning.
- [2] **Development of the Integrated Investment Program.** The public Integrated Investment Program provides information to support the goals outlined above while protecting national security and taking account of commercial sensitivities. To facilitate this approach, a reporting structure was established to enable aggregation of all planned defence capability investments within thematic categories and subcategories that are aligned with the capability priorities identified in the National Defence Strategy. The thematic groupings presented in the public Integrated Investment Program correlate with a full list of Defence’s capability projects, that is held at a classified level, to provide transparency and ensure accuracy. The methodology adopted also involved a consistent approach to the presentation of financial confidence intervals or ‘range bands’ to present funding provisions for projects that have not been approved by the Government. The methodology used established a coherent reporting framework to enable the release of an appropriate level of detail on Defence’s capability plans and associated financial information. The public Integrated Investment Program will be updated biennially in line with the National Defence Strategy.
- [3] **Planned capability investment tables and charts.** The tables included in the public Integrated Investment Program encapsulate planned investment over the period from 2024-25 to 2033-34. The figures:
- ▶ are in 2023-24 Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook out-turned price and exchange basis;
 - ▶ describe the planned investment (not precise cost estimates) for approved and unapproved acquisition funding and associated unapproved sustainment funding for defence capabilities;
 - ▶ do not include expenditure prior to 2024-25 on existing projects, nor long-term expenditure beyond 2033-34;
 - ▶ are based on investment plans for individual projects, including a reasonable level of over-programming at the total program level to assist with budget management by helping to mitigate the impact of unforeseen project delays;
 - ▶ do not include project contingency;
 - ▶ below \$100 million have been rounded to the closest \$1 million;
 - ▶ between \$100 million and \$1 billion have been rounded to the closest \$10 million;
 - ▶ between \$1 billion and \$10 billion have been rounded to the closest \$0.1 billion;
 - ▶ between \$10 billion and \$100 billion have been rounded to the closest \$1 billion;
 - ▶ above \$100 billion have been rounded to the closest \$10 billion;
 - ▶ listed as totals may not precisely add to the figures in the column above; and
 - ▶ are based on a point-in-time and will be regularly adjusted in line with Defence’s capability development, acquisition and approval processes.
- [4] **Approved planned investment.** Figures for approved planned investment include previous

investment decisions where budget and scope authority for future expenditure has been decided. These approximate figures reflect the unexpended portion of approved funding from 2024-25. They include approved acquisition funding only and not sustainment funding. Approved planned investment includes some infrastructure projects that have not yet received Parliamentary Works Committee approval. Approved planned investment also includes particular approved funds that have been transferred from Defence to the Australian Signals Directorate.

- [5] **Unapproved planned investment.** Figures for unapproved planned investment include planned investment that has not received final approval. These figures include both unapproved acquisition funding and unapproved sustainment funding. Figures have been presented within range bands taking into account that funding approvals have not yet been provided and the need to preserve commercial sensitivities.
- [6] **Total planned investment.** Total planned investment is the sum of approved planned investment plus unapproved planned investment. This entails approved and unapproved acquisition funding as well as unapproved sustainment funding. Approved sustainment funding has not been included. Defence's published annual reports and portfolio budget statements provide information on Defence's Top 30 sustainment products, incorporating approved sustainment funding.
- [7] **Allocated funding.** The Government has allocated funding of \$330 billion to Defence capability investment over the decade to 2033-34 through the 2024-25 budget process. This amount of funding available for capability investment does not include over-programming.







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